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Case Summary — Opinion of Agarwala, J. (Appeal by defendants first party)

Factual and Procedural Background

The predecessors-in-interest of the defendants fourth party owned a fractional proprietary share in property and in 1866 executed a usufructuary mortgage of that share to Gopal Sahu and Ayodhya Prasad (now represented by the defendants third party). The mortgage's repayment was due in May or June 1870. In 1890 the defendants fourth party transferred 18 pies of the property to the defendants first party and 6 pies to the plaintiffs and the defendants second party. The mortgage was redeemed in 1905 by the defendants first party alone. The defendants second party conveyed their interest in the 6 pies to the plaintiffs, who thereby became owners of the 6 pies' equity of redemption. The original mortgage sum was Rs. 1,875.

On 5 September 1930 the plaintiffs deposited Rs. 447-8-0 in Court to the credit of the defendants first party. The present suit (to redeem the plaintiffs' 6 pies share of the mortgage by proportionate payment) was instituted on 4 September 1933. The sole question presented on this appeal is one of limitation: from which date does the period of limitation run for a suit by a co-mortgagor to redeem — from the original due date (May/June 1870) or from the date on which a co-mortgagor redeemed the mortgage (1905)? The parties accepted that Article 148, Limitation Act, is applicable to a suit to redeem a mortgage of immovable property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. From which date does the period of limitation under Article 148 (Limitation Act) run for a suit by a co-mortgagor to redeem: the original due date of the mortgage (May/June 1870) or the date on which a co-mortgagor redeemed the mortgage (1905)?
  2. Whether the deed of assignment of 1887 and the plaint in the partition suit of 1911 constituted a written acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act such as to create a fresh period of limitation (a new terminus a quo).
  3. Whether an acknowledgment by one of several co-mortgagees is sufficient to restart limitation, having regard to Section 19 read with Section 21(2) of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants (Appellants) — Principal Contentions

  • The period of limitation runs from the due date of the original mortgage (May/June 1870); if so, the plaintiffs' suit (instituted in 1933) is barred by limitation.
  • The alleged acknowledgments relied upon by the plaintiffs (the 1887 deed of assignment and the 1911 plaint) do not suffice to create a fresh period of limitation.
  • The appellate challenge to the remand order is permissible because the remand was an order under Section 151 CPC and not an appealable order; accordingly the appellants can contest the remand's consequences in this appeal.

Plaintiffs (Respondents) — Principal Contentions

  • Although a co-mortgagor who redeems is subrogated to the position of the mortgagee, it does not necessarily follow that the period of limitation for a suit to redeem must run from the original due date; the period might be calculated from the date of redemption.
  • Alternatively, the plaintiffs rely on written acknowledgments — specifically the deed of assignment of 1887 (which admitted the existence of the 1866 mortgage) and the plaint in the 1911 partition suit (which referred to the 1866 mortgage) — as constituting an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act that would restart the period of limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
26 Bom 500 Represents the Bombay/Calcutta view that the charge given by S.95 (pre-1929) to a co-mortgagor who redeemed was less than the right of a mortgagee; limitation for enforcement treated under Articles 132/144 (12 years) and date of redemption as the starting point. Used to state that a divergent view existed historically (Bombay/Calcutta) and contrasted with the Allahabad Full Bench view; not accepted as determinative for the present case.
14 ALL 12 (Allahabad Full Bench) Held that a co-mortgagor who redeems is subrogated to the position of the mortgagee and that time for a suit to redeem runs from the due date of the original mortgage (Article 148). Cited as authoritative support for treating limitation as running from the original due date rather than from the date of redemption; the Court regarded this view as sound and followed in subsequent Allahabad decisions.
25 CWN 283 Held that a co-mortgagor who redeems stands in the position of an assignee of the mortgage (i.e., in the position of the original mortgagee), implying Article 148 governs suits against him. Referred to as adopting the subrogation/assignee view; the Court noted that the 1929 statutory amendment effectively made this position part of the law (for post-amendment law).
58 Cal 116 (Full Bench) Held that the earlier Calcutta decision (25 CWN 283) had been wrongly decided (as applied in Calcutta before the 1929 amendment). The Court observed that the Full Bench's criticism was limited to Calcutta law prior to the 1929 amendment and that the 1929 amendment later put the position of subrogation into statute.
189 IC 513 (Full Bench, 12 April 1940) Took the view that Section 92 merely gives statutory recognition to the law as it stood before the 1929 amendment. Noted by the Court to show that post-amendment statutory provisions reflected pre-amendment law in substance; used to contextualize the legal landscape (though the present case is decided on the pre-amendment Act).
AIR 1933 ALL 228 Decision following the Allahabad Full Bench view that time runs from the due date. Cited as evidence of consistent application in the Allahabad Court of the rule that limitation runs from the due date.
AIR 1930 Nag 300 Single-Judge decision that, though agreeing with Allahabad's reasoning, concluded the limitation period was twelve years under Article 132 (an outcome the court called inconsistent with the reasoning). Mentioned as the only post-amendment contradictory decision; the Court noted its final conclusion did not follow from its reasoning, reducing its persuasive weight.
1 Pat 780 (1922) Held that a puisne mortgagee who redeems a prior mortgage has rights to enforce the prior encumbrance or be reimbursed, and limitation for enforcement begins to run from the date the money due under the prior encumbrance becomes due. Quoted and applied to support the proposition that limitation runs from the date when the right to redeem accrues (the due date) and that the running of limitation does not cease merely because the creditor assigned the security.
37 Bom 3269 Privy Council held an entry in a receipt book (signed by the relevant mortgagees) constituted an acknowledgment by the mortgagees of their interest in the original mortgage, creating a fresh period of limitation. Examined and distinguished on its facts: the Court emphasised that in 37 Bom all mortgagees had signed the receipt and hence it was not a case of an acknowledgment by one of several mortgagees.
54 Bom 625 Relied upon by respondents as supporting acknowledgment arguments (specific facts not recited in detail in the opinion). The Court indicated that, upon examining the facts of cited Bombay decisions, they did not support the respondents' contention that the present instruments constituted effective acknowledgments by all mortgagees.
17 Bom 173 Earlier Bombay decision referenced in the discussion of an 1839 mortgage; treated as a decision on particular facts concerning partition and exclusive possession. Distinguished on facts from the present case; the Court said that 17 Bom 173 was not dissented from but was a decision that turned on its specific facts (exclusive possession and partial redemption issues).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the sole question as one of limitation and accepted that Article 148 of the Limitation Act applies to suits to redeem a mortgage of immovable property. The real dispute was the proper terminus a quo for the sixty-year period: (A) the original due date of the mortgage (May/June 1870) or (B) the date when a co-mortgagor (defendants first party) redeemed the mortgage in 1905.

The Court surveyed prior judicial views. It observed a historical divergence: some Bombay and Calcutta decisions treated the co-mortgagor's charge (pre-1929 S.95) as different from the mortgagee's right and applied shorter limitation periods (Articles 132/144 — 12 years), counting limitation from the date of redemption. By contrast, an Allahabad Full Bench had held that a co-mortgagor who redeems is subrogated to the position of the mortgagee and that Article 148 applies with the time running from the original due date.

The Court considered authorities (including 25 CWN 283 and 1 Pat 780) that supported the subrogation/assignee view and which imply that limitation runs from the date when the right to redeem accrues (the due date). The Court also noted the 1929 amendment to the Transfer of Property Act, which gave statutory recognition to the view that a co-mortgagor who redeems has the same right as the mortgagee; however, the present case had to be decided on the law as it stood prior to that amendment.

Applying the authorities and legal principle that a co-mortgagor who redeems stands in the position of the mortgagee (and in line with the Allahabad Full Bench view and related decisions), the Court concluded that limitation began to run for all mortgagors from the time the right to redeem accrued (the due date in 1870) and did not cease to run merely because some co-mortgagors later redeemed the mortgage (in 1905).

The Court next addressed the plaintiffs' alternative contention that there had been a written acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act (the 1887 deed of assignment and the 1911 plaint) that would give rise to a fresh period of limitation. The Court applied Section 19 together with the limitation that "nothing in this section renders one of several mortgagees chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed by any other or others of them" (Section 21(2)).

After examining the factual matrix of the cited authorities (notably 37 Bom 3269 and the peculiar Bombay decisions), the Court distinguished those cases on their facts: in 37 Bom the receipt entries had been signed by all mortgagees and so constituted acknowledgments by all. By contrast, in the present case the alleged acknowledgments were not made by all persons interested: the 1887 deed was by one branch and the 1911 plaint was a statement made after the 1905 repayment by defendants first party.

Crucially, the Court found that the 1911 statement could not properly be characterized as an acknowledgment under Section 19 because, by 1905, the original mortgagees had been paid off and thus had no continuing liability; an acknowledgment must be an admission of a present liability, corresponding to a present right in someone else. Because the alleged acknowledgments were either not by all mortgagees or were not acknowledgments of existing liability, they did not create a fresh period of limitation.

Finally, the Court observed a procedural defect: the plaintiffs had not pleaded the facts relied upon to save the suit from the bar of limitation in their plaint, which made the evidence on alleged acknowledgment inadmissible at trial. Although an appellate Court had remanded the case to permit proof of the acknowledgment, the present Court held that the remand was an order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus not appealable; the rejection of an appeal against that remand did not preclude the appellants from raising the matter in this appeal. Consequently, the plaintiffs could not rely on the alleged acknowledgments.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; THE PLAINTIFFS' SUIT IS DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties: The Court allowed the appeal of the defendants first party with costs throughout and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit for redemption of the 6 pies share.

Broader implications: The Court applied existing precedents and statutory framework to hold that limitation for a suit to redeem a mortgage against a co-mortgagor who has redeemed runs from the date when the right to redeem accrues (the original due date), and that isolated acknowledgments by one of several mortgagees (or statements made after the mortgagees had been paid off) do not restart limitation under Section 19. The opinion did not purport to lay down a new general principle beyond applying precedent and statutory construction to the facts of the case.

Additional note from the opinion: Rowland, J. agreed with Agarwala, J.'s reasoning and disposition (the opinion records "Rowland, J.:— I agree").

    Mukh Narain Singh v. Ramlochan Tiwari

    Agarwala, J.:— This is an appeal by defendants first party. The predecessors-in-interest of defendants fourth party owned a fractional proprietary share in certain property. In 1866 they executed a usufructuary mortgage of this share to Gopal Sahu and Ayodhya Prasad, now represented by defendants third party. The due date for repayment was May or June 1870. In 1890 defendants fourth party transferred 18 pies in the property to defendants first party and 6 pies to the plaintiffs and defendants second party; The mortgage was redeemed by defendants first party alone in 1905. The interest of defendants second party in the 6 pies share transferred to them and the plaintiffs by the defendants fourth party was conveyed by the defendants second party to the plaintiffs who thus became the owners of the 6 pies share in the equity of redemption. The original mortgage was for Rs. 1875. On 5th September 1930, the plaintiffs deposited in Court a sum of Rs. 447-8-0 to the credit of defendants first party in the present suit, which was instituted on 4th September 1933. The plaintiffs seek to redeem their 6 pies share of the mortgage by proportionate payment of the mortgage debt. The only question which arises for decision in this appeal is the question of limitation. It has not been contended that Article 148, Limitation Act, does not apply. The conflict between the parties is as to the date from which the limitation runs. For a suit against a mortgagee of immovable property to redeem the mortgage that article provides a period of 60 years from the date when the right to redeem accrues. The Court below held that the period in the present case runs from the date when the defendants first party redeemed the mortgage in 1905. On behalf of the defendants-appellants, it is contended that the period runs from the due date of the mortgage, that is to say, May or June 1870. If this contention be correct, this suit is barred by limitation as it was instituted more than 60 years from that date.

    2. Before the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929, there was a divergence of judicial opinion as to the status and rights of a co-mortgagor who has redeemed the mortgage. The view taken in the Bombay High Court and in some of the Calcutta cases was that the charge created by S. 95 (before its amendment in 1929) in favour of a co-mortgagor who has redeemed the mortgage meant something less than the right of a mortgagee; that the period of limitation to enforce the charge was 12 years under Article 132, Limitation Act, and for a suit to redeem such charge was 12 years under Article 144, it being treated as a suit to recover possession and the date of redemption being treated as the starting point for limitation: see 26 Bom 500.1 In Allahabad, on the other hand, a Full Bench in 14 ALL 12 held that a co-mortgagor who has redeemed a mortgage is subrogated to the position of the mortgagee and that a suit against him by the other mortgagors for redemption is governed by Article 148 and time runs against the plaintiffs from the due date of the mortgage.

    3. In 25 CWN 283,3 the position of a co-mortgagor who has redeemed the mortgage was held to be that of an assignee of the mortgage, that is to say, he stood in the position of the original mortgagee. According to this view also, it follows that a suit against him for redemption by his co-mortgagor would be governed by Article 148. In a litigation commenced before the amendment of 1929 the decision in this case was challenged in 58 Cal 116.4 The Full Bench held that the earlier case had been wrongly decided. But it is quite clear from the judgment of the learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment in the case that it was only in respect of the law as laid down in Calcutta before the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929 that the Full Bench held that the earlier case had been wrongly decided, for he said:

    It may here be observed that Section 95 of the Transfer Property Act has, by Act 20 of 1929, been amended in such a way that Ss. 92 and 95, as they now stand, make it clear that the right of the co-mortgagor redeeming is the “same right as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor.” In effect therefore the decision in 25 CWN 283 is now statute law. The present case however must be dealt with upon the Act as it stood prior to the amendment of 1929.

    4. By the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929, the Legislature has given statutory recognition to the view of the Allahabad Full Bench that a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage is subrogated to the position of the mortgagee. In this Court, in 189 IC 513,5 decided on 12th April 1940, a Full Bench has taken the view that S. 92 merely gives statutory recognition to the law as it stood before the amendment of 1929. It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents that although a co-mortgagor who redeems a mortgage is subrogated to the position of the mortgagee it does not follow that the period of limitation commences from the due date of the original mortgage. I have already pointed out that the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the time ran from the due date of the original mortgage. This view has been followed in that Court since the amendment in AIR 1933 ALL 228.6 I can see no reason why, in the case, of co-mortgagors, one should have a longer period than the other in a suit to redeem the mortgage. That, however, is implicit in the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents in this case. The only case in which the contrary view has been taken since the amendment of 1929 is the case AIR 1930 Nag 300.7 That was a decision of a single Judge who on a careful consideration of the question agreed with the decision of the Allahabad Full Bench, but in the concluding paragraph of his judgment held that the period of limitation was twelve years under Article 132. Thus his final conclusion does not appear to follow from the reasoning given in his judgment. Another decision of this Court may be referred to, namely 1 Pat 780.8 That was a decision of 1922. There a puisne mortgagee and not a co-mortgagor had redeemed the prior mortgage. It was held that the rights of a puisne mortgagee are to enforce the prior encumbrance or to be reimbursed the amount paid off and limitation for the exercise of the right to enforce the prior encumbrance begins to run from the date on which the money due under the prior encumbrance becomes due. Das, J. who delivered the judgment said:

    It may be that the right to enforce the security ……arises on the date of the assignment; but the limitation has already commenced to run and will not ceasa to operate just because the creditor has assigned the security to another person.

    5. Here also time had begun to run against all the mortgagors from the time when the right to redeem accrued, that is to say, from the due date of the mortgage, and did not cease to run against the plaintiffs merely because the other co-mortgagors redeemed the mortgage. It was next contended on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents that even if time began to run against the plaintiffs originally from the due date of the mortgage of 1866, there was a fresh terminus a quo at a later date on account of certain acknowledgments. The facts relating to this are that the original mortgagees assigned the mortgage in 1873 to one Manhgu in the name of Ram-saran, Manhgu's son by his first wife. Subsequently, there was a partition between the sons of Manhgu's two wives. The suit was instituted by the sons of Manhgu's second wife. The plaint in that suit referred to the mortgage of 1866. This was in 1911. In 1887 Dhyan Sahu son of Ram Saran, had executed a deed of assignment in favour of Bujhawan Ojha and Ayodhya Ojha of his half share in the mortgage. The deed of assignment admitted the existence of the mortgage of 1866. It is contended that the deed of assignment of 1887 and the plaint in the partition suit of 1911 contained an acknowledgment by all the persons interested in the mortgage and that this constitutes an acknowledgment under s. 19, Limitation Act, so as to provide a fresh starting point for the period of limitation. Section 19 provides:

    Where, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.

    6. Nothing in this section, however, renders one of several mortgagees chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed by any other or others of them [s. 21(2)]. For the respondents it is contended that the deed of assignment of 1887 and the plaint of 1911 constitute an acknowledgment by all the mortgagees. Reliance was placed on 37 Bom 3269 and 54 Bom 625.10 When the facts of these cases are examined, however, they do not, in my view, support the respondents' contention. The facts of the former case were that a certain desaigiri dastur grant was the subject-matter of a usufructuary mortgage in the district of Broach. When that district came under British rule the grant was commuted into a fixed money allowance payable from the treasury. The mortgagees received that allowance in lieu of the original grant. The date of the original mortgage was 1793. The suit was instituted in 1901 considerably more than 60 years from the due date. The plaintiffs relied on an entry in a receipt book relating to the payment by the treasury to the mortgagees in 1843 of the allowances which had been substituted for the original grant. At that time the rights of the mortgagees were vested in unequal shares in two persons. The entry in the book stated that it was made to the two persons named and the amounts of the shares of each of them was set against their names. Against those shares the mortgagees had written their respective names in acknowledgment of the receipt of their shares of the allowances. The Privy Council held that this was clearly an acknowledgment by the mortgagees that they received these payments as being persons interested in the original mortgage, and that their interest in the property was that of mortgagees thereunder and this created a new period of limitation starting from 1848. It is obvious from the facts stated that all the mortgagees had signed the book evidencing the payments and that it is not a case of an acknowledgment by one of several mortgagees.

    7. The facts of the Bombay case were peculiar. In 1839, one J mortgaged 7 acres 9 gunthas to V, the ancestor of defendants. On partition in the family of the mortgagee, V, 3 acres 20 gunthas was allotted to the branch of defendant 1 and the remainder to the other branch of the family. In 1878, the father of defendant 1 sub-mortgaged the 8 acres and 20 gunthas to the plaintiff's father by a deed which acknowledged the existence of the mortgage of 1879. Plaintiff's father subsequently acquired the right to the equity of redemption of all the property comprised in the original mortgage and in 1921 the plaintiff instituted a suit for redemption. Originally the plaintiff prayed for redemption of the whole of the property mortgaged in 1839, but there was an alternative prayer for redemption of 3 acres and 20 gunthas on payment of the whole of the consideration for the mortgage of 1839. To save the bar of limitation, the plaintiff relied upon the acknowledgment of the mortgage made by the father of defendant 1 in the deed of sub-mortgage of 1878. The trial Court decreed the suit with respect to 3 acres and 20 gunthas and dismissed it in regard to the appellants. On appeal, the District Court, following the decision of the Bombay High Court in 17 Bom 17311 held that the whole suit was barred by limitation, and dismissed it. There was a second appeal to the High Court which was heard by the Chief Justice. The latter restored the decision of the trial Court. In an appeal under the Letters Patent, there was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges who heard the appeal with the result that the opinion of the Senior Judge prevailed and the decree of the District Court was restored. From that decision there was a further appeal under the Letters Patent which was heard by three Judges. The question which these learned Judges decided was thus stated by Marten, C.J:

    The actual question we have to decide in Suit No. 221 of 1921 is whether the plaintiff Jadhav Gopal is entitled to redeem 8 acres and 20 gunthas or thereabouts being part of the land comprised in the mortgage of 9th June 1839, Ex. 19, as against defendant 1, Samal Bechar.

    8. In the result they held that although the acknowledgment of the mortgage of 1839 in the sub-mortgage of 1878 was not in respect of the entire property of the original mortgage yet because there had been separation of the mortgaged property by partition in the mortgagee's family and defendant 1's branch had been in exclusive possession of the property of 3 acres and 20 gunthas this was sufficient to save the bar of limitation in respect of the 3 acres and 20 gunthas. This case must be regarded as a decision on its own particular facts. The suit was treated not as a suit for redemption of the whole of the original mortgage but as one for redemption of a part only of the mortgaged property on payment of the consideration of the whole of the original mortgage. The case in 17 Bom 173, was distinguished and not dissented from. In the present case, the plaintiffs do not seek to redeem the 6 pies by depositing the whole of the consideration money of the original mortgage but by payment of a proportionate part only. In my view, by reason of Section 19(2) of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgment by one of several co-mortgagees is insufficient to provide a fresh period of limitation and the admission contained in the deed of assignment of 1887 did not provide a fresh period of limitation from that date; nor did the plaint in the partition suit provide a fresh period from 1911.

    9. There is, moreover, another reason why the plaintiffs must fail. Even if the admission in the deed of assignment of 1887 be an acknowledgment by one branch of the original mortgagee's family of the existence of the original mortgage, there has, in my opinion, been no acknowledgment within the meaning of s. 19 by the other branch. The reason for this is that the alleged acknowledgment in the plaint in the partition suit was not an acknowledgment at all. It will be remembered that in 1905, the defendants first party had repaid the whole of the zarpeshgi money with the result that the original mortgagees had no further interest in the mortgage. The statement by them therefore in 1911, relating to the original mortgage, cannot be regarded as an acknowledgment of any liability or right. An acknowledgment, by its very nature, must be an admission of some present liability of the person making it, corresponding to a present right in some one else. In 1911, the plaintiffs in the partition suit had no liability whatsoever for they had been paid off.

    10. Furthermore, although the suit as originally framed was prima facie barred by limitation and it was therefore the duty of the plaintiffs to state the facts on which they relied to save the bar of limitation, this was not done, with the result that evidence relating to the alleged acknowledgment was inadmissible. It was only in an appeal from the original decree that the question was raised and the appellate Court then remanded the case to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity of proving the acknowledgment. This should not have been done, it is however contended on behalf of the respondents that the present appellants appealed against the order of remand and their appeal was dismissed and consequently they are not entitled to challenge the order of remand in the present appeal. The order of remand itself, however, was quite clearly on order under Section 151 of the CPC, and was therefore not appealable. The rejection of their appeal therefore does not debar the present appellants from raising the matter now. In this view of the case, it is not open to the plaintiffs to rely on the alleged acknowledgment. In the result I would allow the appeal of the defendants first party with costs throughout and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit.

    Rowland, J.:— I agree.

    D.S/R.K

    11. Appeal allowed.

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    Mukh Narain Singh v. Ramlochan Tiwari
    (May 3, 1940)