R.M Sahai, J.— The only question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal is if the appellant, whose election to the Legislative Assembly of Punjab was set aside by the Tribunal for improper rejection of nomination paper of another candidate, is entitled to pension and other benefits under Haryana Legislative Assembly (Allowances and Pension of Members) Act, 1975, as it stood in 1978, (for short ‘the 1975 Act’).
2. In 1952 the appellant was elected as member of the Legislative Assembly of the erstwhile State of Punjab from Dabwali Constituency. He served as a member from February 1952 to May 1953 till his election was set aside by the Tribunal in May 1953. The operative portion of the Tribunal's order dated 16-5-1953 reads as under:
“We by majority opinion, hold that the nomination papers of Shri Sher Singh were improperly rejected and this improper rejection had materially affected the result of the election of Dabwali Constituency, and therefore, the election of S. Karnail Singh respondent to this seat is declared wholly void ….”
3. This order became final. In 1966 on reorganisation of the State of Punjab Dabwali Constituency became a part of the Haryana State. The Haryana Legislature enacted the 1975 Act. Rules were framed in 1978. The appellant made representation for various benefits under Sections 7-A, 7-B and 7-C of the 1975 Act. It was rejected in 1986. He, therefore, filed the writ petition seeking direction to pay him pension and other benefits as provided in the 1975 Act. The learned Single Judge held that even though Section 100 and Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short ‘the RP Act’) provided for declaration of election to be void, but this declaration could be obtained, only, if someone approached the Tribunal. In other words, if no one would have approached the appellant would have continued as a member. Consequently, according to learned Single Judge, the election of the appellant became void not because it was so from its inception but it was voidable and was avoided by filing a petition only. Therefore, it became void from the date of declaration and not prior to it. Support for it was drawn from sub-section (1-A) and it was held that in absence of any specific provision like the one for corrupt practices the legislature did not intend to deny pension to a member whose election was declared void for no fault of his. The Division Bench did not agree with this reasoning and construction of the provisions of the RP Act or the 1975 Act and held that the effect of the order of the Tribunal was that the appellant could not be deemed to be a member of the Legislative Assembly right from the beginning.
4. Section 7-A of the 1975 Act reads as under:
“7-A. (1) Every person, who has served as a member shall be paid a pension of five hundred rupees per mensem:
Provided that where any person has served as aforesaid for a period exceeding five years there shall be paid to him an additional pension of fifty rupees per mensem for every year or part thereof in excess of five.
(1-A) No pension shall be admissible under sub-section (1) to a member in respect of the term and during the period for which he is disqualified under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or any other law for the time being in force.”
5. Pension under Section 7-A of the 1975 Act was dependent or correlated with membership of the Assembly. Could the appellant be deemed to be member from February 1952 to 15-5-1953? Literally speaking, he was a member. But can it be said so in law? An election of a candidate is subject to an election petition under the RP Act. Section 100 of it (as it then stood) entitled a person to seek declaration that the election was void on number of grounds, one of them being —
“That the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination, the Tribunal shall declare the election to be wholly void.”
6. Even Section 84 of the RP Act entitled a person to claim relief for declarations—
“(a) that the election of the returned candidate was void;
(b) that the election of the returned candidate was void and that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected;
(c) that the election was wholly void.”
And the Tribunal was vested with power of declaring, “the election of the returned candidate to be void; or declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected; or declaring the election to be wholly void”. These provisions clearly and unequivocally provided for declaration of the election to be void. That which is void is non est in law. What is declared void is the election and not the period or part of it for which a person is elected. Since the election was declared void because of improper rejection of the nomination paper it went to the root vitiating the entire election. A person who was entitled to contest was prevented from doing so by an illegality which rendered entire election as nugatory.
7. Even though the appellant did serve as a member for a period of nearly one year, but his membership was in consequence of his being elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly. Once the election was set aside the natural consequence of it was that the appellant ceased to be a member. The order passed by the Tribunal, which has been extracted above, declared the appellant's election as void. The effect of the declaration was that it shall be deemed that no election had taken place in law. The order of the Tribunal could not be read in two parts, one upholding the election of the appellant for a period of one year, and other declaring it void for the remaining period. In fact no such declaration could be granted. Any other construction would be in teeth of Sections 80, 84, 89 and 100 of the RP Act.
8. ‘Void’ dictionarily means, ineffectual, nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect, unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended; nugatory and ineffectual so that nothing can cure it; not valid. In Words and Phrases (American), Vol. 44, published by West Publishing Co., at page 319 it is stated thus:
“A ‘void’ thing is nothing; it has no legal effect whatsoever; and no rights whatever can be obtained under it or grow out of it. In law it is the same thing as if the void thing had never existed.”
What was declared void was election. That is the process which led to choosing or selecting appellant as a member was invalid. The legal effect of declaration granted by the Tribunal was that the election of the appellant became non-existent resulting automatically in nullifying the earlier declaration. The declaration did not operate from the date it was granted but it related back to the date when election was held. The legislative provision being clear and the Tribunal being vested only with power of declaring election to be void the entire controversy about voidable and void was unnecessary. The appellant could not, therefore, claim any pension under Section 7-A of the 1975 Act.
9. In our opinion, the Division Bench did not commit any error of law in allowing the appeal and dismissing the writ petition. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs.