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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 397 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sub-section (4) of Section 145 CrPC.
  • sub-clause (5) of Section 145 CrPC
  • provisions of Section 482 CrPC.4.
  • sub-section and section 398.(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 397 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sub-section (4) of Section 145 CrPC.
  • sub-clause (5) of Section 145 CrPC
  • provisions of Section 482 CrPC.4.
  • sub-section and section 398.(2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), resulting in a preliminary order. Subsequently, on 24-11-1980, the petitioner was absent while the opposite party was present, leading the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Basti, to dismiss the application under Section 145 CrPC in default. The petitioner challenged this dismissal by filing a revision petition before the Sessions Judge, Basti, who dismissed the revision on 9-12-1980, holding it to be not competent. Aggrieved by these orders, the petitioner filed an application under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of both orders and directing the Magistrate to decide the proceedings according to law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision petition lies against an order dismissing an application under Section 145 CrPC by the Magistrate.
  2. Whether the Sessions Judge was correct in dismissing the revision petition as not maintainable.
  3. The scope and applicability of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC in relation to orders passed under Section 145 CrPC.
  4. The propriety of dismissing proceedings under Section 145 CrPC in default due to absence of the petitioner.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhavrao Ganpat Rao v. Bhimrao Tukramji, AIR 1958 Bombay 450 Prohibition on dismissing Section 145 CrPC proceedings in default and the Magistrate's duty to continue proceedings until adjudication on merits. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the proceedings in default and emphasized that the Magistrate must continue the proceedings until proper determination of the dispute affecting public peace.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC, noting it is broad enough to include examination of legality, propriety, irregularity, and jurisdictional errors in proceedings before inferior criminal courts. The Court rejected the Sessions Judge’s dismissal of the revision petition as not maintainable, holding that a revision against an order dismissing proceedings under Section 145 CrPC is competent. The Court emphasized the public interest underlying Section 145 CrPC, which aims at preventing breach of peace rather than resolving personal disputes. Consequently, the Court reasoned that dismissal of such proceedings in default due to absence of a party is improper. The Magistrate’s duty is to proceed with the case until a final adjudication under sub-section (4) or (5) of Section 145 CrPC. The Court found the Magistrate’s order dismissing the proceedings in default to be erroneous, relying on established case law to reinforce this principle. In the interest of justice and avoiding delay, the Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the impugned orders and directed the Magistrate to continue the proceedings lawfully from the point of dismissal.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed. The Court set aside the impugned orders dated 24-11-1980 and 9-12-1980 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Sessions Judge respectively. The case is remitted to the Magistrate with directions to continue the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC from the stage at which they were dismissed in default and to conclude the matter in accordance with law.

The decision directly affects the parties by reinstating the proceedings and clarifies that dismissal of Section 145 CrPC cases in default is improper. No new precedent beyond this case’s application of existing principles was established.

    Ram Yagya v. State

    M.N Shukla, J.:— This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that the orders dated 24-11-1980 and 9-12-1980 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Basti and the Sessions Judge, Basti respectively be quashed and the Magistrate concerned may be directed to decide the proceedings in accordance with law.

    2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The short facts leading to this application are that proceedings under Section 145 CrPC were commenced at the instance of the applicant and a preliminary order was duly passed. There after the case proceeded and on one date, namely, 24-11-1980 the petitioner was absent, the opposite party was present, hence the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate dismissed the application under Section 145 CrPC. in default.

    3. The petitioner preferred a revision against the same, which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on 9-12-1980 and he held that the revision was not competent. It is these orders by which the petitioner has felt aggrieved and has teken recourse to the provisions of Section 482 CrPC.

    4. The question canvassed before me is as to whether a revision lay against an order dismissing the petitioner's application under section 145 CrPC. It is the case of the parties that second revision is clearly prohibited under section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the order passed by the Sessions Judge was erroneous the only remedy open to the petitioner for correction of the order was by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 CrPC. But the basic question is as to whether a criminal revision lay to the Sessions Judge against an order of the Magistrate dismissing the proceedings in default. A revision can be filed under section 397 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

    “397. (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, where calling for such record, direct the execution of any sentence or order be suspended and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending for examination of the record.

    Explanation—All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and section 398.

    (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercise in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

    (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.”

    5. It is the jurisdiction of the High Court by exercising its powers of revision to call for and examine the record of any proceeding of any inferior Criminal Court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court. The ambit of the power is very wide inasmuch as the legality, propriety, irregularity of the proceedings and, of course, jurisdictional errors etc. are all embraced in the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It cannot be seriously contended that the case pending before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate commenced on an application filed by the petitioner under section 145 CrPC was not a proceeding. If while dealing with such proceedings any irregularity, illegality or error is committed by the subordinate Criminal Court, which merits interference by the Court in revision in the exercise of its superior powers, surely a revision for the purpose of obtaining such relief would be competent. The jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge was invoked by the revision for the purpose of examining the validity of the order of the Magistrate dismissing Section 145 CrPC proceedings in default. Therefore, in my opinion, the order of the learned Sessions Judge dismissing the petitioner's revision as not maintainable was patently erroneous and must be set aside.

    6. After quashing that order normally this Court would have remanded the case to the revisional Court for disposing of the revision in the light of the order passed by this Court but on the facts of the instant case I think it would not be expedient in the ends of justice that any further delay be suffered to take place in the final disposal of a case under section 145 CrPC. Hence, I refrain from following the routine procedure of remanding the case to the revisional Court. If on merits I find that the impugned order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was contrary to law, it would be just and proper that this Court shall in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC quash that order also and then direct the Magistrate to proceed in accordance with law. I am unable to endorse the order of the Magistrate dismissing the proceedings under section 145 CrPC for default on account of the absence of the petitioner. There are proceedings which may be purely in the nature of a personal dispute between the parties to a case. On the other hand, there may be another category of cases in which incidentally what may be a dispute between the parties actually triggers off a much larger issue. The prime motive for permitting legal proceedings under section 145 CrPC is prevention of breach of peace an objective predominently connected with public interest. This changes the entire complexion of such proceedings which are not in the nature of a personal fued between two persons or sets of persons. It gives them a larger canvas as the danger to public peace and tranquility is to be effectively prevented. This is what places the proceedings under section 145 CrPC on an entirely different footing. In such cases mere negligence or want of sufficient care and diligence of the prosecution depending on the personal conduct of a party loses importance and has to be subordinated to the larger interest of the public by enjoining a final termination of the proceedings only after adjudication of the case on merits. This seems to have influenced the long string of decisions which have countenanced the view that the proceedings under section 145 CrPC cannot be dismissed in default. The Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to commence such proceedings by passing a “preliminary order”. Having once formed the opinion that an apprehension of breach of peace existed, so long as an order under sub-clause (5) of Section 145 CrPC is not made, the Magistrate's duty is not to terminate the proceedings but to proceed further under sub-section (4) of Section 145 CrPC. This provision imposes a very important duty on the Magistrate to continue such proceedings until he decides which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order or until it is shown under sub-section (5) that ‘no such dispute exists’ or ‘has existed’. The preliminary order can be cancelled only under one circumstance, namely, that the parties required by the Magistrate to appear in proceedings satisfy him that no dispute threatening public peace existed. It follows that it is wrong on the part of Magistrate to treat the informant as complainant and dismiss the proceedings on the date on which he failed to attend the Court. See Bhavrao Ganpat Rao v. Bhimrao Tukramji, AIR 1958 Bombay 450. Therefore, in my opinion, the order passed by the Magistrate was clearly erroneous.

    7. In the result this petition is allowed, the impugned orders are set aside and the case is sent back to the Court of the Magistrate concerned with the direction that he would continue the proceedings in the case under section 145 CrPC from the stage at which it was dismissed in default and conclude them in accordance with law.

    8. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Ram Yagya v. State
    (Sep 16, 1982)