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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. V.T Rangaswami Ayyangar instructed by Mr. T.R Venkataraman Attorney for the Appellants.
  • Mr. K.S Champakesa Ayyangar for the Government Pleader on behalf of the Government.
Judges
  • Venkatasubba Rao
  • Abdur Rahman, JJ.
Acts
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. V.T Rangaswami Ayyangar instructed by Mr. T.R Venkataraman Attorney for the Appellants.
  • Mr. K.S Champakesa Ayyangar for the Government Pleader on behalf of the Government.
Judges
  • Venkatasubba Rao
  • Abdur Rahman, JJ.
Acts
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal was withdrawn as having been settled out of Court. The appellant (referred to in the opinion as the applicant) requested a refund of the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Court-Fees Act permit a refund of the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal, and whether the present case falls within Section 13.
  2. Whether the Court has power, independent of the express provisions of the Court-Fees Act, to direct a refund of a court-fee properly paid.
  3. Whether the Court's inherent powers permit refunding a court-fee properly paid, or are limited to situations such as excess payment by mistake or payment in obedience to a wrong order of Court.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Chidambaram Chettiar (1934) 67 M.L.J. 321: I.L.R. 57 Mad. 1028 Presented as directly in point on the question of refunding court-fees; supports the view that refund cannot be ordered in the present circumstances. The Court treated this case as directly supporting its conclusion and relied on it to reject the application for refund.
Mohammad Sadiq Alt Khan Nawab Mirzav. Saiyid Ali Abbas (1932) I.L.R. 7 Luck. 588 Relied upon by the applicant (as authority for refunding court-fee). The Court noted these cases were relied on by the applicant but stated they had been dissented from in the Madras decision (In re Chidambaram Chettiar) and elsewhere.
Galstaun v. Janaki Nath (1933) 38 C.W.N. 185 Relied upon by the applicant (as authority for refunding court-fee). The Court observed that this case had been dissented from in the Madras case and other decisions.
Indu Bushan Rai Chowdhry v. Secretary of State for India A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 707 Identified in the opinion as a decision expressing dissent from the authorities relied upon by the applicant. The Court cited this decision as an instance of dissent from the cases the applicant relied upon.
In re V.K.P. Chockalingam Ambalam v. Maung Tin (1936) I.L.R. 14 Rang. 173 (F.B.) Identified in the opinion as a decision expressing dissent from the authorities relied upon by the applicant. The Court cited this decision as another instance of dissent from the cases the applicant relied upon.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting that Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Court-Fees Act govern refunds of court-fee and that Section 13 specifically provides for the return of the fee paid on a memorandum of appeal; the Court observed that the present case does not fall within Section 13. The central question was whether the Court has power to direct a refund of court-fee independent of the express provisions of the Court-Fees Act.

The Court acknowledged existing authorities where courts have ordered refunds under their inherent powers, but confined those situations to (i) excess court-fee paid by mistake of party and (ii) payment made in obedience to a wrong order of Court. The Court characterized the underlying principle of those decisions as sound law and sense.

However, the Court concluded that permitting a refund of a properly paid court-fee would nullify the express provisions of the Court-Fees Act. The opinion emphasized the elementary principle that no Court has inherent power to do what is expressly prohibited by statute. The Court relied on In re Chidambaram Chettiar as directly supporting this view and noted that the cases relied upon by the applicant had been dissented from in that Madras decision and in other decisions cited.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application for refund of the court-fee is rejected.

Implications: The immediate consequence is that the applicant's request for refund is denied, and the applicant was ordered to pay costs. Specifically, the applicant must also pay the fees payable to the Government Pleader, which the Court fixed at Rs. 30. The opinion applies existing statutory interpretation and authority to deny refunding a properly paid court-fee; it does not announce any broader change to the law beyond the Court's application in this case.

Show full summary ...

    B. Kappini Gowder

    1. The appeal has been withdrawn as having been settled out of Court and the appellant makes a somewhat unusual request that he should be allowed a refund of the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal.

    2. If we should have regard to what is taken to be the settled practice of this Court, this request should be summarily rejected; however, as a point of principle has been raised, we have gone into the matter carefully. Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Court-Fees Act deal with refunds of court-fee and of these, Section 13 provides for the return of the fee paid on a memorandum of appeal. The present case obviously does not come within the purview of that section. Then the question arises, has the Court power to direct a refund of court-fee, independent of the express provisions of the Court-Fees Act? The Courts have gone to the extent of holding that they can order a refund under their inherent powers, where an excess court-fee has been paid (i) by mistake of party, (ii) in obedience to a wrong order of Court. The principle underlying these decisions, if we may say so with respect, is both good law and sound sense. But to go further and hold that a court-fee, properly paid, can be refunded, would be to render nugatory, the express provisions of the Court-Fees Act, for, what difference does it make in principle, between permitting a document to be filed originally without a court-fee and refunding the court-fee already paid in respect of it? It is elementary that no Court has inherent power t© do that which is expressly prohibited by statute.

    3. Then turning to authority, In re Chidambaram Chettiar (1934) 67 M.L.J. 321: I.L.R. 57 Mad. 1028 is directly in point and supports our view. There are two cases on which the applicant relies, namely, Mohammad Sadiq Alt Khan Nawab Mirzav. Saiyid Ali Abbas (1932) I.L.R. 7 Luck. 588 and Galstaunv. Janaki Nath (1933) 38 C.W.N. 185. These cases have, in our opinion, been rightly dissented from in the Madras case already referred to. Dissent has been expressed from those cases in other decisions also. (See Indu Bushan Rai Chowdhry v. Secretary of State for India A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 707 and In re V.K.P. Chockalingam Ambalam v. Maung Tin (1936) I.L.R. 14 Rang. 173 (F.B.).)

    4. In the result, the application is rejected with costs. The applicant will pay the fees payable to the Government Pleader which we fix at Rs. 30.

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    Comments

    B. Kappini Gowder
    (Oct 12, 1937)