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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Calicut in O.S. No. 30 of 1919 dismissing the plaintiff's suit; the plaintiff is the appellant before the court that delivered the opinion.

The plaintiff became the sole surviving member of his Komancheri Tarwad on the death of his mother and sister in March 1907. At that time he was a minor (about 8 years old) and his father, the 2nd defendant, who had previously managed the tarwad as his mother's agent, continued to manage the tarwad affairs as his de facto guardian. The tarwad lands were subject to an earlier mortgage in favour of Bhattathiripad for Rs. 9,000.

In March 1908, the father (acting as the plaintiff's guardian) borrowed Rs. 12,000 from the 1st defendant and executed a usufructuary mortgage (Ex. A). Two days later he executed a verumpattom chit or lease (Ex. G) for himself and as the plaintiff's guardian, taking the properties on lease and obliging the plaintiff and his father to pay rent of Rs. 1,200 per year. Rent fell into arrears and the father executed a promissory note (Ex. T) for Rs. 692-12-0 to the 1st defendant; the 1st defendant obtained a decree in Order S. No. 37 of 1915 against both father and son. The Head Clerk of the Court was appointed as the plaintiff's guardian in that suit. The 1st defendant subsequently attached and purchased the mortgaged properties at the court auction.

The plaintiff, now a major, brought suit seeking declarations: that the mortgage (Ex. A) was invalid to the extent of about Rs. 2,200 (except amounts used to pay the prior mortgage), that the lease (Ex. G) was not binding on him, that decree Ex. IX was obtained by fraud and was not binding because he was not represented by a proper guardian and the court-appointed guardian was grossly negligent, and that the sale in execution of that decree should be set aside.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit as instituted was maintainable given the plaintiff's minority at the time of filing and the question of whether a guardian had been properly appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act (i.e., whether Order 32 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied).
  2. Whether the decree (Ex. IX) obtained in earlier proceedings and the court sale that followed are binding on the plaintiff — specifically whether the appointment of the court guardian was valid or vitiated by fraud.
  3. Whether the lease (Ex. G) executed by the father/guardian is binding on the plaintiff, particularly given that it imposed an onerous obligation (rent of Rs. 1,200/year) on the minor.
  4. Whether the mortgage (Ex. A) is invalid to the extent claimed by the plaintiff (about Rs. 2,200) or is otherwise valid, and what portion (if any) the plaintiff may lawfully be required to redeem.
  5. Whether, in view of the nature of the mortgage covenant and Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff can obtain declaratory relief without first suing to redeem or without a prior demand for payment by the mortgagee.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The mortgage (Ex. A) is invalid insofar as it is not supported by proper consideration for about Rs. 2,200 (except amounts used to pay off the prior mortgage).
  • The lease (Ex. G) is not binding on him because it is not for his benefit or necessity and imposes an onerous liability (Rs. 1,200 per year).
  • The decree (Ex. IX) was obtained by fraud because the court guardian was appointed as a result of a false affidavit and the court-appointed guardian (Head Clerk) acted with gross negligence; therefore the decree and sale pursuant to it are not binding on him.
  • The plaintiff sought declarations and reliefs that would also permit him to challenge and set aside the execution sale.

Defendants' / Respondents' Arguments

  • The first point taken against the plaintiff was that at the date of suit he was a minor and the suit without a next friend was unsustainable; specifically, that Order 32 Rule 2 applied and the plaint should have been rejected or the suit dismissed for want of a next friend.
  • The 1st defendant contended that the appointment of a court guardian was proper (or at least that the father had been appointed guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act), and it was argued that the court should not have superseded such a guardian without recording reasons under Order 32 Rule 4 Clause (2).
  • The 1st defendant also advanced (in the alternative) that the mortgage and lease were parts of the same transaction and, as lender, he was justified by necessity in insisting on the lease condition (i.e., that the lease was a necessary incident of the loan).
  • The Subordinate Judge relied on a decision (Navunni v. Ramaswami Pattar) to hold that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act would not permit declaratory relief for the mortgagor without a demand for payment by the mortgagee.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Beni Ram Dutt v. Ram Lal Dhukri (1892) I.L.R. 13 C. 189 Order 32 Rule 2: When a plaint shows on its face that the plaintiff is a minor; and that if minority appears on an issue tried the court should allow time for a next friend rather than dismissing immediately. Used to explain that Order 32 Rule 2 applies only when plaint shows plaintiff to be a minor and to support the principle that the court should allow a reasonable time for a next friend; here the plaintiff became a major before decision so the point did not defeat the suit.
Sankaran Nambi v. Davaki Antherjanom (43 M.L.J. 572) Principle that once a next friend has been appointed, the objection that suit was originally by a minor without a next friend cannot be raised. Relied on to support the view that the appointment of a guardian/ad litem removes the technical objection relating to initial want of a next friend.
Sridar Rao v. Ram Lal (1908) I.L.R. 31 A. 7 Absence of a formal order removing a certificated guardian will not vitiate proceedings if another next friend is allowed to sue; irregularity does not necessarily invalidate proceedings. Applied to hold that failure to record reasons under Order 32 Rule 4 Clause (2) would be an irregularity only and would not by itself vitiate the decree if the minor was in fact properly represented by a court-appointed guardian.
Bhimaji v. Hussain Saheb (1920) I.L.R. 43 808 Distinguishable facts where no attempt was made to have the certificated guardian act as guardian ad litem. Distinguished from the present case on its facts; not applied to invalidate the present proceedings.
Bhagwan Dayal v. Param Sukh Das (1915) I.L.R. 37 A. 179 (Privy Council) Where a court guardian's appointment is procured by fraud, proceedings must be treated as having been conducted without a legally appointed guardian ad litem. Applied directly: the court held that because the appointment of the court guardian was procured by a false affidavit suppressing a known next-of-kin, the appointment was vitiated by fraud and the decree and subsequent sale were not binding on the plaintiff.
Indur Chunder Singh v. Radha Kishore Ghon (1892) I.L.R. 19 C. 507 (P.C.) Principle that a guardian cannot bind a minor by entering into onerous covenants; guardian lacks power to subject a minor to onerous liabilities. Relied upon to hold that the lease imposing Rs. 1,200 per year was not binding on the plaintiff (a minor) because it was an onerous covenant and there was no proof of necessity or benefit to the minor.
Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhru'ddin Mahomed Choudhuri (1911) I.L.R. 39 C. 232 Supports the rule limiting guardian's power to make onerous engagements on behalf of a minor. Applied to reinforce the conclusion that the lease is not binding on the plaintiff.
Wagkela Rajsanji v. Sketch Mas-luddm (1887) I.L.R. 11 B. 551 (P.C.) Authority on limits of guardian's power to bind a minor by onerous engagements. Relied upon in support of the proposition that the lease is not binding on the minor-plaintiff.
Narayana Rao v. Venkata Subba Rao (1919) 38 M.L.J. 77 Another authority concerning guardian's incapacity to bind minors by onerous engagements. Used along with other authorities to conclude the lease was not binding on the plaintiff.
Navunni v. Ramaswami Pattar (1918) 52 I.C. 738 Authority considered by the Subordinate Judge regarding whether Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act permits declaratory relief absent demand by the mortgagee. The court held the subordinate judge misread the covenant in Ex. A; Navunni was considered but did not preclude the plaintiff's right to redeem—court concluded the mortgagor's right to redeem at any time remained and allowed amendment to include a prayer for redemption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in structured steps, following the factual assertions and legal points as raised in the record.

  1. On the preliminary point of the plaintiff's minority and the absence of a next friend: the court examined whether Order 32 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied. It noted authorities (Beni Ram Dutt v. Ram Lal Dhukri) establishing that the Rule is relevant where the plaint on its face shows the plaintiff to be a minor and that, if minority is found after an issue is tried, the court should allow reasonable time for a next friend rather than dismissing the suit outright. The court observed that it was not necessary to decide definitively whether a formal appointment under the Guardians and Wards Act had been made because the plaintiff became a major while the suit was pending and agreed to be bound by the previous proceedings; therefore the absence of a next friend at inception did not require dismissal.
  2. On whether the court sale was valid: the court recognized that validity of the sale depended upon whether the decree (Ex. IX) was binding on the plaintiff. The appellant contended the court guardian's appointment was obtained by fraud and that the certificated guardian (the father) should not have been superseded without recorded reasons under Order 32 Rule 4 Clause (2).
  3. On the question of superseding the father as guardian: the court examined the evidence and service of notices to the father (the 2nd defendant). Notices were served (one affixed to his door after he refused personal receipt) and the father's conduct indicated unwillingness to act as guardian; thus the petition to appoint him guardian ad litem was dismissed. The court treated the absence of a formal order removing a certificated guardian as an irregularity but one that would not necessarily vitiate proceedings where the minor was properly represented — relying on Sridar Rao v. Ram Lal.
  4. On the crucial allegation of fraud in procuring the court guardian: the court found that an affidavit filed by the 1st defendant's brother (D.W. 5, Ex. X (a)) falsely stated that the plaintiff had no next of kin other than the father. This suppressed the existence of the plaintiff's maternal uncle (Ravunni Nair, P.W. 2), who was known to the 1st defendant's side and who had been adopted into the plaintiff's tarwad and was effectively a next-of-kin. The brother's explanation for omitting this information was rejected by the court as "worthless." The court therefore concluded that the 1st defendant had committed "fraud in law" by procuring appointment of the court guardian through the false affidavit.
  5. Applying the principle in Bhagwan Dayal v. Param Sukh Das (Privy Council), the court held that where the appointment of a court guardian has been procured by fraud, the proceedings must be treated as having been conducted without a legally appointed guardian ad litem. Consequently, the decree and the subsequent sale were not binding on the plaintiff.
  6. The court declined to decide the separate contention of gross negligence by the court-appointed guardian because it had already held the decree and sale invalid due to the fraud in appointment.
  7. On the merits of the lease and mortgage claims: the court concluded that the lease, which imposed an onerous obligation (Rs. 1,200/year) on the minor, was not binding. The court relied on established authorities holding that a guardian has no power to enter into onerous engagements on behalf of a minor and that a de facto guardian's acts bind the minor's property only if done for the minor's benefit or by necessity. The court found no proof of necessity for the lease and therefore held it invalid as to the plaintiff.
  8. Regarding the mortgage, the plaintiff conceded in court that the mortgage was valid for amounts that paid off the Bhattathiripad mortgage and for the decree debt in O.S. No. 364 of 1905 and the amount due to Unnith Amma — aggregating roughly Rs. 11,000. The plaintiff's objections were limited to about Rs. 1,000.
  9. On the availability of declaratory relief without first suing to redeem (Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act): the court observed that no declaration under Section 42 can be given if the plaintiff can claim further relief (i.e., redemption). The Subordinate Judge had held that plaintiff could not redeem without a demand by the mortgagee, citing Navunni v. Ramaswami Pattar. The appellate court found this to be a misreading of the mortgage covenant (Ex. A) which only required notice for payment if the mortgagee wanted payment at a specific time (after the "Ucharal"). The court held that the covenant did not deprive the mortgagor of the right to redeem at any time. Because the mortgage and lease were parts of the same transaction, declaratory relief as to either could not be given without also providing the plaintiff the opportunity to sue to redeem.
  10. Procedural relief: the plaintiff's counsel sought leave to amend the plaint to add a prayer for redemption and to pay the necessary court-fees; the 1st defendant's counsel did not oppose this. The court allowed the amendment and permitted the plaintiff to pay the necessary fees within two weeks; the appeal was adjourned for that purpose.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court held that the appointment of the court guardian had been procured by fraud and was therefore vitiated; accordingly the decree (Ex. IX) and the subsequent sale are not binding on the plaintiff and must be treated as if proceedings had been taken without a legally appointed guardian ad litem.

Further holdings arising from the reasoning:

  • The lease (Ex. G), insofar as it binds the plaintiff (a minor at the relevant time) to an onerous rent obligation of Rs. 1,200 per year, is not binding on him because a guardian cannot lawfully enter into such onerous engagements for a minor and there was no proof of necessity or benefit to the minor.
  • The mortgage (Ex. A) is valid to the extent conceded by the plaintiff in court — that is, for amounts used to discharge the prior mortgage, for the decree debt in O.S. No. 364 of 1905, and for the amount due to Unnith Amma (aggregating roughly Rs. 11,000). The plaintiff's objections are confined to about Rs. 1,000.
  • The Subordinate Judge's view that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act barred declaratory relief absent a demand was based on a misreading of the mortgage covenant; the mortgagor's right to redeem at any time was recognized by the appellate court.
  • The plaintiff was permitted to amend his plaint to add a prayer for redemption and to pay necessary court fees within two weeks; the appeal was adjourned for this purpose.

Implications for the parties:

  • The decree previously obtained and the sale conducted in execution of it do not bind the plaintiff and are liable to be set aside on the ground identified by the court (fraud in procuring the court guardian).
  • The plaintiff is relieved of the burden of the lease obligation insofar as it was imposed on him when he was a minor under the challenged transaction.
  • The plaintiff remains obligated under the mortgage to the extent conceded (approximately Rs. 11,000) but retains the right to seek redemption of the mortgage or valid portions thereof by amending his pleadings as permitted by the court.
  • The court did not make an express pronouncement about any broader rule of law beyond applying established precedents; the opinion grounds its outcome largely on application of cited authorities (including the Privy Council decision in Bhagwan Dayal) to the facts of the case.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add information that is not present in the text supplied.

    Pupooth Alias Komancheri Rarichan Alias Ramanunni Kurup v. Vayisravanath Manakkal Raman Somayajipad And Anr.

    1. This is an appeal against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Calicut in O.S. No. 30 of 1919 on his file dismissing the plaintiff's suit and the plaintiff is the appellant before us.

    2. Plaintiff became the sole surviving member of his Komancheri Tarwad on the death of his mother and sister in March, 1907. He was then solely entitled to the tarwad properties. He was at the time a minor of 8 years age and his father the 2nd defendant who had previously nianaged the affairs of his tarwad as his mother's agent continued in management of his affairs as his de facto guardian. Being a member of a Marumakkatayam tarwad his father was not his legal guardian, in fact he had no legal guardian. At that time there was a mortgage debt on the tarwad lands m favour of one Bhattathiripad, of Rs. 9,000 which was admittedly binding. To pay off this debt and to meet other alleged necessities the father acting as plaintiff's guardian borrowed in March, 1908 a sum of Rs. 12,000 from the 1st defendant and executed a usufructuary mortgage to him-Copy, Ex. A. Two days afterwards he also executed a verumpattom chit or lease for himself and as plaintiff's guardian and took back the pro-perties on lease; see copy Ex. G. Under this arrangement plaintiff was newly made liable with his father to pay a rent of Rs. 1,200 a year Such an obligation did not exist under the Bhattathiripad's mortgage. The rent was allowed to fall into arrears by the 2nd defendant and he executed a pronote, copy Ex. T, for Rs. 692-12-u to the 1st defendant, again acting for himself and as guardian of his son. The 1st defendant brought OrderS, No. 37 of 1915 on this note and got a decree against both the father and the son. In this suit the Head Clerk of the Court was appointed as the plaintiff's guardian Subsequently the 1st defendant attached the properties mortgaged to him subject to his own mortgage and got them sold and purchased them himself in Court auction.

    3. Plaintiff brings this suit as a major and prays that the mortgage Ex. A may be declared to be invalid to the extent of Rs. 2,200 and odd as not being supported by proper consideration except as to. the amount due under the prior mortgage which had been paid off. He also prays for a declaration that the lease Ex. G. is not binding on him at all, as it is not for his benefit or necessity but on the other hand it imposed on him an onerous liability to pay Rs. 1,200 a year as rent. He states that the decree Ex. IX was obtained by fraud, that he was not represented in it by a proper guardian and the Court guardian appointed for him acted with gross negligence in the conduct of the case and he therefore claims that it is not binding on him; and he further prays that the sale held in execution of that decree may be set aside as invalid.

    4. The first point taken against the plaintiff in the lower court was that at the date of suit he was a minor and the suit as brought without a next friend was unsustainable and must be dismissed. Plaintiff was over 18 years of age but below 21 when the suit was filed and the question whether he was a major or not turns on whether a guardian had been appointed for him under the Guardian and Wards Act. It is not very clear on the evidence whether such an appointment had been made. An application had been filed under the Act by plaintiff's uncle P.W. 2 and the District Judge had passed an order that the plaintiff's father the 2nd defendant would be appointed guardian of the plaintiff's person and property on his furnishing security. Though security was tendered no steps were taken by the Court to test it or get a proper security bond executed and no formal order of appointment was drawn up. Nevertheless in several subsequeent court proceedings the 2nd defendant was treated as a properly appointed guardian for plaintiff; and it was also held that his age of majority had been extended to 21 in consequence. It is not however necessary to decide the point definitely for even assuming that the 21 years' rule applied and the plaintiff was a minor at the date of suit he became a major when the suit was pending in the lower court and, is now a major; and he has before us through his learned Vakil agreed to be bound by all the proceedings that have taken place in the lower court. Order 32 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable only when on the face of the plaint the plaintiff appears to be a minor, see Beni Ran Dutt v. Ram Lal Dhukri (1892) I.L.R. 13 C. 189. That case was decided under the old Code but the new Code makes no change on the point. If on an issue raised and tried in the case, the Court finds that the plaintiff is a minor it should not dismiss the suit at once but should allow a reasonable time for a next friend to come on record and go on with the suit and it is only if no one comes forward that it should reject the plaint. Beni Ram Dutt v. Ram Lal Dhukri (1892) I.L.R. 13 C. 189 is an authority for this position also. In the present case before the Court decided that the plaintiff was a minor he had become a major and there was no necessity thereafter to have a next friend for him. Plaintiff may no doubt have elected to drop the present suit as not properly instituted but he was not bound to do so; he could affirm the previous proceedings and continue the suit. That is the principle embodied in Order 32 Rule 12. A some what similar case was considered in Sankaran Nambi v. Davaki Antherjanom 43 M.L.J. 572 and it was ruled there that when a next friend has been appointed the objection that the suit was originally by a minor without a next friend can no longer be urged.

    5. The next point for consideration is whether the Court sale was valid, for if it was, the property has passed to the 1st defendant and the plaintiff has no more interest in it and cannot maintain this suit. The purchaser in Court auction was the decree holder himself and not any 3rd party and we have not therefore to consider any rights or equities of bona fide purchasers in Court auction. The validity of the sale in this case thus depends on the question whether the decree Ex. IX was binding on the plaintiff or not. The plaintiff contends that the appointment of a court guardian for him was null and void as it was obtained by the 1st defendant by means of a false affidavit and that the 2nd defendant being a guardian appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act there was no reason and none is recorded why he should not have been appointed; and further that the Court guardian was guilty of gross negligence. It will lead to clearness to consider these points separately.

    6. Taking the 2nd point first it will be observed that the 2nd 'defendant was proposed by the 1st defendant as plaintiff's guardian ad litem in the first instance. Four notices were taken out to him; the last of them Ex. XIII (c) was tendered to him personally but he refused to receive it and sign the copy and it was thereupon affixed to his door. That was rightly accepted as good service by the Court under O.V. Rules 16 and 17. The way in which he behaved when the notice was Rendered to him showed clearly that he was not willing to act as guardian and the petition to appoint him guardian was therefore dismissed. The reasons no doubt are not stated in the order but it is apparent what they were. Considering that he was the person who had executed the promissory note on which the suit was brought against the minor he would have been an unsuitable guardian in any event as his interests would clash with the minor's interests. It was however argued that as he was a guardian appointed by a competent authority under the guardian and Wards Act the Court acted improperly in superseding him and appointing a Court guardian without recording proper reasons under Order 32 Rule 4 Clause (2). Now in the first-place as I have already said it is not very clear that he was so appointed, plaintiff's own case being that he was not so appointed. But even if we take it that he had been so appointed the failure to record reasons under Rule 4 Clause (2) is only an irregularity in my opinion and will not by itself vitiate the decree if the minor is in fact properly represented by a guardian appointed by court. The Allahabad High Court has held that the absence of a formal order removing the certificated guardian will not vitiate proceedings if another next friend is allowed to sue and the suit will not be defeated solely upon the ground that no formal permission had been granted. See Sridar Rao v. Ram Lal (1908) I.L.R. 31 A. 7. The case in Bhimaji v. Hussain Saheb (1920) I.L.R. 43 808 is easily distinguishable as there was no attempt at all made there to have the certificated guardian appointed as guardian ad litem as here.

    7. But the more serious objection to the appointment of the Court guardian is that his appointment was procured by means of a false affidavit. The affidavit filed on 1st defendant's behalf by his brother, D.W. 5, Ex X (a) contains a statement that besides the 2nd defendant plaintiff had no next of kin. The statement is false as there was at least one person known to 1st defendant and his brother namely plaintiff's maternal uncle Ravunni Nair P.W. 2 who though he belonged to a different tarwad as plaintiff's mother had been adopted from his tarwad to plaintiff's Komancheri Tarwad, was certainly plaintiff's next of kin just like his father. Yet this information was suppressed. The only explanation D.W. 5 gave for his action in cross-examination is that Ravunni Nair was

    " not proposed as guardian because the Court held that the 2nd defendant was the proper person to act as guardian;"
    this apparently refers to Ex. F. The explanation however is worthless and we must hold that the 1st defendant was guilty of fraud in law in making a false statement and thereby getting a Court officer appointed guardian. The appointment is thus vitiated by fraud and is of no legal effect. This brings the case within the principle of the ruling in the Privy Council in Bhagwan Dayal v. Param Sukh Das (1915) I.L.R. 37 A. 179 for here as there the case must be treated as having been proceeded with without a legally appointed guardian ad litem. The decree and the subsequent sale are therefore not binding on the plaintiff.

    8. It was also urged that even if we take that the appointment of the Court guardian was a regular and proper one, the decree and sale should still be set aside because there was gross negligence on his part in the conduct of the case. It is not necessary to consider this point as I have already held that the decree against the plaintiff and the sale must be set aside on another ground.

    9. Plaintiff has also asked for declarations that the lease is not binding on him and that the mortgage is invalid to a certain extent. Now clearly the lease which imposes an onerous obligation on a minor to pay a rent of Rs. 1,200 a year is not bind-on the plaintiff. A guardian has no power to enter into engagements on behalf of his minor ward making him liable under such onerous covenants. See Indur Chunder Singh v. Radha Kishore Ghon (1892) I.L.R. 19 C. 507 (P.C.), Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhru'ddin Mahomed Choudhuri (1911) I.L.R. 39 C. 232, Wagkela Rajsanji v. Sketch Mas-luddm (1887) I.L.R. 11 B. 551 (P.C.) and Narayana Rao v. Venkata Subba Rao (1919) 38 M.L.J. 77. It was however argued that the lease and the mortgage were one and the same transaction and that as the creditor the 1st defendant was not prepared to lend except on condition that such a lease should be taken it was justified by necessity in the same manner as the mortgage. This argument cannot be supported for even if the two be parts of the same transaction there is no proof that there was any necessity to borrow at all. There was no pressure from the previous mortgagee. The action of a de facto guardian, as 2nd defendant was, will be binding on the minor's property only if it is for the minor's benefit or necessity. That is not proved in this case and the lease so far as the plaintiff is included in it is therefore not valid.

    10. As regards the mortgage the plaintiff has conceded in this Court that it is valid not only to the extent of the Bhattathiripad's mortgage paid off but also to the extent of the decree debt in O.S. No. 364 of 1905 and for the amount due to Unnith Amma i.e. in all for about Rs. 11,000, the objections being confined to about Rs. 1,000 not properly accounted for. There is however a preliminary difficulty in plaintiff's way in getting any declaration as regards the lease and the mortgage inasmuch as no declaration can be given to him under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act if he can claim further relief. In this case on my view it is clearly open to him to redeem the mortgage to the 1st defendant or such portion of it as is valid. The Subordinate Judge holds that plaintiff is not entitled to redeem without a demand for payment by the 1st defendant and cites Navunni v. Ramaswami Pattar (1918) 52 I.C. 738 in support of his view that Section 42 will not apply in such circumstances. But this view is based on a misreading of the covenant in Ex. A. That only provides that if the mortgagee wants payment he must give notice to be paid on the day after " Ucharal " or the beginning of the cultivation season in any year and not at other times. This provision does not affect the mortgagor's right to redeem at any time he likes. The covenant is not mutual by its wording. As the mortgage and the lease are clearly parts of one and the same transaction no declaration can be given regarding either without the plaintiff suing to redeem. The case cited in Navunni v. Ramaswami Pallar (1918) 52 I.C. 738 itself recognises this position. Plaintiff's vakil then asks that his client may be permitted to amend his plaint by adding a prayer for redemption and paying the necessary Court-fees on the plaint and the memo of appeal. This is rightly not opposed by the 1st defendant's vakil and may I think be granted. Plaintiff is allowed to amend his plaint and pay the necessary Court-fees for it and for the appeal in this Court in two weeks from this date. The appeal is adjourned for the purpose.

    11. This appeal again coming on for hearing, after i

    12. The Court delivered the following

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    Pupooth Alias Komanc... v. Vayisravanath Manakk...
    (Dec 22, 1922)