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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by defendant no. 1, Rachpalmahraj, against a decree for sale founded on an equitable mortgage. The plaintiffs (carrying on business in Calcutta under the name Thanmal Chunilal) sued alleging that the defendants constituted a joint family engaged in business under Mitakshara law with the appellant as karta, and that an equitable mortgage was created when defendant no. 1 deposited title deeds in Calcutta on 23 October 1936 as security for sums due and for future transactions. The plaintiffs sought Rs. 10,322-2-6 with interest at nine annas per hundred per month compoundable with yearly rests. The Subordinate Judge found that an equitable mortgage was created by the deposit and considered the evidence unimpeachable; he decreed the suit allowing interest at six percent per annum pendente lite and future interest at the same rate (though the decree's calculations reflected 6.75% p.a. compoundable annually). The defendant appealed, pressing three primary contentions, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal with costs to the plaintiffs-respondents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the document dated 23 October 1936 (exhibit 3) constituted the operative contract creating the mortgage and therefore was compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Registration Act and excluded oral evidence of the contract under section 91 of the Evidence Act.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to any interest prior to the filing of the suit and, if so, at what rate and whether compound interest was claimed and proved.
  3. Whether the Subordinate Judge erred in accepting the appellant's alleged signatures in the plaintiffs' account books and in refusing to reopen the accounts between the parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant No. 1) Arguments

  • The deeds and the contemporaneous letter (ext. 3) constituted the contract for the mortgage; therefore ext. 3 was compulsorily registrable under sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and excluded oral evidence of the contract under section 91 of the Evidence Act.
  • The plaintiffs were not entitled to interest prior to the suit because the evidence did not establish the stipulated rate of interest (or the manner of its computation).
  • The signatures of the appellant on the plaintiffs’ account books were not proved; the Subordinate Judge should have required expert handwriting evidence and should have reopened or re-examined the accounts between the parties.
  • As an asserted alternate defense, the appellant maintained that the deeds were handed over merely for safe custody at Darbhanga and not as security — arising from a family misunderstanding — and that on the true transactions the defendants were creditors of the plaintiffs rather than debtors.

Plaintiffs-Respondents' Case

  • Plaintiffs alleged that an equitable mortgage was created by the deposit of title deeds in Calcutta on 23 October 1936 as security for past and future transactions, and pleaded a specific rate of interest: "9 annas per hundred rupees per month according to mahajani system."
  • Plaintiffs relied on exhibit 3 as a memorandum of the deposit and on a complete set of account papers spanning about ten years together with oral evidence (including Parmanand Daruka, Mangi Lal Sharaf and Hira Lal) to prove the sums due.
  • The plaintiffs produced a series of acknowledgments (exhibit 2-series) in their account books purportedly signed by Rachpalmahraj on three occasions confirming the correctness of balances; they relied on these papers and witnesses rather than on an expert in handwriting alone.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Couch, C.J. (1873) (20 Weekly Reporter 150) The general rule that oral proof cannot be substituted for written evidence where parties have put their contract into writing; the writing is treated as the repository and appropriate evidence of the agreement. The court invoked this rule as the starting point and applied the subsidiary question whether the memorandum (ext. 3) was of such a nature that it could be treated as the contract for the mortgage; finding ext. 3 was not an operative contract, the Couch principle did not bar oral evidence here.
Subramonian v. Lutchman Test: whether the document constituted the bargain between the parties or was merely the record of an already completed transaction. The court applied this test and concluded ext. 3 was a memorandum of an already completed deposit (a record), not the operative bargain creating the mortgage.
Hari Shankar v. Kedar Nath Shows that a memorandum couched in operative or contractual language that embodies terms (including conferring power of sale) constitutes the bargain and is registerable. The court contrasted ext. 3 with the operative language in Hari Shankar and found ext. 3 lacked such operative contractual terms; thus it was not the instrument creating the interest.
Bhairab; Chandra Bose v. Anath Nath De Where title deeds are already in creditor's custody, a written memorandum stating that the deeds "shall be held as collateral security" is operative and effects formal redeposit, thereby constituting the bargain. The court examined ext. 3 against this precedent and concluded ext. 3 did not contain similarly operative words; ext. 3 merely recorded the deposit rather than effected or embodied the agreement.
Dwarka Nath v. Sarat Kumari Illustrates that a letter or memorandum handed over contemporaneously and expressing the making of the deposit may itself be the instrument by which the deposit was made and thus be operative. The court referenced this case to show contrast with ext. 3 — whereas in Dwarka Nath the memorandum operated to make the deposit, ext. 3 did not operate in that manner on its face.
Ebrahim Hazi v. Offl. Trustee Example of a memorandum with operative undertakings (including deposit of deeds and express provisions as to interest) which constituted the agreement and was registerable. The court cited this as another instance of an operative memorandum; ext. 3 lacked comparable operative provisions and was therefore treated differently.
Obla Sundarachariar v. Narayanna Ayyar Test: to bring a memorandum relating to deposit of title deeds within section 17, it must on its face embody the terms of the transaction and be signed and delivered in such circumstances as to legitimately lead to the conclusion that it constitutes the agreement as to the deposit (though it need not contain all particulars). The court applied this specific test and found ext. 3 failed to exhibit operative terms or circumstances proving it to be the agreement itself; therefore ext. 3 did not fall within section 17 and did not exclude oral evidence.
Mohan Bikram Shah v. Deonarain Mahto Clarifies limits on drawing adverse inferences from non-production of documents: the cited case was not authority for a broad proposition that an adverse inference can be drawn only if a party had been called on to produce the papers; the real question is relevance and the context of non-production. The court distinguished the present facts from the narrower point in Mohan Bikram Shah and held that where defendants denied plaintiffs' claim and asserted the reverse, the defendants' failure to produce their own relevant account books warranted the court attaching significance to that failure and drawing adverse inference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured way, addressing the three principal points pressed on appeal and applying the established authorities cited in the record.

  1. On exhibit 3 and registration / exclusion of oral evidence:

    The court first examined the content, timing and effect of exhibit 3 (the letter dated 23 October 1936). It reviewed the authorities governing when a memorandum accompanying or contemporaneous with deposit of title deeds constitutes the operative bargain (and thus becomes registrable under section 17). Applying the line of authorities (including Couch C.J.'s formulation, Subramonian v. Lutchman, Hari Shankar, Bhairab/Chandra Bose, Dwarka Nath, Ebrahim Hazi, and Obla Sundarachariar), the court asked whether ext. 3, on its face, contained operative terms creating or embodying the agreement as to the mortgage, or whether it was merely a record of an already completed deposit.

    The court found that ext. 3 "merely records a transaction which has taken place" and "creates evidence of the circumstances in which the title deeds were deposited." It lacked operative language that would make it the instrument creating an equitable mortgage. The court noted that even if ext. 3 were signed contemporaneously with the deposit, that fact alone did not render it operative; what mattered was the intention of the parties and the operative character of the document's language. Thus, ext. 3 did not fall within section 17 and did not exclude oral evidence under section 91 of the Evidence Act. This disposes of the appellant's first contention against the plaintiffs.

  2. On interest prior to suit:

    The plaint alleged a stipulation for interest "at the rate of 9 annas per hundred rupees per month according to mahajani system." The plaintiffs produced evidence (Parmanand Daruka, P.W.2) stating that the commercial rate of interest was "9 annas p.c. per mensem compoundable every year." The court accepted this evidence, noting it was made in direct reference to the pleading and was unchallenged in cross‑examination. The court observed a drafting mistake in the Subordinate Judge's judgment where interest was described as nine percent per annum instead of nine annas per month; however, the decretal amount had been calculated at the correct rate (6.75% p.a. equivalent) with annual compounding. Accordingly, the court sustained the award of interest as consistent with the pleading and evidence.

  3. On the correctness of the amount claimed and genuineness of signatures:

    To prove the amount due, the plaintiffs produced complete account papers spanning about ten years and oral testimony (P.W.2 and commission witnesses Mangi Lal Sharaf and Hira Lal). Those papers showed that the accounts had been made up on three occasions with the appellant's acknowledgments in the plaintiffs' books (exhibit 2-series). The Subordinate Judge found that the accounts together with witness evidence established the correctness of plaintiffs' claim and rejected the appellant's denial of signatures.

    The appellant argued the judge should have required a handwriting expert. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs did not rely solely on the acknowledgments; they produced direct evidence (the account papers and witness testimony) establishing the dues. In that evidentiary context, the judge was entitled to accept the signatures as genuine and to find the appellant an unreliable witness, particularly as the appellant maintained that his own accounts existed for the last twelve years but did not produce them. The court addressed the appellant's reliance on Mohan Bikram Shah v. Deonarain Mahto, distinguishing that case and holding that here the non-production of relevant defendant account books justified the adverse inferences drawn by the trial judge.

  4. On the minor respondents' new point:

    Counsel for minor respondents nos. 7 to 13 raised, for the first time at the appellate stage, a contention that in the absence of proof of legal necessity they could not be made liable under the decree (a plea appearing in their written statement). The court observed no issue had been framed on that point at trial and that, although the minors were represented at the hearing of the suit, the point was not pursued; it therefore must be taken to have been given up. Because the contention involved a factual question, it could not be allowed to be raised for the first time on appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences:

  • The decree of the Subordinate Judge (decreeing the plaintiffs' claim and allowing interest calculated at the equivalent of 9 annas per hundred per month — i.e., 6.75% per annum compoundable with annual rests — as reflected in the decretal calculations) is affirmed and the decree for sale on the foot of the equitable mortgage stands.
  • The court rejected the appellant's contentions regarding compulsory registration and exclusion of oral evidence, the entitlement to pre-suit interest, and the genuineness of signatures and correctness of the account; it also refused to entertain the minors' belated factual plea on appeal.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs to the plaintiffs-respondents (as stated in the opinion).

The opinion does not purport to announce any new legal principle; it applies existing authorities to the facts and confirms the trial court's findings of fact and valuation of the evidence.

    Rachpalmahraj v. Bhagwandas

    Reuben, J.:— This is an appeal by defendant no. 1 Rachpalmahraj against a decree for sale on the foot of an equitable mortgage.

    The plaintiff-respondents carry on business in Calcutta under the name of Thanmal Chunilal. They sued on the allegation that the defendants form a joint family carrying on a joint, family business and are governed by the Mitakshara law, with the defendant-appellant as its karta, and have been carrying on monetary transactions for a long time with the plaintiffs. They allege that the equitable mortgage was created by defendant no. 1 by the deposit of the title deeds in Calcutta on the 23rd October, 1936, as security for the amount found due on the transactions between the parties up-to-date and for the transactions to be entered into in future. The documents are set out in schedule 2 to the plaint and the property covered thereby is given in schedule 1. The claim was for Rs. 10,322-2-6 with interest at nine annas per hundred rupees per month compoundable with yearly rests. The main defence set up by defendant-appellant was, firstly, that there was no equitable mortgage as alleged, and that the deeds in question were made over to the plaintiffs at Darbhanga not as security for transactions between the parties but merely for the purpose of safe custody, as a misunderstanding had arisen between defendant no. 1 and the other defendants and he was afraid that the other defendants might deprive him of these documents; secondly, that, on transactions between the parties, the defendants were the creditors and not the debtors of the plaintiffs, and, thirdly, that there was no stipulation regarding the payment of interest, compound or simple. All these contentions were negatived by the Subordinate Judge, and he decreed the suit accordingly, allowing interest at six per cent, per annum pendente lite and future interest at the same rate. On the creation of the equitable mortgage by the deposit of the title deeds in Calcutta, the plaintiffs have adduced evidence, which the Subordinate Judge has rightly characterised as unimpeachable, and the correctness of his finding of facts on this point has not been challenged before us. Only three contentions were pressed: firstly, that the suit must fail because the contract between the parties was reduced to writing in the shape of a document (ext. 3), which must be excluded from evidence under the provisions of sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and itself excludes oral evidence of the contract under the provisions of section 91 of the Evidence Act; secondly, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any interest previous to the filing of the suit; and, thirdly, that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in accepting as genuine the alleged signatures of the appellant on the account books of the plaintiffs and should have reopened the account between the parties.

    The document (exhibit 3) is a letter, dated the 23rd October, 1936, addressed to Messrs. Thanmal Chunilal and signed by the defendant-appellant on behalf of the defendants' firm Ramrachpal Surajmal. It was signed and made over to the plaintiffs on the very day when the title deeds were deposited with them by way of security. It is as follows:

    “We write to put on record that to secure the repayment of the money already due to you from us on account of the business transaction between yourselves and ourselves and the money that may hereafter become due on account of such transactions we have this day deposited with you the following title deeds in Calcutta at your place of business at no. 7, Sambhu Mullick Lane relating to our properties at Samastipur with intent to create an equitable mortgage on the said properties to secure all monies including interest that may be found due and payable by us to you on account of the said transactions.”

    Then follows a list of the property referred to. It is contended that this document constituted the bargain between the parties and, therefore, was compulsorily registrable under the provisions of section 17 of the Registration Act.

    The law regarding documents passing between parties in connection with transactions of this kind has been considered in a large number of reported decisions and was laid down, as long ago as 1873, by Couch, C.J, in terms which have been repeatedly approved and followed (20 Weekly Reporter 150): “The rule with regard to writings is that oral proof cannot be substituted for the written evidence of any contract which the parties have put into writing. And the reason is that the writing is tacitly considered by the parties themselves as the only repository and the appropriate evidence of their agreement. If this memorandum was of such a nature that it could be treated as the contract for the mortgage, and what the parties considered to be the only repository and appropriate evidence of their agreement, it would be the instrument by which the equitable mortgage was created and would come within section 17 of the Registration Act.” The document in that case was a promissory note whereby the mortgagor promised to repay “the sum of Rs. 1,200 with interest at the rate of 24 per cent, per annum for value received in cash”, and there was an endorsement: “For the repayment of the loan of Rs. 1,200, and the interest due thereon of the within note of hand, I hereby deposit with Baboo Sham Lall Khettry as a collateral security by way of equitable mortgage title-deeds of my property situate at no. 11 in Fuckeer Chand Mitter's street at Mirzapore in Calcutta.” Their Lordships were of the opinion that the promissory note was given either at the same time as the deposit of the title deeds was made or some hours after it in pursuance of an understanding between the parties. Nevertheless, on a consideration of the facts, they held that it was not a contract for the mortgage but was nothing more than a statement by the mortgagor admitting that he had deposited the deeds on the advance of the money for which the promissory note was given.

    Our attention has been drawn to several cases in which the document in question was held to constitute the bargain between the parties and, consequently, to require registration. The test applied in Subramonian v. Lutchman was whether the document constituted the bargain between the parties or was merely the record of an already completed transaction. It was a memorandum signed and delivered to, the plaintiff on the occasion of the deposit of the title deeds. In holding that it constituted the bargain, their Lordships stressed the following words appearing on it: “We hand herewith title deeds, etc. * * * This please hold as security, etc. * * Please also hold this as further security.” Clearly, the document was the instrument by which the deposit was made. In Hari Shankar v. Kedar Nath, the memorandum was a formal and elaborate document not only containing all the terms on which the moneys were advanced but expressly conferring a power of sale. It contained a parenthetical passage stating that the title deeds had been previously delivered with intent to create a security, but their Lordships thought that this did not alter the character of the memorandum itself, which if the parenthetical passage was disregarded, was an instrument effective to create an interest in the property in favour of the mortgagees. The reason was that the memorandum did not merely evidence an already completed transaction but was couched in an operative language. It was contractual in form and embodied an agreement that the title deeds in question were to be held as security for the advances made and it spoke of the moneys “hereby secured”. In Bhairab, Chandra Bose v. Anath Nath De, the title deeds were already in the custody of the plaintiff having been deposited as security for a previous loan. At the time of taking a subsequent loan for Rs. 1,500, the defendant gave the plaintiff a letter which ran as follows: “Dear Sir, for repayment of the sum of Rs. 1,500 with interest I have borrowed from you on a promissory note of date. I hereby put on record that the title deeds re my premises no. 1, Garpar Road, already deposited with you, shall be held as collateral security.” The words placed in italics by me are clearly operative. The documents being already in the custody of the plaintiff, formal redeposit of the documents was necessary in order to complete the transaction, and this formal redeposit was made by these words. In coming to their decision, their Lordships pointed out that the case was similar to that of Dwarka Nath v. Sarat Kumari, in which the deeds were sent from the defendant, to the plaintiff's attorneys with a letter, which stated: “I have the pleasure of handing to you the title deeds of a house no. 56, Lower Circular Road, as a collateral security for the Rs. 20,000 which falls due this day. Please accept them from my Manager.” It was also similar to Ebrahim Hazi v. Offl. Trustee, in which the memorandum stated: “As collateral security for the due repayment of the loan of Rs. 1,25,000 (one lac twenty-five thousand rupees) which you have this day lent and advanced to me on my Hundi of to-day's date, etc., * * * I herewith deposit with you my principal title deed, etc., * * * I hereby also undertake to deposit with you in Calcutta the other title deeds, etc., *. * * I further place on record that interest will run on the amount of the said Hundi at the rate of Rs. 3,000 (three thousand rupees) per month from and after the expiry of 90 days from, the date until realisation.”

    If we examine exhibit 3 in the light of the above decisions, we will find in it no provision which can be described as an operative provision. On the face of it, it merely records a transaction which has taken place between the parties and creates evidence of the circumstances in which the title deeds were deposited with the plaintiffs. The case seems to be on a par with Obla Sundarachariar v. Narayanna Ayyar, where, before the plaintiff's arrival on the scene, the Manager had already handed over to the plaintiff's son two documents which he had written out and signed—namely: (1) A promissory note for Rs. 60,000 payable on demand with interest at 1 per cent, per mensem, and (2) a memorandum which consisted of a list of the title deeds, with the following introductory words: “Written to E.N.A Samoo Battar by “Krishnaswami Ayyar, of S.V Ramasami Ayyar and Brothers. As agreed upon in person I have delivered to you the undermentioned documents as security.” Upon the arrival of the plaintiff, the deeds were examined to see whether they were in order, and, on being found to be so, the deeds, the promissory note and the memorandum were put away in the plaintiffs' safe, and the loan was advanced by the plaintiff on the security thus created. The test laid down by their Lordships was that, to bring a memorandum relating to deposit of title deeds within section 17 of the Registration Act, it must, on its face, embody the terms of the transaction and be signed and delivered at such time and place and in such circumstances as to lead legitimately to the conclusion that so far as the deposit is concerned it constitutes the agreement between the parties, but it is not necessary that it should embody all the particulars of the transaction of which the deposit forms a part. Our attention has been drawn to the evidence relating to the signing and making over of the memorandum (ext. 3) in an attempt to establish that it was signed and made over to the plaintiffs' firm before the deeds of title were made over. Plaintiff's witness Hira Lal stated:

    “After the lekha parhi Rachpalmaharaj gave certain documents to Parmanand Babu. The papers were given to him for the purpose of keeping them in respect of the dues. At about 4 p.m Rachpalmaharaj came to Parmanand Babu and delivered to him this paper (ext. 3)………Parmanand Babu then asked him to sign the paper. He put his signature then……………There was no other lekha parhi than this paper Ext. 3 at that time.”

    This evidence is not at all clear on the point as to whether the documents were made over before or after the signing and making over of exhibit 3. Lekha parhi, to which the witness referred in his earlier statement, may be the drafting and typing of the memorandum. It may not include the signing, which might have come somewhat later. The only definite statement, which the witness makes on the point, occurs in his cross-examination, where he states that the delivery of the documents and the signature on Ext. 3 were made at the same time. The point, however, is not of much importance. The question really is what was the intention of the parties in executing that document, was the document intended to be an operative document and to constitute any part of the bargain between the parties? As was held in Obla Sundarachariar's case, the mere fact that it was signed and made over before the transaction between the parties was completed would not make it an operative document. On these considerations, I am satisfied that exhibit 3 is merely a memorandum regarding the fact of the deposit of the documents, and that it does not exclude oral evidence of the mortgage agreement. This point must, therefore, be decided against the appellants.

    On the point of interest, it is contended that the claim in the plaint is based on a stipulated rate of interest, and that the evidence does not make out such a rate of interest. It is urged that the Subordinate Judge wrongly allowed interest at the commercial rate prevailing at the time of the transaction. The allegation in the plaint is that it was stipulated between the parties that interest should be paid

    “at the rate of 9 annas per hundred rupees per month according to mahajani system.”

    In evidence, Parmanand Daruka (P.W 2) deposed:

    The commercial rate of interest is 9 annas p.c per mensem compoundable every year.”

    This statement was clearly made in direct reference to the pleading in the plaint that interest was payable according to mahajani system, and, it is reference to this, that the court found that the commercial rate of interest was as stated. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the interest granted by the court is not in accordance with the pleading in the plaint. As regards the correctness of this rate of interest, the Subordinate Judge has rightly accepted the statement of the witness because it was not challenged by any cross-examination on the point, and no evidence to the contrary has been given by the defence. The body of the plaint is somewhat vague as to whether the interest chargeable is simple interest or compound interest, but the point is made clear by a reference to the calculation of interest on which the claim is based, which calculation, as is stated in the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the plaint, is made at the stipulated rate of interest. Through some strange mistake, the Subordinate Judge in his judgment has described the interest chargeable as nine per cent, per annum instead of at nine annas per cent, per month, which is equivalent to 6¾ per cent, per annum. This has not affected the correctness of the decree, however, as the amount decreed has been calculated at the correct rate, namely, 6¾ per cent. per annum, compoundable with annual rests. On the above grounds, this point must also be decided against the appellant.

    This brings us to the third point, namely, the correctness of the amount claimed as due. In order to prove this, the plaintiffs have filed a complete set of account papers extending over a period of about ten years. Supported by the oral evidence of Parmanand Daruka (P.W 2) and witnesses Mangi Lal Sharaf and Hira Lal, both employees of the plaintiffs' firm, who were examined on commission, these papers show that, on three occasions, the accounts between the parties were made up, and, on each occasion, Rachpalmahraj signed in the books of the plaintiffs' firm in acknowledgment of the correctness of the result arrived at. His signatures in token of acknowledgment are exhibit 2-series. The last such acknowledgment, dated Phagun Badi 10, Sambat 1997, says:

    “After comparison of account Rs. 10,891-2-3 (rupees ten thousand eight hundred and ninety-one annas two and pies three only) remained due and payable up to Katik Badi 15, Sambat 1997”.

    It is urged that the Subordinate Judge should not have accepted the signatures of Rachpal to have been proved by this evidence but should have insisted upon the examination of a handwriting expert for this purpose. This was not a case, however, where the plaintiffs relied only upon the acknowledgment of the appellant. In order to prove their dues, the plaintiffs produced direct evidence to establish what amount was due to them. The finding at which the Subordinate Judge arrived is not based merely on the acknowledgment as such. What he says is that the accounts put in by the plaintiffs together with the evidence of the three plaintiffs' witnesses establish the correctness of the plaintiffs' claim. It is in the light of this evidence that he considered the genuineness of the defendant's signatures and refused to accept his denial of these signatures. Besides that, the defendant did not impress him clime truthful witness. He rightly commented on the fact that, although the defendant maintains accounts and admits that his accounts for the last twelve years are in existence, he did not produce the accounts in court. Here, again, it is urged that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in drawing an inference against the defendant from the non-production of these accounts, and Mohan Bikram Shah v. Deonarain Mahto is cited as an authority that such an adverse inference should only be drawn if the party, being called on to produce papers, fails to do so. That case is not an authority for such a broad proposition. The contention there was that the papers which had not been produced were irrelevant for the purposes of the plaintiff and, therefore, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to produce them, and an adverse inference ought to be drawn only if the failure had occurred after being called on to produce them. In the present case, where the defendants were not only denying the, correctness of the claim of the plaintiffs but went so far as to assert that, on the contrary, it was the plaintiffs who owed them money, the account books of the defendant firm, were very relevant documents, and the court was right in attaching great significance to their failure to put these documents into evidence. I see no reason whatever to doubt the correctness of the accounts as shown in the papers of the plaintiffs and would decide this point also against the appellant.

    This disposes of the contentions of the appellants. Mr. S.N Banerji, appearing for minor respondents nos. 7 to 13, raises a new point on their behalf, namely that, in the absence of proof of legal necessity, they cannot be made liable under the decree. He refers to paragraph 5 of the written statement filed on behalf of these minor respondents, in which this plea is set out. In spite of the plea having been, taken in the written statement, however, no issue was framed on the point, and, although the minors were represented at the hearing of the suit, no reference was made to it. It must be taken therefore, that the point was given up, and, as it involves a question of fact, they cannot be allowed to raise it at the appellate stage.

    On the above grounds, I would dismiss this appeal with costs to the plaintiffs-respondents.

    Shearer, J.:— I agree.

    K.D
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Rachpalmahraj v. Bhagwandas
    (Mar 11, 1947)