Siddiqui and others, (1980) 3 SCC 174, a question arose with regard to recruitment and grant of seniority and one of the questions which was to be considered by the Supreme Court in the said case was as to whether the appointments in question were not on substantive capacity or a temporary arrangement. It was held by the Supreme Court that mere use of the term 'appointment or a temporary vacancy' by itself would not conclude the matter or lead to the irresistible inference that the appointment was not made in a substantive capacity. It was held by the Supreme Court that even a substantive appointment could be made on a purely temporary vacancy. In this case, it was held by the Supreme Court that in order to determine the nature of appointment, we are required to look into the heard and substance of the matter, the surrounding circumstances, the mode, manner and the terms and other relevant factors leading to the appointment. It is, therefore, clear that in the present case also to draw an inference with regard to the nature of appointment, the surrounding circumstances and the substance of the matter and all other relevant factors are to be looked into and a conclusion drawn. A conclusion cannot be drawn merely on the basis of the contention of the State Government that because the appointment is not under Rule 12 of the Rules of 1967, therefore, it is not a regular appointment or is an ad hoc or stop gap arrangement. All the circumstances and the prevailing situation is to be looked into and a decision taken. 37. Article 16 of the Constitution creates a constitutional right to equality of appointment and employment in public office. Employment or appointment is, therefore, required to be made in accordance to the mandate of Article 16 of the Constitution. In the case of Union Public Service Commission Vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and others, (2006) 2 SCC 482, a question arose before the Supreme Court with regard to a recruitment process to be undertaken as per the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution and regularisation to be granted to such recruitment to certain direct appointees, who had worked in the department for certain period of time. As per the Rules, regularisation was to be granted to Government servants and the question was as to whether a person appointed on a fixed salary for a fixed period on contract basis is a Government servant or not. While considering the question” the import of Article 16 of the Constitution, the object of the said Article and the right to equality for appointment and the question of regular appointment to a post under the State or the Union was taken note of and in Paragraphs 12 and 13, the following principle is laid down :— "12. Article 16 which finds place in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The main object of Article 16 is to create a constitutional right to equality of opportunity and employment in public offices. The words "employment or appointment" cover not merely the initial appointment but also other attributes of service like promotion and age of superannuation etc. The appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employment exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution. (See : B.S. Minhas Vs. Indian Statistical Institute and others, AIR 1984 SC 363). 13. Article 309 lays down that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. The proviso to this Article confers power upon the President or the Governor, as the case may be, to make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of persons appointed to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State. Article 311 affords several protections to persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. In view of clause (2) of this Article, holder of a civil post under the Union or a State cannot be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and he is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.' It is clear from the aforesaid principle that for appointment to the post under the State or the Union, if an advertisement is issued in a prescribed manner and if the eligible candidates are appointed after holding a selection given a fair chance of competition to all concerned, the appointment would be a regular appointment compared to an irregular appointment, which is de hors the Rules and procedure. 38. Article 309 of the Constitution empowers the appropriate legislature to frame rules to regular recruitment to public service and the posts. Recruitment means enlisting by any method provided for inducting a person into public service, this would be recruitment. Appointment, selection, promotion, deputation are various modes of recruitment.-When a Rule is framed under Article 309 of the Constitution and it lays down a procedure for recruitment, the procedure laid down in the rule is a regular mode for recruitment to public service. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid principles that the case in hand has to be evaluated and a decision taken. By merely holding that the appointment is ad hoc appointment or a stop gap arrangement or an emergency measure, it cannot be held that the appointment of the petitioners are not regular and, therefore, they are not entitled to the benefit. The question as to whether the appointment of the petitioners initially on emergency basis is a regular appointment or not is to be considered after taking note of various factors like the method followed, the rule or regulation, if any, from which the method is derived and various other factors. 39. The procedure for emergency appointment and the provision thereof is a statutory provision contemplated under Rule 13 (5) and Rule 15 of the Rules of 1967 and the Rules of 1990. Appointment even on emergency basis is to the service of the Collegiate Branch of the Education Department and the recruitment even on emergency basis is on the post available as per the Schedule to the Rules, i.e., a vacant post as notified in the Schedule, and could not be filled up due to nonavailability of list from the PSC. Even for appointment on emergency basis availability of post is a pre-condition and, therefore, the incumbent is appointed on a statutory prescribed substantive post. That apart, a regular advertisement by all modes at the national level is published and appointment is made on the post prescribed in the Schedule. The appointment is made by a duly constituted committee, which follows the procedure contemplated under the Rules for preparing a merit list. It may be taken note of that in the Rules of 1967 and upto 31-8-1990 there was no procedure for conducting a written examination. Selections were made on the basis of interviews conducted by the PSC even under Rule 12 of the Rules of 1967. 40. In the case of the present petitioners, therefore, the appointment preceded a prescribed procedure contemplated under the statutory rules and after they were appointed on a substantive existing vacant post, their appointment was not as a stop gap arrangement on a consolidated salary, but it was in the pay scale prescribed under the statutory rules. Not only were they appointed on the pay prescribed in the statutory rules, but the benefit of increment in accordance to the prescribed pay scale, revision of pay scale from time to time and all other benefits accruing to a regularly appointed incumbent under Rule 12 was extended to the petitioners. Benefit of leave of all kinds under the leave rules, additional increment on acquiring extra qualification, benefit of provident fund and even posting on higher post on officiating capacity was extended to the petitioners. It is, therefore, a case where the petitioners for all practical purposes were treated as regularly appointed incumbents to the service of the department and treating them to be so appointed all service benefits as per the Rules were extended. It is not a case, where the petitioners were inducted into the department by any irregular method or by adopting back door entry method or by a pick and choose discriminatory and arbitrary system of appointment. On the contrary, they are appointed in accordance to a mode prescribed under the statutory rules on existing substantive vacant post and all benefit of regular appointment to the said post was extended to them. That being so, the respondents cannot say that appointments of the petitioners were not regular. A regular appointment as indicated in the provision under Note to the Rules of 1990 for grant of senior pay scale will not only mean a regular appointment in accordance to Rule 12 of the Rules of 1967 and 1990, but would also include an appointment in accordance to any of the methods contemplated under the Rules. Even an emergency appointment in accordance to the provisions of Rule 13 (5) of the Rules of 1967 and Rule 15 of the Rules of 1990 would be a regular appointment for the purpose of grant of senior pay scale. 41. At this stage, it may be appropriate to refer to an additional affidavit filed by one Shri B.S. Parihar, Additional Director, Department of Higher Education before the Supreme Court of India in SLP (Civil) No. 17616/2010. In Paragraph 4 of the said affidavit, it is so indicated :— "4. That these emergency appointments have been made as provided in Rule 13 (5) of the Madhya Pradesh Educational Services (Collegiate) Rules, 1967. It is submitted that the respondent was appointed on emergency basis under the State Rules and he has not been appointed on ad hoc basis." Thereafter, in Paragraph 5, it is stated by way of clarification that the petitioners w(ere appointed on emergency basis and not on ad hoc basis. From the aforesaid affidavit, it is clear that the respondent/State Government themselves admit in the affidavit before the Supreme Court that emergency appointments are made under Rule 13 (5) of the Rules of 1967 and their appointment is neither ad hoc or a stop gap arrangement. Under such circumstances, the appointment made under Rule 13 (5) has to be termed as a 'regular appointment'. 42. The criteria for considering a claim for grant of senior pay scale or selection grade and the criteria for granting seniority to a person are different. For the purpose of grant of senior pay scale once it is seen that induction of an employee to the department is in accordance to a statutory prescribed mode contemplated under the Rules, then it has to be held to be a regular appointment even if on emergency basis. An emergency appointment is one of the methods for induction into the department both as per the Rules of 1967 and the Rules of 1990 and, therefore, respondents cannot contend that it is not a regular appointment. The meaning of the word regular and the import of the same clearly contemplates that anything done as per prescribed norms of the Rule and procedure is regular and, therefore, I am of the considered view that induction of the petitioners into the service after following the procedure contemplated under Rule 13 (5) of the Rules of 1967 or Rule 15 of the Rules of 1990 is a regular appointment to the service and such an appointment qualifies the employee to be considered for grant of senior pay scale. 43. In the Rules of 1967, under Rule 7 the methods of recruitment are indicated. In sub-rule (1), three modes of recruitment are indicated under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). Thereafter, in sub-clauses (3) and (4) of Rule 7, the following stipulations are contained :— "(3) Subject to the provision of these rules, the method or methods of recruitment to be adopted for the purpose of filling any particular vacancy or vacancies in the service as may be required to be filled during any particular period of recruitment and the number of persons to be recruited by each methods, shall be in accordance the Schedule No. II. But, in case where the percentage as fixed in the Schedule cannot be strictly applied, preference will be given to Departmental candidates for promotion subject to the condition that suitable and qualified candidates are available in the Department otherwise the posts would be filled by direct recruitment irrespective of the percentage fixed for the purpose in each case. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), if the opinion of the Government or the exigencies of the service so require, the Government may, after consulting the Commission, adopt such methods of recruitment to the Service other than those specified in the said sub-rule as it may, by order issued in this behalf, prescribed." It is clear from sub-clause (4) thereof that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), power is conferred on the Government' if exigency required to adopt such methods of recruitment to the service as may be specified by orders to be issued in this regard. Similar provisions are contained in Rule 6 sub-rules (3) and (4), of the Rules of 1990. The method of recruitment, therefore, contemplated under Rule 13 (5) of the Rules of 1967 and Rule 15 of the Rules of 1990 are nothing but the modes of recruitment approved by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it under the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, i.e., sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 of the Rules of 1967 and Rule 6 (4) of the Rules of 1990 and is in fact a prescribed method of recruitment as contemplated under the statutory rules. It was said that the method of recruitment contemplated under Rule 7 (4) or Rule 6 (4) of the Rules of 1967 and the Rules of 1990 does not include the process of appointment contained in Rule 13 (5) or Rule 15 (5), this argument of the learned Counsel for the State cannot be accepted. In the provisions pertaining to method of recruitment as contemplated under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1967 and Rule 6 of the Rules of 1990, an exemption is carved out in sub-rule (4), which contemplates that notwithstanding anything contained hereinabove, the State Government is given power to formulate procedure for recruitment, as may be required. It is, therefore, clear that sub-rule (4) of both Rules 7 and Rule 6, of the Rules of 1967 and the Rules of 1990, empowers the State to formulate different modes of recruitment other than provided in the Rules itself. If that be so, it can easily be construed that the Rules framed by the State Government under Rule 13 (5) of the Rules of 1967 or Rule 15 of the Rules of 1990 is also a method of recruitment enacted by the State Government by exercising the powers conferred under sub-rule (4) of Rules 7 and 6, as the case may be and, therefore, the method of recruitment contemplated under Rule 13 (5) and Rule 15 (5) are also the method of recruitment to the service. 44. That apart, the provision for grant of senior scale and selection grade was incorporated by the UGC in the Scheme formulated by it in the revision of pay scale in November, 1988. It is seen that prior to November, 1988, initial induction into the department was made in the cadre of Lecturers. Thereafter, there was an avenue for promotion from Lecturer to the post of Assistant Professor and thereafter to the post of Professor and Principal. However, with effect from the year 1988, the post of Lecturers were abolished, inductions were made directly into the post of Assistant Professor and in the cadre of Assistant Professor a different pay scale and senior scale was incorporated and while indicating the provision for grant of selection grade and senior scale, a provision was incorporated by the UGC itself by stipulating certain conditions, including the condition of completing 8 years of service after regular appointment. The words 'regular appointment' as used by the UGC is explained not only by the UGC, but also by the State Government in the circulars issued from time to time, particularly in the Circulars dated 27-11-1990 and 12-2-1992. The UGC clarified the notification issued by it and the clarification for counting of past services was also incorporated in these circulars. If the circulars issued by the UGC and adopted by the State Government are taken note of, it would be seen that in all these circulars certain conditions have been incorporated indicating the manner in which the service of 8 years is to be calculated. One such circular issued by the UGC is 27-11-1990 and the following stipulations are made in the said circular in this regard :— "1. Previous service without any break as a lecturer or equivalent in a University, College, National Laboratory or other scientific organisations (CSIR, ICAR, DRDO, UGC etc.) as UGC Research Scientist should be counted for placement of lecturers in Senior Scale/ Selection Grade provided that :— (a) the post was in an equivalent grade/scale of pay as the post of Lecturer; (b) the qualification for the post were not lower than the qualification prescribed by UGC for the post of Lecturer; (c) the Lecturer concerned possessed the minimum qualifications prescribed by the UGC for appointment as Lecturer; (d) the post was filled in accordance with the prescribed selection procedure as laid down by the University/State Government; (e) the appointment was not ad hoc or in a leave vacancy or less than one year duration. No distinction should be made with reference to the nature of management of the institution where previous service was rendered (private/local body/Government) if the above criteria are satisfied/' 45. Similar circulars were issued by the Additional Secretary to the UGC on 25-4-1988 and even the State Government in the circulars issued on 12-2-1992, has incorporated such a provision. In the UGC Regulation on minimum qualification published in the Gazette of India on 30-6-2010 also under Clause 10, a provision for counting of past service for direct recruitment and promotion is indicated and of these provisions are taken note of, it would be seen that previous regular service includes recruitment in accordance to any prescribed selection procedure as may be laid down. If the circulars issued by the State Government in this regard are taken note of, i.e., the Circular dated 12-2-1992, it would be seen that these circulars have incorporated the provision which is contained in the circulars dated 27-11-1990 and 25-12-1998 issued by the UGC and the conditions to be fulfilled are those reproduced hereinabove as clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). The five conditions to be fulfilled are that the post to which appointment is made is in an equivalent grade or scale of pay on the post of Lecturer, which is now Assistant Professor. This condition is fulfilled in the case of the petitioners, as the appointments are on the post of Lecturer/Assistant Professor as is notified in the Schedule to the Rules, with equivalent pay scale and grade. As far as clause (b) is concerned, the qualification is also the same as is prescribed by the UGC for the post of Assistant Professors and such a condition is already stipulated in Rule 13 (5) and Rule 15. As far as clause (c) is concerned, the person concerned possessed the minimum qualification prescribed by the UGC and these are the conditions stipulated in Rule 13 (5) and Rule 15 also. As far as clause (d) is concerned, the post is filled in accordance to a selection procedure as laid down by the State Government in the Recruitment Rules of 1967 and 1990. As far as clause (e) is concerned, the appointment is not on ad hoc basis nor is on a leave vacancy for a period of less than one year. It is, therefore, clear that in the case of the present petitioners, all the conditions stipulated in the circulars issued by the UGC and the State Government for treating the petitioners as regular appointment is fulfilled. 46. If the circulars issued by the State Government and the UGC are scanned, it would be seen that what is prohibited or what can be termed as an appointment which is not a regular appointment is actually an ad hoc or stop gap arrangement undertaken de hors the Recruitment Rules or a process of appointment contrary to the mandate of Article 16 of the Constitution. All other appointments which do not fall in the category of ad hoc or stop gap arrangement or which is not hit by the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution would come within the purview of a regular appointment as is clear from the circulars issued in this regard. In the circular issued by the UGC on 25-12-1988, the position is clarified and the Commission has clearly stated that all services rendered in ad hoc capacity should be counted for past service for placement in the senior scale/selection grade provided the three conditions mentioned herein are fulfilled. The conditions are : (a) the ad hoc service is for more than one year; (b) the incumbent was appointed on the recommendations of a duly constituted Selection Committee; and (c) the incumbent was selected to the permanent post in continuation to the ad hoc service without any break. If these three conditions are fulfilled the appointment and the service has to be counted for the purpose of placement in senior scale. In the case of all these petitioners even though their appointment is not an ad hoc appointment, but their emergency appointment is in a better footing than an ad hoc, service and is for a period of more than one year duration. They were also appointed on the basis of recommendation of a duly constituted Selection Committee. They were selected to the permanent post as sanctioned in the Recruitment Rules and have continued without any break. 47. That being so, all the conditions stipulated in the circulars issued by the UGC and the State Government are fulfilled by the present petitioners and, therefore, there is no reason for denying the benefit to the petitioners. In fact the meaning of the word 'regular appointment' is clarified by the UGC itself in its circulars dated 27-11-1990 and 25-11-1998 and as the petitioner Vs fulfilled all the requirement of these circulars, the period of emergency appointment is to be counted for the purpose of their placement in the senior scale/selection grade. From the reasons already indicated hereinabove, even on a bare interpretation of the circulars issued by the UGC and adopted by the State Government, the petitioners are entitled to the benefit. 48. It was also argued by learned Counsel for the petitioners that the provision for grant of senior pay scale and selection grade is not incorporated in the Rules by way of its insertion in the main Rule. It is only appended as a note to the main Rule, i.e., as a Note to Schedule V. By inviting my attention to the principle for interpretation of a Note inserted to a statutory provision, the implication of the same as indicated by Hon'ble Justice G.P. Singh (as He then was) in his book on Interpretation on Statute, 13th Edition, Page 172 of the judgment rendered in the case of Rudra Kumar Sain (supra), it was argued that it is a well settled principle of law that a Note appended to a statutory provision or a subordinate legislation must be read in the context of the substantive provision and not in derogation thereof. It was stated that a Note is merely explanatory in nature and the same will not dilute the rigour of the main provision. Referring to the provision of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1990, to which this Note is appended to, learned Counsel points out that Rule 17 contemplates a provision prescribing the conditions of eligibility for promotion/ transfer. The Rule reads as under :— "17. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) the Committee shall consider the cases of all persons who, on the 1st day of January of that year had completed such number of year of service (Whether officiating or substantive) in the posts from which promotion is to be made as specified in column (3) of Schedule IV and are within the zone of consideration in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (2):......" Learned Counsel submits that to be eligible for promotion as per the provisions of this Rule to various posts indicated in Schedule IV, the number of year of service rendered can be either on officiating basis or substantive. If the service rendered in officiating capacity can be counted for grant of promotion under Rule 17, then grant of senior pay scale and selection grade, which is also a measure of granting promotion in a higher scale due to stagnation, cannot be changed or diluted by way of a Note incorporated in the provisions of the main Rule, i.e., Rule 17. It is argued that as an alternate submission that if Rule 17 permits the officiating period to be counted as service for grant of promotion, then the same rule will apply for grant of senior pay scale and selection grade and by incorporating the word 'regular appointment' in the Note, the substantive provision of the rule cannot be diluted. Accordingly, it is stated that even if the matter is analysed in the background, the contention of the respondents cannot be accepted. 49. As far as this ground is concerned, it is seen that the provision for grant of senior pay scale and selection grade was incorporated in the scheme formulated by the UGC in the year 1988 only to grant benefit of career advancement and to remove the frustration due to stagnation. It is for this reason that the provision with regard to grant of senior pay scale and selection grade is incorporated in the Rules of 1990 in Schedule IV to Rule 17. As already pointed out by learned Counsel for the parties Rule 17 of the Rules of 1990 lays down the conditions of eligibility for promotion. It is clearly stipulated in this Rule that subject to the provision of sub-rule (2), the Committee constituted shall consider the case of all persons, who on the first day of January of that year have completed such number of years of service whether officiating or substantive in the post, from which promotion is to be made as specified in column (3) to Schedule IV. It is, therefore, clear that in the substantive provision for promotion under Rule 17, the period of service rendered even on officiating capacity is counted for grant of promotion. If the substantive provision so contemplates, then by appending a Note to the said Rule the rigour of the Rule cannot be diluted by holding that for the purpose of promotion or grant of senior pay scale or selection grade, officiating or other service, cannot be counted, but an employee has to have 8 years of regular appointment. The words 'regular appointment' used in the Note appended to this Rule cannot dilute the mandate of the substantive provision of Rule 17, which contemplates that even an officiating period can be counted for the purpose of granting promotion. 50. That apart, during the course of hearing of this writ petition, learned Counsel for the petitioners pointed out the benefit granted to many of the employees like Dr. J.B. Gautam, Shri S.C. Gaud etc. Respondents have not pointed out as to how the benefit is being denied to the petitioners, when it has been granted to various other employees. Respondents are trying to justify their action by simply contending that an error committed in the case of these employees cannot be treated as a precedent and there cannot be negative equity. This argument of the respondents is also unsustainable. 51. After close of hearing, a written note is submitted by the learned Counsel for the State wherein the same grounds are re-iterated. However, in the written note the following judgments are referred to : Tamil Nadu Vs. E. Paripoorna, AIR 1992 SC 1823; Tejaswani Vs. State of M.P., 1998 MPLJ 790; A.P.N. Mayakutti Vs. Secretary, (1997) 2 SCC 360; and Dr. (Smt.) Agnes Thdkur and others Vs. State of M.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 6931/2003 (S). As far as these judgments are concerned, most of the judgments relate to appointment under Rule 10 of the Temporary Appointment Rules and they specifically provide for temporary appointment without conferring any benefit. The judgments relied upon by Shri Sanjay Dwivedi will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 52. Apart from the aforesaid, it has to be taken note of by this Court that for the purpose of granting senior pay scale if the claim of the petitioners is rejected, two different classes of employee may emerge. Both these classes originate from the same method of appointment, i.e., the emergency appointment under Rule 13 (5) or Rule 15, as the case may be, but in case of certain class of employees particularly those appointed prior to 1986 and in cases of some after 1986, apart from the fact that SLPs have been dismissed, the department itself has extended the benefit for reasons which remain unexplained. Petitioners have given the example of various employees in their additional rejoinder, which goes to show that many employees in the department have received the said benefit. If that be so, on the principle of 'equality', the benefit has to be granted to the petitioners apart from the fact that under law also they are found to be entitled to the said benefit. 53. As far as the contention of the State Government that a Division Bench of this Court has held that seniority of the period cannot be granted in Writ Petition No. 6931/2003 (S), Dr. (Smt.) Agnes Thakur and another Vs. State of M.P. and others, is concerned, in that case the Division Bench was considering the interpretation to Rule 11 of the M.P. Regularisation of Adhoc and Emergency Appointment Rules, 1990 and in that case the question of granting seniority to the appointments regularised under the ad hoc emergency appointment rules was taken note of. In the said case, the question as is canvassed in this writ petition was not under consideration. That being so, the said judgment will not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 54. Even though various grounds were raised with regard to the petitioner being members of the service and the interpretation of Rule 12 (4) of the General Conditions of Service Rules, now in the light of the findings as have been recorded hereinabove, I am of the considered view that it is not necessary to again deal with all these questions, as this Court for reasons indicated hereinabove is convinced that the petitioners are entitled to the relief claimed for. 55. Accordingly, for the grounds and reasons indicated hereinabove, all these petitions are allowed. Respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioners for grant of senior scale/selection grade after treating the services rendered by the petitioners from the initial date of appointment as emergency appointee as 'regular appointment' for the purpose of conferring the benefit of senior pay scale and selection grade. Matters be placed before the appropriate Screening Committee and based on the recommendations of the Screening Committee, the benefit be extended retrospectively with effect from the date of eligibility of each of the petitioners. 56. Accordingly, all the writ petitions stand allowed and disposed of. No order as to costs. _____________
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners were appointed to posts in the collegiate branch of the Education Department on an "emergency" basis under Rule 13(5) of the Madhya Pradesh Educational Services (Collegiate) Rules, 1967 and corresponding provisions in the Rules of 1990 (Rule 15). A dispute arose as to whether these appointments were substantive/regular appointments (entitling petitioners to be considered for senior pay scale/selection grade) or merely ad hoc/temporary arrangements that should not be counted for seniority or placement in senior pay scale. The State contended that because the appointments were not made under Rule 12 of the Rules, they were not regular appointments. The petitioners challenged that position by writ petition(s). The court considered the nature of those appointments, the applicable statutory provisions (including Articles 16 and 309 of the Constitution), relevant Rules (notably Rule 7, Rule 12, Rule 13(5) of 1967 and Rule 6, Rule 15 of 1990, and Rule 17 and Schedule IV of 1990), and circulars/UGC regulations concerning counting of past service for senior scale/selection grade.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether appointments made on the basis of an "emergency" under Rule 13(5) of the 1967 Rules (and Rule 15 of the 1990 Rules) are substantive/regular appointments for the purpose of service benefits, including grant of senior pay scale/selection grade, or whether they are ad hoc/stop-gap arrangements excluded from such benefits.
- Whether the phrase "regular appointment" (as used by the UGC in its circulars and in the Note appended to Rule 17 / Schedule IV) excludes emergency appointments, or whether emergency appointments made in accordance with the Rules qualify as regular appointments for the purpose of counting service for senior scale/selection grade.
- Whether the substantive provision of Rule 17 (which allows counting of officiating or substantive service for promotion) can be diluted by a Note appended to that Rule to require only "regular appointment" for grant of senior pay scale/selection grade.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners contended that their induction under Rule 13(5)/Rule 15 into substantive vacant posts (as per the Schedule) and their subsequent treatment (pay in the prescribed pay scale, increments, provident fund, leave benefits, posting on higher posts in officiating capacity, etc.) demonstrate that they were treated as regular incumbents for all practical purposes.
- They relied on UGC circulars (notably 27-11-1990, 25-12-1988 and others) and the UGC/State guidance that previous regular service (subject to conditions) should be counted; they argued that the petitioners satisfied those conditions (equivalent grade/scale, required qualifications, selection procedure, appointments not ad hoc/leave vacancies of less than one year).
- Counsel for the petitioners argued that Rule 17 explicitly permits counting of officiating service for promotion and that a Note appended to Rule 17 cannot be used to dilute the substantive provision that officiating service counts toward promotion or similar benefits.
- They also pointed to parity: other employees (examples given in the record) had been granted the benefit, and the petitioners argued that denying them the same benefit would produce unequal classes of employees despite similar modes of appointment.
Respondents' / State's Arguments
- The State contended that since the appointments were not made under Rule 12 of the Rules, they were not regular appointments but ad hoc or stop-gap arrangements, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of senior pay scale/selection grade.
- The State relied on several earlier judgments (including some dealing with temporary appointment rules, e.g., Rule 10 of the Temporary Appointment Rules) to argue that temporary appointments do not attract grant of benefits; the State submitted judgments such as Tamil Nadu v. E. Paripoorna and others in support.
- The State suggested that an error in granting benefits to other employees cannot create a precedent or justify granting similar benefit to the petitioners (argument against "negative equity").
- The State also referred to a Division Bench decision in Writ Petition No. 6931/2003 (Dr. (Smt.) Agnes Thakur and another v. State of M.P.) interpreting Rule 11 of the 1990 Rules and argued that it precluded grant of seniority; the court addressed whether that decision applied to the present facts.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Siddiqui and others, (1980) 3 SCC 174 | Principle that use of the term 'temporary vacancy' does not by itself determine the nature of appointment; substantive appointment can be made to a temporary vacancy; inquiry must look to substance, surrounding circumstances, mode and terms of appointment. | The court relied on this principle to hold that one must examine the substance and surrounding circumstances (not merely labels) to decide whether an appointment is substantive/regular. It supports treating emergency appointments as potentially substantive if other indicia show regularity. |
Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and others, (2006) 2 SCC 482 | Consideration of recruitment under rules framed under Article 309 and regularisation; import and object of Article 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) and requirements for regular appointment (advertisement, fair selection). | The court used the reasoning to emphasize that appointments under the State/Union must conform to Article 16 protections and rules framed under Article 309; regular appointment cannot be made without prescribed selection procedure unless rules allow otherwise. |
B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute and others, AIR 1984 SC 363 | Support for the proposition that Article 16 requires proper advertisement and a fair selection process for regular appointments under the State/Union. | Cited as authority for the statement that appointment without prescribed advertisement and selection would violate Article 16; used to frame the standard of what constitutes a regular appointment for constitutional purposes. |
Rudra Kumar Sain (referenced via G.P. Singh's commentary) | Interpretative principle that a Note appended to a statutory provision or subordinate legislation is explanatory and must be read in the context of the substantive provision and not in derogation of it. | The court invoked this principle in addressing the argument that a Note to Rule 17 could restrict counting of service; the court held that the Note cannot dilute the substantive provision of Rule 17 which permits counting officiating service. |
Tamil Nadu v. E. Paripoorna, AIR 1992 SC 1823 | Cases relating to temporary appointments (Rule 10 of Temporary Appointment Rules) and the limited benefits conferred to temporary appointees. | The court observed that many judgments relied upon by the State concerned temporary appointment rules (Rule 10) that explicitly exclude benefits; the court held those judgments were not applicable to facts where appointments were under Rule 13(5)/Rule 15 and involved substantive vacant posts and statutory procedure. |
Tejaswani v. State of M.P., 1998 MPLJ 790 | One of the judgments cited by the State relating to temporary appointment jurisprudence. | The court treated such authorities as inapplicable because they concern appointments under different rules (temporary appointment rules) that do not confer benefits, unlike appointments under Rule 13(5)/Rule 15 as found in the present case. |
A.P.N. Mayakutti v. Secretary, (1997) 2 SCC 360 | Authority cited by the State in support of limiting benefits to temporary appointees in certain contexts. | The court concluded the precedents cited did not govern the facts of the present petitions because the mechanism and statutory provisions (Rule 13(5)/Rule 15 and related Rule 7(4)/6(4)) made emergency appointment a prescribed method of recruitment. |
Dr. (Smt.) Agnes Thakur and others v. State of M.P. and others, Writ Petition No. 6931/2003 (S) | Division Bench interpretation of Rule 11 of the M.P. Regularisation of Adhoc and Emergency Appointment Rules, 1990. | The court observed that the Division Bench in that case dealt with interpretation of Rule 11 and issues distinct from the present petition; accordingly, that judgment was held not to be applicable to the present facts concerning grant of senior scale/selection grade under Rule 13(5)/Rule 15 and Rule 17. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of doctrinal and fact-sensitive steps:
- Substance over form: The court began by reiterating the principle from Siddiqui that the label attached to an appointment (e.g., "temporary vacancy") is not decisive; the court must examine the “heart and substance”, surrounding circumstances, mode, manner and terms of the appointment to determine its nature.
- Constitutional baseline: The court emphasised Article 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) and Article 309 (power to frame recruitment rules) as the constitutional framework governing recruitment and regularisation; regular appointments ordinarily require prescribed advertisement and a fair selection procedure unless the rules explicitly provide alternative methods.
- Statutory recognition of emergency appointment: The court examined the Rules (Rule 7(1), Rule 7(3) and in particular sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 of the 1967 Rules and Rule 6(4) of the 1990 Rules), noting that sub-rule (4) expressly empowers the State to adopt methods of recruitment other than those specified where exigency requires and after consulting the Commission. On that basis the court concluded that Rule 13(5) (and Rule 15 of 1990) are methods of recruitment enacted by the State under the delegated power and therefore form part of the prescribed modes of recruitment.
- Fact-appraisal of petitioners' treatment: The court found that the petitioners were appointed to substantive vacant posts as notified in the Schedule, were placed on statutory pay scales (not consolidated pay), were given increments, revision of pay scales, leave benefits, provident fund, additional increments for extra qualifications, and were allowed officiating postings. Thus, in practice they were treated as regularly appointed incumbents.
- UGC circulars and counting of past service: The court examined UGC circulars (for example the circular of 27-11-1990 and the UGC clarification dated 25-12-1988) and State circulars which set out conditions under which previous service can be counted for placement in senior scale/selection grade. The court found that the petitioners satisfied those conditions (equivalent grade/scale, required qualifications, selection procedure, not ad hoc or leave vacancy less than one year) and therefore the period of emergency appointment qualified for counting.
- Interpretation of Rule 17 and the Note: The court considered the argument that the Note appended to Rule 17 (providing for senior pay scale/selection grade) requiring "regular appointment" could be used to exclude emergency appointments. It invoked the interpretive principle (via G.P. Singh and Rudra Kumar Sain) that a Note is explanatory and must be read in context and cannot dilute the substantive provision. Because Rule 17 explicitly provides that service "whether officiating or substantive" can be counted for promotion, the Note could not be used to nullify the substantive provision's operation for senior scale/selection grade.
- Parity and equality: The court noted that the department had in several instances extended the benefit to similarly placed employees. Absent a principled distinction, denying benefit to petitioners would create two classes of employees drawn from the same method of appointment; the court relied on the principle of equality to require parity where comparable treatment had been given to others in identical circumstances.
- Inapplicability of certain precedents: The court observed that several cases cited by the State concerned Rule 10-type temporary appointments which explicitly exclude benefit; therefore, those authorities were not applicable to appointments made under Rule 13(5)/Rule 15 where statutory procedure and substantive posts were involved.
- Conclusion of entitlement: Putting together statutory authority for emergency appointment as a valid method of recruitment, the petitioners' factual treatment as regular incumbents, compliance with UGC/State circular conditions, and the interpretive position on the Note to Rule 17, the court concluded that emergency appointment under Rule 13(5)/Rule 15 qualifies as a regular appointment for the purpose of grant of senior pay scale/selection grade.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
ALL WRIT PETITIONS ALLOWED AND DISPOSED OF.
Direct consequences and implementation directions given by the court:
- The respondents were directed to treat the service rendered by the petitioners from their initial date of appointment as emergency appointees as a "regular appointment" for the purpose of conferring the benefit of senior pay scale and selection grade.
- The respondents were directed to place the matters before the appropriate Screening Committee, and based on the Committee's recommendations, to extend the benefit retrospectively with effect from the date of eligibility of each of the petitioners.
- No order as to costs was made.
Broader implications noted by the court (as limited to the facts of this opinion):
- The decision emphasises that emergency appointments made in accordance with rules framed under Article 309 and authorised by sub-rule provisions (e.g., Rule 7(4) / Rule 6(4)) can be methods of recruitment that constitute regular appointments when examined on substance and in light of surrounding circumstances.
- The court made clear that a Note appended to a Rule cannot be read to dilute a substantive provision of that Rule (for example, that officiating service may be counted) where the substantive provision itself permits counting of such service.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a general rule beyond the facts considered; it reached its conclusion on the combination of statutory text, the manner in which the petitioners were actually treated, and the UGC/State circulars applicable to counting of past service.
This summary has been prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what the opinion contains.
Deepak Sahu & Ors. v. State Of M.P.
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