1. This is an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters patent from a judgment of Roe, J., in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent. One of the questions in controversy between the parties related to the amount of rent payable in cash. The Court of first instance decreed the claim in full. The Subordinate Judge on appeal modified that decree and allowed the plaintiff a decree at the rate admitted by the defendants. Before the Subordinate Judge, as before the Trial Court, reliance was placed upon a petition of compromise filed in a previous suit for arrears of rent. This document embodied an agreement to pay Rs. 139-2-0, as rent for an area of 35 bighas. A question was thereupon raised, whether the document was admissible in evidence. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that it was admissible in evidence. The Subordinate Judge took the contrary view. There can be no doubt that the opinion of the Subordinate Judge is supported by the decision of a Full Bench in Lalit Mohan Ghose v. Gopali Chauk Coal Co. Ltd. (1) and the earlier decision of this Court in Biraj Mohini Dassee v. Kedar Nath Karmokar (2).
2. These cases show that a document which embodies a contract for variation of the rent payable in respect of a lease is in essence a lease and is compulsorily registrable. If it is not registered in accordance with law, it is not only not admissible in evidence, it does not even constitute a valid and operative contract between the parties.
3. The Subordinate Judge accordingly left the petition of compromise out of considaration and modified the decree of the Court of first instance. On appeal to this Court, Roe, J., has held that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on the strength of an entry in the Record of Rights. This entry, it may be conceded, is, under sub-Section 3, Section 103-B of the Ben. Ten. Act, evidence of the matter referred to therein and must be presumed to be correct until disproved by evidence to be incorrect. The Subordinate Judge held that the entry had been proved by evidence to be incorrect, when it was shown that the entry was based solely on the petition of compromise which, as we have already explained, did not constitute in law, a valid and operative contract between the parties, in modification of the pre-existing agreement between them. Roe, J. has held that the entry cannot be rebutted in this manner, but that other evidence must be adduced to prove that the entry is incorrect.
4. In our opinion sub-S. (3) of S. 103 B, need not be interpreted in the manner suggested, in fact if it is, as it has actually been, established that the only evidence wherein the entry was made by the Settlement Officer does not support his conclusion, that is the strongest possible proof that the entry is incorrect. The party is not limited to a particular mode of proof, he can prove aliundi that the entry is in fact incorrect but there is no reason why he should not achieve the same result by proof that the material whereon the Settlement Officer based his decision does not in law justify his conclusion as to the relative rights and obligations of the parties. We are of opinion that the view taken by the Subordinate Judge is correct and that his decree should not have been modified. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree made by Roe, J., set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs of two hearings in this Court.
V.B/R.K
5. Appeal allowed.