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2003 INSC 5
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 5
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of 27/28 April 1989, Bhura, his son Ram Narain, and Lal Chand (PW-1) were asleep in Bhura’s house at Village Joshian Ki Dhani, Rajasthan. Around 10–11 p.m., the appellants, Moti and Chittarmal, together with several others, allegedly entered the house armed with swords, axes and farsis. Bhura and Ram Narain were fatally attacked, while Lal Chand sustained 24 injuries but survived.

Bhenru (PW-5) lodged FIR Ex. P-1 naming Moti and others; Chittarmal was not originally named. Police registered offences under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307 and 447 IPC. Only the present appellants were charge-sheeted; the trial court later summoned five additional accused under Section 319 CrPC.

The Sessions Court convicted all seven accused. Moti and Chittarmal were sentenced to death under Section 302 IPC and to five years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 IPC. On appeal, the Rajasthan High Court acquitted the five co-accused, declined the death reference, and substituted life imprisonment for the appellants under Section 302 while affirming the Section 307 sentence. The present appeals by special leave challenge that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction of the appellants for murder could stand in the absence of a specific charge under Section 302 IPC, the original charge having been framed under Section 302/149 IPC.
  2. Whether the evidence, particularly the solitary testimony of injured witness Lal Chand (PW-1), was sufficient to affirm the appellants’ participation in the killings and the assault.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • A conviction under the substantive offence of Section 302 IPC is impermissible without a distinct charge; a charge under Section 302/149 IPC cannot be substituted (relying on Subran v. State of Kerala).
  • The testimony of Lal Chand is unreliable: there was no reference to artificial lighting in the FIR, casting doubt on his ability to identify the assailants; further, he made improvements by implicating co-accused at trial.

State's Arguments

  • Under the principles in Willie Slaney v. State of M.P. and State of A.P. v. Thakidiram Reddy, absence of a specific charge causes no prejudice where the facts and defence remain the same; hence the conviction is sustainable.
  • The consistent medical evidence and presence of an electric bulb established adequate conditions for identification, corroborating Lal Chand’s account.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subran v. State of Kerala, (1993) 3 SCC 32 A specific charge under Section 302 IPC is mandatory before conviction for that offence. Cited by appellants; Court found it unnecessary to decide because it validated conviction under Section 302/34 instead.
Willie (William) Slaney v. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116 Irregularity or absence of charge is not fatal unless it occasions failure of justice.
State of A.P. v. Thakidiram Reddy, (1998) 6 SCC 554 Same principle as Willie Slaney concerning defective charges. Reinforced State’s submission on lack of prejudice.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 Overlap and distinction between Sections 34 and 149 IPC in constructive liability. Relied on to justify substituting Section 34 for Section 149.
Mannam Venkatadari v. State of A.P., (1971) 3 SCC 254 Guidelines on when Section 34 may replace Section 149. Applied to hold substitution a mere formality where common intention is proved.
Nethala Pothuraju v. State of A.P., (1992) 1 SCC 49 Further authority on constructive criminal liability under Sections 34/149. Supports entitlement to convict under Section 302/34.
Ram Tahal v. State of U.P., (1972) 1 SCC 136 Clarification of common intention vis-à-vis common object. Used to reinforce reasoning that appellants shared common intention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first affirmed the High Court’s rejection of eyewitness claims by Bhenru (PW-5) and others, noting inconsistencies and concluding they reached the scene post-incident. However, the injured witness Lal Chand’s presence was unquestionable: he bore 24 injuries, his account matched medical findings, and the investigating officer’s site plan confirmed an electric bulb enabling identification.

While Lal Chand attempted to implicate additional accused at trial, those statements were deemed embellishments and rightly ignored. His consistent attribution of sword blows to Moti and Chittarmal established their active participation.

Addressing the absence of a specific Section 302 charge, the Court held that even if Section 302 IPC could not stand alone, the facts clearly demonstrated a common intention. Because fewer than five participants remained after acquittal of co-accused, Section 149 was inapplicable. Relying on authoritative precedents, the Court found no bar to convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC: both arrived armed, simultaneously attacked Bhura and Ram Narain, and severely wounded Lal Chand, revealing a pre-arranged plan.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED. The conviction is modified to Section 302/34 IPC (from Section 302 IPC), but the sentence of life imprisonment and the conviction under Section 307 IPC remain intact.

Practical effect: the appellants continue to serve life imprisonment; no broader legal precedent was set beyond reaffirming principles on substituting Section 34 for Section 149 when common intention is proved.

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    Chittarmal v. State Of Rajasthan .

    B.P Singh, J.— These appeals by special leave have been preferred by Chittarmal and Moti who have impugned the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in DB Criminal Appeal No. 563 of 1997 and DB Crl. (Jail) Appeal No. 1 of 1998 dated 5-9-2000. The High Court while acquitting the other accused of the charges levelled against them, found the appellants guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 IPC. The appellants who had been sentenced to death by the trial court for committing the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life declining the death reference. The trial court had also sentenced the appellants to undergo five years' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs 2000 for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, in default of payment of fine, six months' simple imprisonment, which was upheld by the High Court. The conviction of the appellants under Section 148 IPC was, however, set aside.

    2. The case of the prosecution is that on the night intervening 27-4-1989/28-4-1989 the deceased Bhura and Ram Narain and Lal Chand, PW 1 were sleeping in their house in Village Joshian Ki Dhani when the appellants herein along with five other persons entered the house at about 10 or 11 p.m and brutally assaulted Bhura and Ram Narain as also Lal Chand, PW 1. Bhura and Ram Narain succumbed to their injuries but Lal Chand, PW 1, who suffered as many as 24 injuries survived the assault. Bhura was the father of Ram Narain and the father-in-law of Lal Chand, PW 1. The first information report Ext. P-1 was lodged by Bhenru, PW 5, another son of Bhura (deceased) alleging that on the night of the occurrence Moti (appellant) along with Ramsi, Ratan, Lala, Chhagan, Jaggu and 2-3 others armed with axes, farsis and swords entered the house of Bhura and mounted a murderous assault as a result of which Bhura and Ram Narain lost their lives while Lal Chand, PW 1 was severely injured. It may be noticed at this stage that Chittarmal was not named as one of the accused in the first information report. On the basis of the first information report a case was registered under Sections 147, 148, 302, 307 and 447 IPC at PS Sanganer. In the course of investigation bloodstained clothes and the weapons of offence are said to have been recovered at the instance of accused persons. The post-mortem examination of the bodies of Bhura and Ram Narain was conducted by Dr Nirmal Kumar Sharma, PW 18 and Dr H.C Bairwa, PW 14. Lal Chand, PW 1 was examined by Dr B.C Temani, PW 15, who prepared the injury report Ext. P-26. The report discloses that Lal Chand, PW 1 had suffered as many as 24 injuries, most of them incised wounds which, in the opinion of the doctor, could have been caused by a heavy long sharp-edged weapon. Injuries 9 and 17 were of grievous nature, which were described as follows in the report:

    “(9) Traumatic amputation in an area of 12 cm × 4 cm × cut bones (metacarpals rounded clear-cut) chopping from 2 cm above wrist joint, little and ring finger missing out of the left hand with incised wound 3 cm × 2 cm × muscle-deep on posteromedial part of middle finger.
    (17) Incised wound (V-shaped) 4 ½ cm × ½ cm × muscle, bone-deep on posteromedial and lateral aspect of proximal and terminal phalanx covering anterior aspect of thumb.”

    3. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted only against the appellants herein since the investigating agency found no case against the other accused persons. After the trial commenced before the Sessions Court and seven witnesses had been examined, the Public Prosecutor moved an application for summoning the remaining accused for trial under Section 319 CrPC. The said application was allowed by the Sessions Judge by his order dated 30-3-1992 and the remaining five accused, namely, Ramsi, Ratan, Chhagan, Jaggu and Lala were also summoned for trial.

    4. Initially when the appellants were put up for trial charges were framed against them under Sections 307 and 302 IPC and in the alternative under Sections 307/149 IPC and 302/149 IPC. However, after the remaining accused were summoned for trial the charges were reframed and they were all charged under Sections 148, 302/149 and 307/149 IPC. At the trial the informant Bhenru, PW 5 claiming to be an eyewitness stated that at about 10 or 11 p.m he was at the house of Ramjiwan where they were enjoying a smoke. He heard a noise from the side of his house and, therefore, rushed to his house followed by his cousin Bhanwar. When he reached his house, he saw the appellants Moti and Chittar inflicting injuries on Lal Chand while the remaining accused, namely, Chhagan, Jaggu, Ramsi, Ratan and Lala were surrounding him. The accused also caused injuries to his father Bhura and brother Ram Narain. He cried for help which attracted Ramjiwan, Hanuman, Kesra and Chittar to the place of occurrence, but by that time the accused had fled. The prosecution also examined Bhanwar Lal, PW 2, Chittar, PW 3, Ramjiwan, PW 4, Kesra, PW 6 and Hanuman, PW 7 to support the version given by the informant. Lal Chand (PW 1), an injured witness, was also examined to prove the case of the prosecution. Accepting the testimony of the witnesses the trial court found all the accused guilty of the offence under Section 148 IPC. It convicted the appellants Moti and Chittarmal of the offences under Sections 302 and 307 IPC while finding the remaining accused guilty of the offences under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC. The trial court sentenced the appellants herein to death for the offence under Section 302 IPC and made a reference to the High Court for confirmation of the death sentence.

    5. The appellants as well as the other accused preferred appeals before the High Court which were heard along with the death reference. The High Court while declining the death reference allowed the appeals in part inasmuch as the accused, other than the appellants herein, were acquitted of all the charges levelled against them while the appellants herein were found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 IPC.

    6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance we have perused the evidence on record.

    7. The High Court did not accept the claim of Bhenru, PW 5 of being an eyewitness. In a detailed judgment the High Court has recorded its clear finding and given good and cogent reasons for disbelieving the claim of the informant of being an eyewitness. The High Court noticed the evidence of the other witnesses and finding considerable inconsistency in the testimony of the witnesses came to the conclusion that neither Bhenru nor those witnesses had witnessed the occurrence. In all likelihood they had reached the place of occurrence after the assailants had made good their escape. After perusing the evidence on record we find ourselves in complete agreement with the High Court on this aspect of the matter. Moreover, the acquittal of the remaining accused is not the subject-matter of challenge before us in these appeals, nor has the State preferred an appeal against acquittal of the remaining accused. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to consider in detail the evidence pertaining to the complicity of the accused who have been acquitted by the High Court.

    8. The High Court, however, found that so far as Lal Chand, PW 1 was concerned, his presence at the place of occurrence could not be disputed. He was subjected to merciless assault and had suffered as many as 24 injuries. According to Lal Chand, PW 1 on the night of occurrence he was sleeping in the house of his father-in-law Bhura. His brother-in-law Ram Narain was also sleeping there on a separate cot. At night he heard the sound of thali and woke up. He saw Moti assaulting his brother-in-law Ram Narain with a sword while Chittar was assaulting his father-in-law Bhura with a sword. When he got up he was also assaulted by both of them with swords and he suffered a large number of injuries on his head, hands and legs. At the trial, this witness no doubt implicated Chhagan, Jaggu, Ramsi, Ratan and Lala as well stating that they were with the appellants with axes and farsis and that all of them had caused injuries to him. This part of the evidence of Lal Chand has not been accepted by the High Court and for good reasons. Lal Chand in his statement before the police had not stated that the remaining accused, apart from the appellants, had come armed with the appellants and had assaulted him. His statement before the police was to the effect that when the appellants were going away from the place of occurrence he had seen Chhagan, Ramsi and Lala standing by the side of the wall near the babool tree. The other two accused were not even named by him. The babool tree was at a distance of about 60 yards from the place of occurrence. The High Court, therefore, rightly held that this part of his evidence was clearly an improvement and ought to be ignored. However, the rest of the evidence of Lal Chand was accepted by the High Court as truthful and on the basis of his evidence the High Court recorded the conviction of the appellants herein.

    9. We have carefully read the evidence of Lal Chand and we are in agreement with the High Court that his evidence cannot be discarded on the grounds urged by the defence. It was sought to be urged before us that there is no mention of any artificial light at the time of occurrence. The High Court has discussed the evidence on record and come to the conclusion that there was an electric bulb in front of the gate of the house. It was so found by the investigating officer who had prepared the site inspection memo Ext. P-2 on 28-4-1989. He was not cross-examined on this aspect of the matter even though he had asserted that he had seen the site and had prepared the site inspection memo correctly. Moreover, the failure to mention about existence of electric light in the FIR was not of much consequence and was not fatal to the case of the prosecution particularly when on site inspection such an electric bulb was found in front of the gate of the house. Moreover, as noticed by the High Court, the assailants belong to the same village and were known to Lal Chand. They had caused numerous injuries to Lal Chand with swords and, therefore, Lal Chand had abundant opportunity to identify them even if there was no light. Moreover, the testimony of Lal Chand was corroborated by the medical evidence on record. It was also sought to be urged that though Lal Chand stated that he woke up on hearing the sound of thali, he had not said so in his police statement. That also to our mind is not of much significance because he was sleeping next to his father-in-law and brother-in-law in the same room on a separate cot. When the appellants attacked his father-in-law and brother-in-law, that would have awakened Lal Chand from his sleep because in normal course the two persons sleeping next to him on being attacked must have resisted the attack and in that process there must have been some noise enough to awaken the witness. It is too much to assume that two persons sleeping on two separate cots nearby in the same room would be assaulted and killed and the sleep of the third person sleeping in the same room will not be disturbed.

    10. Having considered all aspects of the matter and perused the evidence on record, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the High Court that on the testimony of Lal Chand, PW 1 the participation of the appellants in the commission of the crime must be held to have been proved. Both the courts have concurrently found Lal Chand, PW 1 to be a reliable witness and even though he sought to make an improvement in the course of his deposition by naming the other accused persons, for that reason his entire evidence cannot be rejected. The High Court has rightly ignored that part of his evidence which appears to be in the nature of embellishment.

    11. It was then urged by counsel for the appellants that the High Court was in error in convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC in the absence of any specific charge framed under that section. It was contended, relying upon several decisions of this Court including Subran v. State of Kerala (1993) 3 SCC 32 that a person charged of an offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC cannot be convicted of the substantive offence under Section 302 IPC without a specific charge having been framed against him as envisaged by law. It was submitted that Section 149 creates a specific and distinct offence and, therefore, a specific charge under Section 302 IPC is a mandatory requirement of law before one can be found guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC. The fact that a charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC is framed, is not sufficient.

    12. On the other hand counsel for the State submitted, relying upon the decision of this Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of M.P AIR 1956 SC 116, 1956 Cri LJ 291 and State of A.P v. Thakidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554, JT (1998) 5 SC 398 that in all cases of constructive liability the absence of specific charge under one or other head of criminal liability by itself is not fatal and no conviction can be set aside unless prejudice is shown by such defective charge. The true test is whether the error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. In the facts of this case, she submitted no prejudice was caused to the appellants and no failure of justice was occasioned by convicting the appellants under Section 302 IPC even in the absence of a specific charge under Section 302 IPC.

    13. We do not consider it necessary, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to consider the aforesaid submissions, because we are clearly of the view that in any event the conviction of the appellants can be sustained under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

    14. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that Section 34 as well as Section 149 deal with liability for constructive criminality i.e vicarious liability of a person for acts of others. Both the sections deal with combinations of persons who become punishable as sharers in an offence. Thus they have a certain resemblance and may to some extent overlap. But a clear distinction is made out between common intention and common object in that common intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a prearranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common object does not necessarily require proof of prior meeting of minds or preconcert. Though there is a substantial difference between the two sections, they also to some extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case whether the charge under Section 149 overlaps the ground covered by Section 34. Thus, if several persons numbering five or more, do an act and intend to do it, both Section 34 and Section 149 may apply. If the common object does not necessarily involve a common intention, then the substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 might result in prejudice to the accused and ought not, therefore, to be permitted. But if it does involve a common intention then the substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 must be held to be a formal matter. Whether such recourse can be had or not must depend on the facts of each case. The non-applicability of Section 149 is, therefore, no bar in convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, if the evidence discloses commission of an offence in furtherance of the common intention of them all. (See Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1, Mannam Venkatadari v. State of A.P (1971) 3 SCC 254, AIR 1971 SC 1467, Nethala Pothuraju v. State of A.P (1992) 1 SCC 49, AIR 1991 SC 2214 and Ram Tahal v. State of U.P (1972) 1 SCC 136, AIR 1972 SC 254)

    15. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find no difficulty in convicting the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, even though the charge framed was one under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. On the facts proved, it must be held that the appellants came together armed with lethal weapons and simultaneously started the assault on Ram Narain and Bhura, who succumbed to their injuries. When Lal Chand, PW 1 woke up, he was also mercilessly assaulted by both of them inflicting as many as 24 injuries. The remaining accused, apart from the appellants, have been acquitted on a finding that they did not come with the appellants duly armed, they did not share the common object, nor did they take part in the assault on the two deceased or PW 1. Thus the charge under Section 302 read with Section 149 could not stand, the number of participants in the crime being less than five.

    16. But so far as the appellants are concerned, it cannot be doubted on the findings recorded that they shared a common intention and had acted pursuant thereto. Overt act and active participation is indicative of common intention of the persons perpetrating the crime, and in the facts and circumstances of this case, we have no doubt that the appellants shared the common intention to commit the murders of the deceased and acting in concert they executed their prearranged plan to eliminate them. Their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 can be safely recorded.

    17. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants is altered to one under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC instead of one under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment is maintained. Subject to the above, the appeals are dismissed.

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    Chittarmal v. State Of Rajasthan .
    (Jan 8, 2003)