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AMICUS AI
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Attorney(S)
  • For appellants: Kapil Patwardhan
  • For respondents: R.D Jain, Advocate General, P.K Kaurav,
  • Additional Advocate General and A. Namdeo, Panel Lawyer
Judges
  • M.C Garg, J.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For appellants: Kapil Patwardhan
  • For respondents: R.D Jain, Advocate General, P.K Kaurav,
  • Additional Advocate General and A. Namdeo, Panel Lawyer
Judges
  • M.C Garg, J.
Acts
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This order governs a large number of miscellaneous appeals (M.A. Nos. listed in the order) that raise a common question: what amount of court fee is payable on an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act for enhancement of compensation against awards passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, in light of amendments to Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as applied to the State of Madhya Pradesh.

The matter involved consideration of two Madhya Pradesh State amendments to the Court Fees Act: the first State amendment (Court Fees (M.P.) Amendment Act, 2008) which, as interpreted, required a 10% court fee on the enhanced amount claimed in appeal from certain accident claims; and a later amendment (Court-fee (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2012, received assent 8 January 2013 and published 9 January 2013) which substituted the 10% rate with a 2.5% rate (subject to a maximum of Rs. 1 lakh) for the court fee on the enhanced amount claimed in appeal.

Arguments were heard from counsel for the appellants and the learned Advocate General on how these amendments apply — in particular whether the applicable court fee is determined by the date of filing of the original accident claim or by the later amendment dates (2 April 2008 and 9 January 2013). The court considered earlier judicial authorities and decided the applicable court fee and incidental directions (time to deposit fee; registry to verify payment and defects; and application of the order to all connected appeals arising out of claims filed after 2 April 2008).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What amount of court fee is payable on an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act for enhancement of compensation after the Madhya Pradesh amendments to Schedule II of the Court Fees Act (in particular, after substitution of Ten percent by Two and one half percent)?
  2. Whether the court fee payable on such an appeal is determined by the date of filing of the original accident claim (distinguishing claims filed before 2 April 2008, those filed between 2 April 2008 and 9 January 2013, and those filed after 9 January 2013) or by the date when the appeal is filed/when the amendment came into force.
  3. Whether the substitution of the 10% rate by 2.5% in the second amendment should operate so as to reduce the court fee payable on appeals arising out of accident claims instituted after 2 April 2008.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • After the coming into force of the Court-fee (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2012 (effective 9 January 2013), the court fee on appeals filed in 2013 arising out of accident claim cases (except for those accident claim cases filed prior to 2 April 2008) is payable at 2.5% and not at 10% as contemplated by the first State amendment (Court Fees (M.P.) Amendment Act, 2008).
  • The use of the word "substituted" (replacing 10% by 2.5%) indicates legislative intention that the new, lower rate should apply in place of the previous rate.
  • Motor Vehicles Act being a welfare legislation counsels in favor of interpreting benefit-conferring provisions (or reductions in expense) so as to benefit poor litigants seeking redress for accident claims.

Learned Advocate General's Arguments

  • The court fee on an appeal for enhanced compensation should be payable according to the date of filing of the original accident claim:
    • If the claim was filed prior to 2 April 2008, the fixed court fee of Rs. 30/- is payable.
    • If the claim was filed after 2 April 2008 and before 9 January 2013, the court fee payable is 10% of the enhanced claim (as per the first State amendment).
    • If the claim was filed after 9 January 2013, the court fee payable is 2.5% of the claim amount (as per the second amendment).
  • The Advocate General relied on judicial authorities in support of his position, including AIR 1957 SC 540, AIR 1960 SC 980, 1980 MPLJ 801 (Para-4) and 2009 (4) MPLJ 50.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 Principle that a vested right of appeal accrues as on the date the lis commences and is governed by the law prevailing at the date of institution of the suit or proceeding; vested right of appeal cannot be taken away. The court observed that this case concerned the right to appeal (a vested right) and noted the distinction that the present issue relates to court fee payable on the appeal rather than the right to appeal itself.
State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 980 Discusses claim of enhanced court fee on a claim filed prior to coming into force of a notification enhancing court fee; principle that there is no vested right in the procedure by which sufficiency of court fees is determined and that an amending Act may confer a new right of appeal rather than take away a vested right. The court relied on the passage to distinguish the present situation: the Allahabad decision considered change in procedure and new right, whereas the present question involved retrospective effect where an enactment might impair a right of appeal by imposing a more onerous condition.
Anand Ram Pramhans v. Ramgulam Sahu, AIR 1923 Pat 150 Cited in State of Bombay decision; related to presentation of memorandum of appeal and application of a new Court Fees Act in that case. Referenced by the State of Bombay discussion (as reported in the opinion) to explain the context in which earlier courts treated application of changed court-fee law.
ILR 1941 All 558 (AIR 1941 All 298) Considered whether right of appeal created by an amending Act was available as against an order passed after the coming into force of that Act; noted that amending Act conferred a new right and did not take away any vested rights. Quoted in the State of Bombay passage and used to demonstrate that change in procedure (or conferment of new right) is of a different character than an enactment impairing a substantive right by retrospective operation; hence this authority did not help the appellant in the present context.
Fatehchand v. Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Officer, 2009 (4) MPLJ 50 (Division Bench of this Court) Discussed amendment in Court Fees Act; opined that where an amendment reduces court fees, in absence of express retrospective language, the amendment permitting the reduced fee may be applied even with respect to claims filed earlier. The court relied on this Division Bench view (paras 8, 9 and 13 cited) to support the position that a reduction in fee by amendment can permit the lower fee to be applied to earlier-filed claims in appropriate circumstances.
Smt. Supriya Kathane v. Shri Lal Singh, M.A. No. 2110/2008 (Division Bench) Held that for appeals arising out of accident claims filed prior to 2 April 2008, the court fee of Rs. 30/- (as per the original schedule) remained payable even if the appeal was filed after 2 April 2008 and prior to 9 January 2013. The court noted this Division Bench judgment as precedent that fixed Rs. 30/- applied to appeals from claims filed prior to 2 April 2008, regardless of subsequent amendment dates (so long as the appeal was filed in the interim period before the second amendment).
Dahiben (widow of Ranchhodji Jivanji) v. Vasanji Kevalbhai (dead), AIR 1995 SC 1215 Held that despite an amendment making an Act applicable to new areas, the amendment was not applicable to pending suits for eviction already filed in those areas. Cited by appellants to support the proposition that amendments may not apply to suits/claims already instituted; the court considered it in the context of whether the second amendment should apply to earlier-filed claims.
Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1 Explains that substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and replacement by the new provision; substitution normally intends to make the new rule operative in place of the old rule (citing several authorities). The court relied on this principle to conclude that the substitution of "Two and one half percent" for "Ten percent" effected a change such that the new (lower) rate operates in place of the old rate as and when the substitution came into force.
West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn. (case cited within Zile Singh paragraph) Used in Zile Singh to illustrate that substitution by the legislature generally shows intent to replace the old rule with the new one. Included among authorities relied upon in Zile Singh, and through that reasoning the court treated substitution as effecting replacement of the old rule with the new one.
State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal (case cited within Zile Singh paragraph) Cited in Zile Singh for upholding legislative practice that substitution in statute has effect during the period it is in force. Part of the chain of authorities supporting the principle that substitution replaces prior provisions and makes the new provision operative.
Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co. (case cited within Zile Singh paragraph) Emphasized the distinction between 'supersession' and 'substitution' and described substitution as making the old rule cease and the new rule come into existence in its place. Used (via Zile Singh) to support the court's conclusion on the legal effect of substitution.
A.L.V.R.S.T. Veerappa Chettiar v. S. Michael (case cited within Zile Singh paragraph) Listed among authorities corroborating the proposition that substitution replaces the former provision. Also noted as part of the authorities relied upon in Zile Singh that informed the court's understanding of substitution.
AIR 1955 Bom 332 (reported in Fatehchand passage) Referenced in the context of whether court-fees payable on an appeal filed after an amendment are to be governed by the law in force at the date of filing of the suit or the date of filing of the appeal. Referred to in the Division Bench discussion to demonstrate the line of authorities on whether amendments operate retrospectively to affect court-fees.
1980 MPLJ 801 (Para-4) (cited by Advocate General) Authority cited by the Advocate General in support of his position (specific principle not elaborated in the opinion text). Cited by the Advocate General; the opinion records the citation but does not elaborate detailed application beyond listing it as relied upon.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by (a) identifying the statutory amendments and their operative dates, (b) hearing arguments of the parties, and (c) examining relevant case law on whether amendments to court-fee law operate retrospectively or prospectively, and how substitution of provisions should be treated.

Key steps in the court's analysis as reflected in the opinion:

  1. The court acknowledged the distinct legislative events: the first State amendment (effective 2 April 2008) which had been interpreted to levy court fee at 10% on the enhanced amount claimed in appeal, and the later State amendment (Court-fee (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2012) which substituted “Two and one half percent of the enhanced amount claimed in appeal subject to a maximum of one lakh rupees” for the earlier “Ten percent of the enhanced amount claimed in appeal” (the 2012 Act received the Governor's assent on 8 January 2013 and was first published on 9 January 2013).
  2. The court considered the Advocate General's reliance on authorities (including AIR 1957 SC 540 and AIR 1960 SC 980) that address vested rights of appeal and the effect of amendments on procedural rights, and it carefully distinguished authorities that concern mere procedural changes from those that impair substantive rights or impose more onerous conditions on appeal rights.
  3. The court noted the Division Bench judgment in Fatehchand v. Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Officer (2009 (4) MPLJ 50), which had held that reductions in court fees by amendment can be applied (in the absence of express non-retrospective language) even with respect to claims filed earlier. The court observed that paragraphs 8, 9 and 13 of that decision were applicable.
  4. Turning to the effect of "substitution" (as discussed in Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and the authorities cited there), the court accepted the principle that substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and replacement by the new provision — i.e., substitution ordinarily brings the new rule into operation in place of the old rule.
  5. Applying these principles to the statutory text that substituted 10% with 2.5% (effective as of the 2012 Amendment Act published 9 January 2013), the court concluded that the substitution had the effect of reducing the rate and that the lower rate was operative for appeals filed after the second amendment came into force, in respect of motor accident appeals which arise out of accident claims filed after 2 April 2008.
  6. On that basis, the court held that for appeals filed after the coming into force of the second amendment (effective 9 January 2013), the court fee on the enhanced amount claimed in appeal is payable at 2.5% (subject to the statutory maximum mentioned in the amendment).
  7. The court gave practical directions consistent with that holding: appellants were allowed two weeks to deposit the court fee; the registry was instructed to ensure the court fee is paid and other defects removed before placing matters for admission; and the order would apply ipso facto to all connected appeals where the enhancement of compensation was sought in appeals arising from accident claims filed after 2 April 2008.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: It is held that the court fee on an appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, for enhancement of compensation, where the appeal is filed after the coming into force of the second Madhya Pradesh amendment (effective from 9 January 2013), shall be payable at 2.5% of the enhanced amount claimed (subject to the maximum provided in the amendment) for appeals arising out of motor accident claims filed after 2 April 2008.

Immediate consequences and directions (as ordered):

  • The appellants are allowed two weeks' time to deposit the requisite court fee at the 2.5% rate as held.
  • The Registry is to verify that the court fee has been paid in accordance with this direction and that other defects are removed; only thereafter will the matter be placed before the Court for admission.
  • The order applies ipso facto to all connected appeals seeking enhancement of compensation where the underlying accident claim was filed after 2 April 2008; a copy of the order is to be placed in all connected files.

The opinion reasons from existing authorities about vested rights, procedural changes, and the legal effect of substitution in statutory amendments to conclude that the substituted lower rate (2.5%) governs appeals filed after the second amendment came into force for the class of cases described.

Show full summary ...

    Ramgopal And Another v. Haneef Khan And Others

    This order shall govern in M.A No. 1283/2011, M.A No. 2545/2011, M.A No. 2551/2011, M.A No. 2556/2011, M.A No. 2562/2011, M.A No. 2564/2011, M.A No. 2566/2011, M.A No. 2573/2011, M.A No. 3593/2011, M.A No. 4873/2011, M.A No. 30/2012, M.A No. 33/2012, M.A No. 34/2012, M.A No. 36/2012, M.A No. 38/2012, M.A No. 45/2012, M.A No. 1492/2012, M.A No. 2452/2012, M.A No. 642/2013, M.A No. 668/2013, M.A No. 669/2013, M.A No. 671/2013, M.A No. 672/2013, M.A No. 673/2013, M.A No. 674/2013, M.A No. 675/2013, M.A No. 676/2013, M.A No. 679/2013, M.A No. 680/2013, M.A No 687/2013, M.A No. 688/2013, M.A No. 689/2013, M.A No. 690/2013, M.A No. 692/2013, M.A No. 693/2013, M.A No. 696/2013, M.A No. 699/2013, M.A No. 700/2013, M.A No. 701/2013, M.A No. 704/2013, M.A No. 705/2013, M.A No. 707/2013, M.A No. 709/2013, M.A No. 710/2013, M.A No. 711/2013; M.A No. 712/2013, M.A No. 713/2013, M.A No. 715/2013, M.A No. 724/2013, MA. No. 725/2013, M.A No. 726/2013, M.A No. 733/2013, M.A No. 734/2013, M.A No. 735/2013, M.A No. 737/2013, M.A No. 738/2013, M.A No. 739/2013, M.A No. 740/2013, M.A No. 741/2013, M.A No. 743/2013, M.A No. 744/2013, M.A No. 745/2013, M.A No. 746/2013, M.A No. 747/2013, M.A No. 748/2013, M.A No. 751/2013, M.A No. 756/2013, M.A No. 757/2013, M.A No. 758/2013, M.A No. 759/2013, M.A No. 761/2013, M.A No. 763/2013, M.A No. 764/2013, M.A No. 766/2013, M.A No. 769/2013, M.A No. 770/2013, M.A No. 773/2013, M.A No. 774/2013, M.A No. 776/2013, M.A No. 777/2013, M.A No. 778/2013, M.A No. 779/2013, M.A No. 780/2013, M.A No. 781/2013, M.A No. 783/2013, M.A No. 784/2013.M.A. No. 785/2013, M.A No. 786/2013, M.A No. 787/2013, M.A No. 788/2013, M.A No. 790/2013, M.A No. 792/2013, M.A No. 793/2013, M.A No. 794/2013, M.A No. 795/2013, M.A No. 797/2013, M.A No. 798/2013, M.A No. 800/2013, M.A No. 801/2013, M.A No. 804/2013, M.A No. 805/2013, M.A No. 806/2013, M.A No. 807/2013, M.A No. 810/2013, M.A No. 811/2013, M.A No. 812/2013, M.A No. 813/2013, M.A No. 814/2013, M.A No. 816/2013, M.A No. 817/2013, M.A No. 818/2013, M.A No. 819/2013, M.A No. 821/2013, M.A No. 823/2013, M.A No. 824/2013, M.A No. 825/2013, M.A No. 826/2013, M.A No. 830/2013, M.A No. 237/2011, M.A No. 365/2013, M.A No. 47/2012, M.A No. 51/2012, M.A No. 56/2012, M.A No. 60/2012, M.A No. 61/2012, M.A No. 62/2012, M.A No. 63/2012, M.A No. 64/2012, M.A No. 66/2012, M.A No. 67/2012,M.A. No. 69/2012, M.A No. 73/2012, M.A No. 75/2012, M.A No. 76/2012, M.A No. 77/2012, M.A No. 789/2013, M.A No. 822/2013, M.A No. 827/2013, M.A No. 828/2013, M.A No. 829/2013, M.A No. 831/2013, M.A No. 832/2013, M.A No. 833/2013, M.A No. 834/2013, M.A No. 835/2013, M.A No. 836/2013, M.A No. 838/2013; M.A No. 840/2013, M.A No. 842/2013, M.A No. 843/2013, M.A No. 844/2013, M.A No. 845/2013, M.A No. 847/2013, M.A No. 852/2013, M.A No. 855/2013, M.A No. 857/2013, M.A No. 858/2013, M.A No. 859/2013, M.A No. 860/2013, & M.A No. 78/2012.

    2. Arguments heard on the question as to what amount of Court Fee is payable on an appeal filed under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act for enhancement of compensation against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal after the amendment of the II Schedule of the Court Fees Act, 1870 in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh.

    3. It has been argued on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellants that after coming into force of the Second Amendment in the Court Fees Act by way of Madhya Pradesh Amendment Act therein vide Court Fees (Madhya Pradesh) Amendment Act, 2012, the Court fee on appeal filed in the year 2013 arising out of an accident claim case except for those accidents claim case filed prior to 2nd of April, 2008 is payable only @ 2.5% and not @ 10% as was contemplated in the first State Amendment of the Court Fees Act by the State of Madhya Pradesh vide first amendment, i.e the Court Fees (M.P) Amendment Act, 2008.

    4. I have also heard the learned Advocate General. According to him, the Court Fee on the appeal for enhanced compensation is payable according to the date of filing of the accident claim that is to say, if the claim has been filed prior to 2nd April, 2008 then the fixed Court Fee of Rs. 30/- is payable, however, if the claim has been filed after 2nd April, 2008 and between 9th January, 2013 then the Court Fee shall be payable @ 10% of the enhanced claim. However, if the claim has been filed after 9th January, 2013, the Court Fee shall be payable @ 2.5% of the claim amount. He has relied upon the following judgments :—AIR 1957 SC 540, AIR 1960 SC 980, 1980 MPLJ 801 (Para-4), 2009 (4) MPLJ 50

    5. It is submitted that the first amendment was incorporated on 2nd April, 2008 requiring 10% of the Court Fee on the difference amount awarded by the Claims Tribunal and that claimed in the appeal, from 2013 by virtue of the second amendment, to be of the fee be reduced, but the term substituted in the second amendment will not change the law, which was in force prior to the amendment.

    6. I have considered the judgment cited by the learned Advocate General. In the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, AIR 1957 SC 540 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the right of appeal and in this regard it has been submitted that the right of the appeal is vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date of lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. It has been held, that the vested right of appeal cannot be taken away. In the present case the issue is not about the right to appeal but is about the Court Fee payable on the appeal.

    7. In the second judgment in the case of State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 980 the issue involved was claim of enhanced Court Fee on a claim filed prior to coming into force of the Notificationenhancing the Court Fee. In that context the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following observation :—

    “In Anand Ram Pramhans v. Ramgulam Sahu, AIR 1923 Pat 150, the question which was mooted and discussed related to the proper presentation of a memorandum of appeal, and incidentally it was observed that the new Bihar and Orissa Court Fees Act which had already come into force applied to the case. There was no discussion of the question as to whether the enactment in question was given retrospective effect or not. As to the decision in ILR 1941 All 558: (AIR 1941 All 298) on which so much reliance has been placed by the appellant, it is necessary to point out that the question there was if the right of appeal created by section 6-A of the Court Fees Act, which was added by U.P Act, XIX of 1938, was available as against an order passed after the coming into force of the latter Act, although that Act was not in existence and consequently there was no right of appeal at the date of filing that plaint. It was held that the enactment, by the amending Act of 1938 of section 6-A which allowed an appeal against an order demanding the payment of a deficiency in court fees did not take away any right which was vested in the plaintiff on the date on which he filed the plaint, it only conferred on him a new right; nor did it take away any right which was vested in the defendant, for though the defendant could object if the plaint was not properly stamped and might also have a right to have the matter determined by the court he had no vested right in the procedure by which it was to be determined, and this procedure could be changed pending the suit and a change in procedure could not be said to deprive him of any vested right. It would appear from what has been stated above that the decision proceeded on the footing that the amending Act conferred a new right of appeal, and not that it took away a vested right of appeal; and the reason of the decision was based on the principle that there is no vested right in the procedure by which the sufficiency of court fees is determined by a court. That is a principle of a different character from the one we are concerned with in the present case, viz., the retrospective effect of a subsequent enactment which either takes away a right of appeal or impairs it by imposing a more stringent or onerous condition thereon. We do not, therefore, think that the Allahabad decision helps the appellant.”

    8. Now, coming to the judgment of this Court the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Fatehchand v. Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Officer, 2009 (4) MPLJ 50 where the question of amendment in Court Fees Act has been considered, the Court has opined that with respect to Court Fees Act, the amendment which reduces the Court Fees without there being anything said in the amendment that it will be retrospective will permit the Court Fees payable at an amount provided for by the amendment even with respect to a claim filed earlier. Paragraphs- 8, 9 and 13 are applicable, which are as under :— “8. As per this amendment in a suit or in an appeal, the maximum limit of Rs. 1,50,000/- has been provided, but the entire Amendment Act does not provide that this amendment shall be retrospective in nature, in absence of which it should be treated as prospective in nature.”

    “9. The Apex Court has an occasion to consider this aspect in Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (supra). The Apex Court considering this aspect held thus :—

    “Where a suit is filed prior to 1-4-1954, on which the Court Fees (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1954, levying enhanced Court-fees, came into force, in the absence of provisions giving retrospective effect to the amendments, the Court-fees payable on the memorandum of appeal filed after the relevant date (1-4-1954) are payable according to the law in force at the date of filing of the suit (which was prior to the relevant date) and not according to the law in force at the date of the filing of the memorandum of appeal (which was after the relevant date : (S) AIR 1955 Bom 332, Affirmed.

    It is thus clear in a long line of decisions approved by this Court and at least in one given by this Court, it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment.

    We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in the view it took, and the orders of refund of excess Court fees which it passed were correct in law.”

    9. In the present case, the second amendment reads as under :—

    “MADHYA PRADESH ACT NO. 3 OF 2013

    THE COURT-FEE (MADHYA PRADESH AMENDMENT) ACT, 2012 (Received the assent of the Governor on the 8th January, 2013, assent first, published in the “Madhya Pradesh Gazette (extraordinary)”, dated the 9th January, 2013.)

    An Act further to amend the Court-fees Act, 1870 in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh,

    Be it enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature in the Sixty-third year of the Republic of India as follows :—

    1. This Act may be called the Court-fee (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2012.

    2. The Court-fees Act, 1870 (No. VII of 1870) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh be amended in the manner hereinafter provided.

    3. In Schedule II to the Principal Act, in Article 11, in clause (a), in sub-clause (i), in the column pertaining to proper fee, for the words Ten percent of the enhanced amount claimed in appeal”, the words Two and one half percent of the enhanced amount claimed in appeal subject to a maximum of one lakh rupees” shall be substituted.”

    10. In this peculiar situation where the second amendment has substituted the word 10% to 2.5%, the question arise as to what shall be the Court Fee payable on appeal, irrespective of the fact that the accident claim was filed after 2nd April, 2008 or after 9th January, 2013.

    11. As per the Division Bench Judgment of this Court delivered in the case of Smt. Supriya Kathane v. Shri Lal Singh, M.A No. 2110/2008, despite the amendment brought in by the State of Madhya Pradesh in the Court Fee Act applicable to the State of Madhya Pradesh, with respect to any appeal which arose out of the accident claim filed prior to 2nd April, 2008, the Court Fee @ Rs. 30/-, which was payable is as per the original schedule irrespective of the fact that the appeal was filed after 2nd April, 2008 and prior to 9th January, 2013.

    12. However, after coining into force of the amendment by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court Fee @ 10% becomes payable on an appeal filed for enhancement of the amount of award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in a case which was instituted after coining into force of the Madhya Pradesh Amendment enhancing the Court Fee payable on the enhanced amount claimed in the appeal @ 10% w.e.f i.e the date, the amended provision came into being i.e w.e.f 2-4-2008 would be payable.

    13. It is the matter of record that the aforesaid judgment is now subject- matter of a review before the Division Bench of this Court in terms of the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

    14. It may be observed here, that in the second amendment there is no provision for enhancing the Court Fee on the accident claim case. In fact, the Court fee payable on appeal is substituted @ 2.5% instead of 10%. Thus, it is the contention of the appellants that if appeal arises even with respect to accident claim filed either after 2nd April, 2008 or after 9th January, 2013 while, the Court Fee on the original claim amount is fixed but the Court Fee payable on an appeal on account of the amendment of the Act, becomes payable only @ 2.5%. Moreover, the Motor Vehicles Act is a welfare legislation, any benefit granted by the statute must be reached in such a manner that it confers benefit to the poor litigant, who are coming to the Court for redressal of the grievance for obtaining accident claim. It was in the light of that schedule, Court Fee on appeal was only payable @ Rs. 30/-. Using the word, “substituted” from 10% to 2.5% also reflects to the intention of the Legislature. In this regard my attention was brought to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dahiben widow of Ranchhodji Jivanji v. Vasanji Kevalbhai (dead), AIR 1995 SC 1215 wherein in respect of pending suit despite the amendment brought in Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, which made the Act applicable even to those areas where it was not applicable earlier, it was held that the amendment was not applicable to those areas for which a suit for eviction has been filed.

    15. In this regard it would be appropriate to take note of judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court delivered in the case Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1, wherein it has been held :—

    “25. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, ibid, p. 565). If any authority is needed in support of the proposition, it is to be found in West U.P Sugar Mills Assn. v. State of U.P, State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal, Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga and Co. and A.L.V.R.S.T Veerappa Chettiar v. S. Michael In West U.P Sugar Mills Assn. case a three-Judges Bench of this Court held that the State Government by substituting the new rule in place of the old one never intended to keep alive the old rule. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances centering around the issue the Court held that the substitution had the effect of just deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative. In Mangilal Pindwal's case this Court upheld the legislative practice of an amendment by substitution being incorporated in the text of a statute which had ceased to exist and held that the substitution would have the effect of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was in force. In Koteswar's case a three Judge Bench of this Court emphasized the distinction between ‘supersession’ of a rule and ‘substitution’ of a rule and held that, the process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place.”

    16. Thus, on account of substitution of the Court Fee payable from 10% to 2.5% only by way of amendment brought in force on 9th January, 2013, the Court Fee on motor accident appeal which arise out of motor accident claim filed after 2nd of April, 2008, shall now be payable only @ 2.5% on the enhanced amount. Accordingly, it is held that Court Fee on the appeal which is filed after coming into force of the second amendment which become effective from 9th January, 2013, shall be payable only @ 2.5%.

    17. The appellants are allowed 2 weeks’, time to deposit the Court Fee. The Registry after ensuring that the Court fee is filed as paid in terms of the direction and also after ensuring that other defects are removed would place the matter before the Court for the purpose of admission.

    18. The order passed in this appeal shall apply ipso facto in respect of all the appeals whereby the enhancement of compensation sought for where accident claim was filed after 2-4-2008. A copy of which order be placed in all connected files.

    Order accordingly.

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