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  • provisions of Section 222 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 216 of the Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 319 Cr.P.C.
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  • Section 308 Cr.P.C.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of Section 222 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 216 of the Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 319 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 309 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 308 Cr.P.C.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (complainant) alleges that on 30.8.2001 at about 8:25 a.m., while walking away from Galaxy Apartments, Vikas Puri, Delhi, he and another person were stopped by respondent No.2 (A.K. Kapoor), who assaulted the petitioner with a hard object and then with a stone, threatening to kill him. Bystanders intervened after the petitioner cried for help. The petitioner was initially examined at DDU Hospital, where the injury was recorded as a simple hurt.

The petitioner later alleged worsening medical condition and was admitted to LNJP Hospital for 22 days, where physicians opined the injury was grievous hurt. On that basis the Investigating Officer (IO) made out a case under Section 308 IPC and the challan was filed under Section 308 IPC, leading to committal to the Court of Sessions. The Additional Sessions Judge, by an order dated 3.2.2003, held there was no material for an offence under Section 308 IPC and characterized the case as one of simple hurt; the judge remanded the matter to the Magistrate to consider whether any charge could be framed. The petitioner challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was material on record to frame a charge against respondent No.2 under Section 308 IPC (attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder) as opposed to charges for simple hurt.
  2. What is the appropriate role and scope of the trial court's exercise in "sifting" material at the stage of framing charges (i.e., the standard to apply at committal/charge framing stage).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Once the injury is found to be grievous as defined under Section 320 IPC, the accused ought to be charged under Section 308 IPC; the petitioner's 22-day hospitalization places him in the eighth category of grievous hurt under Section 320 IPC.
  • Relied on the Apex Court decision in Sunil Kumar v. NCT of Delhi & Ors to submit that an attempt to commit culpable homicide may result in hurt that is simple or grievous, and therefore simple injury does not necessarily preclude a charge under Section 308 IPC.

Respondent No.2's Arguments

  • The initial medical report recorded a blunt/simple injury; the petitioner deliberately sought re-examination, got admitted and prolonged hospitalization to harass respondent No.2.
  • The mere fact of a 22-day hospital stay does not automatically convert the injury into grievous hurt; the nature of the injury and the instrument (a stone) must be considered.
  • There is a history of tussle for control of the society and cross FIRs exist; these facts bear on credibility and context.
  • Even if evidence later showed an offence under Section 308 IPC, the respondent argued (as recorded) that the Magistrate would have power under Section 309 Cr.P.C. to direct proceedings against respondent No.2 under Section 308 Cr.P.C. (as presented by respondent's counsel in the opinion).

State's Arguments

  • The State supported the petitioner that respondent No.2 should be charged under Section 308 IPC; alternatively, if no material is found for Section 308, the accused may be convicted of a minor offence even if not charged (reference made to provisions of Section 222 Cr.P.C.).
  • At the stage of framing charges the trial court is only required to sift material and determine whether there is material to form an opinion that the offence was possible.
  • The State rejected the applicability of Section 319 Cr.P.C. in this context and suggested that Section 216 Cr.P.C. (power to alter or add a charge before judgment) would be relevant if alteration of charge were necessary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sunil Kumar Vs. N.C.T. of Delhi & Ors., 1999 (1) JCC (SC) 92 : 1999 1 AD (Cr.) SC 217 Establishes that an attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder may result in hurt that is either simple or grievous; mere fact of simple injury does not automatically absolve accused from charge under Section 308 IPC. The court accepted the legal proposition advanced from this case but held that, on the facts (instrument used — a stone — and apparent lack of intention/knowledge), the respondent did not commit the act with the requisite intention or knowledge to attract Section 308 IPC in this particular case.
Soma Chakravarty Vs. State Through CBI, 2007 (2) JCC 1673 : (2007) 5 SCC 403 Describes the task of the trial court at the stage of framing charge: to sift through the material to form an opinion that commission of an offence by the accused was possible; probative value of material need not be gone into at that stage. The court cited this principle to explain the correct approach at the stage of framing charges and evaluated whether material existed to form an opinion of the possibility of an offence under Section 308 IPC. The court held that, applying this standard, there was an absence of material to frame Section 308 charge.
Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (1) JCC 172 (2) : (2002) 2 SCC 135 Holds that the trial judge must not act as a mere post office or mouthpiece of the prosecution; the judge must sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether a prima facie case is made out, and where two views are possible he may discharge the accused. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the trial court properly appraised the evidence for the limited purpose of framing charges and was justified in refraining from framing a charge under Section 308 IPC where material did not give rise to a strong possibility of that offence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by reviewing the material placed before the trial court and the findings of medical examinations. It set out the relevant factual matrix: an initial DDU Hospital report indicating simple blunt injury, the petitioner's subsequent admission to LNJP Hospital for 22 days where an opinion of grievous hurt was recorded, and the later constitution of a medical board (two/three doctors) whose report concluded the injury was a simple hurt and that the petitioner was clinically stable during the hospital stay.

The court examined submissions from counsel for all parties. It acknowledged the petitioner's legal argument (relying on the Sunil Kumar decision) that an attempt to commit culpable homicide may be charged under Section 308 IPC even if the actual injury is simple. However, the court emphasised that the specific facts must support an intention or knowledge sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit culpable homicide.

The Court analysed the context and facts: a tussle over control of the apartment society (leading to enmity and cross FIRs); the nature of the instrument (a stone picked up in the heat of the moment); the initial medical observation of a simple blunt injury; the medical board's report indicating clinical stability (noting, inter alia, that after admission on 3.9.2001 the next doctor visit was only on 11.9.2001) and concluding that the clinical condition did not deteriorate.

Applying the legal standard for framing charges (as articulated in Soma Chakravarty and Dilawar Balu Kurane), the Court noted that the trial judge must "sift" the material to see whether the commission of the charged offence was even possible, without conducting a full probe into probative value. The Court found that the Additional Sessions Judge did perform that limited sifting and weighed the material, concluding there was an absence of material to give rise even to a possibility that respondent No.2 committed an offence under Section 308 IPC.

The Court also considered the argument that a 22-day hospital stay by itself establishes grievous hurt. It rejected that proposition on the facts, explaining that mere prolonged hospitalization does not, without proof of severe bodily pain or inability to follow ordinary pursuits during that period, amount to grievous hurt. The medical board's observations that the petitioner was stable and had sparse doctor visits during the hospital stay supported the view that the injury was simple in nature.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

Holding: The Court found no infirmity in the impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 3.2.2003 and dismissed the petition. The Sessions Judge did not err in refusing to frame charges under Section 308 IPC because, on the material available, there was no basis to conclude that respondent No.2 acted with the requisite intention or knowledge to attempt culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Direct consequences: The effect on the parties is that respondent No.2 will not be charged under Section 308 IPC on the basis of the material on record at the relevant stage; the matter was remitted to the Magistrate to consider whether charges for simple hurt can be framed in accordance with law.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates established principles regarding the limited, yet substantive, role of the trial court in sifting material at the charge-framing stage (as drawn from the cited precedents). The opinion itself does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts of this case.

    P.K. Ghosh v. State Another

    Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.:-

    1. The present case is a classic one where two well educated people are al­leged to have taken law into their own hands resulting in physical injuries.

    2. The petitioner, the complainant, is alleged that on 30.8.2001 at about 8:25 a.m. when he along with one Mr. Madan was walking away from the then residence at Galaxy Apartments, Vikas Puri, Delhi, the ex-President of Galaxy Apartments, Mr. A.K. Kapoor, respondent No.2/accused stopped them and started hitting the petitioner on the face and head with some hard object. Respondent No. 2 is there­after alleged to have picked up a stone with which he started hitting the petitioner on the head and body with the threat to kill him. On the cries of the petitioner some persons gathered who intervened. The petitioner was taken for medical examina­tion to DDU Hospital where the doctor found the injury to be a simple hurt.

    3. The petitioner has further alleged that the injury was stated to be a simple hurt on account of the influence of respondent No. 2 as he was a former Administrative Officer of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. Incidently the petitioner is a retired Government servant while respondent No.2 is still in Government service and the original dispute is about who would control the society of the Apartment owners. The petitioner, in fact, was so aggrieved that he addressed several letters to various authorities in­cluding ministries against, respondent No.2.

    4. The petitioner claims that his medical problems got aggravated and had to be admitted to LNJP Hospital for 22 days. In view of the head injuries, the petitioner was kept under observation and the opinion given was that it was a case of a grievous hurt and not a simple hurt. On the said medical report, the IO made out a case against respondent No.2 under Sec­tion 308 of the IPC.

    5. On the aforesaid opinion being given by LNJP Hospital, respondent No.2 is alleged to have used his influence and instructed to get a medical board con­stituted of two-three doctors and the board so constituted examined the petitioner which held that the petitioner had suffered a simple hurt.

    6. The challan was, however, filed under Section 308 IPC and thus was com­mitted to the Court of Sessions at the stage of charge. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, passed an order dated 3.2.2003 holding that there was no material on record for a case under Sec­tion 308 IPC and the present case was one of simple hurt. It is this order, which is sought to be impugned by the petitioner.

    7. A perusal of the impugned order shows that what weighed with the trial court was the initial medical report show­ing a simple blunt injury and there was nothing on record to show that respondent No.2 had any intention or knowledge that by such act he would commit culpable homicide of the petitioner. The matter was, thus, remanded back to the Magistrate to consider whether any charge could be framed against the accused in accordance with law.

    8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that once it was found that the offence complained of was in the nature of a grievous hurt as defined under Section 320 IPC, it is under section 308 of the ipc that respondent No.2 ought to have been charged. Learned counsel relied upon the fact that the petitioner had to be hospitalized for 22 days making him fall under the eighth category of the kinds of grievous hurt as prescribed under Sec­tion 320 of IPC.

    9. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, on the other hand, submitted that the injury initially found on the petitioner was a blunt injury and the petitioner, with the object of harassing respondent No.2 got himself re-examined and got admitted to the hospital and deliberately stayed in the hospital without there being any cause for the same. Learned counsel submitted that the mere fact that the petitioner stayed in the hospital for 22 days would not imply that respondent No.2 should be charged under Section 308 IPC. Learned counsel also emphasized that the nature of injury and nature of weapon have to be kept in mind and the allegation in the present case is only that respondent No.2 hit the petitioner with the stone. In fact, there have been past history of tussle over control of respondent No.2 of society and there are cross FIRs of respondent No.2 in respect of the incident in question.

    10. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 further sought to plead that even if during the course of trial the evidence produced were to show that an offence under Section 308 IPC was made out, the Magistrate would have power under Sec­tion 309 Cr.P.C. to direct the proceedings against respondent No.2 under Section 308 Cr.P.C.

    11. Learned counsel for the Stale has supported the case of the petitioner to contend that respondent No.2 should be charged under Section 308 IPC and if no material is found for the charge under Section 308 IPC, he may be convicted for a minor offence though he may not be charged with it in view of provisions of Section 222 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel fur­ther submitted that at the stage of framing of charges only sifting of the material has to be done by the trial court.

    12. Learned counsel for the State also rebutted the submission of the coun­sel for respondent No.2 to the effect that Section 319 Cr.P.C. would apply. Learned counsel submitted that the said provision would have no role in the present case since that provides for power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guil­ty of offence. Learned counsel submitted that, in fact, in such an eventuality it is Section 216 of the Cr.P.C., which would apply dealing with the power of the Court to alter or add a charge at any time before the judgement is pronounced.

    13. On hearing learned counsels for the parties, one fact which imminently emerges is that the incident in question was the result of the tussle to control the society. It is in view thereof that the petitioner and respondent No.2 became enemical to each other resulting in the cross FIRs being lodged.

    14. The immediate medical atten­tion received by the petitioner showed that there was only a simple blunt injury. The petitioner was not satisfied with it and thus got himself admitted into another hospital subsequently after a couple of days where he continued to stay for 22 days. The question about the medical condition of the petitioner gave rise to the constitution of the board of three doctors, who sub­mitted their report. One of the conclusions reached by the said committee was that after the admission of the petitioner on 3.9.2001, the next visit of the doctor oc­curred only on 11.9.2001 after full 8 days. The petitioner was thus quite stable during this period of time. On the basis of the material on record, the committee opined that the clinical condition of the petitioner did not deteriorate as he suffered from minor head injury, if any. Insofar as the plea of learned counsel for the petitioner for stay of the petitioner in the hospital for 22 days is concerned, it must be kept in mind that a mere stay in a hospital for 20 days, does not constitute a grievous hurt as some doctors and even lawyers are in­clined to 'believe. It must be proved that during that period, the injured man was in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. An injured man may be quite capable of following his ordinary pursuits long before 20 days are over, and yet may prolong his stay-in hospital by interfering with the healing of his wound or for the sake of permanent recovery or greater case or comfort may be willing to remain as a convalescent in hospital, espe­cially if he is fed at the public expenses. Thus, in the present case, the gravity of the injury was simple in nature.

    15. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon the judge­ment of the Apex Court in Sunil Kumar Vs. N.C.T. of Delhi & Ors. 1999 (1) JCC (SC) 92 : 1999 1 AD (Cr.) SC 217 to plead that an attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder may actually result in hurt or may not. The hurt may be simple or grievous hurt. Merely because the injury inflicted in the incident was simple in nature, it did not absolve the accused from the charge under Section 308 IPC. It is the attempt to commit culpable homicide, which is punishable under Section 308 IPC whereas the punishment for simple hurts can be meted out under Sections 323 & 324 IPC and for grievous hurts under Sections 325 & 326 IPC.

    16. There can be no doubt about the legal proposition as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner but in the present case where if the intent and the instrument used is seen whereby a stone was picked up from the road in the heat of the moment, there does not appear that respondent No.2 committed such act with an intention or knowledge to commit an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 308 IPC.

    17. On perusal of the order, I am of the view that the trial court did not commit any error in not framing the charges under Section 308 IPC. The legal position is not in dispute that the task of the trial court at the stage of framing of charge is to sift through the material to form an opinion that the commission of an offence by the accused was possible. The probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into. However, there must exist some material, which should form the basis of the framing of the charge. Such view has been expressed in Soma Chakravarty Vs. State Through CBI 2007 (2) JCC 1673 : (2007) 5 SCC 403. However, simul­taneously it has also been emphasised in Dilawar Balu Kurane Vs. State of Maharashtra 2002 (1) JCC 172 (2) : (2002) 2 SCC 135 that the trial judge cannot merely act as a post office or mouthpiece of the prosecution. He has to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case has been made out and where two views are equally possible and evidence gives rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion, he can discharge the accused.

    18. In the present case despite the prayer made by respondent No.2, the learned Judge has not discharged him but has only come to the conclusion that the injury was of simple nature and there was no basis to frame a charge for grievous hurt under Section 308 IPC leaving it for the Magistrate to determine whether char­ges can be framed for simple hurt. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has thus exercised the power by not acting as a post office but appraising the evidence on record for determining whether there was material which could give rise even to a possibility of the offence for which respon­dent No.2 was sought to be charged to be proved and came to the conclusion that there was absence of such material. The medical examination conducted at DDU Hospital and the report of the medical board constituted thereafter concluded that the nature of injury was one of simple hurt. The stay at the LNJP Hospital for 22 days also does not indicate the fact that the petitioner sustained grievous hurt since the report of the said Board throws light on the visits made by the doctor which is after 8 days from the time the petitioner got admitted indicating the stable condi­tion of the petitioner.

    19. I find myself in agreement with the said view. There is no infirmity in the impugned order.

    20. Dismissed.

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    Comments

    P.K. Ghosh v. State Another
    (Jan 14, 2008)