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  • Sect. 74 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • Sect. 74 of the Contract Act.
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  • Sect. 74 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • Sect. 74 of the Contract Act.
Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — Odgers, J. (with Wallace, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition was brought by the plaintiff seeking an order directing the Additional District Judge of the Agency Division, Waltair, to review his judgment and decree in A. S. No. 2 of 1923 dated 30th April 1923. The underlying litigation arose from a mortgage suit on a bond dated 9th May 1901 executed by the first defendant in favour of K. Perraju (said to be the adoptive father of the plaintiff). The first defendant was the undivided father and manager of a joint family; defendants 2 to 6 were his sons.

The commercial dealings began with several promissory notes owed by the family: a note of 12th December 1892 (Rs. 600 at 18%), a note of 4th February 1893 (Rs. 600 at 12%), and a note of 7th May 1895 (Rs. 1,000 at 12%). These earlier obligations were consolidated by a mortgage dated 11th November 1895 (Ex. L) and later consolidated again into a further mortgage dated 9th May 1901 (Ex. S) for Rs. 11,000 at compound interest. Over many years no payments were made and the indebtedness grew substantially, prompting the plaintiff to sue for the accumulated sum.

Procedurally, the suit initially resulted in a decree in O. S. No. 41 of 1913 before the Subordinate Judge of Cocanada. Execution proceedings recovered only a small sum and, after procedural transfers and the view that a fresh suit should be brought in the Agency Court, O. S. No. 7 of 1921 was filed. On appeal, the Additional District Judge reduced the interest and the total sum due in his judgment (paragraph 8(a)–(f)), prompting the present petition by the plaintiff to set aside that reduction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage transactions and the compound interest provisions (as consolidated in Ex. L and Ex. S) were harsh or unconscionable, either by reason of undue influence or by the inherent harshness of the bargain, so as to justify reduction of the amount payable.
  2. Whether the mortgage debt (as evidenced by the bond) is binding on defendants 2 to 6 (the sons) — i.e., whether the father's act in mortgaging joint family property bound the sons.
  3. Whether the enhanced rate of interest provided for in the documents is penal or usurious, and if so, whether relief should be granted to the defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Position (as recorded)

  • The plaintiff sought enforcement of the decree and opposed the Additional District Judge's reduction of the amount due.
  • The court records indicate the plaintiff (or his counsel) relied on the legal position under Hindu law regarding the manager of a joint family borrowing, but the record also shows that the plaintiff was not required to prove necessity for the rate unless the rate was shown prima facie to be oppressive.
  • The opinion records that there was no suggestion of undue influence by the mortgagee and that the mortgagee warned the mortgagor of the rapid accumulation of the debt.

Defendants / Sons' Position (as recorded)

  • The defendants 2 to 6 raised objections to findings on adoption, limitation and the binding nature of the mortgage, though most of those points were given up before the court; their petition was ultimately confined to the conclusions in paragraph 8(a)–(f) of the Additional District Judge's judgment relating to harshness of the bargain and excessive interest.
  • The sons contended that issue No. 3 (whether the mortgage debt is binding on the defendants 2 to 6) opened the question of the sons' liability for the father's debts and that the enhanced rate of interest was penal and unconscionable.
  • Counsel for respondents argued for a lenient view of pleadings, submitting that the question of the amount (and oppressive interest) could be raised; they based their case on Hindu law rather than on Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act (as recorded by Mr. S. Varadachari).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram Where the manager of a Hindu family borrows on family property, it must be proved there was necessity to borrow at the rate contracted and that it was not unreasonable to borrow at such a high rate and on such terms. The court treated this decision as authority that the necessity and reasonableness of the rate are relevant; it informed the inquiry whether sons could be relieved from obligation.
Nazir Begum v. Rao Raghunath Singh Where there is no evidence on either side as to necessity for borrowing at a particular rate, the Privy Council would relieve where "the thing speaks for itself" (i.e., the document shows an unfair bargain). The court invoked this principle to explain when a court may interfere absent evidence: only if the document itself shows an obviously unfair bargain.
Lala Balla Mal v. Ahad Shah It is misleading to look at the result alone; accumulation of interest by forbearance may produce an apparently oppressive result without any unconscionable demand by the creditor. The court relied on this to caution against judging harshness from the accumulated result alone where the creditor merely forbearance led to accumulation.
Gangapershad Sahu v. Maharani Bibi Illustrative of cases where issues about binding nature of debt allowed the question of amount to be raised; shows leniency in considering pleadings. The respondents cited it to argue that pleadings should be liberally construed to permit challenge to amount; the court considered but did not treat this as dispositive here.
Rai Radha Kishun v. Jag Sahu Example of a case where an obviously excessive (24% compound) rate indicated unfairness and justified relief. Used in discussing categories of Privy Council cases where high rates on the face of documents warranted interference.
Nana Ram v. Bhupal Singh Refers to a very high rate of interest where the original sum became grossly inflated by compound interest. Cited as an example where the document showed an excessive rate on its face and relief was appropriate.
Manna Lal v. Karu Singh Privy Council concurred in reducing compound interest to simple interest (example of relief on appeal). Cited as a case where appellate intervention altered the rate; used to classify Privy Council decisions.
Ramchandra Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad Singh Holding that agreement to pay compound interest on failure to pay simple interest is not invalid and does not fall within Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act. Referred to show that compound-interest provisions are not necessarily void under Section 74 and that each case depends on circumstances.
Hurro Nath RaiChowdhri v. Randhir Singh Listed among cases where Privy Council or appellate courts found excessive interest on the facts. Grouped in the court's discussion of classes of Privy Council cases where findings of fact supported interference.
Nand Ram v. Bhupal Singh Another cited case where an obviously excessive rate supported relief. Included in the court's typology of precedents showing when courts have granted relief.
Aziz Khan v. Duni Chand Listed among authorities where excessive interest was recognized on appeal. Referenced in the court's survey of comparable cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a fact-sensitive assessment and legal analysis that proceeded in the following steps, as recorded in the opinion:

  1. Background and accumulation: The court recited the sequence of promissory notes and two consolidations into mortgages (Ex. L and later Ex. S), noting prolonged non-payment over many years which caused the debt to swell substantially.
  2. No undue influence proved: The court found no evidence of undue influence by the mortgagee; indeed, it is recorded that the mortgagee warned the mortgagor about the rapid growth of the debt.
  3. Relevant legal principles: The court identified the applicable principles from prior authorities:
    • From Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram: a manager of a Hindu family borrowing on joint family property must have necessity for borrowing at the rate contracted and it must not be unreasonable.
    • From Nazir Begum v. Rao Raghunath Singh: where there is no evidence on either side, relief may be given if the document speaks for itself as manifestly unfair.
    • From Lala Balla Mal v. Ahad Shah: the court should not look to the accumulated result alone, because forbearance by the creditor can legitimately produce an apparently oppressive outcome.
  4. Assessment of the instant transaction against those principles:
    • The court noted the history of earlier loans at 12% and 18% simple, Ex. L with 10 1/8% simple and default 12% compound, and Ex. S consolidating at 12% compound.
    • It observed that nothing was paid for about nine years and that the final mortgage did not increase the rate beyond earlier default terms; the lender had foreborne for many years and had warned the mortgagor.
    • The court asked whether, on the face of the documents alone, the transaction was so unfair that the "thing speaks for itself"; it concluded that the documents did not show an unfair bargain as against the sons on their face.
  5. On issues and pleadings: The court stressed that the relevant points were not fully litigated below — issue No. 3 (binding nature) did not open up a full inquiry into necessity for the rate, and issue No. 11 raised usurious/penal interest but the respondents ultimately did not press for relief under Section 74 of the Contract Act and relied on Hindu law.
  6. Concluding evaluation and remedy: Odgers, J. concluded that the Additional District Judge erred in relieving the sons, and that the First Court's decree should be restored. Wallace, J. concurred but emphasized the evidentiary allocation of burden: a court should not presume a rate to be onerous without prima facie evidence, and ordinarily the plaintiff should have an opportunity to explain the rate unless it is monstrously high on the face of the document.
  7. Practical considerations: Wallace, J. noted the long delays and obstructive tactics by defendants, and expressed reluctance to remand for further fact-finding because further delay would further increase the interest; accordingly he concurred with the substantive result.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition by the plaintiff was allowed; the decree of the Additional District Judge (which had reduced the amount payable) was set aside and the First Court's decree was restored. C. M. P. No. 3092 of 1923 (petition by the defendants 2 to 6) was dismissed with costs. The defendants were given six months from the date of the order to redeem.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's challenge succeeded — the prior reduction of the debt was reversed and the original decree in favour of the plaintiff (First Court's decree) stands restored; the defendants (sons) remain liable and have six months to redeem.
  • Burden and evidentiary posture reiterated: The opinion underscores that, except in cases where the terms are manifestly unconscionable on their face, courts should not interfere on the basis of accumulated result alone; typically the party attacking the transaction must show prima facie that the rate is excessively high and give the plaintiff an opportunity to rebut or explain it. Wallace, J. emphasizes that questions of onerousness and necessity are questions of fact and require evidence.
  • No new general precedent announced: The opinion applies and categorizes existing authorities and reaffirms established principles (as applied here) rather than announcing a novel rule. The decision reverses the Additional District Judge on the facts and restores the First Court's decree; the opinion does not purport to create a new legal doctrine beyond the principles cited from earlier authorities.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion. No information not contained in that opinion has been added.

    Kruthiventi Perraju Gabu v. Nallapparaju Miraja Sitarama Chandraraju Garu

    Odgers, J.—This is a petition by the plaintiff for an order directing the Additional District Judge of the Agency Division, Waltair, to review his judgment and decree in A. S. No. 2 of 1923, dated 30th April 1923. The suit came to the Additional District Judge on appeal from the Judicial Assistant Commissioner of the Agency Division, Vizagapatam, in a mortgage suit on a bond, dated 9th May, 1901 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of one K. Perraju, said to be the adoptive father of the plaintiff. The first Defendant is the undivided father of the defendants 2 to 6 and the manager of the joint family. No less than 14 issues were originally framed in the case and there is in fact a petition by the defendants 2 to 6 against the findings of the learned Additional District Judge on points of adoption, limitation and the binding nature of the mortgage. These points were all given up before us, and the petition is confined to the conclusions arrived at by the learned Judge in paragraph 8 (a) to (f) of his judgment.

    The dealings between the parties began on the 12th December 1892 by a promissory note of that date for Rs. 600 at 18 per cent., Ex. D. This was followed by a promissory note of 4th February 1893, Ex. D-2, for Rs. 600 at 12 per cent, and also on the 7th May 1895, Ex. D-1 for Rs. 1,000 at 12 per cent. Nothing having been paid on any of these promissory notes, they were consolidated into a mortgage on the 11th November 1895, Ex. L for Rs. 6,000 at 10⅛th per cent, payable on the 11th November, every year, in default, interest to be paid compounded, the whole principal and interest being repayable on the 11th November 1897; and if it is not paid within that time; interest shall be at 12 per cent, compound. Nothing having been paid under this, the further suit—mortgage, Ex. S, dated 9th May 1901, for Rs. 11,000 was executed at Rs. 1-0-6 or 12⅜ per cent, compound interest. Nothing having been paid for this mortgage, the plaintiff instituted the suit for no less than Rs. 1,07,000 odd. The learned Additional District Judge evidently impressed, I think, with the way in which this debt has accumulated, has reduced the interest payable so as to make the whole amount due from the defendants, Rs. 45,000 and odd. The learned Additional District Judge in paragraph 8 (a) to (f) considers whether the bargain was harsh and unconscionable based on undue influence by the mortgagee or the inherent harshness of the bargain. It may be said at once that no case of undue influence was proved, and in fact I think it is fair to say that the contention of the parties and their counsel was not really focussed on this point of excessive interest until the last moment. Their attention was concentrated on that date on the more important points of adoption, limitation, etc., and Mr. C. Sambasiva Rao, Barrister-at-law, who was present at the hearing in the Additional District Covert, has stated to us that it was only in the later stages in the hearing of the appeal that this point was raised and was pressed on the attention of the learned Judge owing to counsel and the Vakils in the case having received a copy of the Privy Council decision in Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram(1), which will be presently noticed. The suit had a curious history. It began as O. S. No. 41 of 1913 before the Subordinate Judge of Cocanada, some of the properties being situated in the Godavari District and some in the Agency. The plaintiff got a decree and costs. Execution was taken of the properties within the ordinary jurisdiction and a small sum was recovered. As for the balance due, the decree was transferred to the Agency Judge for execution. It was held, however that a fresh suit must be brought in the Agency Court. So, O. S. No. 7 of 1921 was filed in consequence. The learned Judges held in Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram that where, as here, the manager of a Hindu family borrows money on the mortgage of a family property, it must be proved that there was necessity to borrow at the rate contracted for and secondly, that it was not unreasonable to borrow at some such high rate and upon such terms.

    The learned Judges took these propositions from the judgment in Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram where they are quoted from Nazir Begum v. Rao Raghunath Singh(2) and this is the law report referred to by Mr. C. Sambasiva Rao in his statement to us from the bar. The learned Judge proceeds:

    “The main thing is to see if results show that the terms taken as a whole were harsh and unconscionable.”

    On the other hand, the Privy Council in a case reported in Lala Balla Mal v. Ahad Shah(3), say that it is misleading to have regard to the result alone. Their Lordships say:

    “It is not enough—indeed, it is misleading—to look at the result alone………………A borrower who obtained a loan secured by a promissory note on a quite reasonable basis, by neglecting to pay the note at maturity, further neglecting to pay the accruing interest for the several years following, and then giving a renewal note for the original debt plus the capitalised interest, could produce a result which might at first sight appear oppressive, and yet there would be nothing harsh or unconscionable in the creditor's demand, since the added interest only accumulated while he forbore to enforce the payment of the sums from time to time due to him.”

    As to this the learned Judge himself says:

    “There is no suggestion that the mortgagee wilfully allowed default so as to take advantage of an improvident man and to pile up debt swiftly; on the other hand it is clear that the mortgagee warned the mortgagor of the rapidity with which the debt was swelling.”

    The learned Judge is obviously swayed by the hardship on the younger sons losing practically the whole of their estate owing to the improvidence of their father, not in borrowing the money for interest, as it was in fact admitted or found to exist, but in failing to pay interest as it fell due and thereby causing payment of compound interest to become necessary.

    Ordinarily speaking, it is extremely doubtful whether the sons would have been allowed to raise this plea at all. The issues taken as regards that point are issues 3 and 11. The third issue is this:

    Is the suit mortgage debt binding on the defendants 2 to 6?

    It is contended for the sons that this issue opens the whole point of the liability of sons for father's debts created by the mortgage.

    This point is considered at length by the learned Judge in paragraph 6 (a) to (f) and he agrees with the lower Court that the mortgage is a valid charge on the joint family property. The question that it lay on the plaintiff to show that the father could not raise money at a lower rate is not considered in that part of the judgment and it is perfectly clear to me that neither side at the hearing of the appeal contemplated that issue No. 3 would admit that discussion at all. The only other issue properly referable to the point is issue No. 11, whether the interest claimed is usurious and penal. On an examination of the respondent's grounds of appeal to the lower Appellate Court, the only grounds urged are that the enhanced rate of interest provided for in Ex. L and carried into Ex. S is penal and unconscionable and that the lower Court erred in thinking that it had no power to give relief for the usurious and preposterous claim. Cases have been cited to us by the learned Vakil for the respondents to show that the pleadings in this country are to be leniently considered. He contends that practically any objection to the transaction can be made to raise this point as to the binding nature of the interest claimed. He points for example to Gangapershad Sahu v. Maharani Bibi. There the issue was whether the defendant is bound to pay off the debt. It was held that, that enabled the question of the amount to be raised. I cannot, speaking personally, see why in this case the issue could not have been clearly and distinctly taken. One view of it was certainly advanced in issue No. 11, but Mr. S. Varadachari for the respondents, quite frankly says that their case here is not for relief under Sect. 74 of the Contract Act. He based his case entirely on the Hindu Law. I have carefully considered all the cases that we have been referred to. The principle laid down in Nazir Begum v. Rao Raghunath Singh, is that where there is no evidence on either side, i.e, as to the necessity for borrowing at the particular rate, their Lordships of the Privy Council would relieve where “the thing speaks for itself.” This is the case previously quoted by the later decision of their Lordships in Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram. Their Lordships holding that, although there may be necessity to borrow, it is open to the defendants to show that there was no necessity to borrow on the onerous terms of the mortgage. In that case the rate was Rs. 2-8-0, 30 per cent, simple and in default Rs. 3-2-0 or 37½ compound. So it seems to me that before any question of reduction of the amount in question can be raised, there being no evidence on either side, we must see if “the matter speaks for itself,” that is to say, if it is obvious from the terms of the document that an unfair bargain as against the sons has been concluded by the father. The Privy Council cases to which we have been” referred, nearly all concern a rate which is obviously very high. In the case just referred to in Nazir Begum v. Rao Raghunath Singh the sum originally borrowed Rs. 398 became 3 lakhs. In Rai Radha Kishun v. Jag Sahu, another Privy Council case, the rate was 24 per Cent, compound interest, with half yearly rests. Their Lordships observe there that it was evident on the face of the document that the interest charged was far in excess of the commercial rates. In Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram the interest was 36 per cent. compound, with quarterly rests. Nana Ram v. Bhupal Singh(4), refers to a very high rate of interest, the original sum borrowed being Rs. 80 at 27 per cent, compound. In Manna Lal v. Karu Singh(5), the Privy Council concurred in altering 18 per cent, compound to 18 per cent, simple. In Ramchandra Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad Singh(6), the Patna High Court held that an agreement to pay compound interest on failure to pay simple interest is not invalid and does not fall within Sect. 74 of the Indian Contract Act. It will, I suppose, be agreed that each case must be judged by its own circumstances. In the present case, we have a series of prior transactions between the parties at 12 per cent, and 18 per cent, simple. We have Ex. L with 10 ⅛ per cent, simple and in default 12 per cent, compound. Nothing having been paid for over a period of 9 years to the lender, the final transaction Ex. S which consolidates all the others, reserves a rate of interest at 12 per cent, compound, there being no increase on that rate in case of default. It is all very well to consider the case of hardship of the family, but they presumably had the benefits of the amount borrowed. They have also had what benefit there might be in delaying the payment of interest and principal. That this has now aggregated to a very large sum, there is no doubt. But, on the other hand, the interests of the lender who has been kept out of his money for a long series of years have also to be considered and as stated, there is no evidence that he took any undue advantage of his borrower. On the other hand, he warned him that the sum due was very rapidly growing. I cannot agree that on the face of the document or that the thing of itself speaks of an unjust or unfair transaction as far as the sons are concerned. What the commercial rate of borrowing referred to by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram, may be in Cocanada we have no means of knowing. But it is not an unfair inference from the facts, as we know them, that the lender was not willing to wait for his money any longer, unless the borrower consented to pay 12 per cent, compound interest which he had already bound himself to pay by his default in the repayment of the sum borrowed under the previous mortgage, Ex. L. On the best consideration I can give to both the facts and law of this case, I am bound to say, I think that the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in the view he took of this transaction as far as it affects the sons. In my view the petition must be allowed with costs and the decree of the Additional District Judge set aside and the First Court's Decree restored.

    C. M. P. No. 3092 of 1923.

    This is a petition by the defendants 2 to 6 with regard to the question of necessity of borrowing and its binding character on the sons and also raises the question of limitation and adoption which were not raised before us. It must be dismissed with costs.

    The defendants will have six months from this date to redeem.

    C. M. P. No. 2561 of 1923.

    Wallace, J.:—I agree. I do not quarrel with the principle that the manager of a joint family whether the father or not, is not entitled in law to borrow money at an exhorbitant rate of interest, unless there was necessity for such a rate, and that, if the rate of interest is excessive, the onus will be on the lender to show that there was necessity for such an onerous rate. This involves two principles; firstly, that the rate must be shown to be onerous, and, secondly, that there was pressing necessity at the time of the loan for such an onerous rate. I fail to see how the actual result brought about by the mounting of interest, if not paid, to a crushing figure can affect the second principle. If the manager bona fide was in urgent necessity for money and could not get it at a lower figure, then he was in law justified in borrowing at that figure, and the aftermath of that transaction is irrelevant to the consideration of whether he was justified or not. The onerous nature of the interest would only be justified reasonably if the necessity for the money at the time of the loan was really urgent. The more urgent the need, the less unjustifiable a high rate of interest. Both questions are, therefore, questions of fact to be decided by the circumstances of the case. This is the principle approved by the Privy Council in the case quoted by my learned brother reported in Lala Balla Mal v. Ahad Shah.

    Hence, it appears to me that a Court has no right to presume without evidence that any particular rate of interest is onerous, at least without affording the plaintiff an opportunity of rebutting that view. A rate prima facie harsh may, considering the nature of the security offered, its dubious title or its exiguous nature, be perfectly reasonable when the facts are known. Therefore it seems to me that normally Courts are not entitled to presume anything either way without evidence and that these questions are entirely matters of proof in the circumstances of each case. Those attacking the transaction must first show prima facie that the rate of interest is unnecessarily high for the circumstances of the case. It may be that in certain cases the original rate of interest is prima facie so excessive that proof is practically unnecessary and that the plaintiff must know that it is his duty to show necessity for it. But in other cases, it may be that the rate, although high, is not so high that the plaintiff should reasonably take it for granted that he has to explain it, even though the Court does not call upon him to do so. In such a case he cannot reasonably be mulcted if he does not explain it. It seems to be not proper that, when the trying Court has not considered it necessary to call on the plaintiff to explain the rate of interest, and no issue has appraised him that it is necessary for him to explain it, Courts of appeal should interfere without giving him an opportunity to explain it, unless the rate is so monstrous as to be unconscionable in any conceivable set of circumstances, that is, so harsh that no explanation whatever would stand any chance of acceptance by the Courts. Under some such principle I would group the Privy Council cases which have been quoted before us. They resolve themselves into three classes: firstly, where there is a finding of the lower Appellate Court, that is, the High Court, a finding of fact that the rate of interest was excessive and the Privy Council saw no good reason to disturb it, such as Gangapershad Sahu v. Maharani Bibi, Hurro Nath RaiChowdhri v. Randhir Singh, Nand Ram v. Bhupal Singh, Nazir Begum v. Rao Raghunath Singh, Aziz Khan v. Duni Chand and Manna Lal v. Karu Singh. Secondly, the cases in which the Privy Council has reduced the rate of interest awarded by the High Court such as Ram Bujhawan Prasad Singh v. Nathu Ram, and Rai Radha Kishun v. Jag Sahu(7), in which they restore the Subordinate Judge's finding, that is, the trying Court's finding on the rate of interest. In the former case, the initial rate was 36 per cent, compound interest and in the latter, it was 24 per cent, compound interest, rates which the trying Court had already found excessive. In the former case, the Subordinate Judge had on the question of fact held that the fair commercial rate was 12 per cent, simple interest. The third class of cases is those in which the Privy Council has increased the rate of interest awarded by the High Court and restored the rate of interest awarded by the trying Court, such as Lala Balla Mal v. Ahad Shah(8). In no case, therefore, has the Privy Council decided “in the air”, if I may use that expression, without a finding of fact by one or the other of the lower Courts, that finding of fact being based also not “in the air” or on an appeal ad miseri cordiam but on the circumstances surrounding the transaction.

    In the present case, the Judicial Assistant Commissioner, the trying Court, has considered whether the interest could be called usurious or penal and he has found that it could not. The Additional District Judge has given a very halting judgment on this point, based merely on an ad miseri cordiam appeal by the sons, and, without considering whether the rate was at the time of the bond excessive in the circumstances of the case, has based his decision entirely on what has resulted purely from the father's failure to pay anything whatever towards either interest or principal which has caused the interest to mount up to a very large sum.

    I should have preferred to send the case back for a finding of fact on this matter of the alleged excessive rate of interest, but I am not prepared to dissent from the order proposed by my learned brother, considering the long delay that has already occurred in the trial of this case, which is chiefly due to the obstructive tactics of the defendants, to which again is due very much of the swelling of the interest. A further remand would have the further result of prolonging the litigation and swelling the interest still more. As has already been pointed out by my learned brother, in neither of the lower Courts, was any issue taken on this matter, nor was any plea put forward of any undue influence, while the bond in question was taken in renewal of loans which had run for several years without payment of a pie, either for interest or principal. I am not prepared to hold that in the present case, the rate of interest is on the face of it excessive or unconscionable.

    Under these circumstances, I agree with my learned brother that the Additional District Judge was not justified in relieving the sons of their obligation to pay the debt, since they have not shown that the interest was unduly high in the circumstances of the case and it was, therefore, not necessary for the plaintiff to prove necessity for such a rate of interest.

    K. S. D.Petition allowed.

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    Kruthiventi Perraju Gabu v. Nallapparaju Miraja Sitarama Chandraraju Garu
    (Dec 18, 1924)