Rakesh Kumar, J.
While invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, eight petitioners have prayed for quashing of order dated 7.2.10998 passed by Sri A. Singh, learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Begusarai in G.R No. 999 of 1991 (arising out of Begusarai Town P.S Case No. 104 of 1991). By the said order, learned Magistrate had rejected the petition filed on behalf of petitioners-accused for their discharge. The present petition was admitted on 19.3.1998 and while admitting the petition, it was ordered that during the pendency of this application, further proceeding in G.R No. 999 of 1991 arising out of Begusarai Town P.S Case No. 104 of 1991 pending in the court of Sri A. Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Begusarai shall remain stayed.
2. In this case, case diary was also received. F.I.R in the present case was registered only on suspicion in respect of commission of crime. It was alleged by the Executive Magistrate, Begusarai in his written report dated 21.4.1991 addressed to Officer-in-charge of Town Police Station, Begusarai that he on the order of the District Magistrate, Begusarai conducted a raid in the office of Bihar Mahila Vikash Parishad, situated in Mohalla Bishanpur of Begusarai Town, behind the house of one Dr. S.S.P Choudhary. It was further alleged in the written report that in course of raid it appeared to him from the register that said Bihar Mahila Vikash Parishad (hereinafter referred to as Parishad) was a fake institution. On the apprehension of commission of crime, petitioners were made accused for offences under Sections 419, 420, 472, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. On the basis of said written report, an F.I.R vide Begusarai Town P.S Case No. 104 of 1991 was registered for the offences mentioned above and after investigation, police submitted charge sheet.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ajay Kumar Thakur, challenging the order of cognizance emphatically argued that even the F.I.R on suspicion should not have been registered. After registering of F.I.R during investigation, the Investigating Officer also contacted the office of I.G Registration and thereafter, a letter was sent by Sri Vikram Prasad, Assistant I.G Registration. This fact has been noted in paragraph-59 of the case diary and same has been admitted by learned Additional Public Prosecution. The information contained in paragraph-59 of the case diary is specific on the point that the Parishad was registered under the Society Registration Act. Accordingly, Sri Thakur submits that if the Parishad was found during investigation as duly registered with the office of I.G Registration, it cannot be alleged that the said Parishad was fake. So far as material collected during the investigation regarding collection of membership fee of Rs. 50/- is concerned, it has been submitted that as per the bye-laws of the Parishad, the Parishad had collected the membership fee and no offence can be said to have been committed by the petitioners.
4. I have also heard Sri A.H.P Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State. He supports the order of rejection of discharge petition and he further submits that while rejecting discharge petition, there was no requirement to assign a detailed reason. However, the order impugned indicates that the learned Magistrate had examined the case diary and only thereafter, had rejected their discharge petition. According to learned Additional Public Prosecutor, there is no defect in the impugned order.
5. I have also examined the impugned order as well as materials available on the record. I am satisfied that the very initiation of the case was on the basis of suspicion and as per material available in paragraph-59 of the case diary, it appears that said suspicion of the informant was not established during the investigation to make out a case of commission of offence as was alleged in the F.I.R On the contrary, paragraph-59 of the case diary itself indicates that the Parishad in question was not a fake one but was genuine. On the basis of only suspicion, one cannot be compelled to face the rigour of trial and as such in this case, I am of the view that if the prosecution of petitioners on the materials available on record is allowed to proceed, it will certainly amount to allowing abuse the process of the court. The pendency of the present case for such a long time is also one of the reasons for interfering with the impugned order. In the present case, alleged occurrence had taken place in the year 1991, discharge petition was rejected on 7.2.1998 and by order dated 19.3.1998 proceeding was directed to remain stayed. Due to systematic delay, the present case was taken for final hearing after expiry of about 12 years. Accordingly, for an offence which was committed in the year 1991, it would not be appropriate to ask the petitioners to again go and face trial after expiry of 19 years. The court is aware that while exercising power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, it has got very very limited jurisdiction, but at the same time prevention of abuse of process of law is also very much necessary and in that view of the matter, I am of the view that it is a fit case in which this Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C only an object to prevent an abuse the process of the court.
6. Accordingly, order of rejecting discharge petition dated 7.2.1998 stands quashed. Consequently, the entire proceeding against these petitioners is said aside. Petition is allowed.
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