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Judgment Summary — Mitter, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the defendant (the Tamluk Trading Company) from a decree granted to plaintiffs in a suit filed 29 March 1924. The plaintiffs sued for establishment of their natural right to lateral support in respect of cadastral survey plots Nos. 39, 40 and 41 against the defendant's adjoining dâg No. 19. The plaintiffs alleged that dâg No. 19 had formerly been jal land and that the defendant excavated a tank there, causing the lateral support of the plaintiffs' contiguous plots to give way and creating a danger of subsidence into the defendant's tank.

The Subordinate Judge accepted a report of an officer of the Public Works Department (appointed to investigate), and on that basis decreed relief to the plaintiffs. The Subordinate Judge directed the defendant to protect the lateral support of plots 40 and 41 (including the existing bund between them and the defendant's newly excavated tank) by erecting an embankment the details of which were specified in the Subordinate Judge's judgment. For plot No. 39 the Subordinate Judge considered an embankment with an average base of 9 ft. 9 in. and a length of 135 ft. to be necessary and directed the defendants to build it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit for injunction to protect a right to lateral support is maintainable before actual damage has occurred — i.e., whether injunctive relief can be granted on a threat of subsidence.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs have a right to lateral support in respect of cadastral survey plot No. 39 where the plaintiffs themselves had previously raised a bund (within 20 years of the suit) and thus altered the land from its ancient natural state, such that no additional support can be claimed by prescription or grant.
  3. Whether the matter should be remanded for fresh investigation specifically as to the effect of the plaintiffs' earlier construction on the natural state of plot No. 39.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The appellant argued broadly that a suit of this character does not lie until actual damage is sustained; hence no injunction should be granted on threat alone. Dalton v. Henry Angus & Co. was cited in support.
  • The defendant contended there was no danger of subsidence and so the suit for injunction must fail.
  • With respect to plot No. 39, the appellant argued that the plot was not in its ancient natural state because the plaintiffs had themselves raised a bund (by excavating a tank) within 20 years of the suit, so plaintiffs had not acquired any prescriptive right to additional lateral support for that raised bank.
  • The appellant argued that the Subordinate Judge's finding about the new bank required reconsideration and that the matter should be remanded for fresh investigation into the effect of the new construction on the natural state of the land.

Respondent's (Plaintiffs') Contentions

  • The plaintiffs maintained a right to lateral support for plots 39, 40 and 41 and alleged that defendant's excavation of a tank in dâg No. 19 had caused the plaintiffs' lateral support to give way, creating danger of subsidence.
  • The plaintiffs relied on the investigation and report of the Public Works Department officer, and on the Subordinate Judge's acceptance of that report that the excavation had affected lateral support to a considerable extent and that subsidence was certain (and in some parts had already begun).
  • With respect to the specific point about plot No. 39, it was argued for the respondent that the contention concerning the plaintiffs' earlier raising of the bund had not been specifically taken in the written defence and therefore should not be allowed to be raised at the appellate stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dalton v. Henry Angus & Co. Leading case on the right of lateral support (general authority on that right). The court observed that Dalton is not authority for the proposition that an action for injunction will not lie until actual damage has occurred; it does not preclude injunctive relief before subsidence if injury is imminent or certain.
Corporation of Birmingham v. Allen (Sir George Jessel, M.R.) States that every landowner has a right to the support of his land in its natural state and that a court may grant injunction to prevent irreparable damage where expert evidence shows an act would necessarily cause subsidence; the court requires a "much clearer and much stronger case" where damage is only threatened. The judgment was relied upon to support the proposition that injunctive relief can be granted before subsidence occurs when expert evidence establishes that the defendant's acts would necessarily cause subsidence.
Backhouse v. Bonomi As confirmed by the House of Lords, establishes that every landowner has a right to the support of his land in its natural state. Referred to as foundational authority underlying the right to support; used to situate the plaintiffs' substantive right.
Trinidad Asphalt Company v. Ambard (Lord Macnaghten) Holds that, assuming a right to have land supported by adjacent land, that right should be protected by injunction even if recoverable damages would be trifling. Invoked to support the availability of injunctive relief to protect the right to lateral support despite potentially small monetary damages.
Attorney General v. Conduit Colliery Company Supports the proposition that injunction will be granted where the defendant claims a right to do acts which must inevitably cause subsidence. Referred to in support of granting injunctive relief where defendant's asserted or actual acts will inevitably result in subsidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the appellant's primary contention that injunctive relief is unavailable unless actual damage has already occurred. The judge examined the authorities cited and concluded that they do not support an absolute rule requiring actual damage before a suit for injunction can be maintained. In particular:

  1. The court held that the right to lateral support is a proprietary right (not an easement) recognised by earlier authorities (Backhouse v. Bonomi, as discussed in Birmingham v. Allen). Because of the proprietary nature of the right, acts which would necessarily cause the land to subside can be restrained by injunction to prevent irreparable damage.
  2. The court relied on the formulation in Birmingham v. Allen and the statement in Trinidad Asphalt Company v. Ambard to show that an injunction may be appropriate even where legal damages would be small, and that a threatened injury may justify injunctive relief where expert evidence establishes that injury is imminent or certain.
  3. The court referenced Kerr on Injunctions and the Attorney General v. Conduit Colliery Company to underscore that interference with a substantial right to support will be enjoined when injury is imminent or inevitable.
  4. Applying those principles to the facts, the court noted that the Subordinate Judge had accepted the Public Works Department officer's report which concluded that the excavation had affected the plaintiffs' lateral support "to a considerable extent," that subsidence was certain, and that in some parts subsidence had already begun and portions of land underneath the plaintiffs' land had been scoured away. On that factual basis, the court concluded that injunctive relief was properly available despite the absence of complete, pre-suit subsidence in every part.
  5. As to plot No. 39, the court analysed the contention that the plot was not in its ancient natural state because plaintiffs had themselves raised a bund (within twenty years of the suit) by excavating a tank in that plot. The appellant argued that this alteration meant plaintiffs could not claim additional lateral support by prescription or grant. The respondent countered that this defence was not specifically pleaded. The court observed that the Munsif and the Subordinate Judge had discussed the point and that the Subordinate Judge had in effect found the bank to be a new construction raised within 20 years.
  6. The appellant asked for remand for fresh investigation of the effect of the new construction on the natural state of plot No. 39. The court declined remand, explaining that the matter largely entailed a question of cost, that the litigation began in 1924, and that it should be finally decided by the appellate court rather than remitted.
  7. Consequently, the court affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge (as to plots 40 and 41 and plot 39) but introduced a modification allocating one-third of the cost of the specific embankment structure (average base 9 ft. 9 in. and length 135 ft.) to the plaintiffs. The defendant was ordered to erect the structure, submit accounts to the court, and, after scrutiny in the presence of both pleaders, the plaintiffs were to be directed to pay one-third of the costs.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The decree of the lower appellate court is affirmed subject to a modification: the plaintiffs are to bear one-third of the costs of the embankment required to protect plot No. 39 (the embankment of average base 9 ft. 9 in. by 135 ft. in length). The defendant must proceed to erect the structure and submit an account of expenses to the court for scrutiny; following scrutiny in the presence of counsel for both sides the court will direct the plaintiffs to pay one-third of the costs.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The defendant is directed to build the embankment and to protect the lateral support of cadastral survey plots Nos. 40 and 41 and the specified works for plot No. 39.
  • After construction the defendant must submit an account and, upon court scrutiny, the plaintiffs will be ordered to contribute one-third of the structure costs.
  • There will be no order as to costs of the appeal.

The opinion does not claim to establish any novel legal principle; it applies existing authorities to the facts and resolves the remand and cost allocation issues as described above.

Disposition: Decree modified; Subordinate Judge's judgment otherwise stands.

    Tamluk Trading And Manufacturing Company, Limited v. Nabadwipchandra Nandi

    Mitter, J.:— This is an appeal by the defendant and arises out of a suit commenced by the plaintiffs for establishment of their natural right to lateral support in respect of three plots which are described as cadastral survey plots Nos. 39, 40 and 41 from defendant's dâg No. 19, which is adjacent to the said plots. The case of the plaintiffs is that the cadastral survey dâg No. 19 was jal land before, and the defendant by excavating a tank in it has caused the lateral support of the plaintiffs' contiguous plots to give way and there is a danger of subsidence of those plots in the tank of the defendant as excavated. The defendant's substantial defence is that the plaintiffs have got no right to the lateral support and the defendant which is the Tamluk Trading Company further contends that there is no danger of any subsidence and consequently the suit for injunction must fail. It is not necessary to state the earlier history of this litigation, which commenced on the 29th March, 1924. It is sufficient to state that, by the judgment now under appeal, a decree has been granted to the plaintiffs, and the defendant company has been directed to protect the lateral support of cadastral survey plots Nos. 40 and 41, the existing bund or all between them, and the defendant's newly excavated tank by erecting a certain embankment the details of which are given in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge has accepted the report of the Public Works Department officer, who was directed by the court, in pursuance of the order of this Court, to investigate into the matter. His conclusions are embodied in the judgment and it is not necessary to refer to them except the portion with regard to the lateral support of cadastral survey plot No. 39. In order to protect this plot, an embankment, of which the average base is 9 ft., 9 in width and 135 ft. in length, has been considered to be necessary; and the defendants have been directed to build such an embankment by the Subordinate Judge.

    Against this decree, the present appeal has been brought and it has been argued, in the first place, very broadly that a suit of this character does not lie until it is shown that the plaintiff has sustained actual damage. In other words, the broad contention is put forward that no cause for injunction lies unless the damage is actually sustained. Reference has been made in support of this contention to the case of Dalton v. Henry Angus & Co. which is the leading case relative to the right of lateral support. That case, however, is no authority for the proposition contended for, namely, that the suit for injunction will not lie until the damage is actually sustained. This question has been dealt with in an illuminating judgment of Sir George Jessel, Master of Rolls, in the case of Corporation of Birmingham v. Allen, where the Master of Rolls says: “Now, having so far dealt with the facts, let me consider the law. As I understand, the law was settled by the House of Lords, confirming the decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in the case of Backhouse v. Bonomi(3), that every landowner in the kingdom has a right to the support of his land in its natural state. It is not an easement: it is a right of property. That being so, if the plaintiffs' land had been in its natural state, no doubt the defendants must not do anything to let that land slip, or go down, or subside. If they were doing an act which it could be proved to me by satisfactory expert evidence would necessarily have that effect, I have no doubt this Court would interfere by injunction on the ground upon which it always interfere, namely, to prevent irreparable damage when the damage is only threatened. Of course they must have a much clearer and much stronger case to call for the interference of this Court by injunction where the damage is merely threatened and no damage has actually occurred, than when some damage has actually occurred, because in the one case you have no facts to go by, but only opinion, and in the other case you having actual facts to go by.” This view has also been taken, by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of The Trinidad Asphalt Company v. Ambard where Lord Macnaghten said: “Assuming that the plaintiffs were entitled to have their land in its natural state supported by the adjacent land belonging to Ambard, it would seem to follow as a matter of course that this right which the defendants have invaded should now be protected by injunction, and not the less so because in his Honour's view the damages that could be recovered at law would be only trifling.” The law is accurately stated in respect of the remedy by injunction in the case of the kind, with which I have to deal with, in the present case by Kerr in his well-known treatise of Law of Injunction at page 198 of the 6th Edition. The learned author says this: “An owner's right to support will be protected by an injunction when the interference with the right is of a substantial nature even though the pecuniary loss actually resulting from the defendant's wrongful acts is small. The Court will also interfere by injunction before subsidence has actually taken place if satisfied that injury is imminent and certain to result from the defendant's acts, also when the defendant claims the right to do acts which must inevitably cause a subsidence.” In support of this latter proposition, the learned author refers to a case to which my attention has been drawn by the learned advocate for the respondent, namely, the case of Attorney General v. Conduit Colliery Company. On these authorities, it appears clear that this ground, challenging the maintainability of the suit on the ground that an action does not lie unless an actual damage has occurred, must fail. The finding of the lower appellate court, which was based on the report of the Public Works Department Officer, is that the excavation of the tank has affected the plaintiff's lateral support to a considerable extent. It is argued for the appellant that the damage or subsidence in this case was not imminent or certain at the time of the institution of the suit. Reliance has been placed on a passage in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, now under appeal, to the effect that although there is a bund between plots Nos. 40 and 41 and plot No. 19 yet that is insufficient and cannot prevent subsidence in course of time. But it would not be fair to read the judgment of the Subordinate Judge in this way: The other portion of the judgment shows that the Subordinate Judge has accepted the report of the Public Works Department Officer who was appointed in this case to the effect that the subsidence is certain and, as a matter of fact, in some parts subsidence has already begun and portions of land underneath plaintiffs' land have been scoured away by the action of the tank. The next ground taken is really confined to the lateral support with reference to plot No. 39. It is argued that plot No. 39 is not in its ancient natural state and that, on the plaintiffs' own admission, the bund has been raised by reason of the plaintiffs' excavating in his own plot No. 39 a tank many years ago. It is said that this bund was erected not for a sufficiently long period, namely, that it has been raised only within 20 years of the institution of the suit, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs have not acquired a right of lateral support with reference to the erection of the bank. It is contended that the right of support is limited to a right of support from land, in its natural state to land in its natural state. It is said that as this bank has been raised and the support required has been increased by increasing the weight of the surrounding land no right exists in the plaintiffs in the absence of prescription or grant to have this additional support supplied by the neighbouring land. It is argued for the respondent that this point was not specifically taken in the written defence in the suit and that, therefore, it should not be allowed to be raised before me. On the other hand, the appellant argues that this point arises on the finding of the Subordinate Judge to the following effect: “It is true that this bank is a new construction and as it has admittedly been raised within 20 years of the institution of this suit, the plaintiffs have not acquired any easement right with respect thereto.” It is contended that, on this finding, a direction has been given by the lower appellate court to the effect that, in order to protect this plot, construction of an embankment with an average base of 9 ft. 9 in width and 135 ft. in length is necessary. It is contended for the appellant that this order should be modified in view of the increase in the weight of the new construction and change in the natural state of the land. This point seems also to have been discussed by the Munsif, who tried the suit in the first instance. In these circumstances, the appellant contends that the matter should be remanded for a fresh investigation with reference to the effect of this new construction in changing the natural state of the land. It seems to me, however, that remand is unnecessary since the matter after all entails a question of cost, and as the litigation was started in March, 1924, the matter should be decided here and now finally.

    I think the proper order to make in this case is to affirm the decree of the Subordinate Judge with reference to plots Nos. 40 and 41 as also with reference to plot No. 39 subject, however, to this that the plaintiff must bear one-third of the costs of the structure, which is to be of an area of which the average base should be 9ft. 9in in width and 135ft. in length. The defendant must proceed to erect this structure and after he has done so he is to submit an account of the expenses to the court which after a scrutiny is to direct the plaintiffs to put in one-third costs. The scrutiny is to be made in the presence of the pleaders on both sides. Subject to this modification the judgment of the lower appellate court will stand.

    There will be no order as to costs of this appeal.

    A.K.D
    Decree modified.

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    Tamluk Trading And Manufacturing Company, Limited v. Nabadwipchandra Nandi
    (May 22, 1931)