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  • Section 38 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act XXII of 1933. Section 50(b) of the same Act
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 50 of the Marumakkattayam Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 38 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act XXII of 1933. Section 50(b) of the same Act
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 50 of the Marumakkattayam Act
Smart Summary

Court Opinion — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition sought revision of the order of the learned District Munsif of Alatur made in I.A. No. 184 of 1934 in O.S. No. 444 of 1933; it was connected with I.A. No. 183 of 1934 in O.S. No. 2 of 1934. The original suits had been instituted by the karnavan of a Malabar Marumakatayam tarwad. One suit sought a separate share in the tavazhi properties and the other sought the plaintiff's share in another tavazhi described as a Puthravakasam tavazhi. The plaintiff had sent a registered notice demanding partition and had executed a will in favour of his wife and children bequeathing his share in both sets of properties; the opinion records that he is said to have executed another will thereafter. The plaintiff died, and his widow and children moved in I.A. Nos. 183 and 184 of 1934 to be impleaded as his legal representatives. The defendants contended that, under Marumakkattayam law, both suits abated on the plaintiff's death and that legal representatives could not be brought on record. The petition under review was brought under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the District Munsif's order permitting impleading of the widow and children.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Marumakkattayam law and the Madras Marumakkattayam Act (notably Section 38 and Section 50(b)), the death of the plaintiff causes the suits to abate so that his legal representatives cannot be impleaded.
  2. Whether filing a suit for partition effects a "severance of status" (i.e., a division in status akin to that in Mitakshara law) in respect of a tavazhi under Marumakkattayam law, and whether such a doctrine can be read into the Act absent express provision.
  3. Whether the provisions of Section 38 (right of a tavazhi represented by a majority of its major members to claim separation) and Section 40 (method of computing the tavazhi's share) operate to create an indefeasible right of a tavazhi to demand partition and thereby produce the consequences of severance of status.
  4. Whether the words "at any time" in Section 43 (permitting not less than two-thirds of major members to petition for registration of the tarwad as impartible) can be construed to defeat a previously instituted suit under Section 38 (i.e., whether a petition under Section 43 filed after a suit under Section 38 can nullify the earlier suit).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • On the plaintiff's death both suits abated; therefore the widow and children could not be impleaded as legal representatives.
  • This contention relied on peculiarities of Marumakkattayam law and on Section 50(b) of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act which states that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to affect rules of Marumakkattayam law except to the extent expressly laid down.
  • Implicitly, defendants argued that the Mitakshara doctrine of severance of status effected by filing a partition suit should not be imported into Marumakkattayam law absent express provision.

Petitioners' (Applicant/Widow and Children) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon

  • Relied upon decisions including Krishnan v. Maruvalamma (1934) 41 L.W. 353, Krishna v. Maruvalamma (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 417 : 55 M.L.J. 175 (F.B.), Narayana Moosad v. Raman Moosad (1935) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 811 : 68 M.L.J. 678, and an unreported Second Appeal No. 457 of 1930.
  • Contended that Section 43's phrase "at any time" allows two-thirds of major members to present a petition to register the tarwad as impartible even after a suit under Section 38 had been filed, and that if such a petition succeeds the earlier suit would be defeated.
  • Argued that because Section 50 of the Act does not expressly provide that severance of status follows on filing a suit, the doctrine of severance should not be applied to Marumakkattayam law.

Respondents' Arguments — as advanced by Mr. Sitarama Rao

  • Emphasised the new statutory regime: Section 38 grants that any tavazhi represented by the majority of its major members may claim its share and separate from the tarwad; Section 40 defines the share to be allotted on division; Section 41 applies Chapter VI to tavazhis possessing separate properties.
  • Argued that under the Act a tavazhi has an absolute right to demand partition of its share and that the Act therefore brings into operation the doctrine of severance of status in respect of tavazhis, making the filing of a suit or demand notice effective to create the consequences of severance.
  • Contended that Section 43 could not be interpreted so as to render the right under Section 38 illusory; the phrase "at any time" should not be read to defeat an already-existing right created by a notice or suit under Section 38.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnan v. Maruvalamma (1934) 41 L.W. 353 Cited by petitioners as supportive authority (case reporting relied upon by Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon). The Court noted the citation but treated related prior statements in the earlier Krishna/ Krishnan decisions as not constituting an express ruling in favour of the petitioners; not decisive here.
Krishna v. Maruvalamma (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 417 : 55 M.L.J. 175 (F.B.) Chief Justice expressed an opinion opposing the view taken by the District Munsif in the present case; the opinion was obiter and described the matter as arguable. The Court observed that the Chief Justice's opinion was obiter and that the particular case did not decide the precise point now before the Court; accordingly it did not control the present decision.
Narayana Moosad v. Raman Moosad (1935) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 811 : 68 M.L.J. 678 Dealt with an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis under a statute with a saving clause similar to Section 50; cited by petitioners. The Court held that the case had no bearing on the present point because it concerned a different procedural matter (leave to sue) and a different statutory saving clause; the issue of severance did not arise in that decision.
Second Appeal No. 457 of 1930 (unreported; judgment of Madhavan Nair, J.) Expressed reservations about applying the doctrine of severance of status (familiar in Hindu Mitakshara law) to Marumakkattayam law; observed that compulsory partition at the instance of a single individual was not permitted under the older law. The Court examined this authority and concluded that, on the facts and in light of the later statutory changes (Madras Marumakkattayam Act), the reasoning in that judgment supported the respondents' position regarding the pre-Act law, but that the Act had materially altered the legal position.
In the matter of Balusami Aiyar (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 417 : 55 M.L.J. 175 (F.B.) Referred to in dicta concerning consequences following institution of partition proceedings; mentioned in relation to earlier authorities. The Court noted that the earlier decision (on receivership) did not decide the precise severance question and was decided on other grounds; therefore it did not determine the issue raised in the present petition.
Girja Bai v. Sadasiv Dhundiraj (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 151 : I.L.R. 43 Cal. 1031 at 1047 : 31 M.L.J. 455 (P.C.) Privy Council explanation of the distinction between separation/severance of status and the subsequent division of specific shares; articulation of the doctrine that separation of status is distinct and leads to rights of disposal. The Court relied on this authority to explain the general principle that severance of status follows a clear decision to separate and is not peculiar to Mitakshara law; used to support application of severance doctrine where statute gives a right to claim separation.
Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh (1990) I.L.R. 18 Cal. 157 Quoted (Lord Watson) for the proposition that once partition is made a person becomes sole owner of his share and can dispose of it. The Court cited the passage to reinforce the general rule that partition confers powers of disposal and to support the conclusion that severance of status confers recognisable legal consequences as to title and disposal.
Deo Bunsee Koer v. Dwarkanath (1868) 10 W.R. 273 Referenced for authoritative language on the consequences of partition and related observations by Mr. Justice Dwarkanath Mitter. The Court referred to the language used in this older authority to illustrate established principles regarding partition and disposal of shares; used as supplementary support for the doctrine.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-wise analysis grounded in the statutory provisions and the authorities cited in argument.

  1. Preliminary procedural point: the petitioners' counsel admitted that there was no express ruling on the precise point in prior authorities. The Court observed that this admission suggested that the appropriate remedy would ordinarily be an appeal rather than revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure; nonetheless, because the petition was admitted and fully argued before a Bench, the Court proceeded to decide the substantive issue.
  2. The Court examined the defendants' contention that suits abated on the plaintiff's death under Marumakkattayam law and that the doctrine of severance of status (as in Mitakshara law) should not be imported absent express statutory provision. Section 50(b) of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act was cited as a saving clause preserving existing Marumakkattayam rules except to the extent expressly changed by the Act.
  3. The Court then analysed the relevant provisions of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act. It noted that Section 38 expressly provides that "Any tavazhi represented by the majority of its major members may claim to take its share of all the properties of the tarwad over which it has power of disposal and separate from the tarwad." Section 40 defines the share to which such a tavazhi would be entitled (i.e., the share that would fall if a division per capita were made among all members then living). Section 41 applies certain Chapter VI provisions to tavazhis possessing separate properties.
  4. On the basis of Sections 38 and 40, the Court reasoned that the Act confers an absolute right on a tavazhi (which may be a single person in some cases) to demand partition of its share, and that the share is to be calculated by a simple mathematical formula. This statutory right, the Court held, produces the same practical consequences as the doctrine of "severance of status" in cases governed by Mitakshara law.
  5. The Court evaluated the precedents relied upon by petitioners. It treated the obiter remarks in Krishna/Krishnan v. Maruvalamma as not determinative, found Narayana Moosad v. Raman Moosad to be inapposite to the severance question (it concerned leave to sue in forma pauperis under a different Act), and regarded the unreported Second Appeal No. 457 of 1930 (and Madhavan Nair, J.'s opinion therein) as reflecting the position before enactment of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act. The Court concluded that the later statutory changes altered the legal landscape such that the earlier reluctance to apply severance to Marumakkattayam law no longer controlled.
  6. The Court rejected the petitioners' construction of Section 43. It held that interpreting "at any time" in Section 43 so as to allow a petition to register a tarwad as impartible to defeat a previously filed suit under Section 38 would render the Section 38 right illusory. The Court found this construction untenable and contrary to legislative intent. It also noted that the present suits concerned properties of two tavazhis (not properties of a tarwad), and that Chapter VII (dealing with impartible tarwads) was not enacted as applicable to tavazhis.
  7. On the contention that Section 50 prevents importing the doctrine of severance absent express statutory provision, the Court reasoned that Section 38 itself effectually provides for separation by a tavazhi when it claims its share. Therefore, a claim made by registered notice or by filing a suit under Section 38 must be regarded as effecting the separation: Section 38 supplied the express statutory basis for severance for tavazhis. Consequently, Section 50 did not operate to prohibit the application of severance in this context.
  8. Having applied the statutory text and the relevant authorities, the Court concluded that the learned District Munsif's decision to allow the widow and children to be impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff was correct.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED. The petition to revise the District Munsif's order was dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences and implications (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The District Munsif's order impleading the widow and children of the deceased plaintiff was held to be correct and is therefore upheld.
  • The Court concluded that the enactment of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act (notably Sections 38 and 40) has made the doctrine of severance of status applicable to tavazhis under Marumakkattayam law in the same way as it is applicable under Mitakshara law, because the Act now gives tavazhis an indefeasible right to demand partition of their share.
  • The Court rejected the construction that Section 43's words "at any time" permit subsequent registration of a tarwad as impartible to defeat a previously filed suit under Section 38; such a construction would render the statutory right under Section 38 illusory.

The decision thus affirms (for the parties before the Court) that a tavazhi's claim (evidenced by a registered notice or by the filing of a suit under Section 38) effects separation so as to permit legal representatives to be impleaded following the death of the plaintiff. The Court also observed that ordinarily the appropriate remedy for such a contested point would be by appeal rather than revision under Section 115, but having heard the petition on its merits it gave the substantive ruling set out above.

    Elayat Karthiyayini Kunchi Amma And Others Petitioners v. Minakshi Amma And Others S

    1. This is a petition to revise the order of the learned District Munsif of Alatur in I.A. No. 184 of 1934 in O.S. No. 444 of 1933. This is connected with I.A. No. 183 of 1934 in O.S. No. 2 of 1934. The suits were filed by the karnavan of a Malabar Marumakatayam tarwad. The learned District Munsif's order shows that one suit was for a separate share in the tavazhi properties and the other suit is for his share in another tavazhi which is said to be a Puthravakasam tavazhi. The plaintiff sent a registered notice demanding partition and executed a will in favour of his wife and children bequeathing to them his share in both these sets of properties. Then he filed two suits and it is said that he executed another will in favour of his wife and children thereafter. Then he died and his widow and children put in these applications I.A. Nos. 183 and 184 of 1934 to be impleaded as the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff.

    2. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that on the death of the plaintiff both the suits abated and therefore no legal representatives can be brought on record. This contention vas based on the peculiarities of the Marumakattayam Law. The suits were filed in pursuance of Section 38 of the Madras Marumakkattayam Act XXII of 1933. Section 50(b) of the same Act provides that:

    Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect any rule of Marumakkattayam Law, custom, or usage, except to the extent expressly laid down in this Act

    3. If the parties had been Hindus governed by the Mitakshara law it is not disputed that the filing of the suits by the plaintiff would have effected a division in status between him and the other members of the joint family and it would have been possible for his legal representatives to be brought on record and to continue the suits. Under the Marumakkattayam law the contention is that this theory of division in status being effected by the filing of a suit for partition is not tenable, and Section 50 of the Marumakkattayam Act is relied upon as indicating that this peculiar feature of the Mitakshara law is not to be imported into the Marumakkattayam law in the absence of an express provision in the Act itself.

    4. When this petition came on for hearing it was admitted by Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon, Advocate for the petitioners, that there was no express ruling on the point. This we think is a fact which ought to have prevented the petitioners from bringing this petition at all. It cannot be said that the learned District Munsif's decision is so clearly wrong in law that his order impleading the widow and children of the deceased plaintiff is one without jurisdiction and therefore revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is obvious that the appropriate procedure for a decision of such a point as this is to bring it up in appeal. However as the petition is admitted and is posted before a Bench and as we have heard the arguments fully, we cannot avoid giving a decision upon it.

    5. For the petitioners Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon has quoted the cases reported in Krishnan v. Maruvalamma (1934) 41 L.W. 353 and Narayana Moosad v. Raman Moosad (1935) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 811 : 68 M.L.J. 678. He has also referred us to the decision in Second Appeal No. 457 of 1930 which has not been reported. In Krishna v. Maruvalamma (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 417 : 55 M.L.J. 175 (F.B.), His Lordship the Chief Justice has expressed an opinion opposed to the view taken by ths learned District Munsif in this case. This expression of opinion is however obiter, and his Lordship the Chief Justice has agreed that the matter may be described as arguable. The point did not arise for express decision in the case before His Lordship and the words used by His Lordship are as follows:

    It is at the most only arguable that the same consequences as those in In the matter of Balusami Aiyar (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 417 : 55 M.L.J. 175 (F.B.) will result in the case of a suit for partition of a Malabar Marumakkattayam tarward; and, in my view, the Subordinate Judge was wrong in thinking that they did.

    6. That case was one in which the propriety of appointing a receiver for the tarwad properties after the institution of a suit for partition was in question and His Lordship the Chief Justice decided the point on other grounds.

    7. The case in Narayana Moosad v. Raman Moosad (1935) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 811 : 68 M.L.J. 678 has not, we think, any bearing on the point before us. In that case Venkatasubba Rao, J., was dealing with an application by Nambudri Brahmin for leave to sue in forma pauperis. The learned Judge pointed out that under the Nambudri Act Section 26,

    "Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect any law, custom or usage applicable to Nambudri Brahmins, except to the extent expressly laid down in this Act"
    . He went on to show that since before the passing of the Act a Nambudri Brahmin could sue for the removal of a karnavan he had not lost that right by reason of the passing of the Act and therefore leave to sue could be granted. The point with which we are concerned did not arise in that case.

    8. The judgment of Madhavan Nair, J., in Second Appeal No. 457 of 1930 was relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, but when closely examined we think that that case practically supports the case of the Respondents. The decision was given in Second Appeal No. 457 of 1930 in a suit of 1924 filed long before the passing of the Madras Maru-makkattayam Act. Madhavan Nair, J., says:

    I am not at all satisfied that the doctrine of severance of status so familiar in Hindu Law can be introduced into Marumakkattayam Law under which compulsory partition at the instance of a single individual is not permitted. As the law does not declare the share of an individual member in the properties held in common by members of a Malabar tarwad, it is in my opinion difficult to apply the doctrine of severance of status in Marumakkattayam Law. That law is essentially a customary Law and the underlying principle of it which disallows partition at the instance of a single individual is by its very nature opposed.to the conception of 'severance of status' which has for its basis the right of a single individual to claim partition. The question has never been raised in the British Courts.

    9. As Mr. Sitarama Rao points out for the respondents, the law now applicable in Malabar is very different. Section 38 of the Act expressly provides that:

    Any tavazhi represented by the majority of its major members may claim to take its share of all the properties of the tarwad over which it.has power of disposal and separate from the tarwad.

    10. And Section 40 defines what share would fall to such tavazhi on a division. It says:

    In the case referred to in Section 38, the tavazhi shall be entitled to such share of the tarwad properties as would fall to the tavazhi if a division per capita were made among all the members of the tarwad then living.

    11. Under the present law therefore, the tavazhi, which in some cases may be a single person, has an absolute right to demand partition of the tavazhi's share of the joint family property as defined in Section 40, and that share must be allotted in accordance with a simple mathematical calculation to be made on the basis of the number of persons in the tarwad at the time the division takes place. The whole of the reasoning of Madhavan Nair, J., in Second Appeal No. 457 of 1930 is therefore, as we have already stated, in favour of the respondents. Apparently partition at the instance of a single individual is now permitted by Law. It should follow that the doctrine of severance of status by reason of the filing of a suit for partition is equally applicable to persons governed by Marumakkattayam Law. It is to be noticed that this doctrine does not depend upon any principles peculiar to the Mitakshara Law. It depends upon principles of quite general application. In Girja Bai v. Sadasiv Dhundiraj (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 151 : I.L.R. 43 Cal. 1031 at 1047 : 31 M.L.J. 455 (P.C.) their Lordships of the Privy Council observe:

    that separation from the joint family involving 'the severance of the joint status so far as the separating member is concerned, with all the legal consequences resulting therefrom, is quite distinct from the de facto division into specific shares of the property held until then jointly. One is a matter of individual decision, the desire on the part of any one member to sever himself from the joint family and to enjoy his hitherto undefined or unspecified share separately from the others without being subject to the obligations which arise from the joint status; whilst the other is a natural resultant from his decision, the division and separation of his share which may be arrived at either by private agreement among the parties, or on failure of that by the intervention of the Court. Once the decision has been unequivocally expressed and clearly intimated to his co-sharers, his right to obtain and possess the share to which he admittedly has a title is unimpeachable; neither the co-sharers can question it nor can the Court examine his consciencejo find out whether his reasons for separation were well founded or sufficient; the Court has simply to give effect to his right to have his share allocated separately from the others.

    12. Again at page 1048 their Lordships of the Privy Council point out:

    Partition does not give him a title or create a title in him; it only enables him to obtain what is his own in a definite and specific form for purposes of disposition independent of the wishes of his former co-sharers.

    13. They conclude with the observations of Lord Watson in Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh (1990) I.L.R. 18 Cal. 157

    "So long as his interest is indefinite he is not in a position to dispose of it at his own hand and for his own purposes; but as soon as partition is made he becomes the sole owner of his share, and has the same powers of disposal as if it. had been his acquired property"
    . Their Lordships also refer to the language used by Mr. Justice Dwarkanath Mitter in Deo Bunsee Koer v. Dwarkanath ( 1868) 10 W.R. 273. Now it is a settled doctrine of Hindu Law:

    that every member of a joint undivided family has an indefeasible right to demand a partition of his own share. The other members of the family must submit to it whether they like it or not.

    14. The change in the law introduced by the enactment of the Marummakkattayam Act has, we think, made the doctrine of severance of status applicable to tavazhis under the Marummakkattayam Law as it is to persons under the Mitakshara Law, and for precisely the same reason. Under the new law every tavazhi in a joint undivided Marummakkattayam family has an indefeasible right to demand partition of its own share in the joint family property, and all the other tavazhis must submit to it whether they like it or not.

    15. Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon for the petitioners has referred to the provisions of Section 43 of the Act. It is there provided that:

    Not less than two-thirds of the major members of a tarwad may, at any time, present a petition to the Collector for the registration of the tarwad as impartible.

    16. He lays stress upon the words "at any time". His contention appears to be that by reason of these words any suit brought by a tavazhi under Section 38 can be defeated by a petition under Section 43 even if the suit under Section 38 had been filed before the petition under Section 43. Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon contends that if two thirds or more of the major members of the tarwad present a petition to the Collector under Section 43 and if the Collector thereupon registers the tarwad as impartible, the suit already filed under Section 38 would have to be dismissed. We cannot agree with this view. This construction of Section 43 would render the right granted under Section 38 illusory, and we do not believe that such was the intention of the legislature or that the words "at any time" could bear such a meaning. This point, however, cannot possibly arise in this case because the properties of which partition is required in the two suits in question, are properties belonging to two tavazhis and not properties belonging to a tarwad. By Section 41 of the Act the provisions of Chapter VI apply to every tavazhi possessing separate propeties as if it were a tarwad: it is not however enacted that the provisions of Chapter VII which deal with impartible tarwads are applicable to tavazhis.

    17. It is also argued that, as there is no express provision in the Act that a severance of status is effected on the filing of a suit for partition, Section 50 of the Act prohibits the introduction of such a rule in the Marumakkattayam law. But under Section 38

    "Any tavazhi represented by a majority of its members may claim to take its share of all the properties of the tarwad.. and separate from the tarwad"
    . This indicates that so far as a tavazhi is concerned the separation from the tarwad is effected on its claiming to take its share of the properties of the tarwad. There is thus an express provision in the Act itself that severance of status is effected when a tavazhi claims to take its share of the tarwad properties. Such a claim must be deemed to have been made, when a notice demanding its share is given, or at least when a suit is filed for that purpose. There is therefore, no substance in this contention.

    18. For these reasons, we consider that the decision of the learned District Munsif was correct and we dismiss this petition with costs.

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    Elayat Karthiyayini Kunchi Amma And Others Petitioners v. Minakshi Amma And Others S
    (Oct 18, 1935)