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  • provisions of sections 18 and 21 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Art. 45 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act
  • Art. 45 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
  • SECTION 145 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sections 18 and 21 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • Art. 45 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act
  • Art. 45 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
  • SECTION 145 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation concerns a tract of land measuring 1,700 bighas, formed by the recession of the river Padma. The plaintiff claimed the disputed land as reformation in situ of an estate in which he held a share. He alleged that his title had been declared in a prior litigation and that he was placed in possession in execution of that decree. However, he was subsequently dispossessed pursuant to an order under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The plaintiff sought a declaration of title, possession, and mesne profits. The defendants opposed the suit on grounds including lack of jurisdiction, absence of cause of action due to existing settlement with revenue authorities, limitation, non-partitionability by Civil Court, and denial of mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge overruled these defenses and granted the plaintiff a decree for possession and mesne profits. The defendants appealed against this decree on similar grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation.
  2. Whether the plaintiff had an enforceable cause of action without obtaining settlement from the revenue authorities.
  3. Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 45 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act.
  4. Whether partition of the disputed land could be effected by the Civil Court given the nature of the property.
  5. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for mesne profits.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The trial Court lacked jurisdiction as the disputed land lay outside its territorial limits.
  • The plaintiff had no cause of action since he had not obtained settlement from the revenue authorities.
  • The suit was barred by limitation under Article 45 of the Limitation Act as it was not filed within three years from the last settlement.
  • No partition could be effected by the Civil Court due to the nature of the property.
  • The plaintiff was not entitled to mesne profits as the defendants did not exceed their rights as co-parceners.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The disputed land lay within the jurisdiction of the trial Court as it was situated north of the main channel of the Padma River.
  • The plaintiff had an enforceable cause of action despite the absence of settlement from revenue authorities, supported by prior litigation and possession.
  • The suit was not barred by limitation as it was not aimed at setting aside a revenue settlement but to recover possession.
  • The nature of the property did not preclude partition by the Civil Court, distinguishing prior authority cited by appellants.
  • The plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits since he was dispossessed and defendants were in exclusive possession following a Criminal Procedure Code order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharajah Rajendur Pertab Sahee v. Lalljee Sahoo and Rughoobur Dyal Sahoo v. Kishen Pertab Sahee Title to property held under Crown settlement is not affected by periodic revenue settlements; nature of title remains intact. Supported the view that plaintiff's title was not affected by lack of current settlement and reinforced enforceability of cause of action.
Abdul Kadir v. Hamid Meah Limitation and scope of suits challenging revenue authority orders. Distinguished as not applicable since present suit was for possession, not to set aside revenue authority orders.
Bepinbehary Mitter v. Lala Bhugwat Sahai Partitionability of certain types of property by Civil Courts. Distinguished on facts; not applicable to current case where property was partitionable.
Hemadri v. Ramani Partition of property under Civil Court jurisdiction. Applied to hold that partition could be effected by Civil Court in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed each contention systematically. Regarding jurisdiction, it accepted the Subordinate Judge’s finding that the disputed land lay north of the main channel of the Padma River, thus within the Rajshahi Court’s jurisdiction, and noted absence of evidence to the contrary. The Court also relied on Civil Procedure Code provisions to dismiss doubts about jurisdiction since no failure of justice was shown.

On cause of action, the Court rejected the argument that absence of revenue settlement barred suit, referencing prior litigation where the plaintiff succeeded without settlement and authoritative principles affirming that title is unaffected by periodic revenue settlements.

Concerning limitation, the Court held the suit was not barred as it was a possession suit, not one to set aside a revenue authority’s order, thus Article 45 of the Limitation Act did not apply.

Regarding partition, the Court distinguished prior authority cited by defendants and followed the Full Bench decision in Hemadri v. Ramani, holding partition was permissible by the Civil Court.

On mesne profits, the Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge’s finding that the defendants, through their tenants, had dispossessed the plaintiff under a Criminal Procedure Code order and were in exclusive possession, justifying mesne profits.

Since all grounds of appeal failed, the Court dismissed the appeal with costs.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The decision affirms the trial Court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s enforceable cause of action despite lack of current revenue settlement, and entitlement to possession and mesne profits. It clarifies that suits for possession are not barred by limitation applicable to revenue settlement challenges, and that partition of such property is permissible by Civil Courts. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts.

    Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy

    Mookerjee, J.:— The subject-matter of the litigation which has culminated in this appeal is a tract of land, 1,700 bighas in area, formed by the recession of the river Padma. The case for the plaintiff was that the disputed land was reformation in situ of an estate wherein he had a share of 5 annas 16 gundas 2 karas and 2 krant. He alleged that although his title to the property was declared in a previous litigation and he was placed in possession in execution of the decree made therein, he was subsequently dispossessed by virtue of an order made under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He consequently asked for declaration of his title as well as a decree for possession and mesne profits. The contesting defendants resisted the claim on a variety of grounds, namely, first, that the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation; secondly, that whatever the title of the plaintiff might be, he could have no cause of action till the expiry of the settlement already obtained by the defendants from the revenue authorities; thirdly, that the suit was barred by limitation; fourthly, that no partition could be effected by the Civil Court; and fifthly, that in any event, the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for mesne profits inasmuch as the defendants did not exceed their rights as co-parceners. The Subordinate Judge overruled these contentions and gave the plaintiff a decree for possession and mesne profits.

    On the present appeal, the decree of the Subordinate Judge has been assailed on five grounds; viz., first, that the trial Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation; secondly, that as the plaintiff had not obtained settlement from the revenue authorities, he had no enforceable cause of action; thirdly, that the claim was barred under Art. 45 of the schedule to the Indian Limitation Act inasmuch as it had not been instituted within three years from the date of last settlement with the defendants; fourthly, that in view of the nature of the property no partition thereof could be effected by the Civil Court; and fifthly, that no decree for mesne profits could be made in favour of the plaintiff. In our opinion, none of these contentions can be sustained.

    As regards the first point, it appears that on the 10th March 1875 a notification was issued by the Government of Bengal which defined the river Padma as the boundary between the districts of Rajshahi and Nadia. The case for the plaintiff is that at the date of the institution of the suit, i.e on the 22nd March 1916, the disputed property lay towards the north of the main channel of the Padma and was consequently within the jurisdiction of the district Court at Rajshahi. The case for the contesting defendants on the other hand is that the property lay towards the south of the main channel and was consequently within the jurisdiction of the district Court at Nadia. The Subordinate Judge has found that although the property lay towards the south of one of the channels of the Padma, that channel was not the main but only a subsidiary channel and that consequently the trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation. No materials have been placed before us to show that the conclusion of the Court below was in fact erroneous. Indeed, as no map has been prepared in this case, it is impossible for us to say whether the channel which lay towards the north of the disputed land was the main channel or a subsidiary channel of the river. We are therefore not in a position to dissent from the view taken by the Subordinate Judge. It may further be observed that in view of the provisions of sections 18 and 21 of the Civil Procedure Code, the contention of the defendants cannot possibly prevail; even if it be assumed that it is doubtful whether the property lay within the jurisdiction of the Rajshahi Court or the Nadia Court, the decree of the Subordinate Judge cannot be set aside, as it has been neither suggested nor established that there has been a failure of justice. The first contention must consequently be overruled.

    As regards the second point, it is based on the assumption that the plaintiff can have no enforceable cause of action till he obtains a settlement of the disputed land from the revenue authorities. There is, in our opinion, no foundation for this argument. In 1899, a suit was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants as also the Secretary of State for India in Council, for declaration of his title to the disputed property and for recovery of possession with mesne profits. At that time, the property was under settlement with the contesting defendants for a term of 10 years which had commenced in 1894, and was to terminate in 1904. Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff at that time had no settlement from the revenue authorities, he was awarded a decree by the Subordinate Judge for declaration of title as also for recovery of possession with mesne profits. That decree was ultimately confirmed by this Court, subject to variation in one respect not material for the purpose of the present litigation. The view then taken was unquestionably right andat any rate cannot be challenged in this suit between the same parties. After the expiry of the settlement then current, there were two successive annual settlements with the defendants followed by a quinquennial settlement in 1906 which was to expire in 1911, and this was followed by a settlement for 10 years, to expire on the 31st March 1921. In our opinion, the plaintiff had an enforceable cause of action, even though at the date of the institution of the suit he had no settlement from the revenue authorities. This view is supported by a principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee in a well known case which was heard by them on two occasions—Maharajah Rajendur Pertab Sahee v. Lalljee Sahoo and Rughoobur Dyal Sahoo v. Kishen Pertab Sahee. On the second occasion, Sir Barnes Peacock pointed out that the nature of the title to a property is not affected by the circumstance that it is held from the Crown under a periodical settlement, and that although the amount of the revenue payable to the Crown may be periodically varied in view of the varying quantity and quality of the land, the nature of the title thereto remains unaffected. In the case before us, the property is claimed by the plaintiff as reformation in situ of an estate held by him under the Government. This title was established in the litigation of 1899 in the presence not only of the Secretary of State but also of the present contesting defendants. It is worthy of notice that in that litigation, the plaintiff obtained possession and mesne profits. The decree made by this Court on the 13th December 1906 was subsequently executed and the plaintiff was placed in possession on the 15th June 1907. Thereafter the plaintiff was dispossessed on the 31st. March 1913 by virtue of an order under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, which held in substance that the defendants and their tenants were in occupation of the disputed tract. It is unquestionably open to the plaintiff to maintain this suit and to seek recovery of possession as he did in the previous litigation. The second contention of the defendants must consequently be overruled.

    As regards the third point, it has been urged that the suit is barred under Art. 45 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, inasmuch as it has not been instituted within 3 years from the date of the last settlement with the defendants. There is no force in this contention, as the object of the suit is not to set aside an award made by the revenue authorities. This is a suit to recover possession, and if the plaintiff succeeds, the settlement made by the revenue authorities, in so far as it determines the amount of revenue payable in respect of the disputed property by the holder thereof will in no way be affected. The substance of the matter is that the plaintiff seeks to obtain the benefit of the settlement obtained by the defendants, notwithstanding the decision in the previous litigation. The decision in Abdul Kadir v. Hamid Meah has no application, as this is not a suit to set aside an order of the revenue authorities refusing to make a settlement of khas mehal lands with the plaintiff. There is therefore no force in the contention that the suit is barred by limitation.

    As regards the fourth point, it has been urged that in view of the nature of the property, partition thereof cannot be effected by a Civil Court; and in support of this contention reference has been made to the decision of this Court in Bepinbehary Mitter v. Lala Bhugwat Sahai which is clearly distinguishable. In the present case, as already stated, the title of the plaintiff has not been made precarious by virtue of the periodical settlement for the assessment of revenue made by the revenue authorities. Consequently there is nothing in the nature of the property which makes it impossible for partition by the Civil Court and the case is governed by the decision of the Full Bench in Hemadri v. Ramani. The fourth contention accordingly fails.

    As regards the fifth point, the contention is that the plaintiff should have been, allowed a decree for mesne profits, inasmuch as he has not been ousted by the defendants. The Subordinate Judge has dealt with this matter at full length. He has pointed out that the defendants are in exclusive possession of the property through their tenants and that the effect of the order under section 145. Criminal Procedure Code, has been to dispossess the plaintiff. There can be no question that since the date of that order the defendants have been in exclusive possession. This is also in accord with the attitude taken up by the defendants throughout this litigation for they have strenuously maintained, even up to this Court, that the plaintiff is not entitled to possession till after the expiry of the current term of the settlement with them. We are of opinion that the Subordinate Judge has rightly allowed the plaintiff mesne profits.

    As all the contentions urged by the appellants fail, the appeal must be dismissed with costs including reserved costs.

    Buckland, J.:— I agree.

    A.S.M.A
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy
    (Mar 2, 1921)