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  • Section 41 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881
  • Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 78 of the Probate and Administration Act
  • 23 of 1920. 2. Section 151
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Section 41 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881
  • Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 78 of the Probate and Administration Act
  • 23 of 1920. 2. Section 151
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This application was made under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of this Court's judgment in an appeal from Original Decree No. 23 of 1920. The Court's earlier, reported judgment (Surendra Nath Chatterjee v. Sivadas Mookerjee, A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 182) considered whether a will executed on 24 June 1916 and a codicil had been revoked. The trial court had held that both the will and the codicil were revoked. On appeal this Court concluded that the will was revoked but that the codicil remained operative. After concluding the will had been revoked, the Court originally directed that "probate be issued to the appellant in respect of the codicil dated the 24th June 1916." It was subsequently pointed out to the Court that, because the will had been revoked and thus the provision for appointment of executors had disappeared, probate could not properly be granted in respect of the codicil. The present application seeks amendment of the judgment to correct that error.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court may amend its earlier judgment under its powers in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 153 (procedure for amendment) to correct the mistake identified in the judgment.
  2. Given that the will was held to be revoked but the codicil operative, whether "probate" should be substituted by "letters of administration" in the judgment.
  3. If letters of administration are to be issued, who should be appointed administrator (specifically, whether letters should be issued to the petitioner Sibdas Mukherjee alone or to some other person)?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant / Petitioner (as presented to the Court)

  • The petitioner pressed the Court to hold that, if letters of administration are to be issued instead of probate, such letters should be issued in favour of Sibdas Mukherjee alone. (The Court recorded that it had been "pressed" to accede to this request.)

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any other parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surendra Nath Chatterjee v. Sivadas Mookerjee, A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 182 (this Court's earlier reported judgment) Recorded history of the litigation and prior conclusions: that the will of 24 June 1916 was revoked but the codicil of the same date remained in force. The earlier judgment provided the factual and legal starting point for the amendment application: the Court relied on its prior conclusion that the will was revoked and the codicil operative to determine that probate could not properly be granted and that an amendment substituting letters of administration was necessary.
Earl of Warwick v. Greville [1809] 1 Phill. 123 Formulation of the principle governing the court's discretion in appointing administrators: the discretion is to be exercised for the benefit of the estate and persons interested, not according to parties' wishes; the Court should place the estate in hands most likely to serve creditors and beneficiaries. The Court invoked this principle (as articulated by Sir John Nicholl) to guide its exercise of discretion under Section 41 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881 in selecting an administrator who would best secure the safety of the estate and proper administration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a step-by-step manner:

  1. Statutory basis for amendment: The Court noted that Section 151 (inherent power), Section 152 (correction of clerical/arithmetical mistakes or errors from accidental slips or omissions), and Section 153 (amendment of defects/errors in proceedings for determining the real question) of the Code of Civil Procedure permit the Court to make necessary amendments in its judgments. The Court concluded it was open to give directions under these provisions to correct the identified mistake.
  2. Identification of the error: The Court explained that, having held the will revoked, the provision in the will appointing executors had disappeared; consequently "probate" could not be granted solely in respect of the codicil because the codicil did not itself contain a provision appointing executors. This was an oversight that required amendment of the judgment.
  3. Statutory guidance for appointment of an administrator: The Court relied on Section 41 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881, which permits the Judge to appoint an administrator in his discretion, having regard to consanguinity, amount of interest, safety of the estate and the probability of proper administration.
  4. Application of the guiding principle: The Court cited Earl of Warwick v. Greville to explain that the discretion must be exercised to benefit the estate and all persons interested, not merely to satisfy the wishes of any party. The primary duty is to place the estate in hands that will best secure its interests.
  5. Evaluation of candidates in the specific facts: The testator had named two sons (Kedarnath and Sibdas) and a grandson (Surendra Nath) as executors in the will. The Court observed that consanguinity would ordinarily favor the sons over the grandson. However, other relevant factors weighed against giving preference to Sibdas: Sibdas was in involved (financial) circumstances and creditors had instituted proceedings against him. Kedarnath had expressed no wish to act and the Court would not compel an unwilling person to serve. Given these circumstances, the Court concluded that the grandson, Surendra Nath, was the person best suited to be entrusted with administration.
  6. Security and formal conditions: The Court relied on Section 78 of the Probate and Administration Act, which authorizes the Court to require bonds and sureties from those to whom grants are made. Surendra had expressed readiness to furnish security. The Court therefore prescribed the security terms: a bond for Rs. 2,000 with two sureties of Rs. 1,000 each.
  7. Duties and ancillary matters: The Court directed that the administrator's first duty would be to distribute the assets among legatees in terms of the codicil dated 24 June 1916 and to provide for performance of Devasheba under the codicil's first clause. The Court observed that a separate scheme of Devasheba prepared by the testator on 24 June 1916 was not incorporated into the codicil and therefore could not be included in the grant; however, the Court allowed that the scheme might, for present convenience, be adopted subject to modification if it contravened the codicil.
  8. Remedial directions and costs: The Court ordered that its original judgment be amended by substituting the words "letters of administration" for "probate"; directed that letters of administration with a copy of the codicil annexed be issued to Surendra Nath (identified in the judgment as Surendra Nath Chatterji in the operative direction) upon furnishing the prescribed security; directed amendment of the probate already issued by the District Judge so that it would read as letters of administration; provided that the administrator would act under direction of the District Judge; allocated costs so that each party would pay his own costs of the present amendment proceedings; and noted the administrator's entitlement to take his costs out of the estate. The Court assessed the hearing fee at one gold mohur.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court's original judgment is amended by the substitution of the words "letters of administration" for "probate," and letters of administration (with a copy of the codicil annexed) are to be issued to Surendra Nath (referred to in the operative direction as Surendra Nath Chatterji) subject to security and other conditions specified by the Court.

Direct consequences and practical implications:

  • The earlier direction to issue "probate" in respect of the codicil is replaced by a direction to issue "letters of administration" because the will (which contained the appointment of executors) was held to be revoked.
  • Surendra Nath is appointed administrator on terms: he must furnish security (a bond of Rs. 2,000 with two sureties of Rs. 1,000 each) and will administer the estate under the supervision of the District Judge.
  • The administrator's duties include distribution of assets according to the codicil dated 24 June 1916 and provision for performance of Devasheba in accordance with the codicil's first clause; a separate Devasheba scheme prepared by the testator may be adopted for convenience but only insofar as it does not conflict with the codicil.
  • Each party will bear his own costs of the amendment proceedings; the administrator may recover his costs from the estate; the Court fixed the hearing fee at one gold mohur.
  • No broader precedent or novel rule of law is announced beyond the application of existing statutory provisions (Sections 151, 152, 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 41 and 78 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881) and the established discretionary principle as stated in Earl of Warwick v. Greville. The decision effects a corrective amendment to the specific prior judgment and determines who should administer the particular estate before the Court.

This summary is confined to matters expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not infer facts or arguments beyond the text.

    Sivadas Mookerjee v. Surendra Nath Chatterjee

    1. This is an application made under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the judgment of this Court in appeal from Original Decree No. 23 of 1920.

    2. Section 151 presumes the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to pre-vent abuse of the process of the Court, Section 152 authorises the Court to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. This may be done by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. Section 153 provides that the Court may, at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding. We have no doubt that in the events which have happened it is open to us to give necessary directions under one or other of these provisions of the Code.

    3. The history of this litigation is set out in our judgment which has been reported: Surendra Nath Chatterjee v. Sivadas Mookerjee A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 182. We were called upon to consider in the appeal the question whether the will executed by Rai Bahadur Krishna Mohan Mookerjee on the 24th June 1916 and a codicil had been revoked and cancelled. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the will as also the codicil had been revoked. On appeal we held that the will had been revoked but that the codicil was in full operation. Our views were summarised in the following passage of our judgment:

    Our conclusion is that the second will executed on the 24th June 1916 was revoked by the testator on the 14th April 1918 by the execution of the deed of gift and also by tearing; but that the codicil was not revoked either in law or in fact.

    4. After this statement of our conclusion we proceeded to add as follows: " The result is that this appeal is allowed and the decree of the District Judge set aside. We direct that probate be issued to the appellant in respect of the codicil dated the 24th June 1916." Our attention has now been drawn to the fact that as the will was revoked, the provision for the appointment of executor disappeared. Consequently, no probate could be granted in respect of the codicil which did not embody a provision for the appointment of executors. This escaped the notice of the Court and our judgment must accordingly be amended. We direct that the judgment be amended by the substitution of the words "letters of administration" for word ' probate '.

    5. We have been pressed to hold, however, that if letters of administration are issued instead of a probate, the letters of administration should be issued in favour of the petitioner Sibdas Mukherjee alone, who is one of the sons of the testator. We have anxiously considered whether we should accede to this prayer and we have with some reluctance come to the conclusion that we should not grant the application. The testator left two sons, Kedarnath Mukherjee, and Sivdas Mukerjee, as also a grandson by a daughter named Surendra Nath Chatterjee. By his will, he had appointed all these persons as executors; and if we bad not held that the will had been revoked, the probate would have issued, in the normal course of events, to these three persons as executors. Probate, however, cannot be granted in the events which have happened, and the Court is called upon to consider who should be appointed administrator. The rules for the appointment of an administrator is formulated in Section 41 of the Probate and Administration Act 1881 which is in the following terms:

    When a person has died intestate, or leaving a will of which there is no executor willing and competent to act, or, where the executor is, at the time of the death of such person, resident out of the province, and it appears to the Court to be necessary or convenient to appoint some person to administer the estate or any part thereof other than the person who, under ordinary circumstances, would be entitled to a grant of administration, the Judge may, in his discretion, having regard to consanguinity, amount of interest, the safety of the estate and probability that it will be properly administered, appoint such person as he thinks fit to be administrator.

    6. It will be observed that one of the elements to be taken into consideration is consanguinity; judged by this test, a claim by either of the sons of the testator is entitled to preference over that of the grandson by daughter. There are, however, other elements which must be taken into consideration, such as safety of the estate and the probability that it will be properly administered. The principle which underlies this statutory provision was formulated by Sir John Nicholl in the case of Earl of Warwick v. Greville [1809] 1 Phill. 123.

    " The selection rests with the discretion of the Court. That discretion, however, is not to be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised, but it is a legal discretion governed by principle and sanctioned by practice; in exercising it, the Court is not to be guided by the wishes or feelings of parties, but is to look to the benefit of the estate and to that of all the persons interested in the distribution of the property. The first duty of the Court then is to place it in the hands of that person who is likely best to convert it to the advantage of those who have claims, either in paying the creditors, or in making distribution: the primary object; is the interest of the property."

    7. Now, in the case before up, there is no room for doubt that Sibdas Mookerjee is in involved circumstances and that his creditors have already taken proceedings against him for the realisation of their dues Kedarnath Mukherjee has expressed no desire to act as an administrator and the Court would be reluctant to force administration upon an unwilling person.

    8. In these circumstances, Surendra Nath Chatterjee, the grandson, is obviously the person who should be entrusted with the administration of the estate. He has expressed his readiness to furnish security to the Court in accordance with Section 78 of the Probate and Administration Act which provides that '' every person to whom any grant of letters of administration is committed and, if the Judge so directs, any person to whom probate is granted, shall give a bond to the Judge of the District Court, to enure for the benefit of the Judge for the time being with one or more surety or sureties, engaging for the due collection, getting in and administering the estate of the deceased, which bond shall be in such form as the Judge from time to time by any general or special order directs."

    9. We direct accordingly that letters of administration with copy of the codicil annexed be issued to Surendra Nath Chatterji and that he do furnish security to the extent of Rs. 2,000 (two thousand) with two sureties for Rs. 1,000 each. His first duty will be to distribute the assets amongst the legatees in terms of the codicil of the 24th June, 1916, and to provide for the performance of Devasheba in accordance with the first clause thereof.

    10. Our attention has been drawn to a scheme of Devasheba which was prepared by the testator on the 24th June 1916. This was not incorporated in the codicil and consequently we cannot include it in the grant. But, for the sake of convenience, the scheme as framed by the testator, may for the present be adopted as the scheme for the management of the Devashoba, subject, however, to this reservation that if the scheme in any respect contravenes the provisions of the codicil, the scheme must to that extent be modified.

    11. The result is that our original judgment is amended by the substitution of the words 'letters of administration' for 'probate' and Surendra Nath Chatterjee is appointed administrator on the terms and conditions mentioned. The decree based on the judgment will be amended accordingly. Each party will pay his own costs of these proceedings. The administrator will be entitled to take his costs out of the estate. "We assess the hearing fee at one gold mohur. Let the probate already issued be amended by the District Judge so that it may be read as letters of administration instead of probate. The administrator will act under the direction of the District Judge.

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    Sivadas Mookerjee v. Surendra Nath Chatterjee
    (Jul 13, 1923)