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  • Section 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act.
  • S.15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act.
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Section 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act.
  • S.15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Ravani, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 2728 of 1970 in the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad against a defendant-firm. The plaintiff alleged that he was a tenant of premises belonging to Katpitia Mahajan and that he allowed the defendant to use part of the premises on an arrangement that the defendant would pay commission of 25 paise per bag sold. The plaintiff alleged the defendant was not entitled to keep its bags of foodgrains against the plaintiff's wishes and sought injunctions, accounts to recover the commission, and alternatively eviction and possession if the defendant's possession was proved.

The defendant resisted the suit, asserting inter alia that the relationship was landlord and tenant and that the defendant was in possession as of right. The trial Court, after evidence and hearing, concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a licensor-licensee relationship, treated the alleged commission as rent, found the defendant had exclusive possession (creating an interest in the defendant), and dismissed the suit by judgment dated August 6, 1976.

The plaintiff appealed. In the appeal the plaintiff did not challenge the trial Court's finding that a licensor-licensee relationship was not proved but contended that the defendant's possession was unlawful (even if a tenant) based on alleged admissions in the defendant's written statement and on the trial Court's findings. The appellant also sought leave to amend the plaint at the appellate stage to allege unlawfulness of the defendant's possession.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether alleged admissions in the defendant's written statement could be construed as admitting unlawful possession, thereby supporting a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiff.
  2. Whether the trial Court's finding that an interest was created in favour of the defendant could be read as a finding that the defendant's possession was unlawful.
  3. Whether the plaintiff could be permitted, at appellate stage and at final hearing, to amend the plaint to introduce an alternative case alleging the defendant's possession (including as sub-tenant or otherwise) was unlawful.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant-Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff accepted the trial Court's finding that he failed to establish a licensor-licensee relationship but argued that the trial Court also found that an interest in the premises was created in favour of the defendant and that the defendant, in its written statement, admitted that its possession was unlawful; therefore a decree for eviction should be granted.
  • The plaintiff relied on specific averments in paragraph 10 of the defendant's written statement as constituting an admission of unlawful tenancy and on the trial Court's paragraphs 30–31 to support a finding of unlawful possession.
  • The plaintiff relied on precedent (Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad) for the proposition that a plaintiff may rely on alternative rights where the defendant's own pleading admits the alternative case; and sought to amend the plaint at appellate stage to introduce a new paragraph (5A) alleging the defendant's possession was unlawful.

Defendant's Arguments (as reflected in written statement and trial Court findings)

  • The defendant denied the plaintiff's account of the commission arrangement and contended the true relationship was that of landlord and tenant and that the defendant was in possession as of right as a tenant.
  • The written statement denied the specific averments in the plaint regarding commission and possession, asserted exclusive possession by the defendant, and stated that other persons were also given premises on lease and in possession as tenants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Udhay Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744 Principle that pleadings must be read as a whole; it is impermissible to cull out a sentence or passage and read it out of context when ascertaining intention from pleadings. The Court applied this principle to reject the appellant's attempt to isolate averments in para 10 of the written statement as an unequivocal admission of unlawful possession; the written statement must be read in its entirety and does not yield the admission relied upon.
Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 Authority for allowing a plaintiff to rely on alternative inconsistent allegations when the defendant's own pleading admits the alternative case, so that a decree may be given on the defendant's admission without injustice. The Court distinguished this case: there is no admission in the present written statement; even if an admission were cullable, allowing eviction in an ordinary civil suit (as opposed to a money decree) would cause serious injustice to a defendant-tenant and was therefore not analogous or applicable.
First Appeal No. 382 of 1975 (High Court decision reported 1982 Guj LH 536) Example where appellate court, on additional evidence and after proper pleading/issue, found defendant to be an unlawful sub-tenant and upheld eviction. The Court found this earlier decision inapplicable on facts: in the present case there is no pleading, no issue on unlawful tenancy, and no evidence supporting such a case; the present plaintiff cannot rely on that decision to obtain eviction.
H.H. Sir Jiwanjirao Scindia v. Muzammil Khurshid, (1957) 59 Bom LR 1011 Held that in a suit between head-tenant and sub-tenant, the ordinary Civil Court may have jurisdiction to decide questions between landlord and tenant and that the maxim pari delicto melior est conditio possidentis would not be applicable in that context (as decided by Bombay High Court at the time). The Court considered the authority not relevant to present facts and noted that statutory language (S.15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act) had since been amended to include "subject to any contract to the contrary"; therefore the decision was of no assistance in the present case and the jurisdictional question did not arise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal observations and factual assessments:

  1. The Court began by noting that the appellant did not contest the trial Court's core finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a licensor-licensee relationship.
  2. The appellant's principal contention before the Court was that the defendant had admitted unlawful possession in its written statement and that the trial Court's finding of an interest created in favour of the defendant amounted to a finding of unlawful possession. The Court examined these contentions in light of the pleadings and evidence.
  3. Applying the principle from Udhay Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, the Court emphasized that pleadings must be read as a whole; they cannot be dissected to isolate a sentence or passage and read out of context. On reading the entire written statement, the Court found no clear admission that the defendant was in unlawful possession.
  4. The Court analyzed the contents of paragraph 10 of the written statement: the defendant first denied the plaint's averments regarding the commission arrangement, then asserted it was in possession as tenant (as of right), claimed exclusive possession, and alleged other tenants existed. On this holistic reading the Court concluded there was no unequivocal admission that the defendant was an unlawful tenant.
  5. The Court further held that the trial Court's finding that an interest was created in favour of the defendant did not equate to a finding that the defendant's possession was unlawful. The trial Court had gone only so far as to find the plaintiff failed to prove the licensee case; it had not been called upon, by pleadings, issues or evidence, to determine unlawfulness of tenancy.
  6. Turning to the appellant's reliance on Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, the Court distinguished that authority on both law and facts: the cited case involved admissions enabling a money decree where alternative relief was not pleaded; here there was no comparable clear admission and, critically, allowing eviction on such a basis in an ordinary civil suit could cause substantive injustice to the defendant-tenant (loss of opportunities to raise statutory defences and the severe consequence of eviction).
  7. The Court also distinguished prior decisions of this High Court (First Appeal No. 382 of 1975) and the Bombay High Court decision relied upon by the appellant, observing in each instance that the factual matrix, pleadings and evidence differed materially and that jurisdictional or statutory considerations (including later amendments to S.15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act) rendered those authorities inapplicable or not directly helpful.
  8. Regarding the appellant's belated application to amend the plaint at the appellate stage to introduce paragraph 5A alleging unlawful possession, the Court analyzed procedural and substantive consequences: the amendment would introduce a new and inconsistent case (contrary to the plaintiff's pleaded and sworn evidence that the defendant was not his tenant), likely cause prejudice, require further evidence, raise potential jurisdictional issues under the Bombay Rent Act, and lead to complications and multiplicity of proceedings. Given lateness (application made at appellate final hearing, years after admission of appeal) and likelihood of prejudice and complication, the Court rejected the amendment application.
  9. For these reasons—absence of any clear admission, lack of pleading/issue/evidence on unlawful tenancy, prejudice and procedural impropriety in sought amendment—the Court found the appellant's contentions untenable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court rendered the following final orders:

  • APPEAL DISMISSED.
  • The application to amend the plaint (to introduce an allegation that the defendant's possession was unlawful) was rejected.
  • Costs were awarded against the appellant (the appeal dismissed with costs).
  • The Court refused to grant a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that no question of law of general importance arose.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit stands and the defendant's possession remains unimpaired by this appellate proceeding. The Court explicitly distinguished prior authorities relied upon by the appellant and declined to extend them to the present facts; the judgment does not purport to lay down any new legal principle of general application. The decision turned on pleadings, evidence (or lack thereof), and procedural considerations regarding lateness and prejudice in seeking amendment at the appellate stage.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not include information beyond that record.

    Babulal Rameshwarlal v. Digvijay Pulse Mill .

    Judgement

    RAVANI, J. :- The appellant- plaintiff, who lost in trial Court, does not dispute the finding of the trial Court that he has failed to establish relationship of licensor and licensee. However, it is contended that the trial Court has found that an interest in the premises is created and that the defendant in its written statement has admitted that its possession is unlawful and therefore decree for eviction should be passed in favour of the plaintiff. This contention is raised, although there is no such case in the pleadings of the plaintiff; no such issue is raised and that there is no such evidence also. On the contrary the plaintiff has positively asserted in his evidence that the defendant was not his tenant.

    2. After having a brief resume of the facts, the contentions raised by the appellant-plaintiff may be examined.

    3. The appellant-plaintiff filed a Civil Suit No.2728 of 1970 in the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, against the defendant-firm alleging that he himself was a tenant of the property belonging to Katpitia Mahajan, Ahmedabad, that the defendant is a grain merchant and that he allowed the defendant to use a part of this premises on the basis of the arrangement that the defendant should pay commission at the rate of 25 paise per bag sold by the defendant. It was alleged that the defendant was not entitled to keep his bags of foodgrains against the wishes of the plaintiff. Though the defendant was orally informed not to keep his goods in the premises, he did not pay heed to the same and on the contrary filed Small Cause Suit No. 490 of 1970 in the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad. On these and other allegations the plaintiff prayed that the defendant be restrained from placing his goods in the suit premises and be ordered to render accounts of the goods sold by the defendant so that the amount of commission at the rate of 25 paise per bag sold be recovered from him. Alternatively the plaintiff prayed that, in case the possession of the defendant is proved over the premises, the defendant be ordered to be evicted and the possession thereof be given to the plaintiff.

    4. The suit was resisted by the defendant-firm on facts as well as on law points. It was inter alia contended that the real nature of the relationship between the parties was that of a landlord and a tenant and that the defendant was in possession of the premises as of right as a tenant.

    5. The trial Court, after recording evidence and after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not been able to establish that the defendant was in possession of the premises by his permission. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the relationship of licensor and licensee between the parties as contended by the plaintiff was not proved. The trial Court also came to the conclusion that the arrangement for payment of so-called commission was not in fact commission, but was, as a matter of fact, rent. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the defendant had got exclusive possession of the suit premises and therefore there was an interest created by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. The trial Court by its judgment and order dated August 6, 1976 ordered to dismiss the suit.

    6. In the present appeal, the plaintiff has not challenged the finding arrived at by the trial Court to the effect that the plaintiff has not been able to prove the relationship of licensor and licensee. However, it is contended that the possession of the defendant is unlawful even as a tenant and therefore the defendant should be ordered to be evicted and decree for possession should be passed in favour of the plaintiff. This contention is sought to be based on certain averments in the written statement filed by the defendant and on the basis of the finding arrived at by the trial Court. The plaintiff relies upon the following averments in para 10 of the written statement filed by the defendant :

    [Original in vernacular omitted-Ed.]

    7. From the aforesaid averments made in the written statement, it is sought to be contended that the defendant has admitted that he is in possession of the premises as an unlawful tenant.

    8. The method of construction suggested by the plaintiff runs counter to the cardinal principles of interpretation of pleadings. The pleadings cannot be compartmentalised, dissected, segregated and then read. The correct method of reading the pleading is that the pleadings have got to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Udhay Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, reported in AIR 1976 SC 744, wherein it is held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. It is further held that the intention of the party concerned is to be gathered, primarily, from the tenor and terms of his pleading taken as a whole.

    9. If one reads the entire written statement filed by the defendant, it is difficult to spell out any admission as contended by the plaintiff. In para 10 of the written statement, the defendant has first denied the statements and averments made in para 3 of the plaint. In para 3 of the plaint, the plaintiff has made statements and averments with regard to the so called arrangement of payment of commission at the rate of 25 paise per bag sold by the defendant and on that basis the defendant having been allowed to keep the goods in the premises. This averment is denied and then it is stated that the defendant is in possession of the premises as of right as tenant. Then it is further stated that the defendant is in exclusive possession of the premises and that the plaintiff was never in possession of these premises and that other persons are also given the premises on lease and they are in possession of the premises as tenants. It was further averred that the so called arrangement of payment of commission per bag sold, was totally false and while denying the statements and averments with regard to the payment of commission on the basis of the bills, the defendant has stated further that the object of the plaintiff in adopting such device was to eschew the provisions of the rent act and then it is stated that, all the statements and averments made by the plaintiff are, false.

    10. If the aforesaid averments are read in proper context, it is difficult to read any admission as is sought to be contended by the plaintiff. Even if one reads the aforesaid averments in isolation and without context, it can never be said that the defendant has unequivocally admitted to the effect that it is in possession of the premises as an unlawful tenant.

    11. It was then contended that in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the relationship between the parties was not that of a licensor and licensee and that the defendant was in exclusive possession which led to the conclusion that it was in the nature of an interest created by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant over that much area of the property. In view of the finding, it was sought to be contended by the plaintiff that this is a finding by which the trial Court came to the conclusion that the defendant was in possession of the premises as an unlawful tenant. By no stretch of reasoning it can be inferred that the trial Court came to the conclusion that the possession of the defendant of the premises was unlawful. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant was a licensee. The trial Court has gone thus far and nothing further. On this point i.e. alleged unlawful nature of possession of the defendant, as tenant there was no pleading, no issue and no evidence was led by the parties and therefore the trial Court was never called upon to give any finding on this point. Therefore the contention based on the finding arrived at by the trial Court also fails.

    12. The appellant-plaintiff sought to rely upon the following observations from the decision of the supreme Court in the case of firm Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, reported in AIR 1951 SC 177 (para 9) :

    "A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil P.C. to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. Ordinarily, the Court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendants in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendants own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit."

    It was a case for specific performance of a contract. Therein the defendant denied to have received any amount as consideration towards the part performance of the contract, but made certain admissions about having received the amount as loan. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that on the basis of the admission made by the defendant, a money decree can be passed even though the plaintiff had failed to plead and claim alternative relief. Thus it is one thing to decree a suit for money on the basis of admission where the specific performance of the contract cannot be granted; and it is another thing to decree a suit where the case regarding the nature of unlawful possession is not even placed by the plaintiff in his pleadings, nor it is admitted by the defendant in his written statement. In that case the question was as to whether alternative relief can be granted although there may not be pleadings in this behalf. In this case, the relief claimed by the plaintiff is the same. The plaintiff wishes to place an alternative case. Moreover, in a case before an ordinary Civil Court, it would not have been possible for the plaintiff to put his case raising questions between landlord and tenant. Therefore the plaintiff could never have raised such inconsistent plea in a suit for possession filed in an ordinary Civil Court, in this case, the parties were not conscious about the new case which is being sought to be raised by the plaintiff. Therefore it cannot be said that the defendant would not be taken by surprise.

    13. As stated above, there is no admission on the part of the defendant in this case. However, assuming that such an admission, as contended by the plaintiff is possible to be culled out from the written statement of the defendant, even then the plaintiff cannot be permitted to take advantage of the same in a suit for possession filed in a Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. As held by the Supreme Court in this very case, the plaintiff may not be driven to file a separate suit only when no injustice is likely to be caused to the defendant. In a suit for possession before an ordinary Civil Court, the defendant-tenant will lose an opportunity to raise various possible defences including the plea to determine standard rate of rent. Moreover, if the plaintiff is allowed to take advantage of such so-called admission of the defendant, in many cases the defendant may be evicted, which would amount to economic death penalty. Can it ever be said that eviction of premises - an economic death penalty - would not result into any injustice to the other side? In this view of the matter, on facts and on principle, the decision cited by the appellant-plaintiff is of no help to him.

    14. The plaintiff next relied upon the decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 382 of 1975 decided on 14/15th Oct., 1980*(Coram N.H. Bhatt and S.L. Talati, JJ.) In that case the trial Court believed the case of the plaintiff that the defendant was a licensee and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. But in appeal, the High Court came to the conclusion that the case of the plaintiff that there was relationship of licensor and licensee was not believable. The High Court did not uphold the case of the plaintiff with regard to the arrangement of commission. However, in that case the defendant sought an amendment of the written statement and sought an issue at the appellate stage which reads as follows :

    "Whether the defendants proved that the alleged sub-lease was created as per the contract between the plaintiff and their landlords and hence it was not hit by Sec.15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act ?"

    * Reported in 1982 Guj LH 536.

    After appreciation of additional evidence led, the court came to the conclusion that the defendant was in possession as an unlawful sub-tenant and on that basis the Court maintained the decree of eviction passed by the trial Court. Here in this case, there is no such pleading, no issue and no evidence. The sole reliance placed by the plaintiff is on the so-called admission of the defendant in the written statement referred to hereinabove; and on the finding given by the trial Court. In this case the plaintiffs case was that the defendant was a licensee and was using the premises by his permission. The plaintiff has in his evidence positively asserted that the defendant was not his tenant. In terms he has stated in para 18 of his deposition that it was not true that the defendant was a tenant and the rate of rent was Rs. 3,000/- per year. However, he admitted to have withdrawn Rs. 13,000/- deposited by the defendant in the Small Cause suit. In view of this state of facts and circumstances of this case, the decision of this High Court in First Appeal No. 382 of 1975 is of no help to the plaintiff.

    15. The plaintiff relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of H.H. Sir Jiwanjirao Scindia v. Muzammil Khurshid, reported in (1957) 59 Bom LR 1011. In that case, the head tenant filed a suit against his sub-tenant and the Court negatived the plea of the defendant (sub-tenant) holding that the maxim pari delicto melior est conditio possidentis would not be applicable. In that case the Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that in such cases the ordinary Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. It was contended that this case was approvingly referred to by the Division Bench of this High Court while deciding First Appeal No. 382 of 1975. But reference to this case is not at all relevant for the simple reason that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there does not arise any question regarding the jurisdiction of the trial Court to decide the case. However, it must be pointed out that the question of jurisdiction of an ordinary Civil Court to decide the questions between landlord and tenant was not raised at all before the Division Bench of this High Court in First Appeal No. 382 of 1975. Moreover when the Bombay High Court decided the aforesaid case, the words "subject to any contract to the contrary" were not there in S.15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. But as stated hereinabove, the question does not arise before us and hence we do not propose to deal with this decision in details.

    16. Realising the aforesaid difficulties during the course of arguments, the appellant-plaintiff submitted an application for amendment of the plaint and sought to introduce para 5A in the plaint to the effect that alternatively the so-called right of the defendant as sub-tenant or any other right regarding the suit premises, is unlawful and the same being against the provisions of law, possession of the defendant is unlawful. This application for amendment has been stoutly opposed by the other side. Assuming that the amendment application is allowed, what would be the position? The first step would be that this paragraph will have to be inserted in the plaint; then the plaint would definitely read some averments which pertain to the question to be decided between the landlord and tenant in view of the fact that a head tenant is also a landlord as per the definition given in Section 5 (3) of the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore the question as to whether an ordinary Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide such question will arise. What will definitely lead to complications. Moreover, the prayer for amendment is given at a very late stage, that is, at the appellate stage, and at the time of the final hearing of the appeal. This appeal was admitted by the Court on March 2, 1977. Thereafter in the year 1983 this amendment application is sought to be given at the time of the final hearing of the appeal. Delay alone would not have deterred us from granting the application for amendment. But by this amendment a totally a new case is sought to be made out. So far, the case of the plaintiff was that the defendant was his licensee. The plaintiff in his evidence positively asserted that the defendant was not his tenant. Now the plaintiff wants to aver that, even if the defendant is a tenant, his possession is unlawful and therefore decree be given in favour of the plaintiff. This is not only a new case but inconsistent with the plaintiffs own averments and evidence given on oath. Such an amendment is likely to cause prejudice to the other side and the other side is likely to be placed in an embarrassing situation also. Moreover, if the amendment is allowed, it is likely that new evidence also may be required to be led. Thus it is likely to create comp1ications and may even lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Hence the application for amendment is rejected.

    17. No other submissions were made. Hence the appeal is ordered to be dismissed with cost. In view of the reasons mentioned in the judgment, the civil application for amendment of the plaint is also rejected. The counsel for the appellant-plaintiff prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In this case, no question of law of general importance is involved, which, in the opinion of this Court, needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence certificate is refused.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Babulal Rameshwarlal v. Digvijay Pulse Mill .
    (Jan 17, 1983)