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  • Rule 38-A in Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court:38-A. The provisions contained in rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Indian Limitation Act. Rule 38-A refers to Order XXII, Rule 3(2), C.P.C
  • Indian Limitation Act. When Rule 38-A refers to order XXII, Rule 3(2),
  • provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII
  • us).10. Clause (2) of Rule 3 of Order XXII, C.P.C
  • provisions of Order XXII, Rules 1 to 6 and 9
  • petition.9. Order XXII, Rule 3, C.P.C reads:(1)
  • Art. 226 of the Constitution and tax Acts
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Rule 38-A of the Rules
  • it.14. Rule 38-A
  • sub-rule (1)
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 38-A in Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court:38-A. The provisions contained in rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Indian Limitation Act. Rule 38-A refers to Order XXII, Rule 3(2), C.P.C
  • Indian Limitation Act. When Rule 38-A refers to order XXII, Rule 3(2),
  • provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII
  • us).10. Clause (2) of Rule 3 of Order XXII, C.P.C
  • provisions of Order XXII, Rules 1 to 6 and 9
  • petition.9. Order XXII, Rule 3, C.P.C reads:(1)
  • Art. 226 of the Constitution and tax Acts
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Rule 38-A of the Rules
  • it.14. Rule 38-A
  • sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Bench led by Jagdish Sahai, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

A question of law was referred by Rajeshwari Prasad, J., asking whether, in view of the amended Rule 38-A in Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court, an application for substitution in a writ petition must be made within a period of 90 days and whether failure to do so causes the writ petition to be deemed to have abated.

Rule 38-A had been added to Chapter VIII and purported to make certain provisions of Order XXII and Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable, with necessary modifications, to writ petitions under Article 226 and related matters.

Writ Petition No. 1416 of 1963 was filed by Nand Kishore. The petitioner died on 16 October 1965 while the petition was pending. On 5 May 1966, Sheopujan Tewari, Muneshwar Dev Tewari and Kailash Tewari applied for substitution, seeking to expunge the name of the deceased petitioner and to be substituted in his place. The respondents objected that the substitution application was filed beyond time, relying on Rule 38-A. Rajeshwari Prasad, J. referred the legal question to a larger Bench, leading to this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the amended Rule 38-A, an application for substitution in a writ petition under Article 226 must be made within a period of 90 days.
  2. Whether failure to make the substitution application within that period results in the writ petition being deemed to have abated.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Argument

  • An objection was taken that the substitution application filed on 5 May 1966 was beyond time. Reliance was placed upon Rule 38-A of the Rules of Court to support that objection.

Applicants' (Substitutes') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. S.K. Verma

  • Rule 38-A does not specifically incorporate the provisions (including the periods of limitation) of the Indian Limitation Act; therefore an application under Order XXII can be filed at any time and cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation.
  • The duty of bringing necessary parties on record is that of the Court; if the petitioner did not make the substitution application in time, the petitioner should not be penalised for the Court's failure to implead parties.
  • A petitioner in a writ petition is not a necessary party; hence even if heirs are not substituted, the petition can proceed.
  • The decision in Union of India v. Seth Shanti Sarup (A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 530) governs the matter; being a Division Bench decision, this Bench should follow it or refer to a larger Bench if it proposes to differ.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhya Prasad, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 394 Interpreting a statutory provision which adopts provisions of a Code ("as adapted") so as to include associated provisions (e.g., right of appeal) rather than limiting the adoption to only the internal procedure of the adopting statute. The court relied on the reasoning to support a liberal construction of Rule 38-A: where Rule 38-A adopts provisions of Order XXII it may, by implication, adopt the period of limitation envisaged by those provisions (i.e., the Limitation Act). The Rao case was used as illustrative authority for avoiding a construction that would render a provision futile.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 352 Principle that a provision should be construed to avoid rendering it ineffective or meaningless; courts may adopt a construction that preserves the functionality of a statutory provision. Invoked to justify reading Rule 38-A in a manner that preserves its purpose (i.e., to make substitution applications subject to a limitation period), and to support a liberal construction to avoid frustration of the rule's object.
Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 56 Authority for the proposition that courts may read in words to a statutory provision to save it from being rendered wholly ineffective. Used to justify that, if necessary, the court could read words into Rule 38-A to provide for a period of limitation as given by the Limitation Act, so as to make Rule 38-A workable.
Union of India v. Seth Shanti Sarup, A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 530 Cited by counsel for the applicants as governing authority for the present case (Division Bench decision relied upon). The court examined the decision and concluded it was distinguishable and did not deal with the interpretation of Rule 38-A; therefore it was not treated as controlling on the specific question before the Bench.
Attorney-General v. Herman James Sillem (referenced within Rao decision) Illustrated a statutory provision that regulated "process, practice and mode of pleading" and was held to be different in scope from provisions that adopt another code's provisions. Mentioned in the quoted passage from Rao to explain why the Sillem decision did not support a narrow construction; the present Court relied on the Rao Court's treatment of that case in forming its view on how to construe Rule 38-A.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by construing Rule 38-A, which makes "the provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure" applicable to writ petitions under Article 226, "so far as may be and with necessary modifications and adaptations". The central task was to determine whether this adoption carried with it the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act for substitution applications under Order XXII.

Key steps in the Court's analysis:

  1. Recognition that Order XXII, Rule 3(2), C.P.C. provides that "where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1) the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned", and that "time limited by law" refers to the Indian Limitation Act.
  2. Rejection of the argument that because a writ petition is founded on Article 226 of the Constitution (and the main petition may not be subject to any specific limitation), proceedings arising in the writ petition (such as substitution) are thereby free from limitation. The Court observed that the High Court frames rules under Article 225 and may make procedural provisions like Rule 38-A which can import limitations.
  3. Interpretation of Rule 38-A: the Court concluded that when Rule 38-A adopts Order XXII, including Rule 3(2), it implicitly adopts the period of limitation envisaged by that Order (i.e., the Limitation Act's period). Thus Rule 38-A must be read to incorporate, at least by implication, the Limitation Act period for substitution applications.
  4. The Court invoked authorities (notably Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and decisions addressing saving constructions) to support a liberal construction of Rule 38-A so as to avoid rendering the rule ineffective or meaningless. The Court stated that, if necessary, it could read words into Rule 38-A to supply the period of limitation from the Limitation Act to preserve the rule's object and functionality.
  5. The Court addressed and rejected the subsidiary points raised by counsel: (a) while the Court has a duty to ensure necessary parties are on record, the primary duty to implead necessary and proper parties lies with the parties themselves; (b) a petitioner is a necessary party in a writ petition because the petitioner invokes the Court's jurisdiction and it would be improper to pass an order in favor of a person already dead; and (c) the decision in Union of India v. Seth Shanti Sarup was distinguishable and did not govern the interpretation of Rule 38-A.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative in favour of the respondents and against the petitioners. The Court held that a substitution application in a writ petition must be made within ninety (90) days — i.e., the period provided by the Indian Limitation Act — and if the application is not made within that period, and the cause of action does not survive in favour of the remaining petitioners, the writ petition will be deemed to have abated.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The immediate effect is that substitution applications arising out of writ petitions governed by Rule 38-A are subject to the limitation period provided by the Indian Limitation Act (90 days as applied by the Court).
  • If substitution is not effected within that period, and the cause of action does not survive to remaining petitioners, the writ petition will abate as to the deceased petitioner.
  • The Court clarified that the primary duty to implead necessary parties rests with the parties and that a petitioner is a necessary party; these conclusions affect how substitution and prosecution of writ petitions proceed post the death of a petitioner.
  • The opinion did not set out any extended discussion of broader legal or constitutional consequences beyond the decision's direct application to Rule 38-A and substitution procedure; the ruling is an interpretation of the rule and its application to the facts before the Court.
Question answered.

    Nand Kishore v. Deputy Director (Consolidation) And Others Opposite Parties.

    Jagdish Sahai, J.:— Our brother Rajeshwari Prasad has referred to us the following question of law for determination:—

    “Whether in view of the amended Rule 38-A in Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, it is necessary that an application for substitution in a case under the writ jurisdiction of this Court be made within a period of 90 days or not, and whether in the event of default in doing that, the writ petition should be deemed to have abated?”

    2. The following rule has been added as Rule 38-A in Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court:—

    “38-A. The provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be and with necessary modifications and adaptations, apply to special appeals, writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution and tax Acts References falling under Chapter IX, XXII and XXVII of these Rules.”

    3. In the instant case writ petition No. 1416 of 1963 was filed by one Nand Kishore. He died on 16th Oct. 1965 while the writ petition was still pending decision by this Court. On 5th May, 1966, Sheopujan Tewari, Muneshwar Dev Tewari and Kailash Tewari filed an application praying that the name of the sole petitioner, Nand Kishore, be expunged from the array of the parties and in his place, the names of the applicants aforesaid be substituted.

    4. Sheopujan Tewari and Muneshwar Dev Tewari claimed to be the sons of the deceased, Nand Kishore and Kailash Tewari claimed to be a grand son of Nand Kishore, being the son of a predeceased son, Kaushal Chand Tewari.

    5. When the substitution application came up for hearing before Rajeshwari Prasad, J., an objection was taken on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition to the effect that the application has been filed beyond time. Reliance was placed upon Rule 38-A already extracted above.

    6. It was contended before Rajeshwari Prasad, J. on behalf of Sheopujan Tewari, Muneshwar Dev Tewari and Kailash Tewari by Mr. S.K Verma that inasmuch as Rule 38-A of the Rules of Court does not make the provisions of the Limitation Act including the Articles providing periods of limitation applicable to a writ proceeding, there is a lacuna in the rule and for that reason the application made by Sheopujan Tewari, Muneshwar Dev Tewari and Kailash Tewari cannot be dismissed. It was urged that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not hedged in by any condition with the result that to any matter in a writ petition, be it the main petition itself or any proceedings arising out of it or arising in it, notions of limitation cannot be applied. Our brother Rajeshwari Prasad, therefore, referred the case to a larger Bench and that is how the matter has come before us.

    7. Mr. S.K Verma has made the following four submissions before us:—

    1. That inasmuch as Rule 38-A does not specifically provide a period of limitation nor does it refer to any of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, an application under Order XXII can be filed at any time and cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is barred by limitation.

    2. That the duty of bringing the necessary parties on the record is that of the Court and even if the petitioner may not have made the substitution application in time provided by the Limitation Act, he cannot be penalised for it because no party can be penalised for the fault of the Court.

    3. That in any case a petitioner in a writ petition is not a necessary party and for that reason even if the heirs are not substituted, the petition can go on.

    4. That the case is fully governed by the decision in the Union of India v. Seth Shanti Sarup A.I.R 1966 Alld. 530. and that being a Division Bench decision, this Bench cannot go behind it and if it chooses to differ, it should refer the case to a larger Bench.

    8. We proceed to consider the submissions seriatim.

    1. Mr. Verma's contention is not that Rule 38-A is void or unconstitutional. That rule clearly provides that the provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII shall apply to the proceedings in a writ petition. It is conceded that in case of the death of a party or parties during the pendency of a writ petition an application or applications for substitution should be made. All that is contended is that it can be made at any time as there is no period of limitation provided for making it in Rule 38-A. This rule makes the provisions of Order XXII, Rules 1 to 6 and 9 applicable to proceedings arising out of a writ petition.

    9. Order XXII, Rule 3, C.P.C reads:—

    “(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

    (2) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1) the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the Court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff.” (Italicized by us).

    10. Clause (2) of Rule 3 of Order XXII, C.P.C which has admittedly been made applicable to a proceeding arising out of a writ petition, clearly provides that where within the “time limited by law” no application is made, the suit shall abate. “Time limited by law” admittedly means time limited by the Indian Limitation Act. Learned counsel, however, contends that inasmuch as a writ petition is filed under a provision contained in the Constitution and not under the Code of Civil Procedure and the writ petition itself is not subject to any limitation, any proceeding arising in the writ petition must also be held to be free from any restriction of limitation. We are unable to agree. Under Art. 225 of the Constitution the Court has jurisdiction to frame rules for regulating its business. The Court, therefore, has framed Rule 38-A under that provision and if the effect of that rule is to make the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to substitution proceeding arising cut of or in a writ petition that rule of limitation will govern the substitution application.

    11. We must therefore find out whether our Rule 38-A requires that a substitution application must be made in the period provided by the Indian Limitation Act. Rule 38-A refers to Order XXII, Rule 3(2), C.P.C also. Beyond that it provides for no other period of limitation. In our opinion it is implicit in Rule 38-A that the period of limitation within which a substitution application under that rule should be made is the one provided by the Indian Limitation Act. When Rule 38-A refers to order XXII, Rule 3(2), it clearly adopts the rule of limitation envisaged by that rule i.e the one provided by the Limitation Act. This is, in our opinion, the clear meaning and intention of Rule 38-A.

    12. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhya Prasad A.I.R 1953 S.C 394. is of some help to us. In that case Shiv Bahadur Singh was tried under the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance. He was acquitted by the trial court i.e the Special Judge. The State Government filed an appeal under Sec 417, Cr. P.C and the question was whether the appeal was competent. Two provisions, that is, Secs. 5(2) and 6 of the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. 5 of 1949 were considered relevant for determining that question. The provisions read:—

    5(2) “Save as provided in sub-sec (1) the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Ordinance, apply to the proceedings of a Special Court, and for the purposes of the said provisions, the court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without a Jury or without the aid of Assessors, and a person conducting a prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a public Prosecutor:”

    6. “The High Court may, subject to the provisions of Sec. 7 regarding transfer of cases, exercise, so far as they may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters 31 and 32, Criminal P.C as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh, on a High Court as if the Court of the Special Judge were a Court of Sessions trying cases without a Jury within the local limits of the High Court's jurisdiction.”

    13. The Supreme Court observed as follows:—

    “The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that Sec. 6 above quoted provides only for the powers of the High Court on appeal preferred to it, but that there is no provision at all conferring on an aggrieved party a right of appeal from the judgment and order of the special Judge to the High Court. It is contended that the absence of a right of appeal may be a lacuna, but that inasmuch as it has not been expressly provided, it cannot be implied from the fact that a provision has been made for the exercise of powers by the appellate Court. It is conceded that this line of argument, if accepted, would result in there being no appeal even as against a conviction. But it is urged that it is the inevitable consequence of the lacuna. It appears, however, on careful consideration that no such lacuna exists and that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 5, Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance reasonably construed is an express provision conferring a right of appeal to the aggrieved party, whether an accused or the State, against the judgment of the special Judge. The section, in terms, says that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as adapted and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Ordinance shall apply to the proceedings of a special court, and that for the purposes of the ‘said’ provisions (that is, the adapted provisions which are not inconsistent and hence apply) the court of a special Judge is to be deemed a Court of Session. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to the right of appeal are Secs. 410 and 417, and there is nothing in the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance which is inconsistent with the application of these two sections to the proceedings of a special court treated as a Court of Session for the purpose. It follows that the said proceedings are subject to appeal. But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code that are attracted by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 5, Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance, to the proceedings of a special court are only these provisions which relate to the ‘procedure’ before the special court itself in respect of the proceedings before it and not all the provisions which are connected with or related to those proceedings. There is, in our opinion, no warrant for putting such a limited construction on this sub-section. The only limitation on the application of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code to the proceedings of the special court is the one arising from the existence of any inconsistent provisions in the Ordinance and not with reference to the conduct of the proceedings before that very court. Once the special court is to be deemed a court of session the normal right of appeal provided by Sec. 410 or Sec 417, as the case may be, must be taken to have been expressly provided by reference and not as arising by mere implication.

    Learned counsel strongly relied on ‘Attorney-General v. Herman James Sillem,’3 to show that a provision such as the above was meant only to regulate the proceedings in a case within the four walls or limits of the court. The statutory provision which came up for construction in that case was, however, very differently worded, and was meant to regulate “the process, practise, and mode of pleading” i.e the procedure ‘in’ the court and “the proceedings” of the court. While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute and imply a right of appeal it is incumbent on the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The construction urged for the appellant renders Sec. 6 futile and leaves even a convicted person without appeal. We have no hesitation in rejecting it.”

    14. Rule 38-A was added to the rules of the Court with a view to make it incumbent on parties to make substitution applications in cases of death of a petitioner or a respondent. In order to achieve that object we must read Rule 38-A in a liberal manner. When it adopts Order XXII, Rules 1 to 6 and 9 it also at least by implication adopts the period of limitation which is applicable to proceedings under those rule?. This, in our opinion, is implicit in Rule 38-A. If we take the view that even though an application for substitution had to be made in this case, there was no period of limitation provided for it, we would be frustrating the purpose of Rule 38-A which cannot be done. See Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh A.I.R 1959 S.C 352.. Any construction to the contrary would render the provisions of Rule 38-A ineffective and meaningless and render them unadministrable. In order to save the rule from being rendered wholly ineffective, we can even read some words in it which would provide for the period of limitation as given by the Limitation Act. See Ramaswamy Nadar v. State Of Madras . A.I.R 1958 S.C 56.. We, therefore, hold that a substitution application even in a writ petition must be made within ninety days i.e the period provided by the Limitation Act.

    15. It may be that in a sense it is a duty of the court to see that the necessary parties are on the record, but the court can only direct either of the parties to do it. The primary duty to implead necessary and proper parties is of the parties themselves.

    16. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel that a petitioner is not a necessary party in a writ proceeding. In fact the petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the argument that in the present case it is not necessary to have representatives of the deceased petitioner is accepted, the result would be that, if the writ petition is allowed, we would be passing an order in favour of a party, who is already dead. The submission, in our opinion, is not even statable.

    17. We have carefully perused the decision in Union of India v. Seth Shanti Sarup. In our judgment the case is clearly distinguishable. It does not deal with the interpretation of Rule 38-A.

    18. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. We answer the question by saying that the application for substitution in a writ petition should be made within 90 days and if not made within that period, and the cause of action does not survive in favour of the remaining petitioners, it will be deemed to have abated.

    Question answered.

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    Comments

    Nand Kishore v. Deputy Director (Consolidation) And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Aug 2, 1968)