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  • Art. 89 of the Limitation Act.
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  • Art. 89 of the Limitation Act.
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a zamindar, sued the legal representatives (the sons and other representatives) of a deceased pleader who had been employed to conduct summary suits and related proceedings in Bhimavaram. The claim was for approximately Rs. 1,800 alleged to be money received by the deceased pleader and not accounted for. The Subordinate Judge inquired into what suits the pleader had appeared in and when those suits were disposed of, finding that only 22 suits had been disposed of before the institution of this suit. The matter proceeded through appeal and second appeal; the second appeal was dismissed by Phillips, J., and a Letters Patent Appeal was then heard. The principal contested issue on appeal was limitation (whether and when causes of action accrued against the legal representatives).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the pleader was a general agent or a "standing vakil" for the zamindar such that his agency extended continuously from his first engagement in 1916 until his death in March 1918 (implications for accrual of cause of action and limitation).
  2. Whether the pleader maintained an open running/current account with the zamindar (so that accounts ran on and cause of action could be treated as continuing rather than discrete per suit).
  3. Whether, upon the pleader's death, a fresh cause of action arose against his legal representatives so that limitation would run from the date of the pleader's death (invoking Article 89 of the Limitation Act), or whether claims which were barred against the pleader remain barred against his legal representatives.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Chenchiah and Mr. Ohenchiah)

  • There was a general agency: the pleader was a "standing vakil" whose agency extended from his initial engagement in 1916 until his death in March 1918; thus liabilities persisted and limitation should be calculated from the termination of that general agency.
  • The pleader maintained an open running/current account with the zamindar, so accounts were not closed on disposal of each individual suit but the account ran on in the ordinary way (payments by the employer and drawings by the pleader).
  • Even if agency terminated with the pleader's death, a liability to account was outstanding at death and therefore each item of account within three years of the pleader's death should be actionable against the legal representatives — i.e., a new cause of action arises on the agent's death so limitation runs from that date.
  • Reliance was placed on a number of decisions (including Kumeda Charan Bala v. Asutosh Chattopadhyaya and Bindraban Behari v. Jamuna Kunwar) to support the proposition that a fresh cause of action arises against legal representatives and that Article 89 might not apply in the manner contended by the respondents.

Other Counsel Points (as recorded)

  • Mr. Varadachariar pointed out that excluding legal representatives from application of particular articles of the Limitation Act (for example, Art. 89) would produce absurd results in respect of other articles (such as Arts. 78 and 79), thereby arguing for Art. 89's applicability to suits against legal representatives.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v. Rayner That there is no such thing as an office of a solicitor; a solicitor is a person's solicitor only in matters in which he is employed by that person. Relied on to reject the contention of a continuing general agency (standing vakil). The court treated the pleader's authority as conferred by separate vakalats for each suit, not by an office-like standing agency.
Kumeda Charan Bala v. Asutosh Chattopadhyaya Referred to in support of the proposition that a fresh cause of action may arise against legal representatives; also relied upon to suggest Article 89 may not apply to suits against legal representatives. The court noted the case had been cited for that proposition but treated the contention about Article 89 as overruled by later authorities (specifically Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty). The case was considered but its suggested limitation-rule consequence was rejected in this opinion.
Kali Krishna Pal Chowdhry v. Srimati Jagattara Referred to along with Kumeda Charan Bala as authority for the proposition that a fresh cause of action may arise against legal representatives. Cited by appellant's counsel; the court did not adopt the broad proposition in preference to the Madras authorities which it followed instead.
Bindraban Behari v. Jamuna Kunwar Held that a fresh cause of action arose when, on the father's death, the money came into the son's hands; further held that Art. 89 did not apply because the suit was against the legal representative. Both judges in the present opinion discussed this case. Odgers, J., noted it among authorities; Curgenven, J., expressly dissented from both of its propositions, refusing to treat receipt by the son as creating a fresh cause of action and rejecting the proposition that Art. 89 is inapplicable to suits against legal representatives.
Natasayyan v. Ponnusami A Madras case (noted as supportive of a contrary view to later Madras decisions). Noted in the opinion but expressly stated to have been overruled by the later Madras decision Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda and therefore not followed.
Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda Established the Madras view contrary to Natasayyan; treated as overruling Natasayyan and supporting the view that no fresh cause of action arises against legal representatives in the circumstances discussed. Followed by the court as part of the line of Madras authority that supports the view that suits barred against the agent are also barred against his legal representatives (i.e., Art. 89 applies).
Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar Another Madras case cited in support of the same view as Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda. Relied on as supporting authority for the view that the cause of action does not become fresh against legal representatives on the agent's death and that Article 89 of the Limitation Act applies.
Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty Direct authority for the proposition that a fresh cause of action does not arise against legal representatives on the agent's death and that Article 89 applies to suits of this description. Treated as clear and controlling authority. The court followed this decision and applied its principle to hold that claims barred against the pleader remain barred against his legal representatives.
Venkatacharulu v. Mohana Panda Noted for the proposition that the onus and methods of proof may differ when the suit is against a legal representative. Considered by Curgenven, J., who accepted that proof and remedy may differ in suits against legal representatives but concluded these differences do not create a fresh cause of action on death.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Two judges' opinions are recorded; both focus mainly on the question of limitation and whether a fresh cause of action arose against the pleader's legal representatives on his death.

Odgers, J. — Analysis

  1. General agency: Odgers, J. rejected the contention that the pleader was a general or standing vakil whose agency continued from 1916 to his death. He relied on Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v. Rayner to show that an office-like or continuous solicitor-client agency is not recognized; in practice separate vakalats were filed for each suit and execution proceeding.
  2. Running account: The evidence of accounts (Ex. R) displayed separate accounts for each suit and separate expenses for execution petitions, which in his view negated the claim that there was an open running current account between the pleader and the zamindar. Therefore the "running account" contention was rejected on the factual record.
  3. Limitation and fresh cause of action on death: Odgers, J. examined authorities relied upon by the appellant (including Kumeda Charan Bala and Bindraban Behari) but found Madras decisions to the contrary (notably Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda, Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar and Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty). He accepted that the Madras line of decisions established that no separate cause of action arises against legal representatives simply because the agent died, and that such matters fall under Article 89 of the Limitation Act. He rejected the appellant's argument that because legal representatives are not mentioned expressly in Art. 89 the article cannot apply, observing that such an omission would produce absurd results in relation to other articles (Arts. 78 and 79 were given as examples).
  4. Conclusion: Following the Madras authorities and the reasoning above, Odgers, J. held that the appellant's contentions failed and that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Curgenven, J. — Analysis

  1. Scope of agency: Curgenven, J. agreed that a separate agency began and terminated with each suit or proceeding. Although there was an order of appointment for estate litigation, it did not amount to a general power of attorney; the vakalat executed in each matter created the agency.
  2. Accounts and termination: He noted some accounts had been rendered (acknowledged in the plaint), and there was no evidence to show in which instances accounts remained unrendered; for present purposes he considered it permissible to assume that agency in a given case ended with the case.
  3. Fresh cause of action and substitution of legal representatives: Curgenven, J. framed the core question as whether the sons were sued on a cause of action different from that available against the father (i.e., whether a fresh cause of action arose on the father's death). He answered negatively both on general principles and authority. He reasoned that if the father had been sued and died pending suit, the sons could be substituted and the suit continued, showing the cause of action survives against the legal representatives. A legal representative carries on the liability of the deceased in cases where the liability does not lapse with death.
  4. On Bindraban Behari, Curgenven, J. dissented from its core holdings (that receipt by the son created a fresh cause of action and that Art. 89 did not apply). He relied on Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty as clear authority supporting the opposite view.
  5. He accepted that proof or remedy may differ when suing a legal representative (citing Venkatacharulu v. Mohana Panda) but held these differences do not amount to the creation of a new cause of action upon the agent's death.
  6. Conclusion: For these reasons, he agreed the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Direct effect on the parties: The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed and the appellate conclusions affirmed — particularly the conclusion that claims which would have been barred against the pleader himself are also barred against his sons and legal representatives when the cause of action is of the description governed by Article 89 of the Limitation Act. The court ordered dismissal with costs.

Broader implications: The court followed and applied existing Madras authorities (including Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda, Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar and Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty) in holding that no fresh cause of action arises against legal representatives on the agent's death in these circumstances and that Article 89 of the Limitation Act governs accrual of the right of action. The opinion does not purport to create a new precedent contrary to those authorities; it applies the existing line of cases to the facts before the court.

Note: This summary is restricted to and derived only from the information contained in the provided opinion.

    Mahaboob Sir Prajuvanthu Sree Rajah Parthasaradhi Appa Rao Savaji Aswa Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu v. Turlapati Subba Rao

    Odgers, J. — In this case the plaintiff, a zamindar, sued the legal representatives of a pleader who was employed to conduct certain summary suits, etc., in Bhimavaram for the plaintiff asking for a decree for about Rs. 1,800 being the amount due from the deceased pleader to the zamindar on account of money received and not accounted for by him. Now the Subordinate Judge after calling for findings as to what suits the pleader had appeared in and when those were disposed of, held that only 22 suits were disposed of before the institution of this suit, and the most important point perhaps urged by Mr. Chenchiah for the appellant in Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of my brother Phillips (who dismissed the second appeal) is the point of limitation. Mr. Ohenchiah urges the following points: Firstly that there was a general agency that is to say, that the pleader was what is sometimes called a “standing vakil” to the zamindar and therefore his agency must be taken to have extended from 1916 when he was first engaged to his death in March, 1918. Now this contention was not only negatived by my brother Phillips but by the Subordinate Judge also, chiefly on the authority of the case reported in Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v. Rayner where the Lords Justices held that there was no such thing as an office of a solicitor and Lord Justice James points out that a solicitor is a man's solicitor “when he chooses to employ him and in the matter in which he is so employed.” Lord Justice Bramwell says that

    “A man is a solicitor for another when that other has occasion to employ him as such.”

    It is of course not disputed that in our practice the pleader has to file a separate vakalat for every suit that he institutes on behalf of his client. And that was so in the present course of employment: a separate vakalat being also filed by the pleader in each execution proceedings (Ex. R.) so that in my opinion this contention must be negatived.

    Then it was contended that even if his agency was not general, his accounts were that is to say, that the pleader, maintained an open current account with the client and that the account instead of being closed as each suit was disposed of, simply ran on in the ordinary way, familiar to us, as payments by the employer and drawings against those payments by the pleader. Now that really is a pure matter of surmise because the only accounts that we have in evidence are contained in Ex. R which in my opinion negatives any such idea. There the suits are kept separate, the expenses for each execution petition are set out and there is no ground for saying on such accounts as we have, that there was anything in the nature of an open running account between the client and his pleader.

    Now, then with regard to limitation, Mr. Chenchiah strongly contended before us that there was a liability to account outstanding at the death of the pleader when the agency terminated and that, therefore, every item of account within 3 years from the date of the death of the pleader must be taken into account in this suit. He argued that a new cause of action arises as against the legal representatives and that therefore he is entitled to reckon 3 years, not from the date of the suit but from the date of the termination of the agency. Now in support of this proposition we have been referred to Kumeda CkaranBala v. Asutosh Chattopadhyaya, Kali Krishna Pal Chowdhry v. Srimati Jagattara and Bindraban Behari v. Jamuna Kunwar. It is noteworthy that no Madras case has been cited, although one is to be found in Natasayyan v. Ponnusami, to this effect. In fact our law as laid down in Madras is in favour of the opposite view. Natasayyan v. Ponnusami, has been overruled in Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda, the view which is also supported by Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar and there is direct authority in Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty(7). Mr. Chenchiah tried to distinguish this case on the ground that there the suit was barred when instituted being more than 3 years after the death of the agent and therefore could not apply to the principle for which he was contending. But the judgments clearly show that the agent died in April, 1919, and the suit was brought in December of the same year. The learned Judge held that there was no separate cause of action as against the sons, that is to say, the action against the sons is not different from that against the father and as it was barred against the father, after his life it was also barred against the sons. Mr. Justice Spencer in his judgment in that case distinctly says that Natesayyan v. Ponnusami has been overruled by the two later Madras cases referred to above and that the matter falls under Art. 89 of the Limitation Act. It was faintly suggested on the authority of the case in Kumeda Charan Bala v. Asutosh Chattopadhyaya that as legal representatives are not mentioned in Art. 89, that article can have no application to a suit like the present. That in my view is distinctly overruled by the case in Arunachelam Chetiy v. Raman Chetty and it is pointed out by Mr. Varadachariar that there are many articles which would be reduced to absurdity if this contention were applied to them for instance Arts. 78 and 79. The column under which these articles appear is headed “Description of suit.” To my mind the omission of any mention of legal representatives in the word under “Description of suit” does not mean that the article is not intended to apply to a suit against the legal representatives in order to let in Art. 120. It seems to me that in this case we ought to follow the decisions in Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty, Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda and Periasami Mudaliar v. SeetharamaChettiar and no reason has been shown why any of these decisions should be held to be inapplicable to the present case. It seems to me, therefore, that the appeal fails on all the points put forward and must be dismissed with costs.

    Curgenven, J.—The only issue we have to decide in this Letters Patent Appeal is that of limitation. The appeal is taken against the judgment of Phillips, J., in second appeal affirming the appellate judgment that such claims as would be barred against the pleader himself are barred against his sons and legal representatives, the defendants.

    I think there can be no doubt that a separate agency began and terminated with each suit or other proceeding. It is true that there is an order of appointment [Ex. B. (2)] under which the pleader was to conduct the estate litigation, but it did not amount to a general power of attorney, and it has not even been suggested that it would of itself have given the pleader authority to conduct the suits. That was furnished by the vakalat executed in each case, and it was the vakalat, therefore, that created the agency. It is then said that granting so much, the agency did not come to an end with the suit, but continued until the pleader had accounted to his principal or had refused to account. Even assuming this to be so, it is acknowledged in the plaint that in some instances accounts had been rendered, and since there is no evidence on the record to show which cases these were, it is not possible to say, in any particular case, that account was not rendered. It must be taken, I think, that the agency in a given case came to an end with the case, and this assumption is the more permissible since we find that separate vakalats were executed for suits and for execution proceedings.

    Thus, had the suit been against the pleader himself, each proceeding he had taken under a separate vakalat would have furnished the basis for an account to be rendered, and time would have run from the date of termination of the proceeding. Would the rule of limitation be different, now that the father is dead and the suit is against the sons?

    The answer to the question depends upon whether the sons were sued upon a cause of action different from that which was available against the father. In other words, did a fresh cause of action arise upon the father's death? The question, I think, is to be answered in the negative both upon general principles and upon authority. Suppose the father has been sued and had died pending suit. There is no doubt whatever, I suppose, that the sons could have been substituted for him as his legal representatives and the suit continued. This must surely mean that the cause of action survived the father's death, and was available also against the sons. A legal representative, so far as the assets come into his hands, carries on the liability of the deceased in all cases where that liability does not lapse with the death. Of the cases cited which appear to run counter to this doctrine, the only one in which the facts raise an issue strictly analogous to the present is Bindraban Behari v. Jamuna Kunwar. In that case it was not only held that a fresh cause of action arose, when, upon the death of the father, the money came into the defendant's hands but, further, that the suit against the son would not fall under Art. 89 of the Limitation Act because the suit was not against the agent but against his legal representative. With all respect, I must dissent from both propositions—against the latter it has only to be pointed out that the Limitation Act classifies suits according to their ‘description’ and that a suit of the description referred to in Art. 89 may be brought against the legal representative of an agent as well as against the agent himself, just as under Art. 78 the drawer's representatives may be sued upon a dishonoured bill of exchange. Against the doctrine that receipt of the money by the son creates a fresh cause of action, the Madras case relied upon by the learned Judge ArunachelamChetty v. Raman Chetty appears to me to be clear authority from which I can see no reason to differ.

    It may be, as was admitted in Venkatacharulu v. Mohana Panda that the onus and methods of proof may differ when the suit is against a legal representative, and it may even be that the remedy would be different in kind; but those are no reasons for holding, that a fresh cause of action arose when the assets liable for the claim came into the defendant's hands upon their father's death.

    I agree therefore that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    K.S.DAppeal dismissed.

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