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citation codes
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  • section 151 of Civil Procedure Code. Section 44 of Civil Procedure Code
  • Code of 1882 a new section 229-A, now section 45 of the present Code.
  • 4 of Rules and Orders, page 1614, and Rule 161(3) of the Civil Rules
  • clauses (5) and (6) of article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • article 182(6), Schedule I of the Limitation Act;
  • Civil Procedure Code or by the Limitation Act.
  • British India (Civil Procedure Code, section 44)
  • 5 of article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Sections 44 and 45, Civil Procedure Code,
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order V, rule 26 Civil Procedure Code,
  • article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • article 132 of the Limitation Act
  • Rules of Practice, rule 161).I
  • section 39, Civil Procedure
  • Order XXI, rule 3. Rule 6
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Order XXI, rule 22,
  • XXI, rule 6); rules
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 151 of Civil Procedure Code. Section 44 of Civil Procedure Code
  • Code of 1882 a new section 229-A, now section 45 of the present Code.
  • 4 of Rules and Orders, page 1614, and Rule 161(3) of the Civil Rules
  • clauses (5) and (6) of article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • article 182(6), Schedule I of the Limitation Act;
  • Civil Procedure Code or by the Limitation Act.
  • British India (Civil Procedure Code, section 44)
  • 5 of article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Sections 44 and 45, Civil Procedure Code,
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order V, rule 26 Civil Procedure Code,
  • article 182 of the Limitation Act.
  • article 132 of the Limitation Act
  • Rules of Practice, rule 161).I
  • section 39, Civil Procedure
  • Order XXI, rule 3. Rule 6
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Order XXI, rule 22,
  • XXI, rule 6); rules
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench considered a reference arising from an application concerning the enforcement of a decree of a British Indian Court in the Native State of Travancore. The matter was argued at length and two central questions were referred for decision: (1) whether courts in British India have power to send their decrees to the Courts of Travancore for execution; and (2) if such power exists, whether proceedings taken thereunder would amount to proceedings within the Limitation Act that give a fresh period of limitation for execution (the judges examined clauses of article 182 of the Limitation Act).

The record shows that the Travancore Government had issued notifications and regulations (and a Government Order of 29th March 1887 is referred to) enabling execution in Travancore of decrees of British courts by the Travancore Courts pursuant to arrangements between the Governments. The Full Bench heard argument from counsel for the appellant (D. Chamier) and for the respondent (M. D. Devadoss) and delivered a set of opinions (Chief Justice Wallis delivering the principal opinion, with concurring and dissenting observations by other members).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the courts in British India have power to send their decrees to the Courts of the Native State of Travancore for execution.
  2. If such power exists, whether proceedings taken under that transmission (or applications to send documents to enable execution) amount to proceedings within the Limitation Act (in particular article 182, clauses 5 and 6) so as to create a fresh period of limitation for further proceedings in execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (D. Chamier)

  • There are notifications by the Travancore Government enabling the execution in Travancore of decrees of British Indian Courts; the reciprocal arrangement supports transmission.
  • British Indian Courts have inherent power to transmit decrees or the necessary documents to foreign/native Courts under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 44 of the Civil Procedure Code provides for execution of the decrees of Native States in British India and related notifications (Governor-General in Council and Civil Rules of Practice, Rule 161(3)) support reciprocal enforcement.
  • The decision in Chidambaram Chetty v. Ramanatham Chetty was distinguishable (Pudukkottai had not issued a corresponding notification) and thus not conclusive.
  • On limitation, reliance was placed on clauses (5) and (6) of article 182 of the Limitation Act — the present application was not barred because a prior application had been within three years and notice had been issued.
  • In reply the appellant argued that transmission by the Court is an act of execution (citing the heading of Order XXI and rule 6) and that a step in aid of execution may include aiding execution in a foreign Court under the foreign state's notifications.

Respondent's Arguments (M. D. Devadoss)

  • Section 38 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates execution by the Court passing a decree or by one to which it is transferred, but the Code contemplates only transfer to British Indian Courts; there is no statutory power to transfer decrees to Native States.
  • The silence of the Code in sections 44 and 45 as regards transfer to Native States indicates absence of power to transfer to native Courts; if an inherent power existed it would render statutory provisions unnecessary (and thus those statutory provisions imply no such inherent power exists for transfer to Native States).
  • An application for transmission is an application for transfer, not an application for execution; the notice in the present case was a notice to show cause and not a notice issued under Order XXI, rule 22 for execution.
  • Sripati Charan Choudry v. R. Belchambers was cited to show no Code notice is required for transmission to Travancore under some authorities; but the respondent argued the present application was not a step in aid of execution and thus not within article 182 (citing Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesam Pillai and other authorities holding notices from a court without jurisdiction are nullities).
  • The respondent relied on authorities distinguishing what constitutes a "step in aid of execution" and contended that transmission (or the application for transmission) was not such a step under British law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chidambaram Chetty v. Ramanatham Chetty Decision relating to transmission of a decree for execution in the Native State of Pudukkottai. The Bench observed this case was not conclusive here because Pudukkottai had not issued the reciprocal notification shown to exist for Travancore; it was distinguished on that ground.
Kasturchand Gujar v. Parsha Mahar Authority cited regarding transfer/execution and the scope of Code provisions. Referred to by Wallis, C.J. as part of authorities indicating section 42 and following sections do not authorize sending decrees to Native States as executing Courts in the same manner as to British Courts.
Ratan Mahanti v. Khatoo Sahoo Similar principle as above on limits of Code provisions for transfer to Native States. Used by Wallis, C.J. to support the conclusion that statutory sections do not authorize transfer to Native States in the same manner as to British Indian Courts.
Maharajah of Bobbili v. Narasaraju Bahadur Authority about transfer to another British Indian Court under section 39 of the Code. Cited to distinguish transfer within British India (which effects a transfer of execution) from the present situation involving a Native State Court.
Chutterpat Singh v. Rai Bahadur Saita Soomarimull Full Bench decision that where transfer is authorized by the Code, notice must be sent by the transferee Court. Relied on by Wallis, C.J. and others to show the Code contemplates a particular regime for transfers within British India and that this does not extend automatically to Native State Courts.
Sripati Charan Choudry v. R. Belchambers Authority on the absence of Code requirement for notice for transmission to Travancore in some contexts. Cited in argument by respondent to contend no Code notice was required for transmission; the Court dealt with the issue in light of the Code's territorial operation.
Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesam Pillai Holds that a notice given by a Court having no jurisdiction is null and void. Cited by the respondent to argue that a notice issued in circumstances where the Court has no jurisdiction to order transmission is a nullity and therefore cannot be a step in aid of execution.
Natesa Pillai v. Ganapathea Pillai; Langtu Pande v. Baijnath Saran Pande Principles on what constitutes a step in aid of execution and the necessity of conformity with law. Relied upon to argue that the aid must be for execution by a British Court in accordance with British law; transmission to a Native State Court is not such an aid.
Gapilandhu v. Damburu; Abdul Kadir Rowther v. Krishna Malamal Nair Authorities on what acts will be considered "aids in execution." Referred to by the respondent to delineate proper acts that can be treated as aids in execution under British law.
Aghore Kali Debi v. Prosunno Coomar Banerjee; Haridas Nanabhai v. Vithaldas Kisandas Authorities concerning what can amount to a step in aid of execution. Cited in reply by appellant to support the proposition that a step in aid might include transmission to a foreign Court under its own enabling provisions.
Bhagwan v. Dhondi Principle that execution contemplated must be "in accordance with law." Invoked by Oldfield, J. to support the position that a step in aid must assist execution that is legal under the lex fori (the law of the forum) and cannot be established merely by reference to foreign law.
Her Highness Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy Mottichund Principle that limitation is procedural and relates to the lex fori; courts are not obliged to depart from their own judicial order for mere comity. Used by Oldfield, J. as authority for the proposition that steps relied on to extend limitation must be judged by the forum's own law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench addressed the questions by examining (a) the text and scope of the Code of Civil Procedure and statutory notifications, (b) the effect of reciprocal arrangements and notifications between the Government of India and certain Native States (notably Travancore), and (c) the meaning of the Limitation Act provisions invoked (article 182, clauses 5 and 6).

On the first question — power to send decrees to Travancore for execution:

  • Chief Justice Wallis concluded that the provisions of the Code (sections 38–44 and in particular section 45 as inserted by Act VII of 1888) do not generally authorize British Courts to send or transfer their decrees for execution to the Courts of Native States in the same way and with the same consequences as transfers to Courts subject to the Indian Legislature. Section 45 authorizes transfers only to those Native State Courts to which the Governor-General in Council has, by notification, declared the section to apply. The omission of a general provision for transfer to other Native State Courts indicates that transfers in the nature effected by the Code are not authorized to those Courts.
  • Wallis, C.J. recognized, however, that where a Native State's legislative authority has empowered its Courts to execute British decrees (and notifications have been issued to that effect), the British Courts may, as a matter of comity and consistent with the statutory scheme, assist by sending the documents required by the Native State Court (certified copies, certificate of non-satisfaction, etc.) to enable that Court to execute the decree under its own authority. Such transmission of documents is distinguishable from a statutory "transfer" under the Code that makes the recipient Court the executing Court for all purposes.
  • Oldfield, J. agreed that British Courts have inherent powers (recognised by section 151 of the Code) to send the requisite documents to foreign/Native State Courts with which arrangements exist, and therefore may entertain applications asking them to do so. He stressed that these inherent powers are not identical to the specific powers conferred by the Code and so do not produce all effects that a statutory transfer would.
  • Bakewell, J. expressed a different view in argument: he was of opinion that, given statutory recognitions of comity and the notifications between Governments, courts should take necessary steps to carry the comity into effect and construed provisions (section 39 and related practice rules) broadly to permit transmission; but the principal opinion ultimately answered the question in the negative as to transfers making the native court the executing court.

On the second question — whether such proceedings afford a fresh period of limitation under the Limitation Act:

  • The Bench examined article 182 (in particular clauses 5 and 6) of the Limitation Act and concluded that applications to have documents sent to a Native State Court so that that Court may execute the decree under the Native State's law do not amount to applications "in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution" under the article, insofar as the Limitation Act and the Code relate to British India only. The Indian Limitation Act operates in British India and cannot be taken to make an application in accordance with a foreign state's law a fresh starting point under our Limitation Act.
  • Chief Justice Wallis and Oldfield, J. emphasized that notice issued or applications made under inherent powers to assist a foreign Court are not the same as notices or transfers required or contemplated by the Code; therefore such acts do not create the fresh starting points for limitation described in article 182(5) and (6).
  • Oldfield, J. added a policy and conflict-of-laws rationale: limitation is procedural and relates to the lex fori — the forum must determine whether the condition for a fresh start is satisfied according to its own law. An application to assist proceedings in a foreign forum cannot be treated as giving a fresh starting point under the Limitation Act unless the contemplated execution would be "in accordance with law" of British India.
  • The Bench accordingly answered the second question in the negative — an application to send documents to enable a foreign (Travancore) Court to execute a decree does not create a fresh period of limitation under article 182 clauses 5 or 6 in British India.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench answered the reference as follows: British Indian Courts do not have power to send or transfer their decrees to the Courts of Travancore so as to make those Courts the executing Courts in the same manner as statutory transfers under the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., a transfer with all the effects contemplated by sections 38–44). However, British Courts may and should, in the exercise of inherent powers and by way of comity, send the documents required by the Travancore Courts (certified copies, certificate of non-satisfaction, copies of orders for execution, etc.) to enable the Travancore Courts to execute the decree under the authority conferred upon them by Travancore law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the Court cannot treat an order to "transfer the decree for execution" to Travancore as a statutory transfer. The appropriate step for a decree-holder seeking execution in Travancore is to apply for the sending of the necessary documents so that the Travancore Court may execute the decree under its own law.
  • Limitation consequences: an application to a British Court to send such documents to Travancore does not create a fresh period of limitation under article 182(5) or (6) of the Limitation Act; notices or other steps taken in connection with such inherent-power applications are not equivalent to the Code-based steps that trigger fresh limitation periods in British India.
  • On wider legal effect: the decision distinguishes between (a) statutory transfers under the Code (which the Code contemplates only in certain circumstances and to courts subject to the Indian Legislature or specified by notification) and (b) assistance by way of comity and inherent powers to supply documents to foreign/native Courts empowered by their own legislatures to execute British decrees. The Bench recognized and gave effect to existing notifications and reciprocal arrangements (such as those with Travancore) while declining to treat those arrangements as amounting to a general power of transfer under the Code.
  • No broader innovation beyond these points was claimed; the Court grounded its conclusions on the text of the Code, the scope of the Limitation Act, the existence of specific statutory notifications, and basic conflict-of-laws/lex fori principles cited in authority.

Attorneys for the appellant: Messrs King and Partridge (as recorded in the opinion).

    Pierce Leslie And Company, Limited, Cochin (Through Their Authorized Agent James Dell) (, Decree-Holder) v. E.J Perumal Alias Kochu Papi (Petitioner, Judgment-Debtor) .

    Oldfield, J.:— I do not dissent from the considerations based on the provisions of the Code, which my learned brother specifies in the Order of Reference he is about to deliver. But I wish to state clearly why I think that the decision in the recent case, Chidambaram Chetty v. Ramanatham Chetty(1), to which he refers is not conclusive in this.

    That decision relates to the transmission of a decree for execution in the Native State of Pudukkottai; and it does not appear to have been suggested that any such provision has been made by the soverign authority of that State for execution of British decrees, as is shown in the case before us to have been made by the sovereign authority of Travancore, the state with which we are concerned. This seems to me of considerable importance, because, reciprocity established, an important step will have been taken towards establishing that the Government of British India, has committed itself to adoption of both the methods, by which foreign judgments can receive effect, not only to the procedure by suit on them, but also to direct execution of them: vide Bar: Private International Law, second edition, 943: Westlake: Private International Law, fifth edition, 397. The fact that only the first of these methods of enforcing foreign judgment is recognized in England cannot be conclusive, when the conditions in India are essentially different. And it is, as my learned brother points out, a strong reason for the contrary view that the Government of India has entered into agreements with Travancore and other States, which would be one-sided, if our own Courts could not take the action necessary to secure the benefit of them by transmitting decrees. It is of course a question whether such transmission is authorized by the wording of the Code or must be based on the Courts' inherent powers. In any case the application of the latter would in my opinion involve no unduly liberal construction of them. I add that the cases dealt with in the judgment above referred to do not deal with transmission to a State, with which arrangements of the kind now in question have been made.

    Bakewell, J.:— Two questions have been argued in this case: first, whether the courts in British India have power to send their decrees to the Courts of the State of Travancore for execution and secondly, if they have this power, whether proceedings thereunder Full within article 132 of the Limitation Act so as to give a fresh period of limitation for further proceedings in execution.

    There is a difference of opinion amongst jurists as to the principle upon which the courts of one state recognize and enforce the decrees of another (see Piggott's Foreign Judgments and Jurisdiction, Part I, Chapter II), but in India it can scarcely be doubted that it is the comity which should exist between the courts of states united under the same suzerain. Under statutory authority this comity has been recognized by the Governments of India and Travancore for a long time see notification of the Government of India of 10th December, 1885, and notification of the Maharaja of Travancore of 1st July, 1886, set out in the orders of the Madras Government of 30th December, 1885 and 23rd March, 1887. The procedure adopted to enforce the foreign decree in both states is simpler than that prescribed in England and other European states (see Piggott, part I, page 8) and consists in one court transmitting a copy of its record to the other and thereupon the latter court proceeds as if the decree had been passed by itself.

    An application must of course be made by the creditor to the former court, which must to satisfied that its decree is subsisting and is executable in the latter, but otherwise the Court exercises no judicial functions but only performs the ministerial acts of preparing and transmitting the copy of its record. It has been argued that though provision has been made for the enforcement of the decrees of Native States in British India (Civil Procedure Code, section 44) no authority has been given by the Indian Legislature to its own courts to entertain such an application or perform these acts, and since the hearing of this case this view has been adopted by two learned Judges of this Court. With all respect, I am of opinion that when the Legislature and the Government have recognized the existence of this comity, it is the duty of the courts to take the necessary steps to carry it into effect and for this purpose to follow the procedure which has been prescribed as regards other courts.

    I have arrived at the same conclusion from an examination of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Code does not define the word “Court” but only the expression “foreign Court” [section (2)] and section 39 enacts generally that a court may send its decree for execution to another court. The Rules of Practice annexed to the code do not provide any special form of application for transmission of a decree, but merely prescribe the records to be sent (Order XXI, rule 6); rules framed by this court, however, direct that applications shall be in the same form as an ordinary application for execution and that notice to the debtor shall be given in similar circumstances (Civil Rules of Practice, rule 161).

    I do not think that there is any ground for limiting the expression “another Court” in section 39 to a court situate in British India, and construe it as meaning “a court in which the decree is executable.”

    I may point out that a court could not refuse to supply a party with a properly ??? copy of its decree for the purpose of filing a suit thereon in the court of another abate when that is the procedure adopted is trial court for the enforcement of foreign decrees, and that the transmission of such a copy by the court itself cannot be said to involve the exercise of jurisdiction.

    With regard to the second question, paragraph 5 of article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, speaks generally of applications “to take some step in aid of execution,” and I think that it is not limited to execution in the court to which the application is made but includes execution in a court authorized to execute the decree.

    Having regard to ??? we Full Bench for decision.

    On this Reference—

    D. Chamier for the appellant.—There is a notification by the Government of Travancore enabling execution in that state of decrees of British Indian Courts. Our Courts have inherent power to transmit decrees for execution to Tranvancore—see section 151 of Civil Procedure Code. Section 44 of Civil Procedure Code provides for the execution of the decrees of Native States in British India. There is also a notification by the Governor General in Council to that effect—vide Volume 4 of Rules and Orders, page 1614, and Rule 161(3) of the Civil Rules of Practice. The recent case of Chidambaram Chetty v. Ramanatham Chetty is based on the view that there is no notification issued by the State of Pudukkottai enabling decrees of British Courts to be executed in Pudukkottai. Similarly the want of a treaty to that effect accounts for the result in Kasturchand Gujar v. Parsha Mahar(2), Ratan Mahanti v. Khatoo Sahoo(3) is wrong.

    On the second question I rely on clauses (5) and (6) of article 182 of the Limitation Act. The present application was not barred as the last application was within three years of this and as notice was issued.

    [Oldfield, J.:— Is an improper notice, a notice under article 182 of the Limitation Act. Is your previous application an execution application at all? You only asked for notice to be issued.]

    The application is one for exeoution and the notice was properly ordered.

    [Kumaraswami Sastriyar, J., referred to Maharajah of Bobbili v. Narasaraju Bahadur(4).]

    That is a case of transfer to another British Indian Court under section 39, Civil Procedure Coe. But if a case is transferred to a non British Court by a British Indian Court the latter still has seisin of the case. Clause(6) of article 182 has not the words “in accordance with law,” Hence if notice is issued, whether rightly or wrongly, that saves limitation.

    M.D Devadoss for the respondent.—Section 38, Civil Procedure Code, provides that a decree can be executed either by the Court passing it or by one to which it is transferred. The Courts contemplated by the Code to which decrees can be transferred for execution are only British Indian Courts. The fact that the Code is pertinently silent in Sections 44 and 45, Civil Procedure Code, as to execution of our decrees by Courts of Native States shows that our Courts have no power to transfer our decrees to Native States for execution. If there is any inherent power to transfer our decrees to Native States, an inherent power would exist to send our decrees to British Courts in foreign territories in India and section 45 is unnecessary, and the fact that a section specially giving such power is enacted shows the absence of the power now contended for by the other side. If there is any such inherent power even Order V, rule 26 Civil Procedure Code, is unnecessary. I rely on the cases distinguished by the other side.

    On the second question, I submit that the application is not an execution application but one for transmission and the notice sent is not a notice issued under Order XXI, rule 22, but a notice to show cause why the decree should not be transferred. No notice is required by the Code to be sent on an application for transmission of a decree to the Travancore Court: Sripati Charan Choudry v. R. Belchambers.

    [Court.—But as the decree was more than a year old, notice had to go]

    An application for transmission is not an application for execution: Chutterpat Singh v. Rai Bhadur Suita Soomarimull.

    [The Chief Justice:— But our rules require even an application for transmission to be in the form of an execution application.]

    A wholly incompetent application is not a step in aid of execution. Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesam Pillai holds that a notice given by a Court having no jurisdiction is a mere waste paper and null and void. This application, even though it prays for transmission of the decree, is not a step in aid of execution; for, if the lower Court cannot transmit the decree to a Native State, it cannot be a step in aid of execution in accordance with law—vide Natesa Pillai v. Ganapathea Pillai and Langtu Pande v. Baijnath Saran Pande(5). The aid must be for execution, by a British Court since execution by a Native Court is not contemplated either by the Civil Procedure Code or by the Limitation Act. Reference was made to Gapilandhu v. Damburu and Abdul Kadir Rowther v. Krishna Malamal Nair as to what acts will be aids in execution.

    D. Chamier in reply submitted that even a Court transmitting a decree to another Court is an executing Court; see heading of Order XXI, rule 3. Rule 6 comes under that heading; see also clause (c) of the rule 6. A step in aid of execution may be in aid of execution in a foreign Court, and it need not be execution under the Civil Procedure Code but may be one under the notifications issued by a Native State. Reference was made to Aghore Kali Debi v. Prosunno Coomar Banerjee and Haridas Nanabhai v. Vithaldas Kisandas as to what can be a step in aid of execution.

    This appeal again coming on for hearing.

    The Court expressed the following Opinions:—

    Wallis, C.J:— This reference raises questions of novelty and importance as to the execution by the Courts of Native States of decrees passed by Courts in British India. The further investigation which the subject has now received has confirmed me in the opinion expressed in the recent case in Chidambaram Chetty v. Ramanatham Chetty in accordance with the decisions of the Bombay and Calcutta Courts in Kasturchand Gujar v. Parsha Mahar(6) and Ratan Mahanti v. Khatoo Sahoo(7) that section 42 and the following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure do not authorize us to send or transfer our decrees for execution to the Courts of Nativa States, but has also satisfied me that this consideration by no means disposes of the question. Those sections have a two-fold effect. In the first place they empower the Courts to which a decree is sent for execution to execute it when the Court to which it is sent is subject to the authority of the Indian Legislature, an effect they cannot have as regards a Court in a Native State which is not subject to this legislative authority. In the second place they have the effect of depriving the Court sanding the decree of authority to execute it itself and of making the Court to which the decree is sent the executing Court to all intents and purposes. They in fact effect a transfer of the decree for purposes of execution: Maharajah of Bobbili v. Norasaraju Bahadur and Chutterpat Singh v. Rai Bahadur Saita Soomarimul.

    Where the Courts of Native States have been empowered by the legislative authority to which they are subject to execute the decrees of British Courts, there is nothing to prevent the Indian legislature from providing that the decrees of British Courts may be sent to them for execution and that such sending should have the same effect as if the decrees had been sent for execution to Courts in British India. This is exactly what the Indian legislature has done as regards certain Courts in Native States by Act VII of 1888 whereby it inserted in the Code of 1882 a new section 229-A, now section 45 of the present Code. With regard to Courts which have been established or continued in Native States by the authority of the Governor-General in Council (in the exercise of foreign jurisdiction) and to which section 45 has been declared to apply by notification issued by the same authority, that section provides that so much of the foregoing sections (38 to 44) as empowers a Court to send a decree for execution to another Court shall be construed as empowering a Courts in British India to send decrees for execution to such Courts. Its effect is to authorize our Courts to transfer their decrees for execution to those Courts, when the legislative authority to which they are subject, the Governor-General in Council has empowered them to execute them. It is important to observe that neither in 1888 nor when the present Code was enacted was any such provision introduced as regards other Courts in Native States, and the inference seems irresistible that Courts in British India are not authorized to send or transfer their decrees for execution to Courts in Native States in the same way as to Courts to which they are authorized to send them by the Code. The omission is the more remarkable with regard to Courts in Native States not established or continued by the authority of the Governor-General in Council, because section 44 provides for the issue of notifications declaring that the decrees of these very Courts may be executed in British India as if they had been passed by the Courts of British India. Such a notification was issued with regard to the Travancore Courts and also the Cochin Courts in 1887 as part of a reciprocal arrangement by which those Courts were to execute the decrees of our Courts, and a Government Order, dated 29th March 1887, No. 671 (Judicial) directed the Regulations made by the Travancore and Cochin Governments to be communicated to this Court and to be published in the Fort St. George Gazette. Similar notifications have been issued with regard to the Courts of numerous other Native States based on similar undertakings as to execution of our decrees in their Courts; and a Notification 2053 I.B dated the 22nd September 1911, and printed in British Enactments in force in Native States, volume 6, page 158, notifies for general information the Native States which have consented that the decrees passed by Civil Courts in British India may be executed in their territories by the Courts therein mentioned. It also appears that the decrees of our Courts have been executed by the Travancore Courts and the Courts of other Native States for many years, and it would be very unfortunate if we were obliged to hold that there was any legal impediment in the way of the satisfactory working of the system. There is no such necessity. It is I think clear from an examination of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to which I have referred that the policy of the Indian legislature has been to leave such decrees to be executed in the Courts of Native States pursuant to the legislative authority of such states, but not to provide, as they have in section 45 as regards certain other Courts in Native States, for the transfer to them of the decrees of our Court for execution be as to make them the executing Courts as regards such decrees for all purposes with authority to decide all questions arising in the course of execution. The Indian legislature has so far refrained from making provision for the transfer of these important powers with regard to the decrees of Courts in British India to Courts in Native States other than those specified in section 45 of the Code.

    Coming now to the powers conferred on the Travancore Courts and other Courts in Native States by their own legislative authorities to execute the decrees of Courts in British India, such execution might be authorised upon production by the decree-holder of a certified copy of the decree and an affidavit of non-satisfaction without any communication with the Court in British India which passed the decree. This would appear to be the system at home under the Judgments Extension Acts of 1868 and 1882 where the procedure is for the decree holder to get a certificate of the judgment from the officer of the Court which passed it and to register that certificate in the other Court upon which it becomes executable there as a decree. The regulations made by the Travancore. State, and set out in the Government Order already referred to, provide for the execution of the decree upon receipt of a copy of the decree, a certificate of non-satisfaction, and a copy of any orders for execution, or a certificate that no such order has been made, and appear to contemplate this those documents should be received from the British Court direct. If this be so, I can see no reason why a British Court should not act in aid of the Travancore Court and furnish them at matter of comity, and I think it its duty to furnish them and that it has inherent powers to do so. But an order that these documents should be sent to the Travancore Court is not an order sending the decree for execution to the Travancore Court, and should no longer be described as in the petition in the present case, as a transfer of the decree to the Travancore Court for execution. My answer to the first question in the reference is this Courts in British India have no power to send their decrees for execution to the Travancore Courts, but may and should sand to these Courts the documents they require to enable them to execute these decrees under the powers conferred upon them by the legislative authority in Travancore.

    On this view the words “proceedings thereunder” in the second part of the reference must be read as referring to an application to one of our Courts to send the Travancore Court the documents required by it to enable it to execute our decree under the authority of the Travancore legislature, and the question then is whether such an application affords a fresh starting point as regards execution of the decree by our own Courts under article 182 of the Limitation Act. First with regard to the fifth clause in the third column, an application to the Travancore Court to execute the decree of a British Court under powers conferred upon it by the legislative authority in Travancore would not in my opinion be an application “in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution” within the meaning of the article so as to create a fresh starting point for the execution of the decree by the executing Court in British India. The proper Court in my opinion for such an application is the executing Court under the law of British India which, as already shown is not the Travancore Court. The Indian Limitation Act extends only to British India and has no operation proprio vigore in Travancore. It prescribes periods of limitation as to the filing of suits and the execution of decrees in British India, and when it makes an application in accordance with law to a proper Court a fresh starting point, it must be taken to mean an application in accordance with the provisions of the law in British India to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure to which the article refers or elsewhere it cannot have been the intention of the legislature to make an application for execution to a Court in a Foreign State under the law of that State and governed by the law of limitation there in force a fresh starting point under our Limitation Act for the execution of our own decrees in our own Courts. If this be so, I am equally of opinion that an application to a British Court to take a step in aid of the execution by a Travancore Court of the decree of a Court in British India would not be an application to take some step in aid of the execution of the decree within the meaning of the fifth clause of the article. Treating the application to the Court in this case as an application to send the necessary documents to the Travancore Court, I think it did not make a fresh starting point under the article.

    With regard to the sixth clause, notice to show cause why the decree should not be executed was no doubt issued in the present case by the Court in British India prior to the so-called transmission of the decree to the Travancore Court. That however was not in my opinion a notice required by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, so as to bring the case within the article. In the first place the Civil Procedure Code only extends to British India and does not require any notice to be sent as a preliminary to the execution of a decree by a Court in Travancore. Secondly it has recently been held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta Court in Chutterpat Singh v. Rai Bahadur Saita Soomarimull, that where the transfer of the decree for execution is authorized by the Code, the Code requires the notice to be sent by the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution. My answer to the second question is in the negative.

    Oldfield, J.:— I respectfully agree with the conclusion that our Courts are entitled in the exercise of the inherent powers recognized in section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to send the requisite documents to Courts in foreign States, with which the necessary arrangements have been made, and therefore to entertain applications asking them to do so.

    But, as the powers invoked are inherent, it follows that they cannot be identified with any specifically conferred by the Code to do what it authorizes or to produce any result, for which it provides. There can therefore be no question of the issue of any notice being required by the Code in connexion with their exercise or of such issue as the starling point for a fresh period of limitation under article 182(6), Schedule I of the Limitation Act; and this is not affected by the fact that the Court executing the decree may properly exercise its ??? with regard to the issue of notice to the judgment-debtor before deciding to use the powers in question.

    The remaining contention is that the decree-holder's application for the sending of the necessary documents to the foreign Court affords a fresh starting point for limitation under article 182(5), because it is for the taking of step in aid of execution. It may be conceded that the application is, as the article requires, made in accordance with law to the proper Court. But, as was decided in Bhagwan v. Dhondi the execution, which is contemplated, must also be in accordance with law; and I do not think that this requirement is satisfied by the fact relied on before us, that it will be in accordance with the foreign law administered by the Court, where proceedings are to be taken. The point is not, so far as we have been shown, covered by direct authority. But a ground of decision can be found in the principle that “the law of limitation is a law relating to procedure having reference only to the lex fori” and that “no Court is obliged to depart from its own notions of judicial order from mere comity to any foreign nation.” Her Highness Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy Mottichund and Story's Conflict of Laws, 576, 580. It is the British Court, which has to decide whither the conditions postulated by the article are fulfilled and on this principle it will do so in accordance with its own law and without reference to other codes, which may include provisions regarding the executability and methods of execution of decrees different from those in our own. It may be argued that the existence of such provisions in the foreign code in question does not entail that they will in fact be employed or that any execution will take place, which the British Court could not approve and adopt. But that is beside the point, which is that the validity of a step in aid need not be tested, when or if any execution has taken place, but must be determinable, whether any takes place or not, with reference to the legality of the execution, which the step taken is contemplated as aiding. In the case of transmission by one British Court to another, that legality could not be doubtful, since the recipient Court could execute only in accordance with British law. It will be otherwise, when (as in the present case) the recipient Court is foreign and it is uncertain whether its proceedings in execution will conform to that law, the only one which our Courts dealing with the question of limitation can consider. In the absence of ground for any presumption that the foreign Court's proceedings in execution will be in accordance with the law applicable, an application to take a step in aid of them will not be one contemplated in article 182(5).

    For these reasons I would respectfully concur in the answers to the questions referred, which his Lordship the Chief Justice proposes.

    Kumaraswami Sastriyar, J.:— I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Oldfield who agrees with the conclusion arrived at by my Lord. I entirely agree with the judgments and as they deal fully with all the points raised, I have nothing useful to add.

    Attorneys for the appellant—Messrs King and Partridge.

    N.R

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