1. The petitioner is the tenant of a premises situated in Robertsonpet, KGF under the respondent. The respondent filed HRC. 31 of 1970 on the file of the Munsiff, KGF under Sec. 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Karnataka Act’) for eviction of the petitioner and his sister, Rajammal, who was also impleaded as Respt-2 to the said petition. The respondent contended that she was entitled to recover possession of the premises on several grounds, but in the course of the hearing of the petition, he confined his case only to the ground mentioned under Sec. 21(1)(f) of the Karnataka Act. His case was that the petitioner had unlawfully sublet the premises in favour of Rajammal and thereby had become liable to be evicted from the premises. The Petr contested the case. The petitioner pleaded that the respondent was not entitled to recover possession of the premises as the tenancy which was a monthly one had not been duly terminated by the issue of notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the case of the respondent that the petitioner had sub-let the premises was not true. The learned Munsiff allowed the petition and directed the petitioner and Rajammal to deliver possession of the premises to the petitioner within two months from the date of his order. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Munsiff, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge, Kolar, in HRC Appeal no/28 of 1973. Rajammal was not impleaded as a party in that appeal. That appeal was dismissed. The petitioner was, however, granted a month's time to vacate the premises. This revision petition is filed against the order of the learned District Judge.

2. This petition has come before us on a reference made under the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, by Venkatachaliah, J. It is not disputed in this case that no valid notice issued under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the petitioner before the petition for eviction was filed before the learned Munsiff. The first submission made by Sri R. Nagaraj, learned Counsel for the petitioner, was that the Courts below were in error in allowing the petition for eviction even though no notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served on the petitioner. In support of the above contention, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Dattopant Gopalrao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthi Rao(1) in which it had been held that without termination of the contractual tenancy by a valid notice or other mode set out in Sec. 111 T.P Act it was not open to the landlord to treat a tenant of the permises as a statutory tenant and seek his eviction.

3. It was argued by Sri R.N Byra Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondent, that the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the above case stood superseded by a later decision of the Supreme Court rendered by a larger Bench in Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana(2) which was a case arising under the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Andhra Pradesh Act’). In the latter case, the Supreme Court hag observed as follows:

“The only question riased by the appellant before us, in this appeal by special leave, is that no notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served upon the appellant according to the finding of the Andhra Pradesh High Court itself. It was, therefore, urged that the petition under S. 10 of the Act could not succeed. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had, however, relied upon Ulligappa v. Mohan Rao (1969 (2) Andh. LT 268), where a Division Bench of that High Court had held that the Act, with which we are now concerned, provided a procedure for eviction of tenants which was self-contained so that no recourse to the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary.

We may also refer here to the observations of this Court in Raval and Co. v. K.C Ramachandran ((1974) 2 SCR 629 at p. 634 : (1974) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1974 SC 818 at p. 821). There this Court noticed Hem Chand v. Sham Devi (ILR (1955) Pun. 36) and pointed out “that it was held there that the Act under consideration in that case provided the whole procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment, and, that being so, provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had no relevance.” No doubt the decision mentioned with approval by this Court related to another enactment. But the principle indicated by this Court was the same as that applied by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

It is true that, in Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi (AIR 1965 SC 101), this Court has held that the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Contol Act of 1965 do not dispense with the requirement to comply with the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In that case, however, Sec. 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Act merely operated as a bar to an ordinary civil suit so that service of a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act became relevant in considering whether an ordinary civil suit filed on a ground which constitued an exception to the bar contained in Sec. 4 had to be preceded by a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the context of the remedy of ejectment by an ordinary civil suit, it was held that the usual notice of termination of tenancy under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary to terminate a tenancy as a condition precedent to the maintainability of such a suit

In the case before us, the respondent landlord relied upon a provision for special summary proceedings for eviction of tenants under an Act which contains all the requirements for those proceedings. We, therefore, think that the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had correctly applied the principle laid down by a Division Bench decision of that Court. He rightly distinguished such a case from Mangilal's case (AIR 1969 SC 101) (supra) where an entirely different kind of provision of another Act in another State was being considered by this Court. The Division Bench decision of the High Court applied by the learned Judge had, we think, enunciated the correct principle.”

4. The submission made in reply on behalf of the respondent by Sri R. Nagaraj, learned Counsel for the petitioner, was that the decision rendered in Dattapant's case which was a case under the Karnataka Act would continue to operate as good law notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateshwara Rao's case arising under the Andhra Pradesh Act as there was no specific reference to Dattopant's case in the later decision.

5. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to state that Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not embody any rule of equity, justice and good conscience, but it is only a technical rule introduced in the Transfer of Property Act by the Legislature. In Namadeo Loiman Lodhi v. Narmada Bai(3) the Supreme Court, while dealing with a contention based on Sec. 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act observed:

“In the first instance it may be observed that it is erroneous to suppose that every provision in the Transfer of Property Act and every amendment effected is necessarily based on principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It has to be seen in every case whether the particular provision of the Act relied upon restates a known rule of equity or whether it is merely a new rule laid down by the legislature without reference to any rule of equity and what is the true nature and character of the rule. Now, so far as Sec. 111(g) of the Act is concerned, the insistence therein that the notice should be given in writing is intrinsic evidence of the fact that the formality is merely statutory and it cannot trace its origin to any cure of equity. Equity does not concern itself with mere forms or mode of procedure. If the purpose of the rule as to notice is, to indicate the intention of the lessor to determine the lease and to avail himself of the tenant's breach of covenant it could as effectively be achieved by an oral intimation as by a written one without in any way disturbing the mind of a Chancery Judge. The requirement as to written notice provided, in the section, therefore, cannot be said to be based on any general rule of equity.”

6. In the course of the above decision, the Supreme Court also referred to the view prevailing in India prior to the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act, namely, that the institution of a suit for ejectment was itself sufficient for determination of the lease and no other previous act determining the same such as a notice to quit was necessary to maintain the action. In view of the foregoing, this case has to be dealt with on the basis of the statutory provisions without any reference to any rule of equity, justice and good conscience.

7. Art. 141 of the Constitution states that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. It is the duty of the Court in this case to find out whether the decision in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case over-rules by necessary implication, the view expressed in Dattopant's case. The reason given by the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case to hold that a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not a condition precedent for filing a petition for eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Act is that when the petition is filed under an Act which contains the whole procedure for the eviction of a tenant, it would be unnecessary to look beyond the Act to find out whether the landlord has a right to receiver possession of the premises in question or not. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Andhra Pradesh Act was a self contained Code having regard to its various provisions and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Uhgappa v. Mohan Rao(4). We have been taken through the Karnataka Act and also the Andhra Pradesh Act. The salient features of the Andhra Pradesh Act are: The Act is passed for regulating the leasing of building, controlling of the rents thereof and for preventing unreasonable eviction of tenants in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Sec. 3 of that Act requires every landlord to intimate in writing to the officer authorised in that behalf within ten days after the building becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, or by the termination of a tenancy or by the eviction of the tenant or by release from requisition or otherwise. The authorised officer is empowered under the Act to permit the landlord to occupy the premises himself or to direct him to lease it out in favour of somebody else. The controller functioning under that Act is empowered under Sec. 4 to fix fair rent in respect of such buildings. Ss. 5 and 6 provide for the machinery for determining whether any increase in fair rent should be allowed or not. Sec. 7 prohibits the landlord from claiming or receiving anything in excess of fair rent or agreed rent. Sec. 8 requires the landlord to issue the receipt acknowledging the payment of rents. Under Sec. 9, the tenant is entitled to deposit the rent before the prescribed authority where the address of the landlord or his authorised agent is not known to the tenant. Sec. 10 provides that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section or Secs. 12 and 13. Sec. 14 prohibits the landlord from interfering with any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. The Act provides a separate machinery for filing a petition for eviction and an appeal against the order of eviction passed by the authority so authorised to do. The Act also confers the power of revision on the High Court authorising it to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority and to pass such order as it thinks fit. These and other features of the Andhra Pradesh Act were taken into consideration by the Andhra Pradeh High Court in Uligappa's case to come to the conclusion that the Andhra Pradesh Act was a complete Code governing the relationship between the landlord and tenant and that it would be erroneous to go out-side the said Act in order to find out whether the landlord had acquired a right to recover possession of the premises or not. This view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has been approved without any qualification by the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case. In Dattopant's case, an examination of the Karnataka Act on the above lines was not made by the Supreme Court. The learned Judges who decided that case, proceeded on the basis that compliance with the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was also necessary before seeking possession of a premises under Sec. 21 of the Act. We are of the opinion, that in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case, which is decided by a larger Bench, there is a departure from the view expressed in Dattopant's case and we are bound by the enunciation made in it. The principle enunciated by their Lordships in that case is that when eviction of a tenant is being sought under a statute which is a self-contained one there was no necessity to have recourse to Sec. 106 of the T.P Act. This principle governs eviction proceedings under every law in India which is a self-contained Code like the Andhra Pradesh Act.

8. In view of the above enunciation, we have to examine whether the Karnataka Act also can be considered as a self-contained Code like the Andhra Pradesh Act or not.

9. The broad features of the Karnataka Act are: It is an Act passed with a view to provide for the control of rents and eviction, for the leasing of buildings, to control rates of hotels and lodging houses and for certain other matters in the State of Karnataka. Sec. 4 requires every landlord within fifteen days after the building becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the termination of a tenancy or by the eviction of the tenant or by the release of the building from requisition, or otherwise, to give intimation in the prescribed form by registered post to the Controller. The Controller is authorised under the Act, either to permit the landlord to occupy the premises himself or to direct him to lease it out in favour of some other persons. Sec. 10A authorises the Controller to evict a person who has been inducted into a building without following the procedure prescribed under Sec. 4 of the Act. Sec. 11 prohibits the owner of a residential building from converting a residential building into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. Under Sec. 14 the Controller can fix a fair rent in respect of the premises to which the Act applies at the instance of either the landlord or the tenant. Sec. 16 provides the machinery for claiming increase of or reduction in fair rent. Sec. 19 entitles the tenant to deposit rent in Court in certain circumstances. Section 21 provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant and it further provides that the Court (not the Civil Court which ordinarily has jurisdiction to try a suit for ejectment) may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the grounds set out in clauses (a) to (p) in the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 of the Karnataka Act. Compliance with any other law, including the Transfer of Property Act or with any of the terms of a contract is of no avail while seeking eviction. Sec. 23 prohibits a tenant-from sub-letting or transferring the premises in favour of a third party. Secs. 24, 25 and 26 lay down conditions governing the orders of eviction passed in certain specified cases. The Act also creates a special forum for filing petitions for eviction. They have to be filed before the Court as defined in the Act and not before the ordinary Civil Court before which a suit for eviction of tenant would lie under ordinary law. Against the order passed under Sec. 21, there is no appeal, but only a revision. Throughout the State except in Bangalore City, the District Judges have the revisional jurisdiction. In Bangalore City the Court before which a petition, for eviction can be filed is the Court of the Civil Judge and the revisional authority is the High Court. The Court-fee payable on the petition for eviction is the fixed Court-fee and not the usual Court-fee payable in a suit for ejectment. Even the procedure that has to be followed in the case of petitions filed under Sec. 21 of the Karnataka Act is slightly different from the procedure followed in a suit. It is significant that Cl. (a) to the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 21 provides for a special notice to be given to a tenant who has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him and that notice is different from the notice contemplated under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

10. From the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the Karnataka Act is a self-contained enactment governing the creation of a lease in respect of a building to which that Act applies, the rate of rent to be paid in respect of it and the circumstances under which alone the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of a tenant from it. We are of the view that the provisions of the Karnataka Act are substantially similar to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act.

11. In these circumstances, we feel bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case which is a decision of a larger Bench, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhelal(5) which lays down that the opinion of the larger Bench prevails over the opinion of the smaller one. The petitioner cannot, therefore, rely upon the decision in Dattopant's case which can be held as having been impliedly over-ruled by the decision in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case to the extent of the applicability of Sec. 106 of the T.P Act is concerned. Consequently the decisions of this Court in Mallikarjun Virappa v. Govind Waman(6) and in Rangaiah Shetty K.S v. Vasudev Murthy(7) which take a contrary view are over-ruled in so far as they relate to the requirement of issue of notice under Sec. 106 of the T.P Act. The absence of notice under Sec. 105 of the T.P Act cannot, therefore, be considered to be fatal to the respondent's case. Now on the question relating to the sub-letting of the building by the petitioner in favour of Rajamma, it has to be held that the decisions of the Courts below do not call for any interference. It is admitted by the petitioner that his sister Rajammal was carrying on business in the premises in question. It is, however, his case that she was doing so for and on his behalf and he continued to be the owner of the shop. He has not placed before Court any satisfactory evidence to hold that he continued to be its owner. He has not produced the licence issued by the Municipal Council in his favour. It is in the evidence of the witnesses for the respondent that Rajammal was residing separately from the petitioner and that she was living with her sons two of whom were married. The petitioner is a whole-time employee of the Bharath Gold Mine Undertaking. He does not know the value of the stock in trade in the shop. In the circumstances, the Courts below were right in holding that the petitioner had not established that he was the owner of the shop and Rajammal was carrying on business on his behalf in the said shop. The finding recorded by the Courts below that the premises was sub-let by the petitioner unlawfully cannot be interfered with.

12. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. The petitioner is, however, granted three months' time to vacate the premises.