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  • provisions of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 149 of the present Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXXIX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXXIII, Rule 15 of the Code
  • Order XXXIX, Rule 7 of the Code.
  • Order XXXIII, Rule 7(3),
  • Order XXXIII, Rule 5,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 149 of the present Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXXIX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXXIII, Rule 15 of the Code
  • Order XXXIX, Rule 7 of the Code.
  • Order XXXIII, Rule 7(3),
  • Order XXXIII, Rule 5,
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

One Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao and his two minor brothers, Sreedhara Rao and Butchaiya, presented an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tenali, to be allowed to sue in forma pauperis for a decree for partition of immoveable property. The application complied with the Code of Civil Procedure requirements for a plaint and in form and substance was a plaint coupled with a prayer to be allowed to sue without payment of Court-fee. Before the Subordinate Judge could inquire into the alleged pauperism of the petitioner, Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao died.

The deceased petitioner's mother then applied to be brought on the record as his legal representative and to continue the suit in his place, signifying her willingness to pay the Court-fee. The Subordinate Judge dismissed this application, relying on the decision of Horwill, J., in Anasuyamma v. Subba Reddi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 180. The mother sought revision in this Court. Happell, J., referred the matter to a Bench, observing a conflict between Horwill, J.'s decision and the judgment of Bardswell, J., in Duraipandiyan v. Solaimalai Pillai (1934) 67 M.L.J. 332.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the legal representative of a person who dies during the pendency of an application to be allowed to sue in forma pauperis can be brought on the record and allowed to prosecute the suit on payment of the requisite Court-fee.
  2. Whether limitation is to be deemed to have stopped on the date when the original application to sue in forma pauperis was filed (i.e., the effect of treating the application as a plaint for limitation purposes).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Stuart Skinner v. William Orde etc. (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 126 : I.L.R. 2 All. 241 (P.C.) Establishes that an application to sue in forma pauperis is, in effect, a plaint coupled with a prayer to sue without payment of Court-fee; the plaint (petition) is treated as having the original date for limitation purposes even if the fee is subsequently paid. The Court relied on this Privy Council judgment to hold that such an application is a plaint for all practical purposes, that limitation stops on the date of filing, and that Section 149 enables stamp/fee defects to be cured so the document takes effect from the original date.
Anasuyamma v. Subba Reddi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 180 Held that on death of an applicant the right of the legal representative was merely to file a fresh application or institute a separate suit (i.e., the application abates and continuation by legal representative was not permitted without fresh proceedings). The Subordinate Judge had relied on this decision to dismiss the mother's application. The Bench in the present opinion critically examined this decision and regarded it as conflicting with other authorities and with Section 149.
Duraipandiyan v. Solaimalai Pillai (1934) 67 M.L.J. 332 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 169 Held that the sons of a deceased petitioner could be joined as legal representatives and could proceed with the suit on payment of the requisite Court-fee. The Court treated this decision as supporting the proposition that a legal representative may continue the proceedings by paying the requisite Court-fee; it was one of the authorities favouring continuation rather than abatement.
Balaguru Jvaid[u] v. Muthuratnam Iyer (1923) 46 M.L.J. 254 Held that an application to sue as a pauper is a combination of a plaint and an application to excuse payment of the Court-fee on it. Adopted as authority for the proposition that an application to sue in forma pauperis is essentially a plaint plus a prayer for exemption, aligning with Stuart Skinner's principle.
Jagadeeshwaree Debee v. Tinkarhi Bibi (1935) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 711 Pronouncement to the same effect as Balaguru Jvaid[u]: that the application to sue in forma pauperis is tantamount to a plaint with an application to excuse payment of Court-fee. Referred to as supporting authority confirming the composite nature of the application.
Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Sri Thakur Ramchandarji Maharaj (1929) I.L.R. 9 Pat. 439 Patna High Court pronouncement aligning with the view that the application is a plaint combined with a prayer to be excused from payment of fee. Used as further supporting authority for the composite-character view of such applications.
Chunna Mal v. Bhagwant Kishore (I.L.R. 1937 All. 22, Full Bench) Majority of Full Bench held that an application to sue as a pauper was not a composite document; majority held that where an application is rejected under Order XXXIII, Rule 7(3), the Court cannot allow payment under Section 149 and treat it as a plaint; the dissent considered it composite. The Court in the present opinion disagreed with the majority's distinction and considered Stuart Skinner controlling; it viewed the Chunna Mal majority as wrongly declining to apply Stuart Skinner's principle.
Chidambaram v. Mataraja Mudaliar (1939) 1 M.L.J. 96 Held that upon presentation of a petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis the suit should be deemed instituted on that date; interlocutory application (for commissioner inventory) filed during pendency was properly made. Cited to show practice of treating the petition as instituting suit from the date of filing and that interlocutory relief can be granted during pendency of such an application.
Totaram Ichharam v. Dattu Mangu (I.L.R. 1943 Bom. 138) Held that an application for appointment of a commissioner to take inventory could be filed along with a petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis and dealt with; the plaint (original or petition deemed to be plaint) takes effect from the date when presented. Used to reinforce the principle that the petition has effect from its presentation date and interlocutory relief may be obtained while pauperism is pending.
Subbiah v. Sundara Boyamma (1927) 54 M.L.J. 582 : I.L.R. 51 Mad. 697 Held that where a petitioner dies during the pendency of his application for leave to sue in forma pauperis his legal representative is not entitled to continue the petition; the basis was that the application is a personal relief. However, the opinion allowed that the representative could be brought on record if he wished to continue proceedings as a suit by payment of Court-fee. The present Court viewed this decision as compatible with allowing continuation on payment of Court-fee and cited it as one of the authorities considered; it noted that Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., indicated willingness to permit continuation as a suit on payment.
Mst. Bibi Marim v. Surajmal (1936) I.L.R. 15 Pat. 738 Division Bench of Patna High Court held that the legal representative of a deceased petitioner could continue the proceedings as a suit on payment of the requisite Court-fee. Cited as supporting authority for permitting the legal representative to continue the suit upon payment of Court-fee.
Annapurnabai v. Balaji Maroti A.I.R. 1946 Nag. 320 Nagpur High Court held the legal representative was substituted as the plaintiff and permitted continuation as a suit on payment of Court-fee. Referenced as further support for allowing a legal representative to continue the proceedings as a suit by paying the requisite Court-fee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis grounded in statutory provisions, Privy Council authority and High Court decisions set out in the record:

  • Characterisation of the application: The Court accepted the Privy Council's reasoning in Stuart Skinner v. William Orde etc. that an application to sue in forma pauperis is, in substance and effect, a plaint coupled with a prayer for exemption from payment of Court-fee. The petition therefore contains the particulars required of a plaint and the additional prayer for leave to sue as a pauper.
  • Effect of subsequent payment: The Court relied on the analogy given by the Privy Council — similar to correcting an incorrect stamp — and on Section 149 of the present Code, which allows a plaint that lacks proper stamping/fee to be stamped with the permission of the Court at any stage, after which the document has the same effect as if the fee had been originally paid. The Court observed that the present Code contains Section 149 whereas earlier Codes did not.
  • Practice and Code provisions: The Court noted Order XXXIII, Rule 15 provides that a refusal to allow an applicant to sue as a pauper bars a subsequent application of like nature in respect of the same right, but the applicant remains at liberty to institute a suit in ordinary manner upon payment of costs. The Court also referred to the established practice of allowing the applicant to pay the requisite Court-fee within a stipulated period, and on payment treating the suit as instituted on the original presentation date of the pauper application.
  • Precedential survey and conflict resolution: The Bench reviewed a series of High Court decisions on the subject. It found ample authority (including Duraipandiyan, Chidambaram, Totaram Ichharam, Patna and Nagpur decisions) supporting the proposition that where a petitioner dies during the pendency of an application to sue as a pauper the legal representative may be brought on record and continue the suit by paying the requisite Court-fee. The Court criticised the reasoning in Anasuyamma v. Subba Reddi (Horwill, J.) for failing to recognise the composite nature of the application and for overlooking Section 149, and it regarded the majority view in Chunna Mal (Allahabad Full Bench) as not correctly applying Stuart Skinner.
  • Conclusion on limitation and substitution: Applying Stuart Skinner and Section 149, the Court concluded that limitation must be deemed to have stopped on the date when Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao filed his application for leave to sue in forma pauperis, and that the petitioner (his mother) is entitled to be brought on record as his legal representative and to continue the suit upon payment of the requisite Court-fee.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The application for revision is allowed; the petitioner (the mother) is entitled in law to be brought on the record as the legal representative of Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao and to continue the suit on payment of the requisite Court-fee.

Consequences and directions given by the Court:

  • The case is remanded to the Subordinate Judge to determine whether the petitioner is in fact the legal representative of the deceased Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao. If she is found to be the legal representative, the Subordinate Judge must substitute her name for the deceased and allow her to continue the suit on payment of the Court-fee payable in respect of his share.
  • The Court held that limitation is to be deemed to have stopped on the date when the deceased filed his application for leave to sue in forma pauperis (i.e., the petition's filing date is effective for limitation purposes), pursuant to the application-as-plaint principle and Section 149.
  • The minors Sreedhara Rao and Butchaiya had already been permitted to pay the Court-fee on their shares and to continue the suit in the ordinary way; the present order does not disturb that arrangement.
  • The petitioner is entitled to her costs.

The opinion addresses the direct effect on the parties (substitution, permission to continue on payment of Court-fee, and the stopping of limitation). The judgment rests on existing authorities and statutory provision (not presented as establishing a novel principle beyond the application of those authorities and Section 149).

    Dhulipalla Brahamaramba v. Dhulipalla Seetharamayya And Others.

    1. One Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao and his two minor brothers, Sreedhara Rao and Butchaiya, filed an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tenali, asking to be allowed to sue in forma pauperis for a decree for the partition of immoveable property. The application complied with all the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to a plaint. The document was in form and substance a plaint, coupled with a prayer to be allowed to sue without payment of the Court-fee. Before the Court had time to inquire into the alleged pauperism of the petitioner, Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao died. Thereupon, his mother, the petitioner now before us, applied to be brought on the record as his legal representative and to be allowed to continue the suit in his place.... She signified her willingness to pay the Court-fee. The Subordinate Judge relying on the judgment of Horwill, J., in Anasuyamma v. Subba Reddi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 180 dismissed the application. The petitioner then asked this Court to set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge in the exercise of its revisional powers. In the first instance the matter came before Happell, J., who referred it to a Bench for decision. In his order of reference the learned Judge pointed out that the decision of Horwill, J., was in conflict with the judgment of Bardswell, J., in Duraipandiya v. Solaimalai Pillai (1934) 67 M.L.J. 332 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 169.

    2. It follows from what we have said that the question involved is whether the legal representative of a person who dies during the pendency of an application to be allowed to sue in forma pauperis can be brought on the record and allowed to prosecute the suit on payment of the requisite Court-fee. The decision of the question requires the consideration, not only of the two cases referred to, but of the judgment of the Privy Council in Stuart Skinner v. William Orde etc. (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 126 : I.L.R. 2 All. 241 (P.C.) and of other authorities. The judgment of the Privy Council in Stuart Skinner v. William Orde etc. (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 126 : I.L.R. 2 All. 241 (P.C.) has a very important bearing on the question under discussion, but its effect has not always been properly understood. There, a person applied for leave to sue as a pauper, but pending the inquiry into his alleged pauperism he obtained funds which enabled him to pay the Court-fee. He was allowed by the Court to pay the Court fee, whereupon his petition was numbered and registered as a plaint. The Judicial Committee held that in those circumstances the suit should be deemed to have been instituted from the date when the petition to sue in forma pauperis was filed and that limitation ran against him only upto that time. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1859 was then in force. After referring to its provisions with regard to applications to sue informa pauperis Sir Montague E. Smith, in delivering the judgment of the Board, said:

    Therefore it "(the petition)" contains in itself all the particulars the statute requires in a plaint, and, plus these, a prayer that the plaintiff may be allowed to sue in forma pauperis.

    Later in the judgment Sir Montague E. Smith said:

    Although the analogy is not perfect, what has happened is not at all unlike that which so commonly happens in practice in the Indian Courts, that a wrong stamp is put upon the plaint originally, and the proper stamp is afterwards affixed. The plaint is not converted into a plaint from that time only, but remains with its original date on the file of the Court, and becomes free from the objection of an improper stamp when the correct stamp has been placed upon it.

    There is no essential difference between an application to sue in forma pauperis under the present Code and an application under the Code of 1859.

    3. It follows from what was said in the judgment in Stuart Skinner v. Williams Orde-etc.(1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 126 : I.L.R. 2 All. 241 (P.C.) that such an application is in fact a plaint coupled with a prayer to be allowed to sue without payment of the required Court-fee. A plaint which does not bear the Court-fee prescribed by law, in whole or in part, can by reason of Section 149 of the present Code of Civil Procedure be stamped with the permission of the Court at any stage and when this is done the document has the same force and effect as if the fee had been paid in the first instance. There were no such provisions in the earlier Codes.

    4. Order XXXIII, Rule 15 of the Code now in force provides that an order refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper shall be a bar to a subsequent application of the same nature in respect of the same right to sue, but the applicant shall be at liberty to institute a suit in the ordinary manner in respect of the right claimed, provided he pays the costs, if any, incurred by the Provincial Government and by the opposite party opposing the application for leave to sue as a pauper. It has always been the practice of this Court, when an application to sue in forma pauperis has been refused, to allow the applicant to pay the requisite Court-fee within a stipulated period and on payment of the Court-fee within the time allowed to regard the suit as having been instituted on the date on which the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis was presented.

    5. The nature of an application to sue in forma pauperis has been discussed on numerous occasions in Indian High Courts, since the present Code of Civil Prccedure came into force. In Balaguru JVaidu v. Muthuratnam Iyer (1923) 46 M.L.J. 254 this Court (Krishnan, J.) held that an application to sue as a pauper is a combination of a plaint and an application to excuse the payment of the Court-fee on it. The Calcutta High Court gave a pronouncement to the same effect in Jagadeeshwaree Debee v. Tinkarhi Bibi (1935) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 711 as did the Patna High Court in Bank of Bihar; Ltd. v. Sri Thakur Ramchandarji Maharaj (1929) I.L.R. 9 Pat. 439.

    6. On the other hand, two of the Judges of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held in Chunna Mal v. Bhagwant Kishore I.L.R. 1937 All. 22 ( F.B.) that an application to sue as a pauper was not a composite document, although the third Judge was of the opinion that it was. There an application for leave to sue as a pauper was refused and an application for a review of the order met with a similar fate, but the Court of first instance allowed time to the petitioner to deposit the requisite Court-fee. In revision the High Court by a majority held that when an application for leave to sue as a pauper is rejected under Order XXXIII, Rule 7(3), the Court cannot under section 149 of the code allow the applicant to pay the requisite Court-fee and treat the application as a plaint. The majority opinion was expressed by Sulaiman, C.J., and Bennett, J. The dissentient Judge was Allsopp,J. The learned Chief Justice and Bennett, J., held, however, that when the rejection was under Order XXXIII, Rule 5, time to pay the requisite Court-fee could be allowed. Sulaiman, C.J., and Bennett, J., considered that the judgment of the Privy Council in Stuart Skinner v. William Orde etc. (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 126 : I.L.R. 2 All. 241(P.C.) did not apply but we can see no real ground for distinction. We consider that in Stuart Skinner v. William Orde etc. (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 126 : I.L.R. 2 All. 241(P.C.) the Privy Council unquestionably held that an application to sue in forma pauperis is a composite document, a plaint coupled with a prayer to be allowed to sue without payment of Court-fee.

    7. There are two decisions, one of this Court and one of the Bombay High Court in which interlocutory applications have been granted as in a suit during the pendency of an application to sue in forma pauperis. In Chidambaram v. Mataraja Mudaliar (1939) 1 M.L.J.96 Gentle, J., held that on the presentation of a petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis the suit should be deemed to have been instituted on that date and consequently the application for a Commissioner to take an inventory of moveable property was properly made within the meaning of Order XXXIX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was filed before there had been any inquiry into the pauperism of the applicant. In Totaram Ichharam v. Dattu Mangu I.L.R. 1943 Bom. 138 Beaumont, C.J., and Wassoodew, J., held that an application for the appointment of a commissioner to take an inventory of property could be filed along with a petition for leave to sue in forma pauperis and be dealt with by the Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 7 of the Code. The learned Chief Justice said that he entertained no doubt that the plaint, whether it consisted of the original plaint, or of the petition deemed to be a plaint, took effect from the date when the plaint and the petition were presented.

    8. We are concerned in the present case with the position when the petitioner dies during the pendency of an application for leave to sue as a pauper. Our attention has been drawn to five reported cases where this has been the position. Three of them are decisions of this Court. In Subbiah v. Sundara Boyamma (1927) 54 M.L.J. 582 : I.L.R. 51 Mad. 697 Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., held that where a petitioner dies during the pendency of his application for leave to sue in forma pauperis his legal representative is not entitled to continue the further prosecution of the petition. The basis of this decision was that the application to sue in forma pauperis is purely a personal relief and therefore the legal representative cannot stand in the applicant's shoes. The learned Judge was, however, careful to indicate that there was no objection to the legal representative being brought on the record if he wished to continue the proceedings as a suit by the payment of the requisite Court-fee. In Duraipandiyan v. Solaimalai Pillai (1934) 67 M.L.J. 332 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 169 the sons of a deceased petitioner applied to be joined as his legal representatives and sought to proceed with the suit on payment of the requisite of the Court-fee. It was held by Bardswell, J., that this was permissible. The learned Judge's opinion coincided with that expressed by Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. This is the second of the two cases mentioned by Happell, J., in his order referring the present petition to a Bench.

    9. We now come to the first case referred to in the order of reference, namely, Anasuyamma v. Subba Reddi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 180. There Horwill, J, held that the right of a legal representative was merely to file a fresh application to sue in forma pauperis or institute a separate suit. No reference was made in the judgment to the decision in Durai-pandiyan v. Solaimalai Pillai (1934) 67 M.L.J. 332 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 169. Horwill, J , considered that on the death of the person applying for leave to sue as a pauper his application abates, and that it would not be possible for the Court to overlook the break and to regard the plaint as having been presented by the legal representative on the day when the application was originally filed. This decision is not only in conflict with the judgments in Suhbiah v. Sundara Boyamma (1927) 54 M.L.J. 582 : I.L.R. 51 Mad. 697 and Duraipandiyan v. Solaimalai Pittai (1934) 67 M.L.J. 332 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 169 but it ignores the fact that an application for leave to sue in forma pauperis is a plaint and that the legal representative of the applicant is entitled to enforce all the rights which he possesses. Moreover, the learned Judge also ignored the provisions of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He considered that the decision in Subbiah v. Sundara Boyamma (1934) 67 M.L.J. 332 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 169 supported his view but here he overlooked the fact that Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., expressed the opinion that the legal representative could continue the suit on payment of the requisite Court-fee.

    10. The other two cases which have reference to the position when the petitioner dies are Mst. Bibi Marim v. Surajmal (1936) I.L.R. 15 Pat. 738 and Annapurnabai v. Balaji Maroti A.I.R. 1946 Nag. 320. In the former case a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that the legal representative of a deceased petitioner could continue the proceedings as a suit on payment of the requiste Court-fee. In Annapurna Bai v. Balaji Maroti A.I.R. 1946 Nag. 320 the Nagpur High Court expressed the same opinion and said that the legal representative was in reality substituted for the deceased party in his capacity as the plaintiff and not as one suing for exemption from payment of Court-fee.

    11. As the application for leave to sue in forma pauperis embodied a plaint, we hold that the petitioner is entitled in law to be brought on record as the legal representative of Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao and to continue the suit on payment of the requisite Court-fee. We have shown that there is ample authority to support this decision. We also hold that limitation must be deemed to have stopped on the date on which Dhulipala Venkata SubbaRao filed his application for leave to sue in forma pauperis. Here Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies.

    12. The application for revision is allowed and the case remanded to the Subordinate Judge to decide whether the petitioner is in fact the legal representative of Dhulipala Venkata Subba Rao. If she is, he must substitute her name for his and allow her to continue the suit on payment of the Court-fee payable in respect of his share. It may be added that the minors Sreedhara Rao and Butchaiya have already been permitted to pay the Court-fee on their shares and continue the suit in the ordinary way.

    13. The petitioner is entitled to her costs.

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    Comments

    Dhulipalla Brahamaramba v. Dhulipalla Seetharamayya And Others.
    (Dec 12, 1946)