Gokal Chand Mital, J.:— Smt. Kalawati was the owner of the property in dispute. Rajesh Gupta, her daughter's son, filed a suit for declaration against her claiming ownership of the property in dispute on the basis of some family arrangement. Smt. Kalawati confessed judgment and a decree for declaration was passed in favour of Rajesh Gupta against Smt. Kalawati on 25th March, 1976 (Exhibit A. 4) by the Civil Court. The property in dispute was in possession of Mahabir Parshad as a tenant Rajesh Gupta, after becoming owner of the property, filed a petition for ejectment on 13th December, 1976, against Mahabir Parshad on the ground of personal necessity and arrears of rent and pleaded all the necessary ingredients. Since the arrears of rent were tendered on the first date of hearing, therefore, only the ground of personal necessity remained to be decided.

2. In the written statement, Mahabir Parshad pleaded that he was a tenant of Smt. Kalawati and stated that the applicant had no concern with the house. It was further pleaded that the transaction between the applicant and Smt. Kalawati was a fraudulent one and even if the applicant was proved to be owner of the property in dispute, no case for personal necessity was made out. On the contest of the parties, the following issues were framed:—

1. Whether there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?

2. Whether the respondent is liable to ejectment from the premises in question except on the ground of non-payment of rent?

3. Relief.

3. The Rent Controller found both the issues in favour of the applicant and ordered ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity. On tenant's appeal, the decision of the Rent Controller was reversed and the application for ejectment was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. The landlord has come in revision to this Court.

4. After hearing the counsel for the parties I am of the view that this revision deserves to succeed.

5. The compromise decree between the original owner and the petitioner was passed on 25th March, 1976 and Smt. Kalawati, the orignal owner, appeared as A.W 2 on 28th March, 1977, in this case and admitted that under the Civil Court decree the applicant had become the owner of the property in dispute. Tej Parkash son of the respondent-tenant appeared as R.W 3 and admitted that Smt. Kalawati had sent a notice that under the civil Court decree Rajesh Gupta had become owner of the property and was entitled to receive rent and that Rajesh Gupta had also served a similar notice stating therein that he has become the landlord and is entited to receive the rent Smt. Kalawati was entitled to transfer the ownership of the property in dispute to Rajesh Gupta by a registered gift-deed or could suffer a decree and in the case of a decree it would not matter whether the facts stated in the plaint were correct or not because it was Smt. Kalawati alone who was entitled to challenge the facts and once she accepts the facts stated in the plaint to be correct and suffers a decree that decree would not only bind her but would bind her tenant also. A consent decree is as good a decree as a contested decree would be unless the same is avoided in any one of the permissible ways. Reference may be made to the following observations in para 22 of the Supreme Court decision in Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai . AIR 1951 SC 280..

“The rule laid down in Mulla's book is, expressly stated to be in cases where the partition is, not effected by a decree of a competent Court. In our opinion, that is correct. It does not matter whether the decree, was by cousent or otherwise, for a decree unless and unitil it is set aside or avoided in one or other of the ways in which alone a decree may be attacked, holds its force and binds all concerned.”

6. The decree could be avoided by Smt. Kalawati on the grounds of fraud mis representation etc. by filing a suit within a perod of three years as provided by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. When she appeared as A.W 3 on 28th March, 1977, she accepted the decree, as a good decree and even from that date three years have gone by and, therefore, even she is debarred from challenging the consent decree. The respondent, who was a tenant under Smt. Kalawati would be clearly bound by the decree and he cannot be allowed to challenge the ownership of the present applicant as also his status as his landlord.

7. The Appellate Authority placed reliance on para 10 of the Supreme Court decision in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation . 1976 3 SCC 119 (at page 812) and observed that the essential requirement of a family settlement was that there must have been some antecedent title, claim or interest which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement and on this basis was of the opinion that the applicant was unable to prove if he had any antecedent title, claim or interest in the property held by Smt. Kalawati on the basis of which she could suffer a decree, against her. The Appellate Authority relied only on the first part of the report and failed to notice the subsequent lines contained therein which resulted into an erroneous decision. The relevant passage contained in the fifth proposition of para 10 may be reproduced:—

“(5). The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antcedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same”

8. A reading of the latter portion shows that even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title and under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims, then the antecedent title would be assumed and the family settlement would be upheld. Even outside the Court Smt. Kalatawati could suffer a family arrangement in favour of Rajesh Gupta by a registered document. If that course is not followed then the same object can be achieved by suffering a decree which will be binding on the parties unless is avoided in one of the legal means, as held by the Supreme Court in Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai's case (supra). Applying the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court and noticing the fact that Smt. Kalawati admitted the decree to be a good one and did not challenge the same within the period of limitation, the only irresistible conlusion is that Smt. Kalawati ceased to be the landlord of the rspondent and Raiesh Gupta became his landlord. On these facts to hold that the consent decree would not be binding on the parties or can be ignored by the Courts would be wholly wrong if not perverse. Moreover, the title of the applicant Petitioner cannot be challenged in these proceedings merely by saying that the decree suffered by Smt. Kalawali was collusive in view of the decision of Grover., in Sardarni Kirpal Kaur v. Bhagwant Rai . 1962 Cur. L.J 314. and Shri Verinder Singh Verma v. Shri Mohan Lail Talwar,4 Joginder Singh v. Roshan Lal . 1980 1 R.L.R 518. and Santosh Kumar v. Tarsem Lal . 1980 2 R.L.R 399. the facts in Santosh Kumar v. Tarsem Lai's case (suora) were that the original owner filed a petition for ejectment after the transfer of the property. It was held that the orignal owner had ceased to be the landlord and, therefore was entitled to maintain the petition. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Dhanlaxmi G. Shah v. Miss Sushila Shiv Prasad Masurekir . 1979 2 R.L.R 365.. There also the petition for ejectment filed by the original owner was dismissed by holding that he ceased to be the landlord after the transfer. Therefore, the only person who could file the ejectment petition after the decree dated 25th March, 1976, was Rajesh Gupta and the case has to be decided only on the basis whether Rajesh Gupta has been able to prove his personal necessity for occupying the house. Accordingly, issue No. 1 is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent tenant.

9. The question of personal necessity was considered by the Rent Controller in great detail in paras 13 to 15 of the order which run into almost four pages and whole of the evidence brought on record by the parties was thoroughly considered. The Appellate Authority reversed the decision of the Rent Controller on this matter by the reasons given in para 26 which deserves to be reproduced:—

“In the instant case the claim of bonafide requirement has not been substantiated Kalawati's statement reveals that the respondent is living with his grand-mother, mother, brothers and sisters. Thus even the bona fide claim of the respondent has not been established by cogent and reliable evidence and there is no manner of doubt that the instant proceedings were initiated at the instigation of Kalawati whose ulterior motive is nothing but to increase the rent of the tenanted premises”.

10. A reading of the aforesaid passage would show that not only the Appellate Authority was completely misdirected in deciding the point in issue but failed to consider the evidence on the record Once Rajesh Gupta is held to be the owner of the property and landlord qua the respondent, we have to find out whether he has been able to prove his personal necessity to occupy the premises in dispute and no question of ulterior motive of Smt. Kalawati to have the house vacated would fall for consideration. In the petition for eiectment he had pleaded that he required the premises in dispute for his own occupation; he has no other residential house in the locality nor he has vacated any other house. It was also pleaded that at the time of filing of the ejectment petition he was unmarried and wanted to marry and settle in the house in dispute. He had pleaded that at the time of the filing of the petition he was residing with his relations at their mercy. The Rent Controller found that the applicant was living with his grandmother at her sufferance which was not in his own right; that he had not vacated any such premises and had proved his bona fide necessity as by the time evidence was being led he had married and needed the premises in dispute for his separate residence. Tej Parkash, son of the respondent tenant, when appeared as R.W 3, admitted that during the pendency of the litigation the applicant had married and also admitted that he was living with his grand-mother and that he had not vacated any house. Therefore, the case of the applicant is proved not only from his own evidence but also from the statement of the son of the tenant. Moreover, it was stated at the Bar that the petitioner has got two children and now his family consists of four members. Since he is not in occupation of any other premises in the urban area concerned, the trial Court was justified in ordering the ejectment of the tenant. Merely because the petitioner is living with his grand-mother, mother, brothers, and sisters, and has a joint ration card with them would not take away his right to claim separate living house owned by him. The respondent was unable to prove that the house in which the petitioner was living with his grand-mother etc. was owned by him or he had any share therein. Accordingly, the reasons given by the Appellate Authority in Para 26 of its judgment are contrary to law and are reversed.

11. For the reasons recorded above, this revision is allowed, the order of the Appellate Authority dated 13th December, 1979, is set aside and that of the Rent Controller dated 3rd August, 1979, is restored. The respondent is allowed one month's time to vacate the premises provided he deposits with the Rent Controller all arrears of rent due up to 30th April, 1981, within two weeks, from today. There will be no order as to costs

R.M.S

Petition allowed.