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  • Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules
  • Railway Protection Force Rules 44, 45
  • provision of Rule 47
  • Rules 44, 45 and 46
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citation codes
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  • Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules
  • Railway Protection Force Rules 44, 45
  • provision of Rule 47
  • Rules 44, 45 and 46
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by G.N. Ray, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as a constable in the Railway Protection Force (RPF) and at the relevant time was attached to the Shalimar yard. On 29 November 1975, after performing his duties and while about to hand over charge, the petitioner alleges that the Officer-in-Charge, RPF Shalimar (respondent No. 6), together with other RPF personnel, restrained him, took him to the office and asked him to sign blank papers which he refused. The petitioner contends he was then assaulted and tortured and, after losing normal sense, had something recorded by respondent No. 6. The petitioner states four criminal cases were filed against him but he was ultimately discharged from those criminal proceedings. Subsequently, the Assistant Security Officer, South Eastern Railway, dismissed the petitioner from service with effect from 29 November 1975 under Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry under Rules 44–46. The materials on which Rule 47 was exercised were not disclosed to the petitioner, nor were the reasons for the impracticability of an inquiry disclosed in the dismissal order (annexure 'G'). The petitioner made representations and an appellate order was later challenged in this Court after the petition was orally amended to include that appellate order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether dispensing with a formal departmental inquiry under Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules can be validly done without holding the inquiry prescribed by Rules 44–46, and on what basis such dispensation is permissible.
  2. Whether the reasons for exercising the power under Rule 47 must be recorded objectively and can be judicially reviewed by the Court when challenged as mala fide or improper.
  3. Whether secret inquiry reports (with sources not named) and the recorded summaries of those sources can constitute sufficient materials on which an authority may validly exercise Rule 47 to dismiss an employee without affording a normal departmental inquiry or opportunity of hearing.
  4. Whether an appellate authority can validate an initial order that is void for lack of jurisdiction or invalid exercise of power (as argued with reference to precedent).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments — Mr. Dutta

  • Dispensing with the formal inquiry under Rules 44–46 may be permissible only in appropriate cases, and such dispensation must rest on objective, cogent materials rather than mere ipse dixit or subjective satisfaction of authorities.
  • If the initial dismissal order is void because dispensation with inquiry was not justified, then an appellate authority cannot validate that void order (citing Barada Kanta Misra v. High Court of Orissa).
  • The reasons provided in the affidavit-in-opposition (that it was not practicable to call witnesses because they would be exposed, ineffective, humiliated or threatened) lack an objective basis as regards witnesses from security and other railway departments; those grounds are justiciable and must be shown to be objectively grounded.
  • Authorities and precedents (Union of India v. Chandra Bahadur Newar; Maksudan Pathak) support that dispensation with inquiry cannot be justified merely on grounds correlated with the merits (influence or terror of the delinquent) and must be tied to facts making inquiry impracticable in a reasonable manner.
  • If extraneous materials outside the basis of charges were relied on, the dismissal order should be struck down, but the petitioner cannot precisely challenge the secret departmental inquiry because its details are unknown to him.

Respondents' Arguments — Mr. Chowdhury

  • The respondents produced two secret inquiry reports (dated 26 November 1975) which, although they did not disclose the names of sources, contained recorded statements and detailed summaries revealing the petitioner's complicity in thefts and the modus operandi.
  • Rule 47 is a provision intended to permit dispensing with departmental inquiry in special cases; the conditions for exercising that power were fulfilled as reasons were recorded and the inquiry reports were available to the disciplinary authority.
  • No separate opportunity of being heard was required before passing the dismissal order because of the express provision of Rule 47 (compared with R.14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968).
  • The court's role is limited: it may examine whether the material relied upon has a factual basis for formation of belief, but need not inquire into the sufficiency or truth of that material (citing Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Rly. v. J.P. Banerjee and Jayanta Kr. Roy v. Union of India).
  • The secrecy of source names was justified to prevent drying up of sources and protect their lives and families; therefore non-disclosure of source identities in the reports does not invalidate the reports as a basis for Rule 47 action.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Barada Kanta Misra v. High Court of Orissa, (1976) 3 SCC 327 : AIR 1976 SC 1899 Principle that if the order of the initial authority is void, an appellate authority cannot make that order valid. Cited by the petitioner (Mr. Dutta) to argue that a void initial order of dismissal cannot be validated by an appellate authority; the court records this principle as part of the parties' arguments.
Union of India v. Chandra Bahadur Newar, 1978 Cal. HN 489 : 1978 SLWR 506 Illustration that asserted grounds for dispensation (e.g., fear that no witnesses would be available) must have objective basis; when security officers themselves detected the offence, bringing witnesses from outside was unnecessary. Relied upon by the petitioner to contend that the respondents' stated grounds (witnesses would be exposed or ineffective) lack objective basis in relation to security/railway witnesses.
Maksudan Pathak v. The Security Officer Eastern Rly, 1981 Lab. IC 881 (Allahabad Full Bench) Held that reasons for dispensing with enquiry must relate to practicability of holding an inquiry and not be correlated to merits (e.g., collusion/influence cannot automatically justify dispensation). Relied on by the petitioner to argue that dispensation under Rule 47 cannot be based merely on grounds showing collusion or inability to collect evidence due to influence; such grounds render action arbitrary.
Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Rly. v. J.P. Banerjee, 79 Cal. W.N. 709 Rule that non-mentioning of reasons in the punishment order does not automatically invalidate it, though reasons must be recorded and have an objective basis. Invoked by respondents to support the proposition that reasons recorded (even if not mentioned in the order itself) can validate exercise of powers and that such reasons must have objective basis.
Jayanta Kr. Roy v. Union of India, 1981 (1) Cal H.N. 358 When powers are conferred subject to fulfillment of conditions, the authority must act objectively and whether conditions are fulfilled is justiciable; the court's review is limited to whether the materials had a factual basis for formation of belief. Relied upon by respondents to submit that the disciplinary authority objectively considered the inquiry reports and that judicial review should be limited to whether those materials had a factual basis, not to re-assess their truth or sufficiency.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature and scope of Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules vis-à-vis Rules 44–46 which prescribe departmental inquiry. The judge observed:

  • Dispensation with the procedure in Rules 44–46 is permissible only in suitable cases where, on the special facts, such dispensation becomes absolutely necessary because it otherwise would remove the delinquent officer's right of defence; it is an exceptional power.
  • The reasons for exercising Rule 47 must be recorded in writing and the disciplinary authority must consider relevant facts objectively before invoking Rule 47; the exercise of this power is justiciable when mala fides or improper exercise is alleged.
  • The expression "reasonably practicable" in Rule 47 relates to holding the inquiry; the facts making inquiry impracticable cannot be exhaustively enumerated and must be determined case-by-case based on objective considerations (examples given: threats to witnesses, risk of exposing sources, non-availability of witnesses within reasonable time, impossibility of presence of delinquent officer).
  • The Court rejected a narrow construction that would exclude grounds such as collusion, influence or threat where these facts render holding an inquiry futile; it recognized that where evidence cannot be adduced for such reasons, an inquiry could be for no useful purpose and thus dispensed with.
  • On the facts of this case, two separate secret inquiry reports were placed before the Court. Although those reports did not disclose informant names or contain verbatim statements, they recorded the gist and provided detailed accounts of modus operandi and the petitioner's alleged complicity. The reports stated witnesses were afraid to give evidence openly due to threats and possible humiliation or danger to their families.
  • The disciplinary authority considered those reports and recorded satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an open departmental inquiry, and that the materials justified exercising Rule 47. The Court found that the authority had objectively considered the facts and that the reports furnished a factual basis for formation of belief.
  • Accordingly, the Court concluded there were valid reasons on record for invoking Rule 47 in the present case and that judicial interference was not warranted on the showing before it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Rule discharged.

The Court declined to interfere with the dismissal action taken under Rule 47 on the facts presented and discharged the writ rule. The Court held that, on the material placed before it (two secret inquiry reports summarizing sources who feared giving open testimony), the disciplinary authority had objectively considered relevant factors and reasonably concluded that a departmental inquiry was not practicable.

Consequences:

  • The writ petition challenging the dismissal was dismissed (the rule was discharged), i.e., the Court did not set aside the dismissal based on the record before it.
  • No costs were ordered by the Court ("but I make no order as to costs").
  • The opinion emphasizes that the exercise of Rule 47 must be based on objectively recorded reasons and is amenable to judicial review on that narrow ground; beyond the facts of this case, the Court does not purport to lay down any broader new precedent beyond applying these principles.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or invent facts or reasoning beyond that text.

    Baidyanath Singh (Petitioner) v. General Manager, South Eastern Railway And Others (S).

    G.N Ray, J.:— This rule is directed, against the order of dismissal passed by the Assistant Security Officer, South Eastern Railway, against the petitioner. The petitioner was appointed as a constable in the Railway Protection Force and at the relevant time the petitioner, was attached to the Shalimar???yard. The petitioner's case is that on 29th November, 1975, when the petitioner after performing his duties was about to hand over charge, the respondent No. 6, the Officer-in-charge, Railway Protection, Force, Shalimar,. Howrah, along, with other Railway Protection Force Personne???restrained the petitioner from leaving the office and he was taken to his office and was asked to sign some blank papers but, the petitioner had refused to do so. The petitioner contends that thereafter he was assaulted severely and was tortured in humanly and when the petitioner lost???his normal sense because of such torture, the respondent No. 6 got something recorded., The petitioner also contends that four criminal cases against, the petiti???ne??? were filed but the petitioner, ultimately got discharged from the said criminal proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner was served with??? the order of dismissal. It has been stated in the said order, which is annexure ‘G’ to the writ petition that the petitioner is also guilty of serious; misconduct in that on the night of 25th, November, 1975, there was theft of clothes from shed No. 4 in the, Shalimar, yard and also in other identical crimes of theft of cloth from Shalimar goods shed reported on 26th September, 1975, his complicity in the crime came to light. The said Assistant Security Officer was satisfied, that the circumstances of the case were such that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner as provided for in the Railway Protection Force Rules 44, 45 and 46. The said Officer, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 47 of the Railway Protection Force Rules removed the said petitioner from the service with effect from 29th November, 975. The materials on the basis of which the said power under Rule 47 was exercised were however, not disclosed and it was also not disclosed as to why holding of enquiry was not reasonably practicable in the case of the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner made representations to the higher authorities but the petitioner did not receive any intimation whatsoever and according to the petitioner his departmental appeal was pending. It has, however been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that the said appeal was disposed of and the same was dismissed. The notice of the same was sent to the petitioner but it could not be served as the petitioner was not found. The learned counsel for the petitioner there-after, made an oral prayer before this Court that the writ petition should be treated as amended to the effect that the said appellate order is also challenged as illegal and invalid and the said prayer was allowed.

    2. Mr. Dutta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that in appropriate cases, holding of formal enquiry as contemplated under the Rules 44 to 4??? of the Railway Protection Force Rules may be dispensed with but such dispensation can be made only objectively and on the basis of the cogent materials and not on mere ipso dixit or the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authorities. He also submits that if the order of dismissal is illegal and bad because in the facts of the case such dispensation of holding of enquiry could not ha???e been made then the order of dismissal is void from the very beginning and it is immaterial whether the said order is affirmed o??? ??? or ???t. For this contention Mr. Dutta refers to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Barada Kanta Misra v. High Court of Orissa reported in (1976) 3 SCC 327 : AIR 1976 SC 1899. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the said decision that the order of initial authority if void, an order of appellate authority cannot make the said order a valid one. It may be noted in this connection that in the affidavit-in-opposition it has been disclosed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 7 that the order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner because the enquiry revealed the complicity of the petitioner in the matter of theft of goods from the railway goods shed at Shalimar and holding of enquiry as envisaged under Rr. 44 to 46 was not considered practicable for two reasons, namely, (1) “It is considered not feasible, desirable or practicable to call for and to produce the witnesses of security or other railway departments and outsiders in an open enquiry under the above rules for this procedure will expose them and make them ineffective for future, and (2). these witnesses if asked to appear at a confronted enquiry and dispose the facts known to them about the said criminal operation, are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults thereafter or even they and the members of their families may become targets of acts of violence”. Mr. Dutta contends that although the reasons were not disclosed to the petitioner the same have now been disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition and one of the reasons as quoted hereinbefore is that it is not feasible, desirable or practicable to call for and produce witnesses of security/other railway departments and outsiders in an open enquiry under the above rules for this procedure will expose them and make them ineffective in future. Mr. Dutta contends that if th??? witnesses of security and the railway departments are called, it is not understood how they will be exposed and become ineffective in future. He submits that the reasons must have an objective basis and the same are also justiciable in a court of law. In this connection, he refers to a decision of this Court made in the case of Union of India v. Chandra Bahadur Newar reported in 1978 Cal. HN 489 : 1978 SLWR 506. In the said case, a surprise check was made by the Security Officer, Assistant Security Officer and other officers of the Railway Protection Force and the delinquent officers were detected by them in such a way which suggested their complicity in the commission of crime. It was stated that because of the reign of terror unleashed by the said delinquent officers no witnesses would be available in the departmental enquiry but this court held that the said grounds had no objective basis and as such should not be accepted as good grounds because, Senior Officers were witnesses in that case. It was observed in the said decision that when the commi???sion of offence was detected by the officers of the security department, question of bringing witnesses from outside did not arise. Mr. Dutta contends that in the instant case it has been stated that the witnesses of security and other railway departments and also outsiders could not be brought because in such an event they would be exposed and would become ineffective in future. He submits that even if for outsider such an argument is accepted, there is no reason to accept the said contentions regarding the witnesses of security and other railway departments. In this connection Mr. Dutta has also referred to a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court-made in the case of Maksudan Pathak v. The Security Officer Eastern Rly reported in 1981 Lab. IC 881. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held in the said decision that reasons for dispensing with the enquiry are not correlated with the merits of the case. The expression “reasonably practicable” in the Rules is used in connection with the holding of enquiry and cannot be correlated to the merits of the charge. ‘Reasonably practicable’ will apply in a case where the authority cannot in a reasonable manner put into practice the clauses in relation to enquiry because of certain facts and circumstances peculiar to the case. In the said case the ground for dispensing with the enquiry was to the effect that there was collusion with the Railway Protection Force Staff and the department was unable to collect evidence against the delinquent due to his influence at the station where the theft had occurred. The Allahabad Full Bench has held that for the said grounds the dispensation with the enquiry under Rule 47 could not be made and as such the action taken under Rule 47 was wholly arbitrary. Relying on the said decision Mr. Dutta has submitted that in the instant case also another ground for dispensing with the enquiry proceeding is that the witnesses are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults after the enquiry and they and their family members may become targets of acts of violence. Mr. Dutta submits that the said grounds really indicate that because of the influence and/or terror of the delinquent officer it was not possible to collect evidence and/or to lead it but the same cannot be a ground for disp???nsing with the enquiry proceeding and such dispensation must be correlated with the enquiry and not with the merits of the charge. Mr. Dutta has also submitted that since the secret enquiry made by the department is not known to the petitioner, it is not possible for the petitioner to precisely challenge the correctness of such enquiry but if the court finds that extraneous materials were also taken into consideration which were not the basis of the charges for which the order of dismissal was made then the order of dismissal should be struck down by the Court.

    3. Mr. Chowdhury, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has produced the enquiry report on the basis of which the impugned order of dismissal was passed. No other paper containing any statement noted or recorded by the enquiring officers has been produced before this Court and the learned counsel has submitted before this Court tha??? it is on the basis of the enquiry reports which have been produced before this Court, the said order of dismissal was passed and no other records were taken into consideration. It appears that on 26th November, 1975, the Respondent No. 6, namely, the Officer-in-Charge, Railway Protection Force submitted a report wherein he stated that a deep confidential enquiry was conducted and in such enquiry the complicity of a number of persons named in the said report including the petitioner came to light. A detailed] report has been made about the modus operandi of the said persons in the matter of committing thefts of goods stored in the railway yard at Shalimar. The petitioner's complicity in the matter of theft was clearly stated in the said report and how the petitioner took part in the commission of theft was also discribed. It was stated in the said report that he collected the materials disclosed in the report by making secret enquiries from different persons and although there are eye witnesses who had seen the said persons to organise and commit the crime, they were not prepared to give any evidence openly either in court or before any other person or authority for fear of their lives as they had been threatened in such a manner by the Rakshaks as well as the gang of coolies involved in the crime. It has also been stated in the Said report that such witnesses were also afraid of humiliation and harassment to the members of their family in case they would open their mouth to tell the truth publicly. It appears that similar report was also given by the D.I R.P.F on 26th November, 1975. In the said report also the complicity of the petitioner was clearly stated and the details were given as to how the said co???mission of theft was made. The names of the source, however, were not disclosed in the said report and it was stated that the sources who gave that informatian were not willing to come forward and give statements due to fear and threats. Mr. Chowdhury has submitted that the provision of Rule 47 have been incorporated for dispensing with the departmental enquiry. In the special facts of the case he submits, that although in the enquiry report the names of the sources were not disclosed but the statements made by them had been recorded at length and the complicity of the petitioner Was clearly revealed. Mr. Chowdhury has also contended that before passing the order of dismissal, no opportunity of being heard was required to be given because of the express provision of R. 47. He submits that similar provision has also been made in R. 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. In this connect???on he refers to a decision of this Court made in the case of Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Rly. v. J.P Banerjee reported in 79 Cal. W.N 709. In the said decision this court has held that non-mentioning of the reasons in the order will not m???ke it invalid although reasons are to be recorded in writing. It has also been held that such reasons must have an objective basis. Mr. Choudhury contends that provisions of R. 47 are Similar to those of R. 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Aepeal) Rules, 1968. He has submitted that before passing the impugned orders, the reasons had been recorded as to why the powers under Rule 47 were exercised. As such the condition precedent for exercising the powers under R. 47 was fulfilled. He has also contended that since challenge has been thrown in this court about the justification of the order passed under R. 47, the secret enquiry reports have also been made available to the Court and it will appear that such reports clearly reveal the complicity of the petitioner and also reveal that it will not be possible to hold any departmental enquiry because no evidence will be available to substantiate the charges in the departmental enquiry because of threats held out by the delinquent officer and his associates and also on the ground that the secret source from which information was collected will be exposed. Mr. Choudhury in this connection has relied on a decision of this Court made in the case of Jayanta Kr. Roy v. Union of India reported in 1981 (1) Cal H.N 358. In the said case also R. 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, was considered and it has been held by this Court in the said decision that when powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same on fulfilment of certain conditions then the authority would act objectively on fulfilment of such conditions. Whether the conditions were fulfilled or not are matters which are justiciable in courts of law. The Court is not concerned either with the sufficiency or even with the truth of these materials though these materials must have a factual basis to the grounds for the formation of the belief. To this limited extent the judicial review of the action is permissible under R. 14(ii). Relying on the said decision, Mr. Choudhury has submitted that the condition precedent for exercise of the powers under R. 47 of the Rules have been fulfilled inasmuch as the reasons for dispensing with the departmental enquiry have been clearly given. The enquiry reports were made available to the Officer exercising powers under R. 47 and the said enquiry reports had materials on the basis of which objectively the power under R. 47 can be exercised. He submits that the court should not be concerned with the truth or sufficiency of the materials and if the materials have a factual basis to the groands for the formation of the belief, then the action taken must be held to be valid. Mr. Choudhury has submitted that the nature of enquiry made in the instant case was a secret one and from the enquiry reports it is revealed that the petitioner along with other R.P.F personnel and coolies were involved in he commission of thefts. The ‘sources’ were contacted by the Enquiring Officer and the summary of their statements were recorded but the names of the sources were, however, not disclosed in the enquiry report for the reasons that the exposure of their identity would not only dry the sources but was likely to endanger their lives and the lives of the members of their families. Mr. Choudhury has contended that simply because the names of the sources were not disclosed in the two enquiry reports forming the basis of the impugned order, the said enquiry reports should not be held to be invalid reports not containing materials on the basis of which the impugned order could have been objectively passed. Mr. Choudhury, therefore, submits that in the facts of the case, no interference is called for by the writ court and the Rule should be discharged.

    4. After considering the respective submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties it appears to me that dispensation with the procedures laid down in Rules 44, 45 and 46 can only be made in a suitable case and as such dispensation takes away the right of defence; the power of dispensation can be exercised only when in the special facts of the case such dispensation becomes absolutely necessary. The reasons for such dispensation must also be recorded in writing and exercise of the power under R. 47 can only be made after considering the relevant facts objectively. Consequently the reasons and/or facts for which the power under R. 47 has been exercised become justificable in a Court of law whenever a challenge is thrown about mala fide or improper exercise of the discretion. It is true that it is not necessary to disclose the reasons in the order of punishment to be passed by the Disciplinary authority but before exercising such power, the Disciplinary authority must take into consideration the relevant factors and must record his reasons as to why the power under R. 47 was exercised. The expresssion ‘reasonably practicable’ appearing in R. 47 has been used in connection with the holding of enquiry. The factors for which the holding of enquiry cannot be reasonably held in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules, cannot be precisely enumerated and such reason must obviously depend on the facts and circumstances in each case. In my view, if for good reasons, the evidences for establishing the guilt of the delinquent officer cannot be established in the disciplinary proceeding because of the threat held out to the witnesses and/or the risk of the source of information being exposed or for any other valid reasons, namely, non-availability of the relevant witnesses within the reasonable time or the impossibility of the presence of delinquent officer etc. then dispensation with the holding of departmental enquiry can reasonably be made because in such circumstances the holding of enquiry will be for no useful purpose but will be only an idle formality. It does not appear to me that R. 47 should be construed in such a narrow manner so that the grounds for dispensation must not be the grounds of collusion with the departmental staff or inability to adduce evidence in open t???al because of influence and/or threats made by the delinquent officer on the witnesses to be examined. So far as the merits of the instant case are concerned, it appears to me that in respect of the charge of theft committed at the ???nstance and/or collusion of the petitioner from the Railway Goods shed, ???wo separate secret enquiries were held by the officers of the Railway ??? Protection Force and both the said secret enquiry reports were made available to this Court. Although in none of the said enquiry reports, the names of informants and/or verbatim statements made by them have been recorded, but both the said enquiry reports reveal the gist of the information collected from the “sources” of the departmental and detailed reports as to the modus operandi of pilferage and/or theft of goods from the Railway Goods Shed have been given. The complicity of the petitioner has been clearly established in both the reports. It is evident from the said reports that the witnesses from whom the said information was collected were afraid of giving any evidence in an open trial for fear of humiliation and/or torture to themselves and to the members of their families and the authorities concerned also felt that for future enquiries, the names of the “source” should not be exposed. The disciplinary authority before passing the impugned order objectively considered the facts and circumstances contained in the said reports and it appears that he was satisfied about the complicity of the petitioner and was also satisfied for the reasons recorded by him that it was not leasible and/or reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry. Accordingly, he exercised the power under R. 47. In my view, in the aforesaid facts, it cannot be contended that such order was passed without any valid reasons and/or in ??? he facts of the case, the provisions of R. 47 were not attracted, In the result, no interference is called for by the writ court and the Rule is discharged, but I make no order as to costs.

    5. Rule discharged.

    Rules 44, 45 and 46

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    Comments

    Baidyanath Singh (Petitioner) v. General Manager, South Eastern Railway And Others (S).
    (Mar 24, 1982)