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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (advocates of the High Court) sued defendant 1 (United India Life Assurance Company Limited, an insurance company) and several other defendants (directors, an agent/firm and company servants) seeking (1) a declaration that they were validly elected Policy-holders' Directors of defendant 1 for 1928; (2) a declaration that defendant 1 had no power to nominate Policy-holders' Directors for 1928; and (3–4) injunctions restraining the defendants from excluding or interfering with the plaintiffs' acting as directors and from making any further nominations for Policy-holders' Directors for 1928.

The company's Articles of Association (new articles adopted 1926 and in force from 1927) provided a procedure for a policy-holders' meeting to elect not more than two Policy-holders' Directors, with notices, proxy provisions and a provision (Article 77 and Article 79 referenced) enabling the directors to appoint Policy-holders' Directors if the policy-holders did not elect any.

A policy-holders' meeting was convened on 21 April 1928. The meeting was attended by about 97 policy-holders. After debate and concern that many policy-holders (especially those at a distance) had inadequate notice and that company agents held a large number of proxies, the meeting (by the chairman taking the sense of the meeting) resolved to adjourn to 5 May 1928 (with related resolutions about giving individual notices, advertising the adjourned meeting, and restricting proxies held by company employees/agents). Before the adjourned meeting, the company's board published a notice (29 April resolution) announcing that, "no persons were elected" at the 21 April meeting and that the board had appointed two Policy-holders' Directors.

The adjourned meeting was held on 5 May 1928 at a different venue (Mahajana Sabha Hall) because defendant 1 refused to allow the meeting in its premises; the plaintiffs were elected by ballot at that adjourned meeting. The directors refused to recognize the plaintiffs' election and the plaintiffs instituted this suit. At trial the defendants raised several defences; the court heard evidence and argument and delivered the decree described below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs (individually) were entitled to sue the defendants for being excluded from acting as Policy-holders' Directors (standing/ locus standi).
  2. Whether the policy-holders' meeting of 21 April 1928 had the power to adjourn itself (and whether any such adjournment was bona fide).
  3. Whether the adjourned meeting of 5 May 1928 was a valid/regular meeting (issues included validity of proxies for the adjourned meeting and whether change of venue invalidated the meeting).
  4. Whether the directors of defendant 1 validly exercised Article 77 to appoint Policy-holders' Directors between the meetings (i.e., whether the directors' appointments were lawful).
  5. Whether, as a result of the above, the plaintiffs were validly elected as Policy-holders' Directors and whether injunctive relief and declarations sought should be granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • Plaintiffs asserted they were validly elected as Policy-holders' Directors at the adjourned meeting (5 May 1928) and sought declarations and injunctions accordingly.
  • The plaintiffs and their witnesses maintained that the adjournment of 21 April was resolved upon for a bona fide purpose: to secure better representation of policy-holders at the election (because many policy-holders — especially those outside Madras — lacked timely notice and could not reasonably participate).
  • Plaintiffs argued that the proxies and voting procedures, as actually practiced and given the company's control of the policy-holder list and agents collecting proxies, created an unfair ability for the company to control the election and that the adjournment sought to remedy that representation deficit.
  • Plaintiffs relied on the proposition that an adjourned meeting is a continuation of the original meeting and that proxies validly registered for the original meeting would be applicable to the adjourned meeting.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendants contended the plaintiffs had no right to sue personally and that any action should have been brought by policy-holders as a body; they also contended that directors could not be sued personally.
  • Defendants argued the policy-holders' meeting had no power to adjourn itself because the Articles of Association made no provision for adjournment of that meeting and the instrument of proxy referred specifically to the day of the meeting (unlike the general meeting proxy which referenced adjournments); thus they submitted an adjournment was prohibited or at least not authorized.
  • Where an adjournment was permitted in principle, defendants asserted the adjournment was not bona fide (they advanced a theory of constructive mala fides/constructive dishonesty), suggesting the real object was to frustrate proxies and secure particular outcomes.
  • Defendants argued the adjourned meeting was irregular/improper because it was not held at the company's office as required by the Articles, and they contended proxies registered for 21 April were not necessarily valid for an adjourned meeting.
  • Defendants relied on Article 77 (which they read as permitting directors to appoint Policy-holders' Directors if no election took place at the policy-holders' meeting) and asserted their board's appointments were lawful because "no persons were elected" at 21 April.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pulbrook v. Richmond Consolidated Mining Co. Authority that a director excluded from the board can sue in his own name for individual injury and can sue other directors; a single shareholder/director may enforce his own individual rights. Used to reject defendants' contention that plaintiffs were not entitled to sue; court held plaintiffs had standing and that the directors could be properly impleaded.
King v. Mayor Burgesses and Commonalty of Carmarthen Supports the proposition that a corporate assembly/meeting must have the power to adjourn to conclude started business and to prevent obstruction; adjournment by necessity is lawful. Court cited passages endorsing common-sense necessity of adjournment to support the existence of a common-law right to adjourn a meeting in the absence of an express prohibition in the articles.
Stoughton v. Reynolds Held that adjournment of a vestry meeting is a right vested in the assembly (parishioners) at large and not in the chairman; the right is in the assembly unless law or custom provides otherwise. Cited to support the proposition that the power of adjournment resides in the meeting/assembly itself and not solely in the chair or another officer; court relied on this to validate the policy-holders' right to adjourn.
Adams v. G.N.S. Railway Co. Rejects the doctrine of "constructive corruption" or "constructive dishonesty" — i.e., one should not label honest motives as corrupt for purposes of invalidating acts. Quoted (Lord Watson and Lord Bramwell) to repudiate the defendants' argument that the policy-holders' adjournment was constructively mala fide despite admitted honest motives; court rejected "constructive mala fides."
Colquhoun v. Corbet (referenced) Used historically in discussion of "constructive corruption" terminology (Lord Thurlow's usage). Referred to as background in the court's rejection of the defendants' constructive dishonesty theory; court relied on Lord Watson's criticism of "constructive corruption."
Maclaren v. Thompson Establishes that an adjourned meeting is a continuation of the original meeting; proxy deposit rules must be read in that context (proxies valid for adjourned meeting if lodged in time in accordance with article provisions). Cited to determine that proxies registered for the original meeting remained valid for the adjourned meeting; court concluded proxies for 21 April were available for the 5 May continuation (subject to timing rules in the articles).
Scadding v. Lorant Holds that where a meeting begins and is regularly adjourned, the adjourned meeting is part of the original meeting and unfinished business may be completed at the adjourned meeting; notice of the original meeting suffices for adjournments completing unfinished business. Applied to confirm that the 5 May meeting was part of, and a continuation of, the 21 April meeting, making the adjourned meeting regular for purposes of completing the election business.
Kerr v. Wilkie Affirms that a bona fide adjournment makes the adjourned meeting part of the original meeting and that the length of adjournment does not affect that continuity. Relied upon to support that a bona fide adjournment on 21 April rendered the 5 May meeting a continuation and therefore regular.
New Zealand Shipping Co. v. Societe des Ateliers et Chantiers de France Reaffirms the principle that a party cannot take advantage of a state of affairs which it itself produced; one cannot benefit from one's own wrong or an event brought about by one's own act or omission. Used to hold that defendants could not rely upon the company's refusal to provide premises (which caused the change of venue) as a basis to invalidate the adjourned meeting; court applied the principle that a party cannot take advantage of its own wrongful act.
Quesnel Forks Gold Mining Co. Ltd v. Ward Also applied the principle that a party cannot take advantage of a situation it produced. Cited alongside New Zealand Shipping to support the court's refusal to allow defendants to object to the meeting venue change when they had themselves caused that change by refusing facilities.
Roberts v. Wyatt Illustrates application of the principle that a party shall not take advantage of his own wrong; used as an example in discussion. Quotations from Lord Finlay (in New Zealand Shipping summary) referenced Roberts v. Wyatt as illustration; court used the same body of authority to reject defendants' venue objection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing defendants' principal contentions and applying legal principles (both common law and precedents) to the facts found on evidence:

  1. Standing to sue: The court relied on authority (Pulbrook and the statement in Buckley as cited) that a director improperly excluded from acting can bring an action in his own name against co-directors for individual injury. The court therefore rejected the defendants' submission that the plaintiffs had no right to sue and held the plaintiffs were properly before the court and the directors were rightly impleaded.
  2. Power to adjourn: The court rejected the defendants' inference that silence in the Articles regarding adjournment forbids adjournment. The judge held (i) there is a common-law right for a meeting to adjourn itself unless expressly prohibited; (ii) the absence of express provision was attributable to an oversight or to the framers' failure to contemplate the contingency, not to an intention to prohibit adjournment; and (iii) it would be unreasonable and impractical to hold that policy-holders' meetings could not be adjourned. The court cited English authorities (King, Stoughton, and commentary) to support the existence of the common-law adjournment right.
  3. Bona fides of the adjournment: The court accepted the plaintiffs' evidence (uncontradicted and admitted by defendants' counsel in large measure) that the adjournment was resolved upon for the sole bona fide purpose of securing better representation of policy-holders at the election because many had inadequate notice. The court rejected the defendants' "constructive mala fides" theory (that honest motives could be treated as corrupt in law), relying upon authority (Adams v. G.N.S. Ry. Co. and related observations) declining to accept constructive corruption doctrines.
  4. Validity of the adjourned meeting and proxies: The court held the adjourned meeting of 5 May was part of and a continuation of the 21 April meeting, and therefore regular. The court relied on precedent (Maclaren; Scadding; Kerr) establishing that an adjourned meeting is a continuation of the original meeting and that proxies valid for the original meeting are available for the adjourned meeting subject to the company's own article provisions. It concluded that proxies registered for 21 April remained applicable at the adjourned meeting and that the adjourned meeting was not invalidated on that ground.
  5. Change of venue: The court found the change of venue to the Mahajana Sabha Hall occurred because defendant 1 refused to permit the adjourned meeting at its premises (despite earlier indications), and the policy-holders took reasonable steps to notify attendees of the new venue. The court held that (a) the defendants could not complain of a situation they themselves caused, applying the principle that a party shall not take advantage of its own wrong (citing New Zealand Shipping and related authorities), and (b) the venue provision in the Articles was not an essential provision such that a reasonable change would invalidate the meeting where no prejudice to voting was shown.
  6. Effect of directors' early appointments under Article 77: The court concluded that Article 77 (permitting directors to appoint Policy-holders' Directors if the policy-holders did not elect any) could not be invoked while the process of the adjourned meeting (as part of the original meeting) was still ongoing and bona fide efforts were being made by policy-holders to elect representatives. Consequently, the directors' purported appointments were invalid.
  7. Overall result on facts: The court found defendants' various contentions all failed on factual and legal grounds. The plaintiffs were held to have been validly elected at the adjourned meeting; the directors' appointments were invalid; proxies and adjournment were properly treated; and the objections to venue and to the bona fides of the adjournment were rejected.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court decreed the suit and made the following principal declarations and orders (as stated in the opinion):

  • The plaintiffs are declared validly elected "Policy-holders' directors" of defendant company for the year 1928 and until the election of such directors for the year 1929.
  • The court declared that "defendant 1 company had and has no power to nominate Policy-holders' directors for the year 1923" (as that specific declaration appears in the opinion text).
  • The court granted an injunction restraining all the defendants from excluding the plaintiffs or in any way restraining or interfering with the plaintiffs acting or attending as directors of defendant 1 company.
  • The court granted an injunction restraining all the defendants from making any further nominations as Policy-holders' directors.
  • The plaintiffs were awarded taxed costs of the suit on a higher scale; the costs were to be borne by the individual directors (because the acts complained of were done by the directors) and to be met by defendant 1 company. The court certified for two counsel.

Implications:

  • Direct, case-specific consequences: The plaintiffs were confirmed as the legitimately elected Policy-holders' Directors for the specified year and are protected by injunctions from interference by the defendants. The directors' prior appointments were invalidated.
  • Procedural and practical consequences: The judgment affirms the common-law position that meetings have an inherent power to adjourn in the absence of an express prohibition, that adjourned meetings are continuations of original meetings (so proxies and unfinished business can properly be carried forward), and that a party cannot take advantage of a situation created by its own wrongful act (here the company's refusal to permit use of premises).
  • Broader pronouncements: The court rejected the doctrine of "constructive mala fides/constructive corruption" when applied to honest motives, and emphasized that bona fide adjournments and reasonable remedial steps by assemblies should not be invalidated by strained legal theories.
  • Precedential impact: The opinion rests on established English authorities and on application of common-law principles to the facts; the court did not purport to create a novel legal rule beyond these applications. The direct effect is binding on the parties; the court noted the matter had been hard-fought and awarded costs accordingly.

This summary is limited to and strictly derived from the information contained in the provided opinion text. No facts or legal conclusions beyond those explicitly set out in the opinion have been added.

    (Watrap) S. Subramania Aiyar v. United India Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

    1. The plaintiffs are advocates of this High Court and defendant 1 is an Insurance Company with its registered office in Madras and defendants 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are directors of defendant 1's company, defendant 2 being its chairman. Defendant; 8 is a firm of merchants, of which defendant 7 is a member and is the managing agent of defendant 1's Insurance Company. The plaintiffs bring this suit (1) for a declaration that they were validly elected “Policy-holders' Directors” of defendant 1's company for the year 1928, (2) for a declaration that defendant 1's company has no power to nominate Policy-holders' Directors for the year 1928, (3) for an injunction against all the defendants restraining them from excluding the plaintiffs or in any way restraining or interfering with the plaintiffs acting or attending as directors of defendant 1's company, and (4) for an injunction against all the defendants from making any further nomination or nominations as Policyholders' Directors for the year 1928.

    2. The claim arises under the following circumstances. Defendant 1's company has been carrying on the business of Life Insurance from about the year 1906 and in 1926 adopted ??? Articles of Association which came into force from 1927, Under Article 62 the number of directors of defendant 1's company is to be not less than four and not more than nine and of these not more than two directors may be elected by or appointed on behalf of the policyholders of the company. The directors so elected or appointed are to be known as “Policyholders' Directors.” This provision is repeated in Article 70. Under Article 73 a meeting of the policy-holders for the purpose of electing not more than two Policy-holders' Directors from amongst themselves is to be convened by the directors in 1928 and each successive year. The date and the hour at which these meetings are to be held is to be determined by the directors and the meeting is to be held after the ordinary meeting (that is, the meeting of the share-holders) of the same year and within 15 days from the date of that meeting. Article 74 sets out the qualification of the Policy-holders' Director and Article 75 provides that candidates for election to the office of Policy-holders' Directors are to be proposed at least seven days before the policy-holders' meeting by a notice in writing. Article 76 requires 14 days' notice at least of every policy-holders' meeting either by advertisement or by notice sent by post, messenger or otherwise to the registered address of every policy-holder qualified to be present and vote; but it is only in the case of policy-holders holding one or more policy or policies for not less than Rs. 3,000 in the aggregate who are entitled under this article to a written notice; all other policy-holders are to receive notice by advertisement only; and the article further provides that the accidental omission to give such individual notice to any such policy-holders or the nonreceipt of the same by any of them shall not, if the meeting shall have been duly advertised, invalidate the proceedings thereat. Only policyholders holding one or more policy or policies for at least Rs. 3,000 in the aggregate are entitled to vote by proxy at the meeting and the instrument appointing a proxy has to be deposited at the office of the company not less than 48 hours before the time for holding the meeting and the form of proxy is set out in that article. The article further makes provision for the advertisement in one English and one-Vernacular daily newspaper in Madras City of the names of the policy-holders nominated as candidates for the office of Policy-holders' Directors. The voting at the meeting is to be by ballot. Article 77 provides that, if at any policy-holders' meeting the election of Policy-holders' Directors does not for any reason (whether by the policy-holders present not choosing to elect any person or by no eligible person being available for election at the meeting or by the meeting being dissolved for want of a quorum or otherwise) take place, it shall be deemed that no Policy-holders' Directors are elected by the policyholders for the year and Article 79 enables the directors of defendant 1's company to appoint Policy-holders' Directors themselves in the event of the policyholders not electing a director or directors at their meeting. In accordance with the Articles of Association the directors of defendant 1's company convened a meeting of the policy-holders for the purpose of electing. Policy-holders' Directors' on 21st April 1928 at 4 p.m at defendant 1's company's premises.

    3. It is not disputed by the plaintiffs that the requisite notice and advertisement as to the date of the meeting and the names of the candidates for election were issued. The candidates were Messrs C. Munusami Chetti, R. Rangachariar, plaintiff 2 in this suit, B. Sitarama Rao, Watrap S. Subramania Aiyar, plaintiff 1 and Vydhianathan, Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Pachaiappa's College, Madras. Of these, the first named was a pleader and the others, with the exception of the last named, were then vakils of the High Court and are now advocates. The meeting on 21st April started at the appointed time and there were some 97 policyholders present including defendant 7. The meeting commenced at about 4 p.m and Mr. A.R Venkatarama Aiyar, a Bench Clerk of the High Court of Madras was elected chairman of the meeting. After this those attending the meeting were welcomed by defendant 7 in a speech of some duration. After the election of Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar as chairman the proceedings were interrupted by a speech made by a dismissed servant of defendant 1's company who apparently desired to ventilate certain grievances.

    4. This speech lasted for about half-an-hour and the speaker seems to have been very difficult to suppress. But it was pointed eventually that he was not a policyholder entitled to vote at the meeting and he was thereupon ejected from it. Then one of the policy-holders Mr. K. Narasimha Aiyangar raised a point of order that the meeting was not properly convened inasmuch as individual notices by post, messenger or otherwise to the registered address of every qualified policyholder had not been given. There was some discussion with regard to this point of order but eventually the chairman quite properly ruled that the meeting was properly constituted. There was then a discussion with regard to the adequacy of the notice of the meeting given do policy-holders and with regard to the date of the meeting and also with regard to the notice containing the names of the candidates for election at the meeting. Ia this discussion it was not contended that defendant 1 company had not complied literally with the Articles of Association. The speakers complained that in fact the notices required by the Articles of Association were wholly insufficient and it was a fact that many policyholders were quite unaware that the meeting was to be held that day. It was also pointed out that a large number of policy-holders live in places very remote from Madras and that the requirement of only four days' notice to the policy-holders of the names of the candidates for election was wholly insufficient since it was improbable that notices should reach policy-holders living at a distance from Madras in sufficient time to be of any value to them.

    5. An example was given by Me. Watrap S. Subramania Aiyar, plaintiff 1, with regard to policyholders living in Tinnevelly and it was pointed out that notices containing the names of the candidates published in the news-papers of 18th April could not reach policyholders in Tinnevelly in time for them to come to Madras to vote in person nor could they vote by proxy because the proxy form has under the Articles of Association to be registered in the company's books 48 hours before the date of the meeting. A good deal of the information as to what took place is to be found in a report in the columns of the Hindu of April 1925. This report was put in by the defendants in the course of cross-examination and is an exhibit filed by the defendants and was put in as being an accurate report of what took place at the meeting and the witness was cross-examined upon it. There is, of course, also the evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses which I think does not vary except possibly in certain trifling respects from the account given in the Hindu. Plaintiff 1 for the reasons already referred to suggested that there should be an adjournment of the meeting so that due notice might be given to the policyholders of the company and sufficient time given for them to exercise their vote. At this point there was a discussion as to whether or not the result of an adjournment would be to cause the policy-holders to forfeit their right to elect directors, as certain speakers took the view that, if instead of electing directors at the meeting, the meeting were adjourned, the directors might be entitled to appoint directors themselves on the ground that the policy-holders had not chosen to elect directors at the meeting.

    6. After some discussion upon this matter as the view seemed to be general that there should be an adjournment, the chairman took the sense of the meeting and found that it was in favour of an adjournment, but the actual resolution to adjourn was not put to the meeting at that stage because it was desired to discuss other matters and to pass resolutions with regard to those other masters. The resolution to adjourn was, therefore, left until the end. The policyholders then proceeded to discuss those matters which subsequently were the subjects of resolutions and a discussion arose with regard to the proxies and the chairman was asked to obtain from defendant 7 information with regard to the number of proxy forms registered by the company for purposes of this meeting. There was some difficulty in getting this information from defendant 7. But eventually he informed the meeting that 158 proxies were registered and further questions elicited from him the information that 78 of these proxies were in the name of one Mr. Sundaresa Aiyar, an agent of the company. Prom the minutes kept by the chairman it would appear that 120 proxy votes were in the hands of eight of the agents and employees of the company and it was also stated by one speaker that an agent of the company had been going about in a motor-car on, days previous to the meeting collecting proxies. The meeting then proceeded to piss its resolution which was that

    Candidates for election to the places of the Policy-holders' Directors be given by this company within three days from this date a list of the policy-holders with their present addresses together with an additional list as to which of them are entitled to vote by proxy or the candidates be allowed access to the books of the company to make out their own lists of policy-holders with their present addresses as well as the list of such of them as are entitled to vote by proxy.

    7. Defendant 7 raised a point of order and the chairman ruled that the resolution was in order and according to the minutes the resolution was passed unanimously, although I think that in view of defendant 7's objection he must really have voted against the resolution. The second resolution was as follows:

    That no proxy be registered by this company in the name of this company's employees or agents for the election of the Policy-holders' Directors at the adjourned meeting as well as in future elections.

    8. This resolution was carried by a large majority, only four voting against it. The third resolution was as follows:

    That intimation of the adjourned meeting for the election of the Policy-holders' Directors be given forthwith in The Hindu, the Swarajya, the Justice, the Andhra Patrika, the Matrubhumi and the Swadesamitran.

    9. This resolution was carried unanimously. The fourth resolution was as follows:

    That individual notices by post be given by this company forthwith to every policy-holder irrespective of the value of his policy or policies of the adjourned meeting for the election of the Policy-holders' Directors.

    10. This resolution was carried unanimously. The fifth and last resolution was one for adjourning the meeting and was as follows:

    That this meeting for the election of the Policy-holders' Directors do stand adjourned to 5th May, 1928, at 5-30 p.m in this company's premises.

    11. This resolution was carried with one dissentient. The meeting accordingly adjourned until 5th May. On 1st May 1928, however, the following notice appeared in the Hindu. It is headed “United India Life Assurance Company Limited: Policy-holders' Directors” and is as follows:

    As at the meeting of the policy-holders of the company convened by the directors and held on 21st April 1928 for the specific purpose of electing from among the Policy-holders of the company not more than two gentleman as Policy-holders' Directors for the current year no persons were elected as Policy-holders' Directors the Board of Directors of the company have by a resolution passed unanimously at their meeting held on 29th April, 1928, appointed under the powers reserved to them the following two policy-holders of the company as Policyholders' Directors to hold office as such until the election of Policy-holders' directors in the year 1928.

    12. Then follow the names of two persons (1) Dewan Bahadur T. Raghaviah, C.S.I, and (2) Mr. B. Sitarama Rao, B.A, B.L, High Court Vakil. This announcement was made by order of the Board of Directors of defendant 1 Company. On 2nd May Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar, the chairman of the meeting of 21st April, and the two plaintiffs wrote to defendant 1 company with reference to the notification which had appeared in the Hindu of the previous day. The writers stated that the appointment by the directors of Mr. Baghaviah and Mr. Sitarama Rao was illegal and that the policyholders intended to hold the adjourned meeting on 5th May at the company's premises and at that meeting to elect their own representatives to the directly rate. They requested defendant 1 company to arrange for the adjourned meeting to be held at the company's premises and to give the policy-holders all facilities for carrying out the election. To this letter defendant 1 company replied through its Managers pointing out that the directors had acted in a correct and proper manner in making the two appointments and pointing out that in the view of the directors the adjourned meeting would not be in order and expressing their inability to arrange for the holding of the adjourned meeting at the company's premises or providing the facilities asked for. On the same day plaintiff wrote to defendant 1 company asking for a definite statement as to whether or not the company would allow the policy-holders to meet in the company's premises on 5th May and defendant 1 company on 3rd May wrote to say that it was unable to arrange for the holding of the adjourned meeting at the premises of the company. It was then arranged with Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar, the chairman of the meeting, that as defendant 1 company had declined to allow the policy-holders to meet in its premises on 5th May the meeting should be held instead at the Mahajana Sabha Hall, Mount Road, and this change of venue was on the same day and on the next, advertised in the press and hand-bills to the same effect were distributed and on the day of the adjourned meeting persons were stationed at the office of defendant 1 company to re-direct any policy-holders to the Mahajana Sabha Hall in case they should have failed to have notice of the change of venue. The meeting of the policy-holders was duly held on 5th May and the plaintiffs were elected by ballot. There were present 62 policy-holders and the same formalities were gone through as at the previous meeting with regard to the attendance of policy-holders, namely act policy-holder was required to sign his name in the attendance book and did so. I do not think it necessary to refer to the correspondence on matters of a later date. I will content myself with stating that the directors of defendant 1 company refused to recognize the election of the plaintiffs as Policy-holders' Directors. There is one matter which in passing I should mention and it is this, that the two gentlemen who were appointed by the directors themselves, namely Messrs Raghaviah and Sitaram Rao, refused to accept those positions. The position therefore is that no Policy-holders' Directors have been appointed by the directors of defendant 1 company and, if their contention is right, no directors have been validly elected by the policyholders. The plaintiffs have therefore filed this suit claiming that they were validly elected Policy-holders' Directors and for injunctions against all the defendants.

    13. The defences put forward by the defendants at the trial were (1) that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue, the defendants' contention being that individually they had no cause of action and that the suit should have been filed by the policyholders as a body and the point was also taken that the directors themselves could not be sued personally, (2) that the meeting of 21st April had no power to adjourn itself, and if it had, it was not adjourned for a bona fide purpose, and (3) that the adjourned meeting was irregular because it was not held in the office of defendant 1 company as is provided for in the Articles of Association.

    14. I shall now proceed to deal with the defendants' contentions. Mr. S. Doraiswami Aiyar on behalf of the defendants did not seriously press the defence that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue in view of the decision of Sir George Jessel, M.R, in Pulbrook v. Richmond Consolidated Mining Co.(1), which seems to me to be authority both for the statement that a director who has been excluded from acting as a director by the directors of a company can sustain an action in his own name on the ground of individual injury to himself and for the statement that such an action can be sustained against the other directors. On p. 612 Sir George Jessel, M.R says:

    The first question is whether a director who is improperly and without cause excluded by his brother directors from the board from which they claim the right to exclude him is entitled to an order restraining his brother directors from so excluding him.

    15. In this case a man is necessarily a shareholder in order to be a director, and as a director he is entitled to fees and remuneration for his services, and it might be a question whether he would be entitled to the fees if he did not attend meetings of the board. He has been excluded. Now, it appears to me that this is an individual wrong, or a wrong that has been done to an individual. It is a deprivation of his legal rights for which the directors are personally and individually liable. He has a right by the constitution of the company to take a part in its management to be present, and to vote at the meetings of the board of directors. He has a perfect right to know what is going on at these meetings.

    16. And on p. 613 the contention of the defendants upon this point is completely negatived by the following statement:

    But in a case of an individual wrong, another share-holder cannot on behalf of himself and others, not being the individuals to whom the wrong is done, maintain an action for that wrong.

    17. If further authority is needed it is to be found in the 10th edition of Buckley on the Companies Acts at p. 621 where it is stated:

    A single share-holder may sue the company to enforce any individual right of his own, for example, his right to have his vote recorded or his right as a director to restrain his co-directors from excluding him from the board.

    18. I think it is perfectly clear that the plaintiffs are not only entitled to maintain this suit but that no other policyholders could on their behalf have maintained, and further that the several defendants, the directors of defendant 1 company, have properly been impleaded as defendants.

    19. I now go to the question as to whether or not the meeting had power to adjourn itself. Mr. Doraiswami Aivar's contention is that it had no such power. He has in great detail referred to the Articles of Association and in particular to that article which refers to the ordinary general meeting of the shareholders of defendant 1 company which expressly authorizes an adjournment of that general meeting, that is Article 46. He also refers to the form of proxy which is to be used at that ordinary general meeting and in particular draws my attention to the fact that on the instrument of proxy it is stated to be available at the general meeting of the company and “any adjournment thereof.” I am then asked to contrast those articles with the articles which relate to the Policyholders' meeting. There is no article which gives power to the Policy-holders' meeting to adjourn. There is no mention of any adjournment at all. Then the instrument of proxy authorizes its use at the meeting of the policy-holders to be held on the day and does not, like the proxy to be used at the ordinary general meeting, state that it is to be used or may be used at any adjournment thereof.

    20. Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar, therefore, contends that I am bound to infer from the absence of any provision in the Articles of Association of any adjournment of the Policy-holders' meeting, and from the statement of it in the instrument of proxy of its exercise on the day of the meeting, with no reference to its use at any adjourned meeting, that an adjournment of the Policy-holders' meeting is prohibited. I do not in the least agree with this contention. The mere absence of any provisions with regard to an adjournment does not give rise to an inference that a power to adjourn is prohibited. I am satisfied that the reasonable view to take is that it never occurred to the company when the Articles of Association were framed that it would be necessary to adjourn the Policyholders' meeting which is merely for the purpose of transacting the business of electing Policy-holders' directors and no provision was therefore made for such a contingency. Whereas when the company had to consider the articles with regard to the ordinary general meeting it had clearly to provide for a very obvious contingency, namely, the adjournment of such a meeting at which a great deal of business must necessarily be disposed of and which, it would be likely on some occasions, could not be disposed of at one meeting. The fact that no reference is made in the Articles of Association to an adjournment of the policy-holders' meeting is in my view clearly due to the failure to realize that such a contingency might arise. Nor can I see any reason why there should be any distinction intentionally drawn between the ordinary general meeting and-the meeting of the policy-holders or why it should be argued that it was intended that the one could be adjourned and not the other. For these reasons, in my view, Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar's contention that an adjournment of the Policyholders' meeting is prohibited by the Articles of Association is not well-founded.

    21. I have now got to consider whether the meeting had any power to adjourn itself and with regard to this I think it is beyond all question that there is a common law right in every meeting to, adjourn itself—it must be so—and that every meeting is entitled to adjourn unless it is prohibited by express enactment. To say otherwise would be to prevent in a certain number of cases the proper business of a meeting being completed. It would also enable evilly-disposed persons to obstruct and prolong, the meeting to such an hour as to make it impossible to continue it further. In such a case as this there must be power to adjourn the meeting so that the discussion of the business before the meeting can be continued and completed. Quite apart from the example I have given, a meeting might quite easily be necessarily and honestly prolonged to an-hour when an adjournment would be inevitable. Let me take for example the case of a Policy-holders' meeting for the-purpose of electing Policy-holders' directors. Suppose there should be 24 candidates for election which is by no means an impossible supposition. There might be a long discussion with regard to each of the candidates, some speakers being in favour of some of the candidates, others being opposed. This discussion would take a considerable time and, it is quite conceivable, might last many hours. According to the contention of the defendants, the discussion would have to go on notwithstanding the late hour to which he meeting had necessarily been prolonged. I think that is an impossible view to take of the matter and am satisfied that, quite apart from common sense, the law also gives the right to every meeting to adjourn itself unless there is an express prohibition to the contrary. There are some English cases upon the point, which, I think, clearly establish this. The first of those to which I propose to refer is King v. Mayor Burgesses and Commonalty of Carmarthen(2). I do not propose to refer to the facts of the case except to say that the question to be decided in that case was whether a meeting which had been adjourned from unavoidable necessity could be so adjourned and it was held that it could. I propose only to refer quite briefly to the passages in the judgments in that case. Le Blanc, J., said:

    Common sense shows that the charter must have meant that the corporate body should have power to adjourn in order to conclude such business as they had regularly begun, otherwise it would be in the power of any person by contrivance to protract the business and prevent the claims being effectual. Upon these grounds it strikes me that a peremptory mandamus ought to go.

    22. Bayley, J., said:

    I have no difficulty in saying that the Corporation must of necessity have the power of adjournment, in order to conclude such business as they began, and had not time to finish on the charter-day. The business to be done is to fill up vacancies in the Corporation, and to receive the claims and hear the proofs of such persons as claim. That is the general business of the day; which I take it, constitutes one entire business, as much as the election of a mayor.

    23. Dampier, J., said:

    It seems to me, from the very nature of this case, to be absolutely necessary that the corporate body should have the power of adjournment, in order to give effect to the inchoate rights of the claimants, and to guard against the possibility of their claims being frustrated by any contrivance.

    24. The next case is Stoughton v. Reynolds(3), in which it was held that the adjournment of a vestry meeting is by common right vested in the parishioners at large and not in the vicar. The facts of that case quite shortly were that there were two church wardens of the parish, one of whom was elected by the vicar and the other by the parishioners. At the meeting in question, the vicar nominated his churchwarden and two candidates were put up by the parishioners, one of whom was the plaintiff in that case. Some of the parishioners polled for the plaintiff and others for the other candidates. But before all the parishioners had polled, the vicar, who was in the chair, adjourned the meeting until the next day. This adjournment was opposed on behalf of the plaintiff and by some of the parishioners, but nevertheless the meeting was adjourned but several parishioners who remained at the meeting, although it had been adjourned, continued to poll and at the close of the poll that day the plaintiff had obtained a majority of the votes. At the adjourned meeting, however, the rival candidates to the plaintiff obtained a majority. It was held by the Court that the plaintiff had been duly elected because the vicar had no right to adjourn the meeting which was a right which was in the persons who constituted the assembly and not in the vicar. Lord Hardwicke, C.J, said after stating that it must be shown that by law or by some custom the vicar himself has power to adjourn a meeting of the vestry and finding no authority to the contrary:

    What is the consequence? It is that the right is in the assembly itself, for, if there be an assembly all consisting of equals and there is no custom, nor rule of law, to direct the adjournment, the right must be in the persons who constitute the assembly.

    25. In the tenth edition of Buckley on the Companies Acts, on p. 615, in the Notes to Article 55, it is stated:

    There is a common law right of adjournment of a public meeting.

    26. It is not disputed by Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar and Mr. Narasimha Aiyar on behalf of the plaintiffs that, although there is an inherent right in a meeting to adjourn itself, the adjournment must be for a bona fide purpose. I think that is quite clear as it can never be the law that a meeting can adjourn itself for the purpose of frustrating the business which it was called to transact. Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar, however, contends that this was not a bona fide adjournment of the meeting. He frankly concedes that the plaintiffs and those policy holders who voted in favour of the adjournment were moved to do so from the purest and most honest of motives. He stated at the end of the plaintiffs' case that he did not propose to call any evidence for the purpose of contradicting any statement which any of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, and plaintiff 1 himself, had made in the witness-box. He accepted the whole of the evidence of these persons and did not in any way desire to challenge it. That admission of Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar is a very frank one indeed and it is one which, in my view, goes the full length of establishing the plaintiffs' case that the meeting was adjourned for the purpose of getting a better representation of policyholders at the adjourned meeting and that only. That is what all the witnesses for the plaintiffs have said. Attempts were made in cross-examination to show that the object of the adjournment was to defeat the proxies and to secure the election of persons who would otherwise not have been elected had the policy-holders proceeded to an election on that day. But one fact stands out clearly and it is this, that there was no discussion with regard to proxies at all until the sense of the meeting had been taken by Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar, the Chairman, and it had been ascertained that the meeting was entirely in favour of adjourning until another date, the reason for the adjournment being that those present thought that although the Articles of Association had been strictly complied with, nevertheless there were numbers of policy-holders who not only had no notice of the meeting but could not have had any notice of the names of the candidates and that is what all the witnesses for the plaintiffs have said.

    27. Their evidence is accepted by Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar and is uncontradicted by any evidence called on behalf of the defendants and he also concedes that there must be many Policyholders who did not in fact get to know of the meeting. In my view it is obvious that the meeting was adjourned for a bona fide purpose, to enable better representation of policyholders at the election of Policy-holders' directors; and I find as a fact on the evidence that it was that reason which brought about the adjournment. The discussion and the passing of the other resolution do not in my view affect the question in the least bit. It is, of course, obvious that the policy-holders could not pass those other resolutions to the effect that they did which could in any way bind defendant 1 company for one reason alone, namely, that to carry out those resolutions would have-meant an alteration in the Articles of: Association.

    28. The defendants have stressed the discussion and the passing of these resolutions which, it is contended, were entirely outside the business for which the meeting was called and it is pointed out that defendant 7 produced a letter of instruction to the meeting in which it was pointed out that the sole business to be transacted at the meeting, was that of electing policy-holders' directors. I think myself that the chairman was wrong in allowing those resolutions to be put as all the Articles of Association had been complied with, with regard to the calling of the meeting. If they had not, then it would have been the duty of those present to have pointed that out. Bub I am bound to say that though these resolutions were out of order the Policy-holders were not unreasonable in regarding the procedure with regard to calling the meeting and also with regard to the proxies as most imperfect and with regard to the proxies undesirable as well. Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar admitted that, even if the Articles of Association were strictly complied with, there must still be a large number of policy-holders in the mofussal and outside the presidency itself who did not get notice of the meeting of policyholders. This, I think, must be obvious, because it is only those policy-holders who hold policies aggregating to Rs. 3,000 who are entitled even to-a written notice. The other policy-holders who are a very large majority have to depend on the advertisement in certain newspapers in the Madras city and it may be only by mere chance that they came to know of any notice with regard to the meeting, and it was in order to remedy this that the resolution-to that effect was passed by the meeting. As I say it was entirely out of order. With regard to the proxies I think that the Policy-holders were perfectly justified in the critioizms which they made and which resulted in the resolution being passed although that was out of order. The position is this, that the company alone has access to the list; of Policy-holders. It is therefore in the position of being able to collect proxies-in the hands of its agents which it cam use for whatever purpose it desires at a meeting. The Policy-holders have no means of ascertaining who are the policyholders entitled to vote at a meeting. In the immediate circle of their friends policy-holders may know of other policyholders, but it is impossible for them to know to any useful extent who the policyholders are and to obtain proxies from them which they the policy-holders can use at a meeting. This is, of course, absolutely one-sided. It means that the company can control the voting at the Policy-holders' meeting and secure the election of whichever candidate or candidates the company desires and can bring about the defeat of the candidate the company does not desire to have upon its board. A great deal was said by Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar about this great and new privilege which had been granted under the new Articles of Association to the Policy-holders. On the face of it does appear to be a privilege.

    29. In fact in the hands of a company which does not choose to act in a bona fide manner the privilege is no privilege at all. The company can itself nominate any candidate it desires either by one of its directors who is a policy-holder or any of its servants or agents who are Policy-holders because every policyholder is entitled to nominate candidates for election. In this way the company can elect from its Policy-holders any person or persons whom it may choose to be elected to its board; in other words, it can, if it chooses, select mere puppets in the hands of the other directors of the board and by means of proxies secure the election of them and it is of importance to refer to certain facts which came out at the meeting of 21st April. It appeared that one Mr. T.K Sundaresa Aiyar was the holder of about 80 proxies in his own name. Mr. Sundaresa Aiyar is an agent of defendant 1 company and it was stated at the meeting that this gentleman had gone round in a motorcar collecting proxies previous to the meeting. Some other proxies were also held by other servants of defendant 1, company. It is quite clear that the proxies in the hands of Mr. Sundaresa Aiyar were nearly sufficient to defeat the unanimous vote of the policyholders present. But it does not need much common sense or effort of imagination to suppose that defendant 1 company had collected these proxies for the purpose of using them in a certain way. Defendant 1 company was not through its agent collecting proxies merely as curios; the intention to do something with those proxies must be attributed to defendant 1 company. I think it is beyond question that the intention of defendant 1 company was to secure the election of two candidates of their own selection and certainly to bring about the defeat of plaintiff 1 Mr. Watrap Subramania Aiyar. I say that for the following reasons: During the trial the nomination papers with regard to the candidates nominated for election were put in and I find this, that one of the candidates, Mr. B. Sitarama Bao, who was one of those subsequently appointed as a Policy-holders' director by the directors themselves, was proposed as a candidate by Mr. T.K Sundaresa Aiyar, an agent of defendant 1 company, who was the holder of all these proxies at the Policy-holders' meeting. It does not seem to be a violent inference to draw that Mr. Sutidaresa Aiyar would have used the proxies he had in his hand for the purpose of securing the election of Mr. Sitarama Rao. I also notice that Mr. Vydianathan was proposed as a candidate by Mr. Sundaresa Aiyar.

    30. Mr. Sitarama Rao was proposed by an other policy-holder as well, Mr. K.S Rajagopala Aiyangar, who is one of the advocates at this trial for the defendants and is, I believe, one of defendant 1 company's legal advisers, so that two of the candidates for election were proposed by an agent of the company in whose hands the bulk of the proxies were and by one of its legal advisers. I have no hesitation in describing Mr. Sitarama Rao as defendant 1 company's candidate at the election. Mr. Sitarama Rao is a gentleman of repute and standing at the bar and no doubt would have made an excellent Policy-holders' director, but the privilege of electing a Policy-holders' director is supposed to be that of the Policy-holders themselves and not of defendant 1 company. But there is more than this. During the cross-examination of the plaintiffs' witnesses and of Mr. Watrap Subramania Aiyar himself they were asked questions which at first I had some difficulty in seeing had any bearing upon this case. The questions put sought to establish the fact that there was at the time of the Policy-holders' meeting a body called the Policyholders' Protection Association and Mr. Watrap Subramania Aiyar was asked whether he was not or had not been an office-bearer in that association.

    31. Those questions were founded on wrong premises because the evidence is that although there had been such an association before the Policy-holders' meeting it was defunct at the time of the meeting and had been so for some months but that since the meeting that association had been revived. The suggestion of the defendants was that Mr. Watrap Subramania Aiyar was the candidate put forward by this association; that was in fact incorrect. But supposing he had been, what was there wrong in a Policyholders' protection association putting forward a candidate who in the opinion of that association was a person who was likely to usefully represent them on the board of directors and who would look after their interest? The questions were put to the witnesses almost as if the formation of such a body was something very wrong. Why should it be? Why should not policy-holders form am association for their own protection? There are in this Insurance Company as in others a very large number of policyholders, a great many of whom have no doubt paid their premie for very many years and have done so with the object that at their deaths the policy money should go to their representatives, or, if they had insured for a term of years that they themselves should get the policy money. Why should they not form an association to protect their interest when they have invested a very large amount of money in the company in the shape of premia? But the fact that Mr. Watrap Subramania Aiyar was supposed to be the candidate of this supposed association, that is the Policy-holders' protection association, clearly shows one thing, namely that he was on account of that association a person whom the directors did not desire to have elected to the board as a Policy-holders' director. Mr. Watrap Subramania Aiyar, from what I have seen of him in the witness-box, is what can be described as a live wire and the fact that defendant company regard the formation of an association for the protection of Policy-holders as being an association hostile to themselves, as they obviously do, leads to the not unreasonable inference that the business of defendant 1 company is being carried on in a way which is likely to cause dissatisfaction to the policyholders. I think that it is quite clear that the proxies in the hands of the company's servants at the meeting of 21st April would have been used for the purpose of securing the election of those candidates who had been proposed by the company's agents and would most certainly have been used to bring about the defeat of Mr. Watrap Subramania Aiyar. Anything more likely to create feelings of distrust and suspicion in the minds of the policyholders present at that meeting than this it is impossible to imagine. But it is because of these resolutions which were passed that Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar contends that the meeting had no right to adjourn itself. He admits that the meeting did so, as I have already said, for the purpose of securing better representation of policyholders at the next meeting. He does not challenge the bona fides of the Policy-holders. He admits that they were perfectly honest but he seeks to distinguish between bona fide in fact and bona fide of law. His argument is based upon a sort of theory of constructive mala fides; that is, however honest and high-minded a person may be in fact, in law he is dishonest and mala fide. That proposition strikes me as being an astounding one on the face of it. How can these persons who have been awarded by Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar the highest testimonials as to their bona fides and honesty be said in law to have been dishonest and mala fide. I confess that I cannot follow Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar's argument. Either they were bona fide or they were not. Elsewhere apparently an attempt to establish this strange proposition was made but was most ruthlessly dealt with by Lord Watson in Adams v. G.N.S Ry. Co.(4). In another case, namely Alexandar v. Bridge Allan Water Co.(5) a Scotch case, one of the Judges had said:

    That which the law has stamped with the character of legal corruption may exist where the motives are perfectly pure, as no one can doubt was the case here, and in Adams v. G.N.S Ry. Co., it was attempted to apply that ruling i.e, the theory of “constructive corruption” or “constructive dishonesty.” On p. 46 dealing with that argument Lord Watson said as follows:

    32. I feel bound to protest against the view expressed by some of the Scotch Judges in the cases to which we have been referred at the bar, with regard to what they call “constructive corruption.” I suppose that as well as “constructive corruption” you may have “constructive bribery” and “constructive falsehood.” The meaning of it appears to be this that in order to satisfy the ends of justice in dealing with the validity of an award, it is necessary to invoke this constructive principle of which I have under all circumstances the greatest distrust; and that for the purpose of doing justice it is necessary to call a man “corrupt” who is not corrupt but honest, to call a man “bribed” who never listened to an improper suggestion from any quarter, to call a man “false” who never uttered a falsehood. I do not doubt that corruption might be infer red from the terms of an award; and it is clear that, if Lord Thurlow used the expression “constructive corruption” in Colquhoun v. Corbet(6), he must have used it in that sense. Even in that case the term is inappropriate, because such corruption is actual and not constructive.

    33. Lord Bramwell at p. 47 said:

    My Lords, I am entirely of the same opinion, and I desire to express my hearty concurrence in what has been said by my noble and learned friend opposite (Lord Watson) about “constructive corruption.” I think that and similar expressions are only used by persons who have a desire to bring about a certain result, and do not know how to do so by the use of ordinary and intelligible expressions.

    34. I think that the observations of those two eminent Law Lords are quite sufficient to dispose of Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar's theory of constructive dishonesty and constructive mala fides. These observations dispose of the question as to whether the meeting had the power to adjourn itself and whether it did so for a bona fide purpose. The answer is, the meeting had the right to adjourn itself and did so for a perfectly bona fide purpose.

    35. The next question which I have got to consider is whether the adjourned meeting was a valid one or not, not in the sense that the meeting had no right to adjourn itself but whether that adjourned meeting was a regular one. A great deal of time was occupied in argument on behalf of the defendants and some in cross-examination, in order to show that the effect of adjourning the meeting was to make the proxies valueless; in other words, that the proxies were only good for the first meeting and not for the second and that, therefore, the very fact of the adjournment was to disenfranchise all those policy-holders who had chosen to appoint proxies instead of themselves voting and it seems to have been the view of some of the Policy-holders present at the meeting of 21st April that such might be the case. But I am satisfied, as I have already stated, that if was not for the purpose of defeating proxies that the adjournment was resolved upon but for the purpose of getting better representation of the policy-holders at the next meeting. There is, however, no substance in the defendants' arguments. Proxies which were registered for the meeting of 21st April were good for the adjourned meeting or any other adjourned meetings and but for the fact that the defendants had acted so precipitately in hastening to appoint their own nominees before the adjourned meeting, Mr. Sundaresa Aiyar could have appeared at the adjourned meeting and used all the proxies in his name for whatever purpose he desired. It is perfectly clear that an adjourned meeting is the same meeting and merely a continuation of the meeting. This question of the availability of proxies at an adjourned meeting has been dealt with in the English Courts. In Maclaren v. Thompson(7), it was held that where the articles of a company provided that the instrument appointing a proxy shall be deposited at the registered office of the company not less that two clear days before the day for holding the meeting at which the person named in such instrument proposes to vote, proxies lodged after the date of an original meeting, but more than two days before the day fixed for an adjournment thereof, cannot be used for the purpose of voting at the adjourned meeting. The reason for so deciding was that the adjourned meeting is merely a continuation of the first meeting; in other words, the adjourned meeting is to be considered as the original meeting. Warrington, L.J, on p. 266 after dealing with the Articles of Association in which it is quite clear that the question of adjournments was provided for, said:

    It is perfectly plain that under these articles for a very large number of purposes a meeting which has been interrupted by an adjournment, or by more than one adjournment, is nevertheless to be treated as a single and continuous meeting—one meeting.

    36. In other cases it has been held that an adjourned meeting is merely the same meeting but a continuation of it. The first is the well-known case of Scadding v. Lorant(8). In that case it was held that where notice of the purpose of a vestry meeting has been duly given, and that meeting has begun but not completed a certain business, and the meeting is regularly adjourned, such business may lawfully be completed at the adjourned meeting though the notice for summoning such adjourned meeting does not state the purpose for which it is summoned. In this case the House of Lords called for the opinion of the Judges upon this question and the opinion of the Judges was unanimous, namely, that it was sufficient to give notice on the church door of the purpose to which the first meeting was to assemble and that notice extended to all adjourned meetings, such adjourned meetings being for the purpose of completing unfinished business of the previous meeting and all being in continuation of the first meeting. Daring the course of the argument the Lord Chancellor asked the following question:

    Does not the same authority continue from day to day after the business is declared not to be concluded as from hour to hour in the same day? Suppose we were to adjourn now for a quarter of an hour, would it not be the same meeting when the house resumed its sittings?

    37. This case was followed in the case of Kerr v. Wilkie(9) in which it was held that where notice of the meeting had been properly given there was no necessity for notice of its bona fide adjournment. At p. 1021 Lord Campbell, L.C, stated:

    But it seems to me quite clear, that this meeting having the power of adjournment, and having exercised that power bona fide when the adjournment took place, it was part of that meeting just as much as if it had been a meeting held on the same day. Supposing there had been a debate, as was suggested during the argument, and that during that debate the clock had struck 12 at night. Could there not have been an adjournment till the following day at 9 o'clock, and would not the meeting which was then resumed have been part of the meeting which had taken place the day before? I cannot doubt it for a moment; and whether the adjournment be only for three hours or for three days, if the proceeding be bona fide, can make no difference.

    38. On p. 1023 Lord Chelmsford made observations which are useful upon the points raised in this case both as regards the regularity of an adjourned meeting and the power of a meeting to adjourn itself. He said as follows:

    I should have thought that when a meeting is to be held, and business to be transacted, and where it is possible that at the original meeting the whole of the business may not be got through, there must be power to adjourn that meeting, and that the adjourned meeting must be considered as part of the original meeting.

    39. The cases to which I have referred? make it quite clear that the meeting of 5th May was a part of the meeting of 21st April and the meeting was therefore a perfectly regular one.

    40. But the defendants who seem to me to have raised every possible contention in the course of what I can only describe as very bitter litigation raise the further point that the meeting was invalid because instead of taking place in the-company's office as is provided for in the Articles of Association and which was the place at which the meeting of the 21st April was called, the meeting took place in the Mahajana Sabha Hall. Before dealing with this contention I propose to-state that the meeting of the 5th May was in other respects perfectly regular. No one appears to have voted at that meeting who was not entitled to vote and the voting was by ballot. I particularly asked the question of the defendants as to whether they could show that any person who voted on that occasion was not qualified to vote. This is a matter which could easily be ascertained because the book in which the signatures of all those who were present at the meeting were taken was handed to the defendants during the trial for the purpose of being examined and Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar is unable to point out a single instance of any person unqualified to vote who did so. Therefore no unqualified person voted at that meeting, nor can it be suggested that persons who desired to vote were prevented from doing so by the change of venue. The change was advertised in the press, hand bills were distributed and the extra precaution was taken of stationing people at the office of defendant 1 company in order to redirect Policy-holders to the Mahajana Sabha Hall. No evidence has been called by the defendants to show that any single policyholder was through this change of venue prevented from voting and Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar does not suggest that such was the case. But nevertheless it is said that the meeting was irregular and the election at it of the plaintiffs invalid because of this change of venue. The first question to be asked is why was the venue changed? At the meeting of the 21st April it was decided that the adjourned meeting was to take place at the office of defendant 1 company, and I think upon the evidence given in this case that defendant 7 did say verbally that the company would give all facilities for that meeting. As a matter of fact the company proceeded to appoint its own directors in baste. Having done so it is clear that it refused to give the facilities for the meeting being held in its office and the other facilities which the Policy-holders desired; in fact, it clearly and definitely declined to allow the office to be used for the purpose of the adjourned meeting. The Policy-holders therefore selected the Mahajana Sabha Hall. It was the deliberate act of the defendants that caused this ohange of venue and Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar has argued with great force that it does not lie in the mouth of any one who has by his own act prevented something taking place afterwards to take exception to that state of affairs and to use that state of affairs for his own benefit. I think that argument is a perfectly sound one. It seems to me that it would be a travesty of the law if a person who has deliberately brought about a state of affairs should be allowed to take exception to that state of affairs and use that changed state for his own advantage. Two cases were referred to, which are cases arising out of contract, where the principle of law that a party shall not take advantage of his own wrong or of an event brought about by his own act or omission was discussed. The first case is New Zealand Shipping Co. v. Societedes Ateliers et Chantiers de France(10). In that case the respondents contracted to construct a steamer for the appellants and the contract contained a stipulation that if the builders should be unable to deliver the steamer within, in the event of France becoming engaged in a European War, eighteen months from the date agreed by the contract for completion thereupon this contract shall become void and all money paid by the purchasers shall be-re-paid to them.

    41. In this case it was held that the contract was void and not merely voidable because its non-fulfilment had not been brought about by any wrongful act or default on the part of the builders and it was said that a stipulation in a contract that it shall be void in a certain event is to be construed according to its natural meaning, subject to the principle of law that a party shall not take advantage of his own wrong or of an event brought about by his own act or emission. On p. 6 Lord Finlay in discussing this principle states:

    It is a principle of law that no one can in such case take advantage of the existence of a state of things which he himself produced. This is illustrated by the case of Roberts v. Wyatt(11). There the plaintiff had purchased an estate, and it was provided in the contract that the vendors should make out a good title, and on of before 21st December 1608, on receiving from the plaintiff the purchase money, execute a legal conveyance of the fee-simple. There was a proviso that “in case the vendors could not deduce a good and marketable title such as the purchaser or his counsel should approve, or if the purchaser should not pay the purchase money on the appointed day, the agreement should be utterly void.”

    42. The defendant refused to make a good title and this principle was applied against him. Continuing, Lord Finlay says:

    Lord Ellen borough applied the same principle to a case in which it was alleged that a lease became void by the failure of the lessee to pay the rent. I may quote the following sentences from his judgment: “In this case, as to this proviso, it would be contrary to an universal principle of law, that a party shall never take advantage of his own wrong, if we were to hold that a lease, which in terms is a lease for 12 years, should be a lease determinable at the will and pleasure of the lessee; and that a lessee by not paying his rent should be-at liberty to say that the lease is void.”

    43. In Quesnel Forks Gold Mining Co. Limited v. Ward(12), this principle was also dealt with. I think that the defendants cannot be heard to say that the change of venue was an irregularity such as to make the meeting of the 5th May invalid. Quite apart from this I think that this is an objection which the defendants themselves are not entitled to make. It is true that the Articles of Association provide for the meeting being held in defendant 1's office, but in what way have the defendants been injured? They have not shown that they suffered any injury whatever by the change of venue. The only persons who might complain—and they have not—are the Policy-holders. And, moreover, I cannot sea that the provision is the Articles of Association that the meeting is to be held at the company's office is an essential one. So long as the meeting was properly convened and regularly conducted, it does not seem to me to matter very much where the meeting is held. But in any case the first meeting was in fact held in the company's office strictly in compliance with the Articles of Association and I think that it would have been permissible at that meeting when it passed the resolution for an adjournment if it had then been thought to be more convenient to have adjourned the meeting to a place other than defendant 1's office. For the reasons I have given, in my view there is nothing in this last contention of Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar.

    44. The result is that the defendants have failed upon all points, and the plaintiffs are entitled to all the reliefs they claim in this suit. In these circumstances, it is hardly necessary for ma to deal with one of the contentions of the plaintiffs, namely, that in any event the appointment made by the directors was invalid. Since I have held that the meeting of the 21st April was properly adjourned and that the adjourned meeting was a valid one, it follows that no appointment made by the directors of other persons to be policy holder's directors could be valid. But I wish to say something more and it is this, that even supposing there had been some irregularity which would have made the adjourned meeting of the policyholders invalid, in my view the directors were not entitled when they did to make the two appointments they made. They purported to act under Article 77 of the Articles of Association. I have already referred to this article, but I repeat it again. It provides that: if at any Policy-holders' meeting the election of Policy-holders' directors does not far any reason (whether by the Policy-holders present not choosing to elect any person or by no eligible person being available for election at the meeting or by the meeting being dissolved foe want of a quorum or otherwise) take place, it shall be deemed that no Policy-holders' directors are elected by the Policy-holders for the year.

    45. The directors decided that no policy holders' directors had been elected by the policy-holders and proceeded to appoint their own two nominees to fill up the two vacancies; but although the Policy-holders' directors had not at that date been elected there was no warrant for the directors acting in this way. Lt follows that if an adjourned meeting is merely a continuation of the first meeting, and is in fact the meeting, until that meeting is over and until the policy holders have definitely and unequivocally expressed their intention not to elect Policy-holders' directors or shown clearly that they are not inclined to do so, Article 77 cannot apply at all. The only part of that article which it is suggested by the defendants can possibly apply is that part which relates to the policyholders present not choosing to elect any parson. It is true that at the first meeting no directors were elected, but it is perfectly manifest that so far from not choosing to elect Policy-holders' directors the whole of the efforts of the policyholders was directed to obtaining a better representation amongst the policyholders at the election with a view to the candidate who would be the real choice of the policyholders being elected and it is clear the directors cannot; take advantage of Article 77, and that the appointment of the two directors by the defendants was invalid.

    46. There is only one other thing that I desire to say and it is this. I think that it is a most deplorable thing that this case was not settled and that it should have been fought out to the bitter end by the defendants Efforts were made by disinterested persons to bring about a settlement and at one time it did appear that a settlement reasonable and honorable to both parties would result, but nothing came of those efforts. However, during the course of Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar's argument at my suggestion an offer was again made by the defendants and it was that there should be another election held by the policy-holders, that every facility should be given for it and that the defendants would undertake not to interfere in that election. This offer seemed to me to be a very reasonable one. However, Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar and Mr. Narasimha Aiyar and those associated with them and the plaintiffs carefully considered the matter and Mr. Narasimha Aiyar asked that the Court might be cleared in order that he might state to ma the reasons why his clients viewed that offer of the defendants with the gravest misgivings and questioned its bona fides. The Court was cleared and I listened to his statement and also to what Mr. Doraiswami Aiyar had to say in answer to it I do not think it right or necessary to say anything of what was stated to me. I merely content myself with saying that I am satisfied that the defendants' offer was declined by the plaintiffs in their honest relief that it was not bona fide. More than that I do not think it necessary for me to say. The result must be that the plaintiffs are declared validly elected “Policyholders' directors” of defendant company for the year 1928 and until the election of such directors for 1929 and that it must be declared that defendant 1 company had and has no power to nominate Policy-holders' directors for the year 1923, that there must be an injunction against all the defendants restraining them from excluding the plaintiffs or in any way restraining or interfering with the plaintiffs acting or attending as direct tors of defendant 1 company and also an injunction against all the defendants from making any further nominations as Policy-holders' directors. The plaintiffs must have the taxed costs of this suit. This case was a long fought out one and a difficult one and in my view justifies me in awarding the plaintiffs' costs on higher scale and seeing the acts complained of were done by the directors but otherwise they are individually and personally liable, I order the costs to be borne by them and met by defendant 1 company. I certify for two counsel.

    P.R.S/S.N

    47. Suit decreed.

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    (Watrap) S. Subramania Aiyar v. United India Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
    (Sep 14, 1928)