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  • provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that of Article 159 of the Limitation Act
  • provisions of section 18 sub-clause (b) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions of sub-rule 2 of Order 37 of the CPC.
  • provisions of sub-rule 3 of Order 37 of the CPC.
  • provisions of Order 37 sub-rule 2 of the CPC
  • section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions of O. 37 sub-rule (2) of the CPC.
  • Article 159 of the Limitation Act.
  • Sub-rule (2) of Order 37 of the CPC
  • Order 37 sub-rule (2) of the CPC,
  • section 12 sub-section (2)
  • provisions of sub-rule 2
  • clause of section 18(b)
  • section 18(b)
  • sub-rule (1)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that of Article 159 of the Limitation Act
  • provisions of section 18 sub-clause (b) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions of sub-rule 2 of Order 37 of the CPC.
  • provisions of sub-rule 3 of Order 37 of the CPC.
  • provisions of Order 37 sub-rule 2 of the CPC
  • section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions of O. 37 sub-rule (2) of the CPC.
  • Article 159 of the Limitation Act.
  • Sub-rule (2) of Order 37 of the CPC
  • Order 37 sub-rule (2) of the CPC,
  • section 12 sub-section (2)
  • provisions of sub-rule 2
  • clause of section 18(b)
  • section 18(b)
  • sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for recovery of Rs. 28,300 under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), relying on a promissory note dated 1-7-1959. Along with the plaint the plaintiff applied for attachment before judgment and obtained an interim injunction restraining the defendant from disposing of his properties. After the plaint was filed, no summons in the form required by Order 37, sub-rule (2) CPC was served on the defendant.

The defendant, through his counsel Mr. Sharma (and later also Mr. Sehgal), appeared in Court to contest the attachment-before-judgment application. The matter was taken on several dates; the suit was adjourned multiple times and listed for hearing on different dates. On 22-12-1965 the defendant filed an application, supported by affidavit, praying for leave to defend the suit. The learned Single Judge held that this application was hopelessly barred by time and consequently rejected it and decreed the plaintiff's suit.

The defendant appealed. The appellate Court reviewed disputes of fact (including a finding that a copy of the plaint was handed to Shri Chuni Lal, clerk of Mr. Sharma, on 12-7-1965) and diverse legal contentions about limitation, the mandatory character of Order 37 sub-rule (2), and the effect of appearances made without the leave required by that sub-rule. The appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial Judge's order and decree, and remanded the matter for the trial Judge to decide the defendant's application for leave to defend on merits. The Court also ordered refund of the Court-fees paid on the memo of appeal and directed that costs would abide the result.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant's application for leave to defend the suit was barred by limitation under Article 159 of the Limitation Act where no summons in the form required by Order 37, sub-rule (2) CPC was served.
  2. Whether the defendant's appearances by counsel to contest attachment-before-judgment proceedings (and the handing over of a copy of the plaint to the counsel's clerk) could be treated as an "appearance" for the purpose of starting the period of limitation or otherwise estopping the defendant from seeking leave to defend.
  3. Whether the starting point of limitation under Article 159 (i.e., "when the summons is served") can be treated as starting from the date the defendant acquires knowledge of the suit (by analogy to certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act), rather than from the actual service of summons in the form prescribed by Order 37, sub-rule (2).
  4. Whether an appearance made without obtaining the leave required by Order 37, sub-rule (2) has any legal effect or must be ignored.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments — as presented in the opinion

  • Counsel Mr. Sehgal submitted that because no summons in the form required by the mandatory provisions of Order 37, sub-rule (2) CPC was ever served on the defendant, the application for leave to defend was within the time prescribed by Article 159 of the Limitation Act and therefore could not be barred by limitation.
  • Mr. Sehgal further argued that the mere receipt of a copy of the plaint by Shri Chuni Lal (a clerk) who was not duly authorised by his client to receive it, did not establish that the defendant or his counsel actually received the plaint; therefore, knowledge of the suit could not be imputed on that basis.
  • He also contended that appearances to contest the attachment-before-judgment application could not be treated as an appearance in the suit under Order 37 for the purpose of imputing knowledge or starting limitation.
  • Another argument (advanced by Mr. Das on behalf of a party) was that the words “when the summons is served” in Article 159 ought to be construed to include the date when the defendant acquires knowledge of the suit; by analogy he relied upon judicial interpretation of section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — as presented in the opinion

  • Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the learned Judge had found that the defendant had knowledge of the suit (specifically that a copy of the plaint was handed to Shri Chuni Lal on 12-7-1965 and that Mr. Sharma appeared on several dates thereafter) and so the defendant ought to have filed the application for leave to defend within 30 days from the date of such knowledge.
  • Mr. Prakash, counsel for the plaintiff, filed an affidavit alleging that the copy of the plaint was handed over to Shri Chuni Lal who in turn gave it to Mr. Sharma; this allegation was not controverted by Mr. Sharma before the Court below.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1962 SC 113 Support for the proposition that where a statute prescribes a particular mode of doing an act, departure from that mode amounts to disobedience of the statute; strict compliance is required. The Court cited this Supreme Court decision to support its view that Order 37 sub-rule (2)'s mandatory provisions must be strictly enforced and that failure to follow the prescribed mode cannot be treated as immaterial.
AIR 1962 SC 1694 Same general principle as above: supports strict adherence to statutory procedure where mode is prescribed. Used along with AIR 1962 SC 113 to reinforce that mandatory procedural requirements cannot be circumvented and to support the conclusion that limitation cannot be held to have begun by mere knowledge where the statute prescribes service of summons as the starting point.
ILR (1956) 1 Cal 197 (Calcutta High Court) Supports the view that Order 37 sub-rule (2) prohibits appearance without leave; appearances made contrary to that provision are ineffective. The Court relied on this decision to fortify its holding that an appearance made in disobedience of Order 37 sub-rule (2) has no legal effect and should be ignored.
Pestonji Shapurji v. Jamshedji Nowroji, AIR 1926 Bom 250 (Bombay High Court) Illustrates that a defendant in a summary suit may not be permitted to appear while the hearing is proceeding and that appearance without the required permission is impermissible even for limited purposes (e.g., seeking payment by instalments). The Court cited this case to demonstrate that the Bombay High Court held appearances without court permission under Order 37 are not entitled to legal effect; it was used to support the proposition that appearances without leave should be ignored.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis, grounded in the text of the statutes and the procedural character of suits under Order 37:

  1. Character of Order 37: The Court emphasised that Order 37 of the CPC contemplates a summary, harsh and rigorous procedure in which a defendant cannot appear or defend as a matter of right but must obtain leave of the Court within a specified period. Given that penalty (decree and deemed admission of allegations) is prescribed for non-compliance, the Court concluded these provisions are mandatory and must be strictly construed.
  2. Text of Article 159: Article 159 of the Limitation Act provides a 10-day period to file an application for leave to appear and defend, measured from the date when the summons under Order 37 sub-rule (2) is served. The Court observed that this is the only starting point of limitation stated in Article 159.
  3. Effect of absence of service of summons: Because it was common ground that no summons in the form prescribed by Order 37 sub-rule (2) had been served, the Court held that the statutory starting point for limitation had not arisen; consequently the defence application could not be said to be barred by limitation under Article 159.
  4. Rejection of the "knowledge" alternative by analogy to Land Acquisition Act: The Court considered and rejected the submission (advanced by some counsel) that the words “when the summons is served” should be read to include the date of the defendant's knowledge of the suit by analogy to judicial interpretations of section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court gave multiple reasons for refusing the analogy:
    • The language of section 18(b) explicitly refers to "receipt of the notice" and therefore the statute's starting point was tied to knowledge by receipt; Article 159 does not contain analogous wording.
    • The local textual context and the conjunction "whichever period shall first expire" in section 18(b) required reading its clauses together; that textual structure is not comparable to Article 159.
    • The language of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and Article 159 are essentially different, and it would be impermissible to import additional interpretative glosses into Article 159 that are not supported by its text.
    • Importing a "knowledge" criterion where Article 159 expressly provides service of summons as the sole starting point would amount to reading additional words into the statute, which the Court disapproved of.
  5. On the evidentiary factual point, the Court accepted the trial Judge's finding (corroborated by file endorsements and an affidavit by plaintiff's counsel) that a copy of the plaint was handed to Shri Chuni Lal, the clerk of Mr. Sharma, on 12-7-1965 and that counsel for the defendant had appeared on several dates thereafter. The Court observed that the defendant did not positively assert before the trial court that the clerk had not given the plaint to the counsel.
  6. Effect of appearances without leave: The Court analysed the wording of Order 37 sub-rule (2) and concluded that the prohibition attaches separately to both "appearance" and "defending". Consequently, any appearance made in disobedience of the mandatory sub-rule is devoid of legal effect and must be ignored. The Court relied on the cited Calcutta and Bombay High Court decisions and the Supreme Court authority to support this proposition.
  7. Outcome of these points: While the Court agreed with the trial Judge's finding that the defendant had knowledge of the suit from 12-7-1965, it held that this knowledge could not be used to start the statutory period in Article 159 because summons in the prescribed form had not been served. Therefore the trial Judge's rejection of the application for leave to defend on grounds of limitation was legally erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The appellate Court set aside the order and decree of the trial Judge and remanded the case to the learned Judge to dispose of the defendant's application for leave to defend the suit on its merits and then decide the suit in accordance with law.

Direct implications and orders made by the Court:

  • The trial Judge's order and the decree in favour of the plaintiff were set aside.
  • The matter was remitted to the trial Judge to consider and dispose of the defendant's application for leave to defend on merits and thereafter decide the suit in accordance with law.
  • The Court directed that the court-fees paid by the appellant on the memo of appeal be refunded to him.
  • Costs were ordered to abide the result.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasises strict compliance with the mandatory procedural mode prescribed by Order 37 sub-rule (2) CPC and construes Article 159 of the Limitation Act as starting limitation only from the service of summons in the prescribed form. The Court did not purport to lay down a new, general rule beyond its interpretation and application to the facts of this case.

    (Lala) Gopal Das v. (Lala) Chander Prakash .

    S. Murtaza Fazl Ali, J.:— This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of a Single Judge of this Court in a suit brought by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 28,300 under Order 37 of the CPC. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff presented an application for attachment before judgment and obtained an interim order of injunction restraining the defendant from disposing his properties. The suit was based on a promissory note dated 1-7-1959 and it is common ground that after the plaint was filed in the Court of the learned Single Judge, no summons as retired by the provisions of Order 37 Sub-rule (2) of the CPC were ever served on the defendant. The defendant, however, appeared in Court through his lawyer Mr. Sharma in order to contest the application given by the plaintiff for attachment before judgment and injunction. The attachment matter was considered by the Court from date to date and ultimately the suit was ordered to be heard on 18-11-1965 and was then again adjourned to 2-12-1965 and then to 22-12-1965. On this date the defendant filed an application supported by an affidavit praying for leave to defend the suit. The learned Single Judge held that the application filed by the defendant was hopelessly barred by time and he accordingly rejected the application and decreed the plaintiff's suit.

    2. In support of the appeal Mr. Sehgal has submitted that as no summons was ever served on the defendant as required by the mandatory provisions of Order 37, sub-rule 2 of the CPC, the application for leave to defend the suit was within time and the question of limitation did not arise at all. On the other hand, it was submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that as the learned Judge has found that the defendant had knowledge of the suit filed against him, he ought to have filed the application for leave to defend the suit within 30 days of the date of the knowledge of the suit. There appears to have been serious controversy between the parties on the question as to whether or not a copy of the plaint presented by the plaintiff was given to the defendant or his counsel. The learned Judge has come to a specific finding that the defendant did receive a copy of the plaint through Sri Chuni Lal the clerk of Sri Sharma advocate on 12-7-1965. The Court below has further held that since Mr. Sharma appeared for the defendant on various dates after 12-7-65, it can be safely presumed that the defendant had knowledge of the suit more than 30 days before the date when he filed the application for leave to defend the suit. This finding of the learned Single Judge was seriously disputed before us by Mr. Sehgal and he contended that a mere receipt of Mr. Chuni Lal who was a clerk of Mr. Sharma and not duly authorised by his client to receive the copy of the plaint, would not show that the defendant or his counsel had actually received the copy of the plaint. In this connection, the learned counsel has taken us through various interim orders passed by the Court below. It was submitted by Mr. Sehgal that even if the defendant had appeared to contest the application for attachment before judgment, such an appearance could not be treated as an appearance in the suit so as to impute the defendant with the knowledge of the allegations made in the plaint or to show that the suit was actually instituted under Order 37 of the CPC, and not under the ordinary law. In our opinion, however, the learned Judge has given a very cogent finding on the point as to when the defendant came to acquire the knowledge of the suit and it is not possible for us to disagree with the findings given by him. A perusal of the order-sheet would clearly show that on several dates Mr. Sehgal and Mr. Sharma appeared for the defendant and a copy of the plaint was in fact handed over to Shri Chuni Lal the clerk of Mr. Sharma on 12-7-1965 which is corroborated by the endorsement on the file of the Court. At no stage of the proceedings, before the Court below did Mr. Sharma or Mr. Sehgal make a categorical statement before the Court below that the copy of the plaint which was handed over to Shri Chuni Lal was not given to the counsel for the defendant by Chuni Lal. It is true that on 10-11-1965 counsel for the defendant did make a complaint to the Court that they had not been given a copy of the plaint and the Court directed the counsel for the plaintiff to deliver the copy of the plaint to the defendant. A similar prayer was made before the Court below on 16-12-1965 and on 20-12-1965. Mr. Prakash counsel for the plaintiff filed an affidavit in which he made a clear allegation that the copy was handed over to Chuni Lal clerk of Mr. Sharma and who gave the copy of the plaint to Mr. Sharma. Despite this affidavit, Mr. Sharma did not controvert this allegation and did not assert before the Court that he had not received any copy of the plaint from his clerk. In these circumstances, therefore, we find, ourselves in complete agreement with the learned Single Judge that the defendant must be deemed to have acquired the knowledge of the present suit on or about 12-7-1965. It is obvious when the counsel for the defendant filed their objections to the application for attachment before judgment, they could not have been in a position to do so, unless they had perused the plaint filed by the plaintiff. Two eminent counsel for the plaintiff had been appearing on several dates and it is difficult to believe that on none of these dates any of the counsel for the defendant would not care to peruse the plaint even in Court. The question of knowledge, however, in our opinion, is not sufficient to decide this case.

    3. The second argument put forward by Mr. Sehgal is that as the mandatory provisions of sub-rule 2 of Order 37 of the CPC, have not been complied with, the application for leave to defend the suit could not be barred by time. This argument, in our opinion, appears to be well founded and must prevail. Sub-rule (2) of Order 37 of the CPC runs as follows:

    “In any case in which the plaint and summons are in such forms, respectively, the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend; and, in default of his obtaining such leave or of his appearance and defence in pursuance thereof, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree…,”

    4. A perusal of this clause makes it very clear that the statute prohibits the defendant from appearing or defending the suit without obtaining permission of the Court in the manner laid down in this sub-rule. The sub-rule also contains the penalty for non-appearance as a result of which the plaintiff's suit has to be decreed and the allegations of the plaintiff would be deemed to be admitted. Order 37 of the CPC, makes a serious departure for the trial of the suits from the procedure laid down for the trial of the suit under the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure contemplated by Order 37 of the CPC, is both harsh and rigorous and is in the nature of a summary trial. In such suits the defendant cannot appear or defend the suit as a matter of right but has to obtain the permission of the Court within a specified period of time. In view of these circumstances, we have to construe the provisions strictly giving every benefit of doubt to the subject. Article 159 of the Limitation Act, provides a period of 10 days to file an application for leave to appear and defend the suit from the date when the summons under Order 37 sub-rule 2 of the CPC, is served on the defendant. This is the only starting point of limitation mentioned in Article 159 of the Limitation Act. As if is common ground that no summons was ever served on the defendant, the starting point of limitation in the present case, did not reach at all and therefore, the question of application for leave to defend the suit being barred by time does not arise. Mr. Das argued that the words “when the summons is served” should be construed to include also the date when the defendant acquires knowledge that a suit under Order 37 of the CPC, had been filed against him. Learned counsel has drawn out attention to the provisions of section 18 sub-clause (b) of the Land Acquisition Act which runs as follows:

    “In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12 sub-section (2) or within 6 months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.”

    5. It has been contended that the second clause of sub-section (b) lays down the period of six months from the date of the Collector's award but it has been held by various Courts in India including the Supreme Court that the period would run not from the actual date of the award but from the date when the concerned party gets knowledge of the award having been made. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, it was submitted that a similar interpretation should be put on Article 159 of the Limitation Act. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. The analogy of section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied to Article 159 of the Limitation Act for several reasons. In the first place, the plain language of the first part of clause (b) lays stress on the fact of the receipt of the notice from the Collector. Thus, the Statute clearly intends that the starting point of limitation would be the date of the knowledge of the award either when the party knows about it by virtue of a notice being served on it or otherwise. Similarly section 18 clause (a) provides a lesser period of limitation where an award is announced in presence of the party or its agent. Here also the Legislature intends that the knowledge of the award should be the test to determine the starting point.

    6. Secondly, the words used in the second clause of section 18(b) have to be read together with the words in the first clause because the last words are “whichever period shall first expire” and it is, therefore, manifest that where the Statute used the words “from the date of Collector's award” these words have to be read ejusdem generis, the words used in the first part of section 18(b) which gives six weeks time from the receipt of the notice from the Collector. Thirdly, the language of the provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that of Article 159 of the Limitation Act are essentially and absolutely different and it is not possible for us to adopt a common criterion for interpreting the two provisions of two separate Acts. Finally, when Article 159 of the Limitation Act, provides that the starting point of limitation would run from one and one contingency alone, namely, the date of the service of the summons on the defendant it will amount to importing additional words in the Statute, if we were to hold that the starling point may arise also from the date when the defendant acquires the knowledge of the suit and not only from the date when summons are served on him under the provisions of O. 37 sub-rule (2) of the CPC. Mr. Sehgal rightly pointed out that the language of Order 37 sub-rule (2) of the CPC, was mandatory and since a penal clause was provided for default of appearance, it cannot be held that the provisions are merely directory. Moreover, it is well settled that when a Statute provides a particular mode of doing something in a particular manner, any departure from the manner prescribed by the Statute would amount to disobedience of the express provisions of law. We are supported in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1962 SC 113 and AIR 1962 SC 1694.

    7. Moreover, on an interpretation of the plain language of Order 37 sub-rule (2) of the CPC, it would appear that the Statute lays down in express words that the defendant shall be prohibited both from appearing and defending the suit unless he obtains permission of the Court as laid down in that sub-rule. The words “appear” and “defend” are separated by the disjunctive “or” and, therefore, the disability imposed by this rule attaches separately both to appearance and to defending. In other words, neither the defendant can appear in the suit nor can he defend the suit without complying with the provisions of sub-rule 2 of Order 37 of the CPC. The bar for appearance by the defendant is categorical and the provisions of sub-rule 2 debar the defendant from appearing at any stage of the suit either before or after the service of the summons and for any purpose whatsoever without obtaining the leave of the Court. We are fortified in our view by a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in ILR (1956) 1 Cal 197. A similar view was also taken by the Bombay High Court in Pestonji Shapurji v. Jamshedji Nowroji, AIR 1926 Bom 250. In this case, the defendant appeared before the District Judge for the limited purpose of praying to the Court that in the event of decree being passed against him, the said decree may be allowed to be paid by instalments. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that as no permission from the Court had been taken by the defendants to appear to defend the suit, the defendant was not entitled to appear in the suit even for the purpose of praying that a decree by instalments be granted. In this connection, their Lordships of the Bombay High Court observed as follows:

    “The important point to notice is that a defendant in a summary suit cannot be allowed to appear while the hearing is proceeding, and in this case, in my opinion the Judge was wrong in allowing the defendants' attorney to appear before a decree had been passed in accordance with the plaint.”

    8. It follows, therefore, that if the Statute prohibits the defendant from either appearing before the Court or defending the suit, then any appearance made in express disobedience to the mandatory provisions of Order 37 sub-rule 2 of the CPC will be destitute of any legal effect and would have to be completely ignored. It is common ground that in the present case, right from the date when the suit was instituted till 22-12-1965, when the defendant filed an application for leave to defend the suit, no permission by the Court to appear or defend the suit was granted in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule 3 of Order 37 of the CPC. Thus, the appearance of the defendant upto 22-12-1965 would have to be ignored and cannot be interpreted to be an appearance in the suit. It is common ground that no summons had been served in the form prescribed by the sub-rule (1) to the defendant upto the date of the decree.

    9. In these circumstances, therefore, the application filed by the defendant for leave to defend the suit could not be rejected as being barred by limitation but had to be considered by the trial Judge on merits. The learned Judge, however, has not considered the application on merits but dismissed the same on the preliminary ground that it was barred by limitation. For the reasons, that we have already given, we are clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Judge is legally erroneous. As the learned Judge has rejected the application, of the defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit, and has passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff by a composite order, the entire order as also the decree are liable to be set aside.

    10. We would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order and decree of the trial Judge and send this case back to the learned Judge who will dispose of the application for leave to defend the suit on merits and then decide the suit in accordance with law. Let the Court-fees paid by the appellant on the memo of appeal be refunded to him.

    11. Costs will abide the result.

    12. J.N Wazir, C.J:— I agree.

    HJ/AGJ/D.V.C

    13. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    (Lala) Gopal Das v. (Lala) Chander Prakash .
    (Apr 29, 1966)