Citation Codes

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Case Number

C.W.P No. 4312 of 1995.

Attorney(S)

Mr. S.P. Jain
Advocate.

Judges

G.S Singhvi & T.H.B Chalapathi, JJ.

Acts

Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with Section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1992 (for short the 1922 Act).
provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the 1894 Act).3. Submission
Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.
Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
SECTION 42 PUNJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT 1922
provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of the Code
section 28, the invocation of section 151 CPC
section 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act
LAND ACQUISITION AMENDMENT ACT
provisions of the Land Acquition Act, 1894
section 152 CPC. Though section 151 CPC
provisions of Sections 11, 18 and 28-A
sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of Section 23
PUNJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT ACT
section 18 of the 1922 Act,
Sections 151 and 152, C.P.C,
Amendment Act 68 of 1984
LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Section 4(1)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (G.S. Singhvi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Improvement Trust, Hoshiarpur, acquired the land of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to implement a development scheme in the locality known as Premgarh, revenue estate Hoshiarpur. The scheme initially covered 40.93 acres; later the total area was measured as 346 Kanals 7 Marlas. A notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was issued on 16.1.1978. An award by the Land Acquisition Collector was made on 6.1.1979, followed by supplementary awards on 21.2.1979 and 30.7.1979.

The landowners filed applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with Section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. Those applications were decided by the Land Acquisition Tribunal (Improvement Trust), Hoshiarpur by an order dated 17.3.1983 (Annexure P1).

About eleven years after the order of 17.3.1983, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 filed an application under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for correction of that order. The Tribunal, by the impugned order, directed that the claimants be paid solatium at the rate of 30% of the market value and interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation for the first year and at 15% thereafter until realisation of the enhanced amount.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Land Acquisition Tribunal (Improvement Trust) could exercise powers under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure to modify the earlier order/award and grant solatium and interest to respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
Whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (specifically Section 23(1-A) etc.) were applicable so as to entitle the landowners to enhanced benefits, despite the awards having been passed before the amendment.
Whether the claimants' application (filed approximately 11 years after the Tribunal's order of 17.3.1983) was maintainable, given the alternative remedy (as argued) of appeal within the prescribed limitation period under the relevant statutory scheme.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Shri Jain)

The Tribunal committed illegality by exercising powers under Sections 151 and 152 CPC to modify the award by granting solatium and interest; the Tribunal is not a "Court" for purposes of the Land Acquisition Act and therefore cannot invoke those provisions.
The claimants' application was filed after a delay of almost 11 years from the order dated 17.3.1983; their remedy, if aggrieved, was to file an appeal before the High Court within 90 days, and after the limitation period expired the Tribunal could not entertain a correction/review application.
Relied on Supreme Court decisions: Babua Ram and others v. State of U.P. and another, and Union of India v. Karnail Singh (as authority for limitations/limitations of remedies post-award).

Respondents' Arguments (Shri G.S. Jaiswal)

The claimants were entitled to compensation under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.
Relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court: Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Daljinder Singh and others (1992 P.L.J. 520) to support entitlement under the Amendment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Babua Ram and others v. State of U.P. and another (1994/1995 references)	Interpreted provisions of Sections 11, 18 and 28-A; held that the three-month limitation under Section 28-A runs from date of award under Section 26 and that Section 28-A(1) is prospective and does not apply to awards made prior to 24.9.1994; Section 28-A applies only to awards under Part-III.	The court relied on this interpretation to support the conclusion that late invocation of amended benefits is not permissible where awards predate the amendment; it contributed to the court's finding that the Tribunal's reasoning was legally impermissible.
Union of India v. Karnail Singh (1995 reference)	This case was cited by the petitioner; the opinion lists it among authorities relied upon by the petitioner.	The opinion notes the petitioner relied on this decision; the court treated it as part of petitioner’s authority on limitation/availability of remedies but does not elaborate the decision's principle beyond noting reliance.
Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Daljinder Singh and others (1992 P.L.J. 520)	Division Bench decision of this Court relied upon by respondents to support applicability of the Amendment (Section 23(A) or Section 23(1-A)).	The court explicitly held that in view of subsequent Supreme Court decisions it was not possible to accept respondents' contention regarding applicability of Section 23(A) based on this Division Bench judgment.
State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar (JT 1995 (2) SC 582)	Held that the additional amounts under sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of Section 23 are in addition to market value and not part of the component under Section 23(1); interest is consequential to enhancement; where the court has not enhanced compensation on reference, it is devoid of power to award such additional benefits; invocation of Section 151 CPC is excluded by implication where Section 23 provides express power.	The court relied on this reasoning to conclude that the Tribunal/Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to award additional benefits under the Amendment by invoking inherent powers and that such orders are void.
State of Punjab v. Babu Singh (1995)	Reversed an order granting additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) where application was made under Sections 151 and 152 CPC; held the Amendment Act had no application where notification and award predated the Amendment; High Court without jurisdiction to entertain such applications.	The court cited this as supporting authority for the proposition that the Amendment Act cannot be invoked to modify awards or decrees made prior to the Amendment by using inherent powers under CPC.
Neer Fazeelath Hussain v. Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (JT 1995 (3) SC 410)	Held that interest envisaged in Section 28 of the Act is not part of compensation and solatium is also not part of the award.	The court relied on this principle to reinforce that solatium and interest are not components of the award that can be treated as having been simply overlooked and later added via inherent powers of the court/tribunal.
Union of India v. Raghuvir Singh (JT 1989 (2) SC 427)	Referenced in Neer Fazeelath Hussain; the opinion records it as an earlier decision to which Neer Fazeelath referred.	The opinion notes this earlier decision's reference; it forms part of the chain of authority relied upon concerning the non-inclusion of interest/solatium within the award.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Malaprabha Dam Project v. Madivalappa B. Melavanki (1995)	Held that where an award was passed prior to the Amendment (14.12.1981 in that case), claimants are not entitled to 30% solatium on the enhanced compensation and additional amounts under the Amendment.	The court used this authority to support its conclusion that the claimants in the present case could not validly be granted solatium and additional interest under the Amendment when the awards predated the Amendment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the impugned order and the Tribunal's stated reasons. The Tribunal had entertained the application of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under Sections 151 and 152 CPC on the ground that the landowners were entitled to the benefit of the Land Acquisition Act amendments and that no limitation was prescribed for filing the application. On merits the Tribunal awarded solatium at 30% and interest at 9% for the first year and 15% thereafter.

The court concluded that the Tribunal's rationale for entertaining and deciding the application was "patently illegal" and required setting aside. The reasoning proceeded principally by reference to a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Land Acquisition Act and its Amendment:

The court relied on Babua Ram and others to show that the statutory limitation provisions (Section 28-A as interpreted) restrict the availability of remedies after an award and that Section 28-A is prospective; the Amendment would not apply retrospectively to awards made before the specified date.
State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar was used to demonstrate that the additional amounts under Section 23(1-A) and (2) are additions to market value and are not part of the original award; where a court has not enhanced compensation on reference, it lacks power to award those additional amounts by invoking inherent powers (Section 151 CPC), and Section 151 is by implication excluded where Section 23 provides express power.
State of Punjab v. Babu Singh reinforced that the Amendment Act has no application to awards predating the Amendment and that proceedings under Sections 151 and 152 CPC cannot be used to award additional benefits under the Amendment.
Neer Fazeelath Hussain (and referenced earlier authorities) established that interest under Section 28 and solatium are not components of the award; they are consequential to enhancement and cannot be treated as integral to an already passed award.
Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Madivalappa B. Melavanki provided further support that claimants with awards made prior to the Amendment are not entitled to solatium and the additional benefits claimed under the Amendment.

Applying these precedents to the facts (the awards and notification in the present matter predated the Amendment), the court found that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application under Sections 151 and 152 CPC for granting additional benefits under the Amendment. The court also noted that although the petitioner had raised an objection about the applicability of the Amendment to acquisitions under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, that particular objection was not pressed at argument and was not considered further.

Holding and Implications

WRIT PETITION ALLOWED; IMPUGNED ORDER QUASHED

Holding: The court held that respondent No. 1 (the Tribunal) acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the application under Sections 151 and 152 CPC and in passing the impugned order granting solatium and interest. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed and the impugned order was quashed.

Immediate consequences for the parties: If respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have received any amounts under the impugned order, they are directed to refund those amounts along with interest to the petitioner within a period of two months.

Broader implications: The opinion rests on and applies existing Supreme Court authorities that limit the availability of Amendment benefits (Section 23(1-A), interest, solatium) to cases where the statutory conditions are met and the awards fall within the temporal and procedural reach of the Amendment. The opinion does not purport to create a new precedent; it applies the Supreme Court's decisions to hold that the Tribunal's invocation of Sections 151/152 CPC to grant Amendment benefits where the award predated the Amendment was impermissible.

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Hoshiarpur Improvement Trust Through Its Chairman v. President, Land Acquisition Tribunal, Hoshiarpur .

G.S Singhvi, J. — The land of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 was acquired by the Improvement Trust, Hoshiarpur, in order to carry out the development scheme framed by it. Initially, the scheme was for 40.93 Acres of land situated in the locality known as Premgarh in the revenue estate of Hoshiarpur. Subsequently, the total area was measured as 346 Kanals 7 Marlas. Notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 was issued on 16.1.1978 Thereafter an award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 6.1.1979 A supplementary award was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector on 21.2.1979 Another supplementary award was made by him on 30.7.1979 The landowners filed applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with Section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1992 (for short ‘the 1922 Act’). These applications were decided by the Land Acquisition Tribunal (Improvement Trust) Hoshiarpur on 17.3.1983 vide order (Annexure P1). After about 11 years of the passing of the order (Annexure P1) the landowners (respondents Nos. 2 and 3) filed an application under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for correction of the order dated 17.3.1983 and by the impugned order the Tribunal has directed that the claimants shall be entitled to payment of solatium at the rate of 30 per cent of the market value and interest at the rate of 9 per cent annum on the enhanced amount of compensation for the first year and at the rate of 15 per cent for the subsequent period till the realisation of the enhanced amount.

2. Although in the writ petition the impugned order has also been challenged on the ground that the provisions of the Land Acquition Act, 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 are not applicable to the acquisition of lands under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, during the course of arguments learned counsel appearing for the petitioner did not press this point and, therefore, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the objection of the petitioner regarding the non-applicability of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the 1894 Act’).

3. Submission of Shri Jain is that the Tribunal has committed a serious illegality in exercising the power Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure to modify the award by grant of solatium and interest to respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Learned counsel argued that the Tribunal was not entitled to apply the provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of the Code because it is not a Court for the purposes of the Land Acquition Act. Another argument of Shri Jain is that the Tribunal has altogether ignored the fact that the claimants had filed an application after almost 11 years of the passing of the impugned order dated 17.3.1983 The learned counsel argued that if at all respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were aggrieved by the order passed under section 18 of the 1922 Act, the remedy available to them was to file an appeal before the High Court within a period of 90 days and once the period of limitation expired it was not competent for the Tribunal to have entertained the application filed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for correction/review. Shri Jain placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Babua Ram and others v. State of U.P and another, 1995 (1) RRR 293 (SC) : JT 1994 (7) SC 377, and Union of India v. Karnail Singh, 1995 (2) RRR 285 (SC) : (1995-2) 110 P.L.R 661 (SC).

4. Shri G.S Jaiswal, appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, supported the impugned order by arguing that the claimants were entitled to compensation under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. He relied on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in The Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Daljinder Singh and others, 1992 P.L.J 520.

5. Perusal of the impugned order shows that although the Land Acquisition Tribunal has considered the objection raised on behalf of the petitioner to the maintainability of the application filed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same has been brushed aside on the ground that a person whose land has been acquired is entitled to the benefit of the amendment made in the Land Acquisition Act and no limitation has been prescribed for filing of the application by the land-owners. On merits, the learned Tribunal held that the landowner was entitled to payment of solatium @ 30% of the market value and interest @ 9% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation for the first year and @ 15% for the subsequent period.

6. In our opinion, the reason assigned by the Tribunal for entertaining the application filed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and its order granting relief to the respondents is patently illegal and deserves to be set aside.

7. In Babua Ram and others v. State of U.P (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Sections 11, 18 and 28-A and held that limitation period of three months under Section 28-A expires with the expiry of three months from the date of award under Section 26 and thereafter no remedy is available to the landowners, In that case, it has also been held that Section 28-A(1) is prospective in nature and does not apply to an award made prior to 24.9.1994 It has further been held that Section 28-A applies to the award made under Part-III only and does not apply to the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court under Section 54.

8. In State Of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar., JT 1995 (2) SC 582, a question similar to the one raised in this petition arose for consideration before the Supreme Court. In that case, the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 17.12.1981 A reference was made to the civil Judge (Senior Division), Jalgaon, on an application filed by the claimants. The reference Court passed a decree dated 25.10.1983 and enhanced the compensation. No appeal was thereafter preferred. However, after coming into force the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984, the claimants made an application to the reference Court for awarding the enhanced solatium, additional compensation and interest under the amended Act. The Civil Judge allowed the application vide order dated 31.3.1986 The High Court summarily dismissed the appeal filed by the State. While reversing the orders of the Civil Judge and the High Court of Bombay, their Lordships held:—

“It would thus be seen that the additional amounts envisaged under sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of Section 23 are not part of the component of the compensation awarded under sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act. They are only in addition to the market value of the land. The payment of interest also is only consequential to the enhancement of the compensation. In a case where the Court has not enhanced the compensation on reference, the court is devoid of power to award any interest under section 28 or the spreading of payment of interest for one year from the date of taking possession at 9% and 15% thereafter till date of payment into the Court as envisaged under the proviso.

xx xx xx xx xx

Thus, it would be seen that a decree having been made under section 26(2), the civil court is left to correct only either clerical or arithmetical mistakes as envisaged expressly under section 13-A of the Act or under section 152 CPC. Though section 151 CPC gives inherent power to the Court, it is intended only to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or meet the ends of justice. The present is not a case of such nature, Further, since section 23 is an express power under which the Civil Court has been conferred with the jurisdiction to determine compensation, and in addition to the market value certain percentage of the amount is directed to be awarded as envisaged under section 23(1-A) and 23(2) and the interest component under section 28, the invocation of section 151 CPC by necessary implication stands excluded.

Thus, we hold that the Civil Court had inherent lack of jurisdiction and it was devoid of power to entertain the application to award additional benefits under the Amendment Act. The order thereby is clearly a void order. The High Court has not applied its mind to this crucial consideration but summarily dismissed the appeal.” (Underlining is our)

9. In State of Punjab v. Babu Singh, 1995 (2) RRR 588 (SC) : JT 1995 (3) SC 37, their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed an order passed by this Court for grant of additional amount of compensation under section 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act on the basis of an application filed under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While reversing the order of the High Court, their Lordships took notice of the fact that notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 11.12.1974 and the award of the district court was dated 23.2.1978 and held:—

“Under these circumstances, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 has no application and there is no error in the award or the decree as initially granted. The High Court was clearly without jurisdiction in entertaining the application under Sections 151 and 152, C.P.C, to award the additional benefits under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 or to amend the decrees already disposed of.

10. In Neer Fazeelath Hussain v. Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, JT 1995 (3) SC 410, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court again dealt with the scope of sections 11, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28 and 30 of the Act and after making reference to an earlier decision in Union of India v. Raghuvir Singh, JT 1989 (2) SC 427, held that the interest vasualised in Section 28 of the Act is not a part of compensation and so not a part of the award. It also held that solatium too is not a part of the award.

11. In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Malaprabha Dam Project v. Madivalappa B. Melavanki, 1995 (3) RRR 536 (SC) : JT 1995 (6) SC 373, the Supreme Court has again held that where the award was passed on 14.12.1981 much prior to the amendement of the Land Acquisition Act, the claimants are not entitled to 30% solatium on the enhanced compensation and additional amount @ 10% per annum.

12. In view of the latest decisions of the Supreme Court, it is not possible to accept the contention of Shri Jaiswal regarding applicability of Section 23(A) on the basis of judgment in Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Daljinder Singh and others (supra).

13. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that respondent No. 1 acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the application filed by the respondents under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in passing the impugned order. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. If respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have received any amount under the impugned order, they should refund the same along with interest to the petitioner within a period of two months.

Hoshiarpur Improveme... v. President, Land Acqu...