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  • S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code or by S. 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act II
  • S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and S. 75 of the Religious Endowments Act
  • S. 78 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
  • S. 73 of the Endowments Act
  • S. 73 of the Madras Act
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citation codes
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  • S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code or by S. 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act II
  • S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and S. 75 of the Religious Endowments Act
  • S. 78 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
  • S. 73 of the Endowments Act
  • S. 73 of the Madras Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaint alleges that, by an agreement reached about 1903 among members of certain Nattukottai Chetty families (now represented by plaintiffs and defendants), Rs. 54,000 was set apart for two purposes: (a) the renovation of the Sri Vedanayagi Amman temple at Vedaranyam (the "Thirupanni"); and (b) the maintenance and conduct of a Veda Patasala (a school for Vedic study). About 1907 a further sum of Rs. 12,500 (composed of shares) was endowed to start and maintain an institution called a kulithaligai in the Vedaranyam temple.

The plaintiffs allege maladministration of the trust funds (now said to have accumulated, with interest, to over five lakhs of rupees) and pray for: removal of certain managing trustees, appointment of new trustees, an account of the trust funds, and framing of a scheme of management for the charities.

For filing the suit the plaintiffs obtained consent from the Advocate-General under S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and from the Board under S. 78 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Tiruvarur (a court within the District of East Tanjore), and the central procedural question is whether that Sub-Court has jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trusts described in the plaint are governed by S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) or by S. 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (i.e., whether they are "religious endowments" within the meaning of the Madras Act).
  2. If governed by S. 73 of the Madras Act, whether the Subordinate Judge at Tiruvarur has jurisdiction or whether jurisdiction lies with the District Court of East Tanjore (as provided by the Endowments Act).
  3. Whether, in the case of the first endowment (Rs. 54,000 with blended purposes), the fund is a religious endowment under the Madras Act or falls within S. 92 of the CPC.
  4. Whether the second endowment (Rs. 12,500 for the kulithaligai) is a religious endowment under the Madras Act or a charitable/religious trust under S. 92 of the CPC — and, relatedly, whether the pleadings permit a determination of that question without evidence.
  5. Whether S. 73 of the Madras Act, if applicable to the second trust, leaves the plaintiffs without an effective remedy (as argued by defence counsel).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaint was filed under S. 92 of the CPC; the plaintiffs contend the trusts are governed by that section and that the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur has jurisdiction—arguing that the subject-matter includes the objects/purposes (temple and Patasala) which lie within the Tiruvarur Sub-Court's local limits.
  • As to the kulithaligai (second endowment), the plaintiffs argued that it is not a religious endowment under the Madras Act but rather a charitable purpose—emphasizing that the offering to the deity is ancillary and that feeding the poor may be the primary purpose.

Arguments Advanced by Mr. S. Srinivasa Ayyangar (mentioned in the opinion)

  • Argued that for the purpose of the plaintiff's claim it makes no difference whether the defendants are strict trustees or merely managers of the funds (citing relevant authority and practice).
  • Contended that if the second trust (the kulithaligai) is a religious endowment excluded from S. 92 by S. 73 of the Madras Act, the Act does not provide an effective remedy in regard to removal of trustees for such endowments, and therefore plaintiffs would be left without a proper remedy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Ranganatha Mudaliar Interpreting the phrase "except as provided by that Act" to mean "except under the provisions of that Act"; discussion of an omission in the Act concerning removal of trustees in certain cases. Used to explain that S. 73 excludes suits falling within the Endowments Act and to address the defence contention that S. 73 left plaintiffs without remedy; the Court distinguished and limited the earlier ruling, observing that the Act's other clauses provide remedies in many cases.
Padampat Singhanya v. Narayandas Jhunjhunwalla Assumed that the "subject-matter" of a trust means the trust property (i.e., the trust money or property) for purposes of S. 92 jurisdiction. Cited to support the Court's conclusion that "subject-matter" in S. 92 refers to the trust property and not the objects/purposes; hence jurisdiction depends on where trust property (or debt representing it) is situated.
Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar Authority for treating managers of funds similarly to trustees for certain claims (i.e., that a cestui que trust's claim is in substance a debt). Relied upon to support the view that it makes no difference whether defendants are strict trustees or managers: the claim is in the nature of a debt and hence local situs rules for debts apply.
English, Scottish and, Australian Bank, Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners Principle that debts and choses in action should possess a locality; Lord Macmillan and Lord Lindley's observations quoted to the effect that to say property exists nowhere is unintelligible. Invoked to justify treating the trust claim (a debt or chose in action) as having a local situs for jurisdictional purposes.
Favorke v. Steinkopff Russel J.'s observation that the actual state of investment is irrelevant to the question of situs of a debt; supports the view that debts can have a legal locality. Used to show that the form of investment does not prevent the debt from having a situs where it can be enforced or where the debtor resides.
Chaturbhaj Piramal v. Chunilal Oomkarmal Authority cited alongside Favorke in support of the rules on where a debt is situate. Supported the Court's position that a debt's situs can be where the debtor resides or where the debt is recoverable/enforceable.
Soniram Jeetmull v. R. D. Tata & Co. Ltd. Observation that in ascertaining parties' intention regard should be had to the obligation to find the creditor to pay him; used to support the rule that debt may be situated where it can be enforced. Applied to conclude that the trust claim could be treated as situated at Vedaranyam (where the trusts are to be executed and part of the cause of action arises), as well as at the residence of the debtors.
Ranganayaki Bat Ammal v. Shivarama Dubay Judge Gurgenven J.'s view suggesting S. 73 might be confined to mutts and temples (interpretive position on scope of S. 73). Quoted in the discussion of statutory interpretation; the Court considered and rejected a narrow reading and explained why clauses of S. 73 apply to religious endowments generally.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in distinct analytical steps, addressing (a) statutory scheme and definitions, (b) character of each endowment pleaded, and (c) the rules governing jurisdiction under S. 92 of the CPC.

1. Statutory framework: S. 92 CPC applies to trusts "created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature." However, S. 73 of the Madras Endowments Act removes from S. 92 those trusts which constitute "religious endowments" under the Endowments Act, and provides that no suit may be brought in respect of such religious endowments "except as provided by that Act." The Endowments Act vests jurisdiction for those religious endowments in the District Court within whose local limits the temple (or committee jurisdiction) is situated.

2. Construction of "religious endowment" and application to the first endowment (Rs. 54,000): The first fund was devoted jointly to temple renovation and to maintaining a Veda Patasala. The Court held that renovation of the temple, by itself, would be a religious endowment under the Madras Act (because it is a service or charity connected with a temple). However, the maintenance of the Veda Patasala was not "connected with any temple" (the plaint so alleges) and so that portion, although religious in nature, does not fall within the Act's statutory concept of "religious endowment." The Court therefore held that the combined fund (devoted to both purposes and not apportioned) is not a "religious endowment" as defined by the Madras Act. Instead, the fund (or at least the portion devoted to the Patasala) is a religious trust within the meaning of S. 92 CPC.

3. Meaning of "subject-matter" in S. 92 (jurisdiction): The Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that "subject-matter" included the objects/purposes of the trust. Relying on Padampat Singhanya and standard authorities, the Court held that "subject-matter" means the trust property — the trust money or trust property itself — and therefore jurisdiction under S. 92 depends on where the trust property (or part of it) is situate.

4. Situs of the trust claim (debt/chose in action): The Court explained that a beneficiary's claim against trustees is in the nature of a debt or chose in action. Authorities (Lewin, Dicey, English decisions such as Favorke v. Steinkopff and English, Scottish and Australian Bank Ltd. v. IRC) were invoked to establish that debts and choses in action are regarded as having a locality. The common rules are:

  • a debt is situate where the debtor resides; and
  • alternatively, a debt is situate where it is recoverable or can be enforced (for example where part of the cause of action arises), which in the present case includes the place where the trusts are to be executed (Vedaranyam).
Applying these principles, the Court found two local situations for the claim: (i) Pallathur (where the trustees are said to reside — within Ramnad jurisdiction); and (ii) Vedaranyam (where the temple and Patasala are situated — within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur). Hence, at the plaintiffs' option, a suit could be filed in either forum.

5. Practical jurisdictional conclusion for first endowment: The Court held that the Sub-Court at Tiruvarur (where the suit was filed) does have jurisdiction over the first endowment under S. 92. However, S. 92 also gives concurrent jurisdiction to the District Court to which the Sub-Court is subordinate. For reasons explained, the Court directed transfer of the suit from the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur to the District Court of East Tanjore.

6. Analysis of the second endowment (Rs. 12,500 for kulithaligai): The plaint did not explain the precise nature of "kulithaligai" beyond noting it is familiar to the community and that "taligai" denotes an offering to an idol. The Court found the pleadings inadequate to determine whether the kulithaligai is primarily a charitable purpose (e.g., feeding the poor) or a religious purpose performed in connection with the temple (and hence a "religious endowment" under the Madras Act). Because the question turns on evidence of the institution's nature, the Court held that it cannot be decided on the pleadings alone. If it is a religious endowment within the Act, jurisdiction would lie to the District Court of East Tanjore; if governed by S. 92, jurisdiction would be either the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur or the District Court of East Tanjore. Since the Court had directed transfer to the District Court of East Tanjore and that Court would have jurisdiction in either eventuality, the case was ordered to be tried there.

7. Response to the contention that S. 73 leaves plaintiffs remediless: The Court reviewed its earlier decision in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi and explained that while that judgment noted an omission in the Act with respect to removal of trustees in certain limited cases, the present interpretation is that S. 73 (and its clauses) applies to religious endowments generally and that clauses (c) and (d) provide remedies in many cases. Consequently, even if the second trust is a religious endowment under the Madras Act, the plaintiffs are not wholly without remedy under the Act.

8. Ancillary observations: The Court remarked that the Legislature should amend the Act to correct defects in providing remedies in certain cases, repeating its earlier suggestion from the Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi decision.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • The first endowment (Rs. 54,000) is not a "religious endowment" entirely within the scope of S. 73 of the Madras Endowments Act because it is devoted jointly to temple renovation and the maintenance of a Veda Patasala; the latter purpose, though religious, is not "in connection with a temple" as required by the Act. Consequently, that fund falls within S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • The Sub-Court of Tiruvarur has jurisdiction to entertain the suit in respect of the first endowment; nonetheless the suit is ordered to be transferred to the District Court of East Tanjore (to which the Sub-Court is subordinate), which also possesses jurisdiction.
  • As to the second endowment (Rs. 12,500 for the kulithaligai), the plaint does not disclose whether it is a religious endowment under the Madras Act or a charitable/religious trust under S. 92; the determination requires evidence. Because the District Court of East Tanjore has jurisdiction in either eventuality, the case shall be tried by that Court.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The suit, though properly instituted in the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur as regards the first endowment, is to be transferred and tried by the District Court of East Tanjore.
  • The defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs and their own costs from and out of the trust funds in their hands. The counsels' fee on each side is fixed at Rs. 250.

Broader legal implications: The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law but applied existing principles about (i) the statutory distinction between religious endowments under the Madras Act and religious/charitable trusts under S. 92 CPC, and (ii) the rules determining the situs of debts and choses in action for jurisdictional purposes. The Court also reiterated a legislative recommendation that the Act be amended to cure recognized defects.

    M. Ar. Rm. M. Annamalai Chettiar And Others Petitioners. v. Al. A. C. T. Solaiyappa Chettiar And Another

    JUDGMENT

    This case raises the question as to the nature of the suit trusts and on that depends whether the lower Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. Are the trusts governed by S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code or by S. 73 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act II of 1927)—that is the question as regards the nature of the trusts that has to be decided.

    The plaint alleges that by an agreement come to about the year 1903 among the members of certain Nattukottai Chetty families (now represented by the plaintiffs and the defendants), a sum of Rs. 54,000 was set apart for certain purposes. In paragraph 4 of the plaint those purposes are thus described:

    “It was agreed by and among the members of the first four families, about the year 1903, that a sum of Rs. 54,000 should be set apart by them for the Thirupanni, i.e, the renovation of the Sri Vedanayagi Amman temple, at Vedaranyam, that a large sum out of the same should be set apart for the maintenance and conduct of the Veda Patasala which was already in existence and being run on a moderate scale from the contribution made prior thereto by the aforesaid four families and that with the said sum of Rs. 54,000 and the interest accruing therefrom the Vedanayagi Amman Temple should be renovated and repaired and the Patasala should be efficiently conducted by the members of the said families.”

    Paragraph 8 then deals with another endowment made about 1907 of a further sum of Rs. 12,500. The passage dealing with that endowment is extracted below:

    “In addition to the aforesaid endowments in or about 1907 a further sum of Rs. 12,500 made up of 10 shares of Rs. 1,250 each, contributed by the families of plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 6, 8 to 20, 24 to 26 and one Malladi Sathilmgam was allotted for the purpose of starting and maintaining an institution of pious service, familiarly known among the Nattukottai Chetty community as kulithaligai in the said Vedaranyam temple and the funds were similarly agreed to be invested and improved.”

    The plaint charges the defendants or some of them with mal-administration of the trust funds, which with the accumulaation of interest, are alleged to amount to over five lakhs of rupees and prays (1) that certain defendants, the present managing trustees, may be removed from their office, (2) that new trustees may be appointed, (3) that the defendants may be directed to render an account of the trust funds and (4) that a scheme of management in respect of the charities be framed.

    The plaintiffs obtained for the filing of the suit, the consent of the Advocate-General under S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code as well as of the Board under S. 78 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The question is whether the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tiruvarur, where the suit has been filed, has jurisdiction to entertain it.

    S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to trusts “created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature” but the application of that Section is excluded by S. 73 of the Endowments Act in the case of religious endowments falling within it. The result is, that all charitable trusts are still governed by S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code; but where the trusts are of a “religious nature”, such of those trusts as are “religious endowments” within the meaning of the Endowments Act, are removed from the ambit of S. 92 and to that limited class of religious trusts S. 73 of the local Act applies. The effect of the last mentioned section is, that no suit can be brought in respect of the religious endowments as defined by the Madras Act, “except as provided by that Act,” which expression has been held to mean “except under the provisions of that Act”. [See Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Ranganatha Mudaliar .] The Court mentioned in S. 73 as having jurisdiction in respect of religious endowments referred to in it, is the “Court of the District Judge within whose local limits a Committee exercises its jurisdiction or a mutt or temple is situated:” (S. 9 (3).

    Now, turning to the definition of “religious endowments” under the Madras Act, so far as it is material to the present purpose, the expression means, all property given or endowed for the performance of any service or charity connected with a temple; the Court having jurisdiction over those religious endowments under the relevant part of the definition of “Court” referred to above, is the Court of the District Judge within whose local limits the temple in connection with which the service or charity has to be performed, is situated.

    If the trusts referred to in the plaint are religious endowments within the meaning of the local Act, then the Court having jurisdiction would be the District Court of East Tanjore within whose local limits the temple of Sri Vedanayagi Amman at Vedaranyam is situated; the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Tiruvarur (which Court, it may be mentioned, is in the District of East Tanjore) where the present suit has been instituted, would in that event have no jurisdiction.

    The question then is, are the suit trusts “religious endowments” as defined by the local Act? The plaint, as already stated, refers to two distinct endowments and each of them for the present purpose has to be considered separately. The first endowment is that of Rs. 54,000, which, according to the plaint, is set apart for two purposes—the renovation of the temple and the maintenance of the Veda Patasala. The entire amount is devoted to both the purposes together, there being no apportionment or severance of the fund. That the two purposes are blended and that the fund is one and entire, is brought out very clearly by the allegation in the plaint that “the sum is set apart for the renovation but that a large portion out of it should be applied to the maintenance of the Veda Patasala.” If the object of the trust were the renovation of the temple and nothing more, that the trust would in that event be a religious endowment under the local Act, can admit of no doubt; for, the renovating of a temple would clearly be the “performance” of a “charity” in connection with that temple. But what is the effect of combining with that purpose, the maintaining of a Veda Patasala which, it must be observed, is not connected with any temple? Under the Act, it is of the essence of a religious endowment that it should be so connected, and as this requisite is wanting, the fund to the extent to which it is devoted to this purpose, cannot be held to be a religious endowment. Although it is not a religious endowment under the Act, the object is nevertheless not temporal or secular in character as the plaintiffs contend, but is of a religious nature under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The object of maintaining a Veda Patasala is not to promote knowledge in general but spiritual knowledge; in other words, its purpose is the advancement of religion. Under the English decisions, gifts for the maintenance of institutions, such as, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, or, the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, are gifts for religious purposes and hence are charitable; for, all religious trusts are in a sense charitable, although the converse of this proposition does not hold good. A Veda Patasala is akin to the institutions mentioned above as its purpose is the promoting of the knowledge of the Vedas.

    The fund in this case being devoted to two purposes, one falling within the Act and the other, though a religious purpose, falling outside it, I must hold that that fund is not a religious endowment as defined by the Act. The respective spheres of S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and S. 75 of the Religious Endowments Act must not be forgotten. The latter Act removes, as already stated, from the ambit of S. 92 which relates to all trusts of a religious nature, only those religious trusts which amount to “religious endowments” under that Act.

    In regard then to the first endowment which, as I have held, is governed by S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the question arises, which is the Court having jurisdiction in respect of it? That section enacts that a suit may be brought either “in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the Local Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate.” The point to consider is, what is the meaning of the expression “the subject-matter of the trust”? The plaintiffs contend that it includes the purposes or the objects of the trust and go on to maintain that as the Vedaranyam temple and the Veda, Patasala are situated within the local limits of the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur, that Court has jurisdiction. This argument ignores the well-known distinction in regard to a trust, namely, its subject-matter and its object, and must be rejected. In this very Section both the sets of expression are found used: see the main part and clause (e) The Charitable and Religious Trusts Act (XIV of 1920) deals with public trusts and is therefore an Act in pari materia, and the two expressions in relation to a trust—“the subject-matter” and “the object”—are there used in different senses. Similarly, in English works dealing with charitable trusts, the same distinction is maintained: (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. IV, page 171 (ascertainment of the subject-matter of the trust) and page 175 (ascertainment of the objects of the trust). I am therefore quite clear that a suit under S. 92 should be brought where the subject-matter of the trust, that is to say, the trust property or the trust money or any part of it, is situate: see Padampat Singhanya v. Narayandas Jhunjhunwalla , where is assumed that the subject of the trust means the trust property.

    So far as the first endowment is concerned, although the ground urged by the plaintiffs in support of the Tiruvarur Sub-Court having jurisdiction is, as stated above, wrong, that Court has nevertheless jurisdiction for other reasons as I shall presently show. The test, as already mentioned, is, where is the trust money or any part of it situate? The claim of the cestui que trust, as stated by Lewin, is in general a simple contract debt (Lewin on Trust, 1928, 13th Edn. page 952) and as Mr. S. Srinivasa Ayyangar rightly contends, it makes no difference for this purpose whether the defendants are trustees in the strict sense of that term or mere managers of the kind described in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (2). The funds in question are in the bands of the trustees or ought to be with them; if not, they have been invested. In any case, the claim against them is in the nature of a debt. The question then arises, where is this debt situate? The actual state of investment is, as pointed out by Russel J. in Favorke v. Steinkopff , entirely irrelevant, as the investment can be altered from time to time. “But. debts do, in one form or another,” observes Lord Buckmaster, “represent property of very considerable value in the modern world, and it appears to me it is desirable that they should possess a locality, even if they are invested with it by means of a legal fiction:” English, Scottish and, Australian Bank, Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners . In that case Lord Macmillan quotes Lord Lindley's observation,

    “to talk of property as existing nowhere is to use language which to me is unintelligible.”

    It being thus established that a debt may have a local situation, the question is, where a debt, according to the rules of law, can be said to be situate? “The debt is where the bond is, being upon a specialty; but debt upon a contract follows the person of the debtor.” (1932) A. C. 238.

    As Dicey points out.

    “Debts, choses in action and claims of any kind must be held situate where the debtor or other person against whom a claim exists resides; or, in other words debts or choses in action are generally to be looked upon as situate in the country where they are properly recoverable or can he enforced.”

    Diceys's Conflict of Laws (1932) 5th Edn. page 341).

    See also Favorke v. Steinkopff already quoted, at page 178, Chaturbhaj Piramal v. Chunilal Oomkarmal (3). The situation of the debt therefore is either where the debtor resides or where it is recoverable or can be enforced. In the present case, the debtors (i. e., the trustees), it is said reside at Pallathur within the jurisdiction of the Ramnad District Court and not of the Tiruvarur Bub-Court where this suit has been filed. But the debt may be situate, as pointed out, also where it is recoverable or can be enforced. As to where the present debt can be recovered or be enforced, reference should be made to S. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, which enacts that a suit may be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction either the defendants reside or the cause of action wholly or in part arises. There can be no question that in Vedaranyam where the temple and the Patasala in respect of which the trusts are to be executed, are situate, a part of the cause of action arises. Under the English law, where no place is appointed for the performance of a contract, the debtor is bound to find the creditor, in other words, there is an implied promise on the part of the debtor to pay where the creditor resides. See Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, (1934) 10th Edn. p. 119, Comentary under S. 20). Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee point out in Soniram Jeetmull v. R. D. Tata & Co. Ltd. that even under the Indian law, in ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard should be had to the fact that the obligation to pay the creditor involves the further obligation of finding the creditor so as to pay him. It follows from what I have said, that the debt is situated also at Vedaranyam where under the provisions of the Civil Precedure Code it can be recovered or enforced.

    To sum up, the debt in question has two local situations: (1) where the debtors reside, namely, Pallathur within the jurisdiction of the Ramnad District Court and (2) where the debt can be enforced on the ground that a part of the cause of action arises there, i. e., Vedaranyam (within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur) where the trusts are to be executed; the cause of action arises there in part on a further ground, namely, that there is an implied promise on the part of the debtor to pay where the creditor resides. At the plaintiffs' option the suit could have been filed in either of the two Courts mentioned above. I must therefore hold that this suit, so far as the first endowment is concerned, has been properly instituted in the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur. But under S. 92, of the Civil Procedure Code, both the Sub-Court and the District Court to which it is subordinate have concurrent jurisdiction, and for reasons which will hereafter appear, I direct the transfer of this suit from the Sub-Court of Tiruvarur (which, I have held, has jurisdiction) to the District Court of East Tanjore (to which that Court is subordinate) which also possesses jurisdiction.

    Passing on to the second endowment, namely, Rs. 12, 500 alleged to have been allotted for the maintaining of kulithaligai in the Vedaranyam temple, the question arises whether the purpose of the trust is charitable or religious. If it is a religious trust, it satisfies the requirements of a “religious endowment as defined by the local Act, for, the plaint states that the kulithaligai is to be maintained in the temple, which means “in connection with the temple.” But the plaintiffs (they having filed the suit under S. 92) contend that the kulitkaligai is not a religious but a charitable purpose, for, the offering of the food to the deity is but ancillary (it being a Hindu religious conception that all food should be so offered) and that the feeding of the poor is the primary, if not the sole, purpose. The plaint, beyond stating that the kulithaligai is an institution familiar to the Nattukottai Chetties, does not explain what it means, nor are the Counsel able to say what the expression connotes: all that is known is, that the latter part of the words, ‘taligai’, means an offering to an idol. If the taligai was of the usual kind, I should have had no difficulty in holding that the purpose was religious, but on the pleadings alone and in the absence of evidence, it is impossible to come to any definite conclusion as to the nature of this trust. The second endowment is either a charitable trust governed by S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, or, a religious endowment falling within the local Act; to which of these categories it belongs, can be decided only when evidence has been adduced. If it is governed by S. 92, the Court having jurisdiction, as already stated, is either (a) the Sub-Gourt of Tiruvarur or (b) the District Court of East Tanjore; if, on the other hand, S. 73 of the Madras Act governs it, the proper Court, as explained in the earlier part of this judgment, is the District Court of East Tanjore. As I have already, while dealing with the first endowment, directed the case to be transferred to the District Court of East Tanjore and as in either view that Court possesses, as just shown, jurisdiction even in regard to the second endowment, my order is, that the case shall be tried by that Court.

    Before concluding, I must point out that the contention of Mr. S. Srinivasa Ayyangar, that if the second of the two trusts is a religious endowment within the meaning of the Endowments Act, while it is excluded from the operation of S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, S. 73 of the former enactment has not provided an effective remedy in regard to it and that therefore, as the law stands, no suit can be brought in respect of that endowment,—that contention is, in my opinion, not well-founded. The learned Counsel in support of his argument relies upon my judgment in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Ranganadha Mudaliar , already cited. But all that I there held was, that by an oversight the Act has failed to provide for a suit for the removal of a trustee of a religious endowment not being a “mutt” or “excepted temple”, the reason being that S. 73 (a), owing to its restrictive wording, does not apply to religious endowments in general. S. 73 , in spite of its opening sentence which refers only to “mutts” or “temples”, applies to all “religious endowments”, as the second part of that section shows. If that be so, even excluding Cl. (b)), if Cl. (a) is inapplicable, Cl. (b) seems necessarily excluded; Cls. (c) and (d), which are not restrictive in their wording as Cl. (a) is, must be held to apply to religious endowments generally. I must observe that Gurgenven J. in Ranganayaki Bat Ammal v. Shivarama Dubay , seems disposed to think that S. 73 must be confined to mutts and temples, although, as the learned Judge points out, Cls. (b), (c) and (d) of the first part are wide enough to apply to religious endowments in general. He derives support for that view from the mention of “any person having interest” in S. 73 and from the fact that in defining such a person, the Act has advertence only to a mutt or temple: (See S. 9 (ix). But as there can be no religious endowment, under the scheme of the Act, except in connection with a mutt or temple, the definition is wide enough to include persons having an interest in endowments other than mutts or temples. Therefore, even should it be found that the second of the trusts is a religious endowment under the Madras Act, the plaintiffs are not, in my opinion, wholly without remedy under the provisions of the Act (defective as they are) in respect of that endowment.

    I may in conclusion repeat what I said in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Ranganatha Mudaliar (already cited), that it is desirable that the Legislature should suitably amend the Act providing for the cases in regard to which it is now defective.

    My order as to the costs of the Civil Revision Petition is, that the defendants shall pay the plaintiffs' costs and their own costs from and out of the trust funds in their hands. The counsels' fee on each side is fixed at Rs. 250.

    N. R. R.Order accordingly.

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