Dinesh Maheshwari, J.:— The applicant herein seeks to maintain an intra-court appeal against the order dated 13.04.2012 as passed in CWP No. 2996/2012 whereby the learned Single Judge of this Court has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 against the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in relation to a contract for collection of royalty and other charges for the mineral Sandstone, as dispatched from the areas held under quarry licenses within Tehsil Jodhpur, District Jodhpur.

2. The appeal filed by the applicant-appellant remains on the defect side with the office having raised the objection that the appellant was not a party to the writ petition. The applicant has moved an application seeking leave to appeal. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length on the application so moved by the applicant.

3. The relevant background aspects of the matter are that the Superintending Mining Engineer, Jodhpur invited tenders under a notification dated 23.01.2012 for awarding different royalty etc. collection contracts in terms of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 (‘the Rules of 1986’). The subject matter of the present case relates to item No. 3 of the said notification for the area and mineral as referred hereinabove. In regard to the contract in question, the mining department stated the yearly reserve price at Rs. 22,38,90,000/-; the tenders were to be received by 14.02.2012 and were to be opened on 16.02.2012 These dates for receiving and opening the tenders were later on extended to 22.02.2012 and 24.02.2012 respectively. In view of condition No. 2 of the notification, as the reserve price was beyond Rs. 10 lacs, the tenderer was required to submit, inter alia, a registration certificate per Rule 32(4) of the Rules of 1986. It is asserted that the applicant Shiva Corporation (India) Ltd. is duly registered in terms of Rule 32(4) ibid.; and offered its rates for the contract in question at Rs. 27,17,00,000/- as against the reserve price.

4. It is borne out that the writ petitioner Devdashrath Royalties (the respondent No. 1 herein), said to be a proprietorship concern, also made an offer at Rs. 27,87,87,878/- as regards the contract in question. The respondent No. 1 also submitted the registration certificate as required by the Rules of 1986 that was procured with submission of the requisite affidavit of the proprietor of the firm, inter alia, stating the fact that none of the member of his family was a partner in any firm in which any government dues were outstanding.

5. The bids for the contract in question were opened on 24.02.2012 where the offer as made by the respondent No. 1 was found to be the highest and the same was provisionally referred for sanction. However, at that stage, the respondent No. 1 was informed about the dues against a firm M.S Bhati & Company in which, the wife and sons of the proprietor of the respondent No. 1 were the partners. The proprietor of respondent No. 1 alleged that he was not aware about such dues but upon inquiry, it came to his knowledge that there were certain contracts executed by the said firm M.S Bhati & Company wherefor an amount of Rs. 24,25,102/- was outstanding; and in that firm, his wife Smt. Pramod Kanwar was also a partner at one point of time but subsequently, she ceased to be a partner therein. It was suggested that she retired on 09.04.2010 and, thereafter, the retirement deed was executed on 31.12.2011 It was also stated at the later stage that the said outstanding had been cleared off by the firm M.S Bhati & Company with interest. However, the bid as offered by the respondent No. 1 was rejected by the respondent No. 3 in his order dated 30.03.2012, inter alia, taking note of the background facts and while concluding as under:—

6. Thereafter, on 31.03.2012, the Superintending Mining Engineer issued a fresh notification inviting offers for the contract in question, this time putting the annual reserve price at Rs. 27,87,87,878/-, as per the offer made by the respondent No. 1.

7. The tenders on this fresh notification were to be submitted by 3:00 p.m of 09.04.2012 and were to be opened on 10.04.2012 at 3:00 p.m However, in the meantime, the respondent No. 1 filed the writ petition that has been decided by the order sought to be challenged herein. In this writ petition (CWP No. 2996/2012), on 09.04.2012, the learned Single Judge directed the learned Government Counsel to produce the record in regard to rejection of the bid of the writ petitioner; and the matter was adjourned to 10.04.2012 while recording the undertaking of the Government Counsel that the respondent-department would not open the (fresh) bids. Thereafter, on 10.04.2012, after perusing the record, the learned Single Judge placed the matter for final disposal on 13.04.2012 while restraining the respondents from awarding the contract in question to any other person until further orders.

8. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge decided and allowed the writ petition by the order dated 13.04.2012 The learned Single Judge considered the question arising for determination as to whether the affidavit as filed on behalf of the petitioner-firm was violative of Rule 35(vi)(c) of the Rules of 1986 for making a wrong statement that there were no dues outstanding of the department against the tenderer and his family members. The learned Single Judge, then, referred to the definition of family occurring in Rule 3(xiii-b) of the Rules of 1986 that reads: ‘“Family” means husband, wife and their dependent children.’ The learned Single Judge observed that though the wife and the major sons of the proprietor of the writ petitioner were the partners in the other concern said to be in default but, the department accepted the fact that the wife of the proprietor of the petitioner firm ceased to be the partner therein; however, 2 major sons, who were the partners of the defaulting firm, were treated as the family members of the petitioner and, therefore, the bid was cancelled.

9. The learned Single Judge opined that once the fact of retirement of the petitioner's wife from the partnership was brought to the notice of the department and was taken into consideration, it cannot be said that a false affidavit was filed. The learned Single Judge also observed that in any case, as on 30.03.2012, the day on which the rejection order was passed, there were no dues against the firm M.S Bhati & Company. The learned Judge proceeded to allow the writ petition while observing, inter alia, as under:—

“In my opinion, as per definition of “family” enumerated in the Rules of 1986, major sons cannot be treated as members of family and, admittedly, the fact of retirement from partnership of Smt. Pramod Kanwar, wife of the proprietor of the petitioner firm with effect from 09.04.2010 was brought to the notice of the Director, Mines and he observed said fact in the order but rejected the bid only on the ground that this fact of outstanding was not disclosed in the affidavit. In my considered opinion, first of all, once wife of the proprietor of the petitioner firm, deponent of the affidavit, ceased to be partner of firm prior to filing affidavit, then, if any outstanding of the firm was in existence that cannot be treated to be outstanding against wife of the proprietor of the petitioner firm because much before filing of affidavit the wife of proprietor of the petitioner firm retired from partnership under retirementdeed. Therefore, rejection of the tender bid of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 30.03.2012 is not sustainable in law.

Further, as per definition of “family”, the major sons cannot be treated to be family members, therefore, on that count also, there was no occasion for the Mining Director to exercise power under Rule 35(12) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986. Therefore, order impugned is not sustainable in law. It is also worthwhile to observe that even if all facts are accepted, then, too, on 30.03.2012, the day on which rejection order was passed, there was no dues against the firm M.S Bhati & Company.

As a sequel to the foregoing discussion, this writ petition is allowed. Order impugned dated 30.03.2012 (Annex.-6), so also, fresh tender notification dated 31.03.2012 (Annex.-7) are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are hereby directed to consider the provisional recommendation made by the committee to award tender contract in favour of the petitioner firm as per its highest bid in accordance with the rules.”

10. It is given out that since after passing of the aforesaid order by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the department has awarded the contract in favour of the respondent No. 1; the requisite document has been executed in that regard; and the respondent No. 1 has started operating on the contract.

11. The applicant seeks to maintain the appeal against the aforesaid order dated 13.4.2012, inter alia, with the submissions that the learned Single Judge has erred on facts as well as in law; and that the writ petitioner had clearly been guilty of stating incorrect facts in the affidavit filed on its behalf. The affidavit dated 15.2.2011 (page No. 56 of the paper book) has been refe-red wherein, the proprietor of the respondent No. 1 categorically stated that:

12. It is also submitted that the aforesaid statement was untrue because as per the admitted case, the alleged dues were deposited only between 15th to 17th March 2012 and thus, as on the date of applying for the registration and making the bid, the respondent No. 1 was not at all eligible to be registered for being referable to a ‘defaulter’ within the meaning of the Rules of 1986. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to examine the relevant requirements of the Rules of 1986 and failed to appreciate that the story of retirement of the wife of the proprietor of the petitioner firm was entirely baseless; and has also erred in reading the words “major sons” in place of the clear expression used in the Rules of 1986 whereby “dependent children” are included in the family. It is submitted that the writ petitioner was not at all entitled to be registered and hence, his bid was required to be rejected; and upon such rejection, only the applicant had the right to be awarded the contract in question being the second highest bidder. It is submitted that in the given facts and circumstances, it being a matter of infringement of its legal rights, the applicant is directly the “person aggrieved” and hence, is entitled to the leave to appeal against the order dated 13.4.2012

13. The application has been opposed on behalf of the respondents. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner respondent No. 1 strenuously contended that the applicant was not a party to the writ petition as he was neither a necessary nor a proper party and, therefore, the present application deserves to be rejected. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition after due appreciation of the facts and the law applicable to the case; and quashed the rejection order on relevant considerations. It is also submitted that the applicant has no right or interest left in the matter because after opening of the tenders on 24.2.2012, the applicant submitted an application for withdrawal of the amount of security deposit on the very next date, i.e, 25.2.2012 without demur. It is further submitted that the applicant did not participate even in the fresh tender process initiated on 31.3.2012 and, in fact, not even a single bid was received in pursuance of the tender notification dated 31.3.2012 It is contended that the applicant cannot be said to be an aggrieved person for the subject matter of the writ petition involving purely an issue between the respondent No. 1 and the other respondents. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has referred to and relied upon the decisions in the case of Shobha Suresh Jumani v. Appellate Tribunal, For-eited Property, (2001) 5 SCC 755 : RLW 2001 (3) SC 397; Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy: (1980) 4 SCC 62; Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty: (1998) 4 SCC 447; and Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay: (1970) 2 SCC 484.

14. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length on 06.08.2012, we inquired from the applicant and the writ petitioner on their present stand qua the amount involved in the contract in question where the same has been awarded to the writ petitioner at Rs. 27,87,87,878/- whereas the applicant had offered an amount of Rs. 27,17,00,000/-. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant was ready to enhance its offer so as to match the offer as made by the writ petitioner or even more. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner (the respondent No. 1), however, prayed for time to complete his instructions wherefor we deferred the matter to 08.08.2012

15. On 08.08.2012, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that he was not in a position to offer anything over and above what had already been offered and for which, contract has already been executed. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 in this regard and the contents thereof are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

“1. That I am the proprietor of the respondent No. 1 and I am fully conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case.

2. That at the conclusion of arguments on the application for grant of leave, counsel for appellant stated that his client was prepared to raise the bid given by it equivalent to that of writ petitioner respondent No. 1 or even more than that.

3. That respondent No. 1 submits that he is not in position to give any further bid beyond the one which has been given by him.

4. That the respondent No. 1 further submits that this offer given by the appellant cannot be termed as bonafide nor it is tenable in as much as in the second tender in which bid took place on 9.4.2012, the appellant did not even submits its bid where the reserve amount was equivalent to bid submitted by the respondent writ petitioner. Therefore offer now given cannot be termed as bonafide. In any case, so far as respondent no. 1 writ petitioner is concerned he humbly submits that he will not enhance the bid already given and accepted by the department.”

16. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant was ready to offer an amount of Rs. 28,11,00,000/- in relation to the contract in question and made the offer in writing that reads as under:

“That in the present matter, the appellant has given an offer for a sum of Rs. 27,17,00,000/- only.

That appellant hereby enhance his offer to the tune of Rs. 28,11,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty Eight Crores Eleven Lacs only).

It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that while deciding the present special appeal, above-referred offer may kindly be kept in view.”

17. The learned Government Counsel submitted after taking instructions that the Govt. was not in a position to consider any fresh bid as offered by the applicant for the contract having already been concluded and executed.

18. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and have examined the material placed on record.

19. The issue arising for determination in this application is as to whether the applicant Company be granted leave to appeal against the order dated 13.04.2012 as passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No. 2996/2012. The determination of this issue depends on the answer to the core question as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the applicant Company could be said to be a “person aggrieved” in the sense it could be said to be having a legal grievance?

20. In the context of the right to maintain an appeal in the Court of law, worthwhile it would be refer to the principles enunciated in the cited decisions for an insight into the connotation of the words “person aggrieved”.

21. In the case of Shobha Suresh Jumani (supra), the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was as to whether a wife, whose husband's property was ordered to be forfeited under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, was entitled to file an appeal as a person aggrieved under Section 12(4) of the said Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered in the negative while referring to and quoting with approval the following observations in Sidebotham, Re, ex p Sidebotham: (1880) 14 Ch D 458:—

“But the words ‘person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.”

22. In the case of Thammanna (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the person defeated in the election, who was joined as a respondent in the election petition but did not participate in the proceedings, could be a person aggrieved so as to maintain an appeal against the dismissal of the election petition. The claim by such a person to maintain the appeal was negatived with reference, inter alia, to the very same observations in Re Sidebotham as quoted hereinabove.

23. In the case of Adi Pherozshah Gandhi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question about competence of the Advocate General of Maharashtra to maintain an appeal before the Bar Council of India against the order passed by the Disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State. In the concurring opinion forming majority, with reference to the above quoted definition of the phrase “person aggrieved” in Re Sidebotham and while referring to the other cases too, it was observed,-

“From these cases it is apparent that any person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a ‘person aggrieved’. He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone the other way. The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. It is no doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters but his legal grievance must be a tendency to injure him. That the order is wrong or that it acquits some one who he thinks ought to be convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance…..”

24. In the other opinion forming majority, it was observed as under:

“Generally speaking a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. A person who is not a party to a litigation has no right of appeal merely because the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him. But it has been held in a number of cases that a person who is not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave would not be refused where the judgment would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure…….”

25. The decisions above referred may not be directly co-related with the fact situation of the present case but the binding principles therein are of vital importance and relevance herein.

26. It is not the case that the impugned order dated 13.04.2012 is otherwise binding on the applicant. Thus, maintainability of an appeal against the said order at the instance of the applicant would require consideration of the question if the applicant Company can be said to be having a legal grievance so as to suggest that the order wrongfully deprives it of some existing legal right and causes a legal injury; and those aspects shall have to be considered with reference to the fact situation of the case.

27. After having taken into comprehension all the facts and the circumstances of the case, even when we have reservations on some of the observations made by the learned Single Judge and may not endorse all the propositions occurring in the order impugned yet, in the ultimate analysis, we are not persuaded to grant leave to the applicant to appeal against the order dated 13.04.2012 It is for the fundamental reasons that the applicant failed to take requisite steps at the point of time it could have taken; and cannot be said to be having an existing legal right that has been taken away by the order impugned and whose deprivation could result in legal grievance. Thus, in relation to the subject matter of the writ petition and the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 13.04.2012, the petitioner cannot be said to be a “person aggrieved” so as to maintain an appeal.

28. The facts of the case make it clear that in the first place, the respondent No. 1 was considered by the mining department disentitled to make an offer and his offer was rejected by the order dated 30.03.2012 Significantly, the department, then, issued the fresh notice inviting offers on 31.03.2012 It is not the case of the applicant that the applicant was not aware of the fresh notice inviting offers as issued on 31.03.2012 The reserve price therein was stated as that earlier offered by the writ petitioner. It was more than clear thereby that the bid as offered by the writ petitioner had not been accepted by the department. Even though the applicant cannot be faulted in seeking refund of amount of security deposit as on 25.02.2012, for the reason that at that point of time, the applicant was considered to be an unsuccessful bidder but then, as on 31.03.2012, it was made generally known to all and sundry by the department that fresh bids were being invited after fixing the reserve price at the amount as offered by the writ petitioner. The applicant, if at all having any suggestion to make about consideration of its earlier offer as the second highest, could have, and ought to have, taken appropriate steps at that stage i.e, the stage when fresh offers were invited.

29. In our view, if the applicant wanted to assert its right for being the second highest bidder in the original tender process, the cause for asserting such right accrued immediately upon issuance of the fresh notice inviting offers on 31.3.2012 That notice effectively made it clear that as per the depart-ent, the earlier tender process was over. The applicant, at that stage, ought to have taken the steps as permissible by law so as to put forth its grievance, if any, and to seek relief in regard to the right sought to be suggested, for being the second highest bidder and entitled to the contract for the writ petitioner being not eligible. By not taking any such step at that point of time, the applicant apparently made it clear that it had no concern left with the tender process. It is now too late in the day for the applicant to seek resurrection of its claim as the second highest bidder and that too, by way of appeal against the order passed in the writ petition in favour of the respondent No. 1.

30. Apart from the above, we are clearly of the view that the decision sought to be questioned by the applicant i.e, the order dated 13.04.2012 as passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, cannot be said to be wrongfully depriving the applicant of its rights; and the applicant cannot be said to be disappointed of a benefit which it would have received if the order had gone the other way i.e, in dismissal of the writ petition. As noticed, the writ petition was filed by the respondent No. 1 against rejection of his offer and issuance of fresh notice inviting offers. Even if the said writ petition were to be dismissed, the applicant was not going to get any advantage therefrom because, in that case, only the fresh notice inviting offers would have revived and not the applicant's alleged right as being the second highest bidder in the first process. The right, if any, in the applicant as a second highest bidder had effectively come to an end with issuance of fresh notice inviting offers; and the applicant having not challenged the same, cannot be said to be a legally disappointed person of a benefit which it would have received had the writ petition been dismissed. It gets per force reiterated that even the dismissal of writ petition was not going to result in acceptance of the bid of the applicant that stood annulled. Thus, the applicant cannot be said to have suffered deprivation of any of the legal right. As a necessary corollary, the applicant cannot be said to be such a person aggrieved who can maintain intra-court appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1.

31. In the aforesaid context, the submission on behalf of the writ petitioner assumes relevance that none, not even the applicant, made any bid pursuant to the fresh advertisement dated 31.03.2012 The tenders were to be submitted on the fresh invitation by 09.04.2012 and until 08.04.2012, there was no interim order in the matter and even on 09.04.2012, the Court only recorded the undertaking of the learned Government Counsel that fresh bids would not be opened. Noteworthy it is that the stay order against awarding of the contract to anyone else was granted by the writ Court only on 10.04.2012

32. The applicant, if at all desirous, could have made a bid in the fresh tender process too but it did not. On the other hand, as observed above, if the applicant had any grievance about the fresh tender process on the basis of itself being the second highest bidder in the earlier process, it was required of it to have asserted such right at the relevant stage. The applicant did not. It is very difficult to accept the submissions now lately made by the applicant in the proposed appeal about infringement of any of his existing legal right.

33. From the material placed on record and the contentions urged on behalf of the applicant, only this much can be said that as per the applicant, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is wrong and the writ petition ought to have been dismissed. In fact, as observed hereinabove, we too have reservations on some of the observations made by the learned Single Judge. Yet, in the context of the present case, it cannot be said that there is an existing legal right and thereby, a legal grievance with the applicant so as to maintain the intra-court appeal.

34. In the backdrop of the facts of the case and the factors noticed above, we do not feel persuaded to grant leave to the applicant to appeal against the order impugned.

35. During the course of consideration, we had yet pondered over the aspect relating to balance of equities and interest of revenue and attempted to find if at all granting indulgence to the applicant was going to serve the cause of revenue. What has been offered by the applicant now, lately and in the response of the queries of the Court, is an amount of Rs. 28,11,00,000/- towards the annual rate of contract. This amount, when compared to Rs. 27,87,87,878/- offered by the respondent No. 1, represents an enhancement by about 0.83% i.e, less than 1%. In the overall set up of the things related with execution of such a contract, the proposed enhancement cannot be said to be of a substantial character particularly when compared to several of the administrative difficulties likely to be faced by the department if any change-over is effected, including the likelihood of pilferage of the revenue in the process. Thus, apart from not finding any legal right in the applicant to maintain the appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 2996/2012, even on equity, we are not persuaded to grant indulgence so as to consider any interference in the matter.

36. However, before parting, we feel it necessary to make it clear that our not granting leave to appeal to the applicant is not of affirmation of the views as expressed in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge because in our opinion, so far the definition of family under the Rules of 1986 is concerned, therein, ‘the dependent children’ have been referred and merely for reaching the age of majority, the son of a person may not cease to a dependent one. Moreover, in relation to the facts of the case, the wife of the writ petitioner was, prima facie, a defaulting party qua the department. The story about her retirement also appear to be carrying several snags. Though we need not dilate further on the aspects relating to the merits of the case for we are not granting leave in this matter but refusal to leave is essentially for the reasons that the applicant is not directly answering to the description of an “aggrieved person” and is not making out a case for interference at its instance.

37. Subject to observations foregoing, the application stands rejected; and consequently, the appeal stands dismissed.