Sawant, J.:— This is a Contempt Petition filed by the members of the non-teaching staff belonging to unskilled Class, which is generally called Class IV Category, employed by the respondents in their High School. Petitioners 1 and 10 are peons, petitioners 2, 3 and 6 are gardeners or malis, petitioners 4 and 8 are carpenters, petitioner No. 7 is a polishman, petitioner No. 5 is a driver and petitioner No. 9 is a cleaner. They were in service of the respondents from various dates between 1973 and 1985. Their services were terminated in January, 1986. They preferred an appeal to the School Tribunal constituted under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and the Tribunal by its order dated 29th August, 1986 allowed their appeals, set aside the termination of their services and directed the respondents to reinstate them in service with all benefits due to them from the date of the termination of their services till they were reinstated/allowed to resume their duties. The order was to be given effect to within forty days from the receipt of the Tribunal's order by the respondents.

2. Against this order, the respondents preferred a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the Original side of this Court being Petition No. 2567 of 1986 raising a number of contentions. By his judgment and order dated October 8, 1986 a learned Single Judge of this Court rejected the petition unholding the order of the School Tribunal. An oral application for stay of the Tribunal's order was also rejected by the learned Judge. The respondents thereafter preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of this Court being Appeal No. 942 of 1986. By its order of October 16, 1986, the Division bench rejected the contentions of the respondents, including the contention that the respondents were a minority institution and therefore, the Act was not applicable to them and dismissed the appeal against all petitioners, except petitioners Nos. 3 and 6. The appeal was admitted against petitioners 3 and 6 because of the contention taken by the respondents that they had since passed their superannuation age. However, the Bench rejected the application for stay of the Tribunal's order even against petitioners 3 and 6. The respondents thereafter deferred special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court being S.L.P No. 14931 of 1986 which was dismissed summarily by the Court on January 23, 1987 with the following order:

“We find no reason to interfere. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. Shri Sorabjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contends that the petitioners have since discontinued the bus service. If that be so, the petitioners are at liberty to move the High Court for appropriate direction with regard to respondents 7 and 11, namely Akram ashraf Ali and S.S Omar.”

(emphasis supplied)

3. The said respondents are petitioners 5 and 9 before us. We will have an occasion to refer to this order a little later. The result of all these proceedings is that the Tribunal's order directing the respondents to rainstate the petitioners and to pay them all their benefits remained undisturbed. Even in the case of petitioners 3, 6, 5 and 9 there being no stay obtained of the operation of the Tribunal's order either from the Division Bench or from the Supreme Court the order continues to operate, and the respondents are duty bound to abide by and comply with the same. It is now necessary to point out that the respondents have obviously misled Hon'ble the Supreme Court while taking the above quoted ex-parte order from the Court on January 23, 1987 in the Special Leave Petition. It appears from the order that the respondents through their counsel had made a representation to the Supreme Court that after the Division Bench of this Court had dismissed their appeal on October 16, 1986, and before the Special Leave Petition came up for admission on January 23, 1987, the respondents had discontinued the Bus service. Since we wanted to ascertain the exact date from which the bus service was discontinued, we had on the last occasion, i.e on August 18, 1987 directed the respondents to file an affidavit stating the exact date from which the bus service was discontinued.

4. In paragraph 5 of the affidavit filed by the 1st respondent pursuant to that order it is disclosed that the school bus service was closed for the first time on January 31, 1986. In paragraph 6, she has further stated that in view of the fact that the school bus service was discontinued, the services of the petitioners meaning thereby petitioner No. 5, the driver of the bus, were discontinued “by accepting his resignation”. In paragraph 8, she has referred to the discontinuance of the services of petitioner No. 9, the cleaner, and in that connection she has again asserted that in view of the fact that the management had already decided to “close the school bus”, his services also became redundant and were terminated. It is thus apparent that the school bus-service was not stopped nor was the school bus allegedly sold between the date of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court on 16th October, 1986 and the date of the order of the Supreme Court, namely 23rd January, 1987. In fact, the school bus service was closed, as stated earlier, on 31st January, 1986 and the services of petitioners 5 and 9 were terminated according to the respondents also on that count and that ground was itself a subject-matter of dispute before the School-Tribunal. The School-Tribunal had taken into consideration the contention of the respondents in that behalf and after negativing the said contention had given its verdiet on August 29, 1986 which has been confirmed by all the higher Courts, including the Supreme Court When we asked Mr. Bajaj, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, and Mr. Kamat appearing for respondent No. 2, as to in what circumstances it was represented to the Supreme Court that the bus service was discontinued after the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, or even for that matter, after the decision of the Tribunal, the Counsel could not give any answer. This is therefore, an instance where even the Supreme Court was deliberately misguided on facts. Since the Supreme Court had given liberty to the petitioners to move this Court for appropriate direction with regard to petitioners 5 and 9 because of the said misrepresentation, there is no need for this Court to reconsider the earlier order dismissing the respondents' Letters Patent Appeal as against petitioners 5 and 9 (respondents 7 and 11 in the Special Leave Petition).

5. It further appears that after the present Contempt Petition was filed on January 29, 1987, the respondents preferred a Civil Miscellaneous Petition being Petition No. 19819 of 1987 in the Supreme Court for quashing the contempt proceedings and in the meanwhile for staying the same. In that petition the Supreme Court on June 28, 1987 passed the following order:

“The matter is adjourned to 13-7-1987. Contempt proceedings in the meantime shall remain stayed awaiting orders of this Court.”

6. Thereafter on July 13, 1987 the following order was passed by the Supreme Court:

“It was brought to our notice that the management's special leave petition against the High Court's direction for restoration of services of the teachers has been dismissed in this Court. In that view of the matter, there is no scope for granting an order of stay of employment of the teachers.

The management is allowed time till July 31, 1987 to comply with the direction of the High Court. The contempt proceedings shall not be proceeded with in the High Court until then.

CMP is disposed of”.

7. Hence today there is no stay of the present proceedings. We, therefore, propose to proceed with the same. Shri Bajaj appearing for respondent No. 1 however, sought to urge that the respondents had filed a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court being Writ Petition No. 3636 of 1982 challenging the validity of the Act itself and the same was admitted and is pending at present. Hence, pending the said proceedings the hearing of this petition be stayed. The Supreme Court has admittedly not granted in that petition any stay of the operation of the provisions of the Act nor is there any stay of the operation of the order of the Tribunal or of the present contempt proceedings. Hence the application made by Shri Bajaj has to be rejected. Shri Bajaj then tried to argue that the respondents had filed a review Petition before the School-Tribunal for reviewing its order from which the present proceedings have arisen and hence the proceedings be stayed. Needless to state that the School Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to review its order once the Writ Petition, and the Appeal in this Court and the Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court against its order have been disposed of. Hence the so called review petition before the Tribunal cannot stall the present proceedings.

8. Coming now to the merits of the present contempt proceedings, the undisputed facts are that the order of the School Tribunal dated August 29, 1986 directing reinstatement of the petitioners in service and of payment to them of all the benefits with retrospective effect have not been complied with. When the petition came up for hearing before us on the last occasion, we had also directed the respondents to deposit in this Court an amount of Rs. 66,000/- which even according to the respondents is approximately the amount due as salary to the petitioners up to 31st July, 1987. (This figure is disputed by the petitioners and they have at Exhibit ‘E’ to the present petition, given a statement of the amount due to the petitioners from 1st January, 1985 to 31st January, 1987. The said amount comes to Rs. 1,31,041.95). The respondents accordingly deposited the amount of Rs. 66,000/- on 13th instant. However, the respondents have even till this day neither issued letters to the petitioners to come and resume their services nor have they even in this Court offered to take them back in the service. The affidavit filed in reply to the contempt petition is silent upon it. When while dictating the judgment, we pointed out this fact to Shri Bajaj, he sought some time to take instructions from his client, the 1st respondent, who was present in Court, and after consulting her stated that although it was true that the respondents had not so far offered to take the petitioners back in service, the 1st respondent is now willing to take them back in service. We have referred to this fact since it has a bearing on the bona fides and the sincerity of the respondents.

9. Before we deal with the contentions of the respondents, it is necessary to state that there is no dispute that the 1st respondent is “the management” within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Act and it is she who is administering the school. The record also further shows that it is she who had contested the proceedings before the School Tribunal and had prosecuted all the proceedings in this Court and before the Supreme Court. It is again she who is contesting the present contempt proceedings on behalf of the respondents. Shri Bajaj appearing for her has also asserted before us that she is the “management” within the meaning of the said provisions.

10. The respondents' first contention is that the School Tribunal constituted under the Act being not a “Court” within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, there is no contempt for non-compliance of the direction given by the said Tribunal. Reliance for this purpose was placed on a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1956 All 258, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ratan Shukla. There, a view has been taken that the word “court” in Contempt of Courts Act cannot be interpreted to include all Tribunals. The Tribunal involved there was the District Magistrate who had exercised his powers under Section 160 of the U.P Municipalities Act, 1916. The Court took the View that although the Magistrate was authorised to make reference to the High Court, he was not bound to make such a reference nor did he become a statutory Court on that account. The Court has also observed there that the subordination contemplated by the Contempt of Courts Act is judicial subordination and since the High Court had no powers of appeal or revision over the decisions of the District Magistrate while he exercised the concerned powers, he would not be a Court subordinate to the High Court. It is apparent from the said judgment that the question whether the Magistrate's decision being subject to the judicial superintendence of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, the Magistrate was a Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act was not considered there. As against this authority, we have a decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1955 Bom. 103, Velji Shamji… v. Venkatrao Swamirao Nazare….*, which has taken a different view. In this case, the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes acting as a persona designata under City of Bombay Municipal Act was held to be a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court in terms has observed that under the Constitution the High Court has been given the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and the superintendence contemplated by Article 227 is not only administrative superintendence but also judicial superintendence. The Court has thereafter gone on to observe as follows:

“The subordination contemplated by Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act is a judicial subordination and there can be no doubt that the Chief Judge, although he is a persona designata, in passing order under Section 507, City of Bombay Municipal Act is a Tribunal which would fall within the purview and ambit of Article 227…”

11. With respect, we are bound by the decision of this Court and hence it will have to be held that the School Tribunal constituted under the Act is a “Court” within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act and hence a defiance of the orders passed by the School Tribunal can be punished under that Act. What is more, a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1986) 2 SCC 560 : AIR 1986 SC 1874, Principal R.P Arts, M.B & S.C.J.S College v. M.A Shah, is also a case arising out of the contempt or violation of the orders of the Affiliated Colleges Services Tribunal and the Court has held there that a violation of the said orders was punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act.

12. It was then contended that since the Act itself had made a provision for penalising the management for failure to comply with the Tribunal's directions, no proceedings for the contempt of Court under the Contempt of Courts Act can be taken for such defiance. The argument according to us is misconceived. In the first instance, the provisions of Section 13 of the Act show that a prosecution has to be launched for failure on the part of the management to comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal. If the management is convicted, the only punishment that can be awarded to the management is a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for the first offence, and to two thousand rupees for the second and subsequent offences. As has happened in the present case, the direction of the Tribunal to reinstate the petitioners cannot be enforced through the modalities of the said provisions of Section 13. It is, therefore, clear that the Act is not a Code by itself to ensure compliance with the directions given by the Tribunal. What is more, neither the provisions of the said Act nor the provisions of general law, including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, exclude the operation of the Contempt of Courts Act in such cases. It is well settled that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are in addition to the provisions contained in any law for the enforcement of the orders and directions given by the Courts. Apart from the fact that the provisions of the Act do not exclude the operation of the Contempt of Courts Act, the law is to the contrary, namely that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are in addition to the provisions of special statute even if such a statute provides for punishment for contempt of Courts. Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act makes this position very clear, when it states that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law relating to the contempt of Courts. If this is so even where a special law makes provision for contempt of Courts, it is difficult to appreciate the contention that when a statute like the present one does not make provision for Contempt of Courts, but marely provides for prosecution of the offender the exclusion of the Contempt of Courts Act should be read in it. This being the position in law, all that we have to find out is whether the respondents are guilty of the contempt of Court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act.

13. As pointed out above, till today the respondents have not complied with the direction given by the Tribunal for reinstating the petitioners. Nor had they paid them their dues. It is only when we gave direction in this petition to deposit at least the amount which, according to the respondents, was due to the petitioners towards their salaries that the amount was deposited by them on 13th August, 1987. The respondents on their own had thus not even offered to pay the salaries. The inaction on the part of the respondents is deliberate and in open defiance and wilful disobedience of the orders of the Tribunal and of this Court and the Supreme Court. There is no explanation given by the respondents, except that they were hitherto prosecuting their remedies. As pointed out above, the final attempt to block the operation of the Tribunal's order came to an end on 31st July, 1987, till which date they had succeeded in staying the present contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court, in fact had given them time to comply with the direction of the Tribunal till that day. Not only there is no desire whatsoever to comply with the Court's orders but Shri Bajaj on behalf of the respondents tried to quibble over the order passed by the Supreme Court on July 13, 1987 by urging that, firstly, the Supreme Court was under an impression that the Tribunal's order was for the restoration of services of the teachers. The present petitioners being not teachers the Supreme Court's order will have to be considered as ineffectual. He also argued that the Supreme Court had purported to stay the directions of the High Court but there were no directions of the High Court. The directions were of the Tribunal and hence also the order of the Supreme Court does not permit this Court to proceed further with the contempt proceedings. These hyper technicalities introduced by Shri Bajaj in his arguments only go to show the scant respect in which the respondents hold the courts and their orders contemptuous indifference and disregard that they have for them. It is obvious that the Supreme Court has referred to “teachers” in its order by a mistake. It is nobody's case that the Tribunal's order which was the subject-matter of the dispute related to teachers. The Supreme Court therefore, obviously did not have teachers in their view but only the petitioners, who belonged to the non-teaching staff. The error, therefore, has crept in unknowingly. It cannot, therefore, be argued as is done brazenly here that the Supreme Court would not have passed the said order, if the Court knew that the employees involved in the petition were not teachers but non-teachers. As regards the second plank of the argument, namely that there is no direction of the “High Court” but of the Tribunal, the respondents seem to forget that when the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of this Court rejected the writ petition and the appeal respectively, the effect was that this Court did in terms hold that the directions given by the Tribunal be implemented. The order passed by the Tribunal emerged in the orders passed by this Court and, therefore, there is nothing wrong if the Supreme Court in its order referred to in the directions of this Court.

14. Further in paragraph 2 of the affidavit-in-reply to the petition, respondent No. 1 has stated that she holds the Courts in high esteem and that she has not a semblance of an intention to commit contempt and that in the event of this Court coming to the conclusion that she is in contempt she tenders unqualified and unconditional apology for the same. Thereafter however she goes on to urge the very same contentions which were raised before the Tribunal, in this Court and the Supreme Court earlier in the main proceedings. According to us, this show of respect for the Court as well as the apology is neither bona fide nor sincere. On the other hand there is a consistent attempt on the part of the respondents to defy the orders of the Court. Not only there is not even a modicum of regret for the defiance of the order so far, but there is an attempt to justify it by reiterating the same old orguments which were rejected up to the Supreme Court level. What is worse the respondents, as pointed out earlier, have even hoodwinked the Supreme Court with the sole object of disobeying the orders. This conduct on the part of the respondents is calculated to substantially interfere with and tends to interfere with the due course of justice. We further find no circumstance in favour of the respondents mitigating the contempt committed by them. Unfortunately all the partners of the partnership firm which runs the second respondent school are not arraigned as contemners before us. Only the 1st respondent who even according to her is the “management” within the meaning of the Act and runs the entire show is before us. We are, therefore, of the view that respondent No. 1 is guilty of the contempt of court and we convict her accordingly for the same.

15. As regards punishment Shri Bajaj submits that the 1st respondent has been running the school for the last 49 years and she is about 70 years old. She has been operated on both her eyes for cataract, recently. As per the directions of this Court, she has also deposited Rs. 66,000/- on 13th August, 1987, i.e during the hearing of this petition. He, therefore, submits that a liberal view be taken of the contempt and the punishment be as mild as this Court can award. As against this, Shri Vashi for the petitioners contends that the petitioners have been out of service since January, 1986 i.e since the date their services were terminated; they belong to Class IV category and are without employment since then. They and their families have been starving. Even till this date, there was no bona fide attempt on the part of the respondents to take them back in service. It is only during the course of the hearing that for the first time the respondent reluctantly showed her willingness to take them back in service, when she apprehended that she would be convicted for the contempt. He also pointed out that even the amount deposited as salary is less than half of the salary which is due to the petitioners under the Rules.

16. The contempt and its punishment are matters between the Court and the contemner. There is no doubt that the present is a case of contumacious and a wilful discbedience of the orders of the Court There is neither repentance nor a bona fide attempt to purge the contempt. On the other hand, there is every effort to subvert the process of the Court and to interfere with it substantially. This brazen conduct on the part of the respondent has brought the Court and its process in ridicule creating a disrespect for its orders. The conduct, therefore, deserves a severe punishment both of fine and of substantive sentence. However, taking into consideration the fact that the 1st respondent is a lady alleged to be in the 70th year of her age, (though there is no evidence to bear it out and her appearance and health indicate a younger age which can make her stand detention in civil prison) and taking also further into consideration the fact that though belatedly and at the instance of the Court she has deposited at least Rs. 66,000/- in this Court towards wages (which are approximately half of the petitioners' emoluments prescribed under the Rules) we are of the view that punishment less than what is otherwise fit in the case should be awarded. We are also of the view that a mere sentence of fine, the prescribed maximum being only Rs. 2,000/-, will not meet the ends of justice. In fact, it will be a mockery of the law. Some substantive sentence has to be awarded to uphold the majesty of the law and the dignity of the Court. Hence we sentence the 1st respondent to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and to undergo detention in a civil prison for 15 days.

17. The execution and operation of this order is stayed for four weeks from to day to enable the respondents to approach the higher Court. The petitioners are at liberty to withdraw the amount of Rs. 66,000/- which is deposited by the respondents in this Court and to appropriate it towards their emoluments as per the statement to be furnished by the petitioners within a week from today. There will be no stay of the withdrawal of the amount. The withdrawal of the amount will be without prejudice to the contentions of the petitioners that they are entitled to larger amounts under the Rules and to adopt separate proceedings for the same.

Order accordingly.