Govindan Nair, J.:— The short question raised in this appeal is whether the order Ext. P1 passed by the 1st respondent, the State of Kerala, suspending the appellant “with immediate effect till the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him are completed,” is liable to be set aside by this court in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Subramonian Poti, J. who heard the Original Petition, in which Ext. P1 order was challenged, considered the three grounds urged by the appellant, viz.,

(i) that the order was passed malafide;

(ii) that the order was against the terms of Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 (for short the Rules); and

(iii) that there were no grounds which would justify the inference that it was necessary for the state government to place the appellant under suspension;

2. and negatived all the three contentions and dismissed the petition. This appeal is from that judgment.

3. Counsel for the appellant, though he touched on the aspect of malafides, and lack of materials from which a reasonable inference is possible that it was either necessary or desirable that the appellant should be kept under suspension, gave up those contentions on the ground that the determination of these questions, though only for the purpose of deciding whether the suspension order should stand or not will necessarily involve the consideration of atleast certain aspects which are likely to arise for consideration before the Commission appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, before whom the matter is now pending; and he, therefore, submitted that he will be satisfied by a direction that the Commission will be untrammeled by the observations made by the learned Single Judge on these two aspects of malafides and the existence or otherwise of materials to draw the inference that suspension was necessary or deserving. We think, this will be the proper course to adopt. It would be impossible to deal with these two aspects of the case without atleast indirectly referring to the charges that have been levelled against the appellant and without dealing with the question whether those charges are atleast prima facie sustainable. There are two reports, one of the appellant himself as to the propriety of acquiring a certain piece of land having an extent of 1750 acres for the Kerala Agricultural University, which report appears to have been rejected by the Government, and there is the report of Justice M.U Isaac, as Commission, dealing with the same question and there are observations in this report, against the appellant. The appellant in his report has not spared the Government, the party to which the Chief Minister belongs, the Chief Minister himself, and the Chief Secretary, not to mention the Special Officer, Additional Secretary, and the Agricultural Production Commissioner. In fact, the charges against the appellant stem from these remarks made in his report and the manner in which he conducted the enquiry. There are some remarks against the appellant in the report of Justice Isaac and these remarks arise from the basic question as to whether the proposal to acquire the land that was first decided upon by Government was proper and whether these remarks are justified. We conceive that the remarks in the two reports will have to be considered by the Commission atleast indirectly in dealing with the charges against the appellant. We, therefore, make it clear that the observations and findings entered by the Single Judge in the judgment under appeal are meant purely for the purpose of deciding whether grounds existed for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We make it further clear that the observations and findings should not in any manner embarrass the Commission who has now been appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, and that the Commission is free to deal with the questions arising before it untrammelled by any of the observations or findings in the judgment under appeal. We are not dealing with these aspects acceding to the request of the appellant's counsel to leave the matter open not because the appellant has no case that there is malafides or that the suspension order is unjustified; but because those are matters best dealt with in proceedings other than that under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The only question, therefore, remaining in this appeal turns on the interpretation of Rule 3(1) of the Rules. We shall extract Rule 3(1), which is in the following terms:—

“3. Suspension During Disciplinary Proceedings—

(1) If, having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case, the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the Service against whom such proceedings are started, that Government may—

(a) if the member of the Service is serving under it, pass an order placing him under suspension, or

(b) if the member of the Service is serving under another Government, request that Government to place him under suspension, pending the conclusion of the inquiry and the passing of the final order in the case:”

4. The interpretation of Rule 7(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 (shortly stated the 1955 Rules), dealing with suspension during disciplinary proceeding arose for consideration in S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India (AIR. 1967 SC. 1274); and again in Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs v. Tarak Nath Ghosh ((1971) 1 SCC 734 : AIR. 1971 SC. 823). Rule 3(1) of the Rules also came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in P.R Nayak v. Union Of India ((1972) 1 SCC 332 : AIR. 1972 SC. 554), wherein the Supreme Court specifically ruled that it is unable to agree with the view taken in Tarak Nath Ghosh's case. The Supreme Court also referred to a passage from the judgment in AIR. 1967 SC. 1274 (supra) and observed that the order of suspension in S. Govinda Menon's case was held to be the order initiating the disciplinary proceedings. No question was raised in that case about the legality of a composite order both initiating disciplinary proceedings and suspending the Government servant. In the light of these conclusions reached by the Supreme Court in (1972) 1 SCC 332 : AIR. 1972 SC. 554 (supra), it is unnecessary to consider the rulings in AIR. 1967 SC. 1274 and (1971) 1 SCC 734 : AIR. 1971 SC. 823 (supra) in disposing of this appeal.

5. The question then is whether it is possible to hold that disciplinary proceedings have not been initiated against the appellant. The submission of the counsel for the appellant is that disciplinary proceedings were only “contemplated” and that the principle enunciated in Tarak Nath Ghosh's case must apply. We shall address ourselves to this aspect. Before doing so, we shall read the relevant part of the order of suspension, Ext. P1:—

“In the light of the facts came out in the Inquiry conducted by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Isaac, the Commissioner appointed under the Commissions of Inquiries Act to enquiry into certain matters relating to acquisition of laud for the Kerala Agricultural University. Government decided to take disciplinary proceedings against Shri K.K Ramankutty. Second Member, Board of Revenue, as per Memo No. SC. 9633/71.Pub'SC) dated 12-11-71, and framed the following charges against him and asked for his statement of defence thereto:

……………………

2. Shri K.K Ramankutty, submitted his written statement of defence on 7-12-1971. Having considered and examined the explanations in detail, the Government have found them unsatisfactory and hence have decided that an enquiry under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, be conducted regarding the charges contained in the memorandum of charges.

3. ……………………………………

4. ……………………………………

5. The Government therefore hereby order, under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 that Shri K.K Ramankutty be placed under suspension with immediate effect till the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him are completed………….

6. …………………………………

6. That there should be initiation of proceedings before an order of suspension is passed in the case has not been disputed before us. What is urged is that when the explanation of the alleged delinquent on the misconduct with which he was proposed to be charged was considered by the Government and it was decided to take disciplinary action against the delinquent officer and when a Commission had also been appointed for the purpose, it has to be held that there has been initiation of proceedings; and simultaneous with such a decision, an order of suspension can also be passed against the delinquent officer. Para 2 of the order Ext. P1, that we have read, clearly shows that the Government have decided that an enquiry should be held under Rule 8 of the Rules. The Order also proceeded to state in para 3 as follows:

“… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … …

7. Government have therefore decided to appoint Shri P. Govinda Menon, Retired Judge of the Kerala High Court as authority to enquire into the truth of the charges under the provisions of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969.”

8. In P.R Nayak's case the Supreme Court referred to a passage from S. Govinda Menon's case (AIR. 1967 SC. 1274), which we may extract:—

“A perusal of this document shows that the Government had accepted the proceedings taken in the matter up till that date and had decided to go forward with the disciplinary proceedings. In our opinion, there is no formal order necessary to initiate disciplinary proceedings under Rule 4(1) of the Rules and the order of the State Government under Ext. P1 must be deemed to be an order under Rule 4(1) of the Rules initiating disciplinary proceedings.”

9. In P.R Nayak's case, after quoting the above passage, the Supreme Court observed:—

“In S. Govinda Menon's case AIR. 1967 SC. 1274—therefore the order of suspension was held also to be the order initiating the disciplinary proceedings. No question was raised in that case about the legality of the composite order both initiating disciplinary proceedings and suspending Govinda Menon.”

10. Since no formal order for initiating disciplinary proceedings is necessary what has to be found out is whether from the attendant circumstances and the matters taken into consideration and from the terms of the order, it is possible to conclude that there had been initiation of proceedings. We may here advert to the fact that before Ext. P1 order was passed, Ext. P2 Memo of Charges was served on the appellant. He challenged this Memo of Charges in O.P 5454/71 on the grounds that the charges were on the face of them unsustainable. This Court dismissed the Original Petition. The appellant had submitted his explanation to Ext. P2 Memo of Charges and it is this explanation that is said to have been considered in Ext. P1 Order, in para 2. There has, therefore, been a preliminary investigation and the Government has categorically stated that after considering the explanation it has taken the decision to proceed with an enquiry under the Rules. Counsel for the appellant pointed out that in the counter-affidavit, Ext P4, it was stated on behalf of the Government that Ext. P2 charges were not final, that the charges enumerated in Ext. P1 are the same as that contained in Ext. P2, and that there has, therefore, been inconsistent stands taken up by the State Government in the counter affidavit that was filed before this Court and the statement in paragraph 1 of Ext. P1 that it was decided to take disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. It is, no doubt, true that there is a statement in paragraph 1 of Ext. P1 that a decision was taken to conduct disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. We do not think that we must understand this paragraph in the manner in which the counsel for the appellant would have us interpret it. We think that it is only the result of the use of loose phraseology; it was stated before this Court in Ext. P4 that the charges contained in Ext. P2 were only tentative and that it was open to the appellant to explain the charges and that it would be considered by the State Government before a decision was finally taken. The explanation is said to have been considered in paragraph 2 of Ext. P1 and it is further stated that it was decided to conduct disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. Reading the document Ext. P1, as a whole, it is therefor difficult to come to the conclusion that the decision had been taken even at the time Ext. P2, Memo of Charges, was issued. Ext. P1, therefore, can be said to contain a clear indication of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. If that be so, there can be no lack of jurisdiction to suspend the appellant pending those proceedings and the suspension order which is contained in Ext. P1 itself cannot be said to be against the terms of Rule 3(1) of the Rules.

11. The only question then is whether there should be a separate formal order for initiating proceedings against an alleged delinquent before he is suspended from service. We do not think that there should be such a formal order for initiating proceedings against a delinquent officer. If the decision is seen from either the flies or from some other records or even from the order suspending the officer pending enquiry that would be sufficient. The real question is whether there has been a preliminary investigation and an objective satisfaction after considering the explanation of the delinquent officer followed by a decision that there should be disciplinary proceedings taken against the delinquent. That there has been such a decision is clear from Ext. P1 Order. The fact that Ext. P1 also contains the order suspending the appellant cannot detract from this decision embodied in Ext. P1 and by that decision and by the appointment of Enquiring Authority, we consider that there has been initiation of proceedings. That the initiation proceeding is embodied in the same order which suspended the appellant cannot make the initiation anything other than initiation of disciplinary proceedings. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that Ext. P1 order is not in accordance with Rule 3(1) of the Rules and that it is liable to be set aside by this Court. We dismiss this appeal. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.

12. Dismissed.