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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted by a dismissed trustee seeking: (1) a declaration that his dismissal was invalid, and (2) an injunction restraining the co-trustees and the temple committee from interfering with his exercise of the rights of a trustee.

The District Munsif dismissed the suit, holding that the removal of the trustee was valid and that because the plaintiff was out of possession a suit for a mere declaration and injunction was not maintainable. On appeal the District Judge reversed the Munsif's decree, holding the dismissal to be irregular and that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration and injunction. The District Judge relied on Kunj Bihari v. Keshavlal Hiralal (28 B. 567) and distinguished other authorities. The court giving the present opinion (the higher court) disagreed with the District Judge, restored the decree of the District Munsif, and directed costs in this Court and the lower appellate court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a trustee who has been ousted from possession may maintain a suit asking only for a declaration of invalidity of dismissal and an injunction restraining interference, rather than seeking possession or other consequential relief.
  2. Whether Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act relieves an out-of-possession plaintiff from claiming the full consequential relief (e.g., possession) and permits injunctive relief alone to be adequate.
  3. Whether the fact that the plaintiff is a trustee suing on behalf of a temple (with the property said to be vested in an Idol) alters the rule that an ousted party must seek consequential relief such as possession rather than a mere declaration.
  4. Whether, when rival claimants (including co-trustees) are entitled to joint possession, the plaintiff must sue for joint possession rather than only for a declaration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiff (as reflected in the record)

  • Sought a declaration that his dismissal was invalid and an injunction against interference by co-trustees and the temple committee.
  • Relied (as accepted by the District Judge on appeal) on the authority of Kunj Bihari v. Keshavlal Hiralal to support his entitlement to the relief sought without necessarily claiming full consequential relief.
  • Argued (implicitly through the District Judge's acceptance) that injunction and declaration were an adequate remedial package in the circumstances.

Respondents / Defendants (as reflected in the record)

  • Contended that the lands of the temple were in the physical possession of tenants and that the plaintiff could not himself obtain possession of those lands.
  • Called attention to the fact that the plaintiff was out of possession and therefore argued that a suit for a mere declaration and injunction was not maintainable.
  • Relied on the proposition (as drawn from the Bombay authority) that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act does not require the whole consequential relief to be claimed and that an injunction might be adequate; additionally contended that trustees of temples (or the office of an Acharya) are in a special position such that injunctions restraining interference effectively protect their rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kunj Bihari v. Keshavlal Hiralal, 28 B. 567 Authority relied upon by the District Judge to support allowing declaratory and injunctive relief without full consequential relief. The District Judge rested his judgment on this authority; the present court noted the Bombay case appears to support the District Judge but declined to follow it in view of contrary decisions of this Court.
Narayana v. Shankunni, 15 M. 255 Illustration that even when tenants are in actual possession a suit for possession (by receipt of rents or against rival claimants) should be brought rather than merely a declaration. The court treated this as authority for the proposition that an ousted person should sue for consequential relief (possession) and noted the District Judge had distinguished this case but the present court relied on it to require a suit for possession.
Vengan Poosari v. Chinnu (Patchamuttu), 14 M.L.J. 290 Contains Subrahmania Aiyar, J.'s analysis that injunction is not the appropriate remedy where the plaintiff is out of possession and entitled to claim possession; review of English authority. The court treated Subrahmania Aiyar, J.'s reasoning as persuasive on the discretionary nature of injunctions and their inappropriateness where plaintiff is out of possession and can seek possession.
Zemindar of Vizianagaram v. Behara Suryanarayana Patrulu, 25 M. 587 Held that a landlord's interest that consists in the mere receipt of rents is capable of delivery and possession; Sections 264 and 319 of the Code of 1882 were framed on that supposition. The court relied on this authority to show that a landlord-like interest (including receipt of rents and temple property interests) is capable of possession and therefore supports a suit for possession rather than merely a declaration.
Jagannatha Charry v. Rama Rayer, 28 M. 238 Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act this Court held possession by receipt of rents may be disturbed and the dispossessed person may bring a suit for possession within six months. Used to support the proposition that possession by receipt of rents is a recognized form of possession for which legal relief (possession suit) may be sought.
Abdulkadar v. Mahomed, 15 M. 15 Example where tenants were in actual possession but the Court held that a suit for possession should have been brought. Referred to as support for the rule that even with tenants in possession, the rightful claimant should sue for possession rather than rely on declaration only.
Subramanyan v. Paramaswaran, 11 M. 116 Contains observations inconsistent with the line of cases requiring possession to be sought; specifically cited at p. 122. The present court stated that if Subramanyan's observations are at variance with the cited cases, they cannot be accepted as correct.
Suryanarayanamurti v. Tammanna, 25 M. 504 Supports the proposition that property in the actual possession of tenants is nevertheless capable of possession by the landlord. Relied upon to show tenancy in actual possession does not preclude a landlord (or trustee) claiming possession through legal proceedings.
Lowndes v. Bettle, 33 L.J. Ch. 451 (Kinderseley V.C.) and related English authorities Principle that when the defendant is in possession and the plaintiff is out of possession, a claim for injunction without seeking possession will generally not be upheld (absent fraud, collusion, or risk of destruction). The court cited and approved the principle as reaffirmed in subsequent English authorities and used it to reject the contention that an injunction alone is adequate for an ousted plaintiff.
Stanford v. Hurlstone, L.R. 9 Ch. 116 English Court of Appeal approval of the principle limiting injunctions where plaintiff is out of possession. Used as part of the line of English authorities supporting refusal to grant injunctions when a full remedy at law (e.g., ejectment) exists.
Leeds and Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Horsfall, 33 Solicitor's Journal 183 Illustrative authority on the courts' reluctance to grant injunctions to plaintiffs out of possession. Referred to in support of the general rule that injunction is not an appropriate remedy for an out-of-possession plaintiff who has a legal remedy for possession.
Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi, 32 C. 129 Recognized that an Idol may be regarded as a juridical person but held the shebait (trustee) has possession and the right to bring suits for protection of dedicated property. Applied to show that the fact of the Idol being owner does not prevent the trustee/shebait from being regarded as the possessor entitled to bring suits; nevertheless, this does not excuse a trustee from seeking possession when ousted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a multi-part analysis addressing possession, the adequacy of injunctions, and the effect of trusteeship/Idol ownership:

  1. Possession and the nature of the plaintiff's loss: The court found this case to be "clearly one of plaintiff having been ousted from possession." Because the temple comprises immovable property (the temple building), movable properties, and landlord-like rights to receive rents, those interests are capable of delivery and of legal possession even though tenants occupy the lands. The court relied on Zemindar of Vizianagaram and related authorities to support the proposition that receipt of rents and the landlord's interest can constitute a form of possession cognizable by the law (and that Sections 264 and 319 of the Code of 1882 are framed on that assumption).
  2. Requirement to seek consequential relief (possession): Given the capability of those interests to be possessed, prior decisions (including Jagannatha Charry, Abdulkadar v. Mahomed, and Narayana v. Shankunni) show that where a person claiming to be the landlord or possessor has been ousted, he must seek consequential relief in the nature of possession (or joint possession against co-claimants) rather than sue for a mere declaration. The court rejected contrary observations in Subramanyan v. Paramaswaran.
  3. On the sufficiency of an injunction under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act: The court considered and rejected the argument that Section 42 permits an injunction alone as adequate consequential relief. Even if Section 42 were read generously, the court held that a plaintiff out of possession is not entitled to ask merely for an injunction against the person in possession. The court drew from Subrahmania Aiyar, J.'s review of the English authorities in Venganpoosari v. Patchamuttu and general English jurisprudence (as discussed in Kerr on Injunctions) to conclude that injunctions are generally inappropriate where the plaintiff is out of possession and an adequate remedy at law (possession/ejectment) exists, absent special circumstances (fraud, collusion, or risk of destruction). The court observed that while Section 25(8) of the Judicature Act, 1873, has general language permitting injunctions whether or not the defendant is in possession, the established principle (as reaffirmed in English cases such as Lowndes v. Bettle and Stanford v. Hurlstone) is that injunctions are not to be awarded to plaintiffs out of possession when the defendant is in possession and a legal remedy exists.
  4. Discretionary nature of injunctions: The court emphasized that injunctions are discretionary under Section 52 of the Specific Relief Act, and the considerations against granting such relief to plaintiffs who can seek possession are entitled to full weight.
  5. Effect of trusteeship / Idol ownership: The court rejected the argument that the plaintiff's status as trustee or that the property is vested in an Idol makes a difference to the rule requiring possession to be sought. Where the office or role includes management of temple properties and attached inams, a mere restraint on interference (negative relief) is not equivalent to transferring possession. The court pointed to Article 124 of the Limitation Act to show that the mode of possession of an office is more than mere prevention of interference; possession is positive and involves acts of dealing or enjoyment. The Jagadindra Nath Roy decision was cited to show that even if an Idol is a juridical person, the shebait (trustee) holds the management and the right to bring suits. Consequently, trusteeship does not excuse the omission to claim possession when ousted.
  6. Final synthesis: Because the plaintiff was out of possession and the defendants (including co-trustees) were in possession or had rival claims to possession, the plaintiff could not properly rely on a mere declaration and injunction. He was required to sue for consequential relief (possession or joint possession as appropriate). The District Judge erred in allowing the suit on a declaration and injunction alone.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the suit as framed was not maintainable and therefore reversed the decree of the District Judge.

Final Disposition: The decree of the District Munsif is restored with costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court.

Immediate consequences for the parties: The plaintiff's claim for a mere declaration of invalidity of dismissal and an injunction restraining interference was held inadequate because the plaintiff had been ousted from possession; the plaintiff must, if he wishes to obtain effective relief, pursue consequential relief in the nature of possession (or joint possession where appropriate) against rival claimants.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reaffirms existing principles (as reflected in the cited authorities) regarding the inappropriateness of injunctive or declaratory relief alone where the plaintiff is out of possession and a remedy for possession is available. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying those established principles to the facts of this case.

Show full summary ...

    Rathnasabapathi Pillai And Ors. v. G. Ramasami Aiyar

    1. The suit is by a dismissed trustee for a declaration of the invalidity of his dismissal and an injunction restraining the co-trustees and the temple committee from interference with his exercise of the rights of a trustee. The District Munsif dismissed the suit holding that the removal of the trustee was valid and that as the plaintiff was out of possession, the suit for a mere declaration and injunction was not maintainable. On appeal the District Judge reversed the Munsifs decree and allowed the plaintiff's claim. He held that the plaintiff's dismissal was irregular and that he was entitled to sue for the declaration and injunction. No ground was taken before him on appeal that the Munsifs finding as to the plaintiff being out of possession was erroneous. He rests his judgment on the authority of the decision in Kunj Bihari v. Keshavlal Hiralal 28 B. 567, and distinguished the decision in Narayana v. Shankunni 15 M. 255, and the remarks of Subrahmania Aiyar, J., in Vengan Poosari v. Chinnu alias Patchamuttu 14 M.L.J. 290. We are unable to agree with his view. No doubt the Bombay case referred to appears to support the District Judge, but in the face of the decisions of this Court we are unable to agree with him. The present case being clearly one of plaintiff having been ousted from possession, it is open to him to sue for joint possession with defendants Nos. 8 and 9, who are admittedly the other trustees of the temple. It is said that the lands of the temple are in the physical possession of the tenants, and that the plaintiff cannot have such possession himself. Besides the lands, there are the temple itself and movable properties belonging to the temple. And even as regards the landlord's right to receive rents, it is certainly capable of possession. It has been well pointed out in The Zemindar of Vizianagaram v. Behara Suryanarayana Patrulu 25 M. 587 at pp. 591, 592, that the interest of the landlord which may consist in the mere receipt of the rents is capable of delivery and possession, and Sections 264 and 319 of the Code of 1882 have been framed on that supposition. It has been held under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, by this Court that possession by receipt of rents may be disturbed and the person dispossessed may bring a suit for possession under that section within six months of such dispossession. See Jagannatha Charry v. Rama Rayer 28 M. 238. In Abdulkadar v. Mahomed 15 M. 15, and in Narayana v. Shankunni 15 M. 255, it appears that there were tenants in actual possession of the property. It was held by this Court, notwithstanding that circumstance, that a suit for possession should have been brought against the rival claimants to possession by receipt of rents. If the observations in Subramanyan v. Paramaswaran 11 M. 116 at p. 122, are at variance with the view expressed in the above cases, we cannot accept them as correct. We must, therefore, hold that property in the actual possession of the tenants is capable of possession by the landlord see also Suryanarayanamurti v. Tammanna 25 M. 504, and one person claiming to be landlord ousted by another cannot content himself with suing for a mere declaration but must sue for consequential relief in the nature of possession against his rival claimants. And if the rival claimants are entitled to joint possession with the plaintiff, the plaintiff must sue for joint possession with them. It is, however, contended on the authority of the Bombay case, first, that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act does not require the whole consequential relief to be claimed; and that injunction is a sufficient relief consequent on the declaration, and, secondly, that the rule requiring a plaintiff to seek for possession as consequential relief where he asks for a mere declaration is not applicable to trustees of temples. As regards the first position, assuming that, Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is to be understood as not requiring the whole consequential relief to be claimed, we think a plaintiff out of possession is not entitled to ask for an injunction merely against the person in possession. This question has been fully discussed in the judgment of Subrahmania Aiyar, J. in Venganpoosari v. Patchamuttu 14 M.L.J. 290, though his actual decision in the case was not upheld on appeal on another ground. Upon a review of the English cases the learned Judge came to the conclusion that injunction is not the appropriate relief where the plaintiff is entitled to claim possession against the defendants. Kerr on Injunctions (4th Edition) states at page 82: "The result of the cases apart from the alteration made by the Judicature Act of 1873 was, that where the plaintiff was out of possession, the Court would refuse to interfere by granting an injunction, unless there was fraud or collusion, or unless the acts perpetrated or threatened were so injurious as to tend to the destruction of the estate." Again at page 114 "if the trespass or damage is complete and the title is a pure legal title, the Court would not in general interfere by way of mandatory injunction, there being a full remedy at law by ejectment." The passages above cited are supported by a number of English cases, some of which Mr. Justice Subrahmania Aiyar has referred to in his judgment in Vengan Poosari v. Patchamuttu 14 M.L.J. 290. It is true that the language of Section 25, Sub-section 8, of the Judicature Act of 1873, is wider and allows an injunction, whether the person against whom such injunction is sought is, or is not, in possession under any claim of title or otherwise. But notwithstanding the generality of the language the principle laid down by Kinderseley, Vice-Chancellor, in Lowndes v. Bettle 33 L.J. Ch. 451 at p. 454 : 4 N.R. 609 : 12 W.R. 399, and approved of by the Court of Appeal in Stanford v. Hurlstone L.R. 9 Ch. 116 : 30 L.T. 140 : 22 W.R. 422, has been re-affirmed, viz., that while defendant is in possession and the plaintiff seeks an injunction without possession, his claim will not be upheld. See Leeds and Liverpool Navigation Co. v. Horsfall 33 Solicitor's Journal 183. An injunction is a discretionary relief under section 52 of the Specific Relief Act; and the considerations adverted to by Mr. Justice Subrahmania Aiyar in the case in Vengan Poosari v. Patchamuttu 14 M.L.J. 290, against the grant of such relief in this country where the plaintiff is entitled to ask for possession against the defendant, are entitled to full weight. If, therefore, the plaintiff in the present case cannot claim an injunction when he is out of possession and defendants Nos. 8 and 9 are in possession, the only other relief claimed in the plaint that remains is a mere declaration. It is thoroughly well established that the plaintiff cannot sue for a mere declaration when he is entitled to consequential relief. Speaking with all respect, it appears to us that the learned Chief Justice of Bombay has overlooked the fact that injunction is a discretionary relief and cannot be claimed by a plaintiff out of possession when he does not ask for possession against the defendant who is actually in possession.

    2. Passing to the next point, viz., that the plaintiff is only a trustee of the temple, we are unable to appreciate the distinction. It. is said that the property is vested in the Idol and that an injunction restraining interference secures to the plaintiff the rights he claims in the most complete manner. In the Bombay case the plaintiff claimed the office of an Acharya, but it included the management of a temple and of inams and other properties attached to it. It was not a mere performance of certain duties which might involve no possession of properties. Under those circumstances, it is difficult to see that a mere restraint from interference is equivalent to the transfer of possession from the defendant to the plaintiff. The learned Chief Justice of Bombay asks, "how would practical effect be given to an award of possession of an office otherwise than by preventing interference with the rights of which it is made up." Where tangible movable and immovable property is also attached to the office, the question as regards the property is easily answered. There are provisions in the Code for giving possession of immovable property, and the possession of such property is a great deal more than the prevention of other people's interference. But even where it is a mere office of which possession is claimed, Article 124 of the Limitation Act explains the mode of possession, which certainly is more than the mere restraint of another from interference. Possession is positive, and connotes acts of dealing with the property, and sometimes beneficial enjoyment; while an injunction which restrains another from interference is negative. The fact of the Idol being the owner and the plaintiff the trustee, does not appear to us to affect the question. In Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi 32 C. 129 : 7 Bom. L.R. 765 : 8 C.W.N. 809 1 A.L.J. 585, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, while recognizing that an Idol may be regarded as a juridical person capable as such of holding property, observed. "Assuming the religious dedication to have been of the strictest character, it still remains that the possession and management of the dedicated property belongs to the shebait, and this carries with it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for the protection of the property. Every such right of suit is vested in the shebait and not in the Idol." It follows that the circumstance of a trustee suing is no answer to the objection that possession should have been sued for and not a mere declaration. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the present suit is not maintainable, and in reversal of the decree of the District Judge, we restore the decree of the District Munsif with costs in this and the lower appellate Court.

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    Comments

    Rathnasabapathi Pillai And Ors. v. G. Ramasami Aiyar
    (Jan 19, 1910)