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  • sec. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • sec. 105, Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Defendant.(4).,..16. Rule 11
  • provision.15. Rule 4
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citation codes
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  • sec. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • sec. 105, Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Defendant.(4).,..16. Rule 11
  • provision.15. Rule 4
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Pal, J. (Appeal under sec. 105, Bengal Tenancy Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, Sir Bijoy Chand Mahatab (the Maharaja of Burdwan), instituted a suit on 11 July 1936 under section 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for settlement of rent in respect of lands recorded in C.S. Khatian No. 201 of Mouja Tala (J.L. 61 of P.S. Arambagh). The Defendants were recorded in that C.S. record as tenure-holders under the Plaintiff and the tenure was recorded as liable to be assessed to rent.

The Defendants contested the claim, asserting the lands were their niskar (rent-free) holdings. The Assistant Settlement Officer decreed the Plaintiff's claim, fixing a fair and equitable rent of Rs. 121-4-0 to take effect from the next agricultural year (mid-April 1938). The Assistant Settlement Officer relied on the presumption arising from the finally published record-of-rights and found the Defendants had not established their niskar right.

The Defendants appealed. The Special Judge allowed further evidence, found certain specified plots were no longer in the Defendants' possession because purchased by the Plaintiff at auction (so the Defendants were not liable to pay rent for those plots), affirmed that the Defendants failed to prove a niskar right, set aside the decree only insofar as the precise amount and commencement of rent were fixed, and remanded to the Assistant Settlement Officer to grant proportionate reduction for lands no longer in Defendants' possession and to settle rent for the remaining plots.

The Defendants filed the present appeal on 9 December 1938. During its pendency the Plaintiff granted a putni (permanent lease) to Panchanan Palit on 27 April 1939; Panchanan Palit was added as Respondent No. 2 on 22 July 1940, while the Maharaja remained Respondent No. 1. The original Plaintiff (the Maharaja) died on 29 August 1941 and was not substituted. A preliminary objection raised that the appeal had abated as against the deceased Plaintiff and had therefore become incompetent as against the added Respondent was considered by the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the right to appeal survived against the surviving (added) Respondent alone after the death of the original Plaintiff-Respondent (i.e., whether the appeal abated in whole or in part by reason of the death).
  2. Whether, on the merits, the Defendants had successfully established that their tenure was a niskar (rent-free) holding and thus not liable to assessment of rent under section 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  3. Whether entries showing other undivided shares as "niskar" in the C.S. record are relevant to proving that the Defendants' undivided shares are likewise niskar.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The lands in suit constituted the Defendants' niskar (rent-free) holdings and had been wrongly recorded as liable to be assessed to rent under the Plaintiff.
  • They relied on documentary exhibits (Exs. A to Z, A|A and A|H) and the oral evidence of D.W.1 to support their claim of niskar right.
  • The learned Advocate for the Defendants argued that because the tenancy comprised undivided shares in certain plots and tenancies in respect of other undivided shares in those same plots had been recorded as "niskar," the present tenancy ought also to be regarded as niskar.

Respondents' Contentions

  • The added Respondent (the putnidar) contended that, following the death of the original Plaintiff-Respondent (the Maharaja), the appeal had abated as against the Maharaja and had thereby become incompetent as against the added Respondent as well.
  • General position taken by the Plaintiff side (as reflected in the lower findings): the C.S. record and the presumption arising therefrom operated against the Defendants and the Defendants had failed to rebut that presumption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Md. Wajid All Khan v. Puran Singh Illustration of situations in which partial abatement (by death of a party) can render it impossible to proceed with an appeal to final conclusion, thereby causing the entire appeal to fail (e.g., partition where a co-sharer dies and heirs are not impleaded). The Court relied on this authority to frame the analytical categories by which partial abatement may or may not affect the entire appeal and to assess whether the present appeal could proceed effectively in the absence of the legal representative of the deceased Plaintiff.
Jagdeo Narain v. Baldeo Narain Principle that a person who claims to hold land free of the obligation to pay rent must prove by satisfactory evidence that he has been relieved of that obligation. The Court applied this principle to hold that the Defendants bore a heavy onus to establish rent-free character of their tenancy, noting also that the C.S. record raised a presumption against them; the Court found the Defendants' evidence (long possession without payment) insufficient to rebut the presumption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed two main strands of reasoning: (A) procedural question of abatement and survival of the right to appeal after the death of the original Plaintiff; and (B) the merits of whether the Defendants had proved a niskar (rent-free) tenure.

A. Procedural analysis — Abatement and survival of right to appeal

  • The Court identified the applicable Civil Procedure Code provisions as Order 22, rule 4 read with rule 11 (the latter equating the words "Plaintiff/Defendant/suit" to "Appellant/Respondent/appeal" for purposes of appeals).
  • Rule 4(1) was quoted to show when legal representatives should be brought on record and rule 4(3) to show when abatement occurs for lack of timely application for substitution.
  • The pivotal factual point was that at the time of the Plaintiff's death there were two Respondents on the appeal (the Maharaja and the putnidar) and one of them (the Maharaja) died.
  • The key legal question became whether the right to appeal "survived" against the surviving Respondent alone. If it did, substitution of the Maharaja's legal representative was not required and the appeal could continue; if not, the appeal would have abated as against the Maharaja and the court had to consider the effect of that partial abatement on the whole appeal.
  • The Court analyzed how the putni created pendente lite altered the parties' interests: after creation of the putni (27 April 1939), the transferee (putnidar) became the immediate landlord, the Maharaja ceased to be landlord and became superior landlord, and the interest in the suit (which was for settlement of rent under sec. 105) "came to or devolved upon" the holder of the putni within the meaning of Order 22, rule 10, C.P.C.
  • The Court relied on the text of section 105 and the definition of "landlord" in section 3(6) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, together with the explanation to section 105(1), to show that the person with the immediate and permanent interest (the putnidar) was the party vitally concerned with the relief (settlement of rent), not the superior landlord who had leased out his interest.
  • Given this, the Court held that the right to appeal survived the deceased Plaintiff and survived against the putnidar Respondent alone under Order 22, rule 2, C.P.C; therefore substitution of the Maharaja's legal representative was not necessary and the appeal was competent to proceed.

B. Merits analysis — Whether the Defendants proved a niskar tenure

  • The Court accepted the factual findings of the Court of Appeal that the C.S. record had recorded the tenancy of the Defendants as liable to be assessed with rent, and that the Defendants had failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favour of the landlord arising from the C.S. record.
  • The Court addressed the Appellants' contention that because other undivided shares in the same plots were recorded as "niskar," the Defendants' shares must likewise be niskar. The Court rejected this reasoning: entries recording other shares as niskar do not establish as a matter of fact that the present shares are niskar, and the presumption of correctness of entries does not make them decisive to prove the Defendants' particular claim.
  • The Court noted the relevant juridical burden: since the land lay within the revenue-paying Mahal of the Plaintiff, the prima facie obligation was on the Defendants to pay rent and those claiming rent-free status must show satisfactory evidence (citing Jagdeo Narain v. Baldeo Narain). The C.S. record added a presumption against the Defendants, increasing their burden.
  • The only relevant evidence the Defendants established was long possession without payment of rent. The Court observed that this fact was relevant but insufficient; the Court of Appeal took it into account and nevertheless negatived the Defendants' claim on evidence. The present Court found no reason to interfere with that evidence-based finding.
  • Consequently, the Court concluded the Defendants had "hopelessly failed" to establish that their tenure was not liable to pay rent.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED. The appeal was dismissed with costs; the hearing fee was assessed at two gold mohurs.

Direct consequences:

  • The appellate court held the appeal competent against the surviving Respondent (the putnidar) despite the death of the original Plaintiff-Respondent and proceeded to decide the appeal on the merits.
  • On the merits, the court affirmed the factual conclusions of the lower court that the Defendants failed to establish a niskar (rent-free) tenure and are liable to assessment of rent; the earlier findings that certain plots had passed out of the Defendants' possession (and were not liable for rent) were accepted by the appellate process as reflected in earlier remand directions.
  • The Defendants were ordered to pay costs as fixed by the Court.

The opinion does not purport to set out a novel legal precedent; it applies existing procedural rules (Order 22, r. 4 and r. 11, C.P.C.) and established principles on burden of proof in tenancy cases (as exemplified by the cited authorities) to the facts of this appeal.

    Haradhone Palit And Anr. v. Panchanan Palit .

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

    Pal, J.:— This appeal is by the Defendants in a suit under sec. 105, Bengal Tenancy Act for settlement of rent in respect of the land held by the Defendants under the Plaintiff.

    2. The lands in suit have been recorded in C.S Khatian 201 of the finally published record of Mouja Tala, J.L 61 of P.S Arambagh. The Defendants have been recorded therein as tenure-holders under the Plaintiffs in respect of these lands and the tenure has been recorded as liable to be assessed to rent.

    3. The C.S record was finally published in 16th March, 1936, and the Plaintiff Sir Bijoy Chand Mahatab, G.C.I.E, K.C.S.I.I.O.M, instituted the present suit on the 11th July, 1936, under sec. 105, Bengal Tenancy Act, for the settlement of rent in respect of the tenure.

    4. The Defendants appeared and contested the claim, saying that the lands constituted their niskar holding and that these were wrongly recorded as liable to be assessed to rent under the Plaintiff.

    5. The Assistant Settlement Officer who heard the case decreed the Plaintiff's claim and settled Rs. 121-4-0 to be the fair and equitable rent in respect of the Defendants' tenure recorded in Khatian No. 201 as aforesaid. He directed that the new rent would come into effect from the beginning of the next agricultural year, i.e, from the middle of April, 1938.

    6. The Assistant Settlement Officer based his decision on the following considerations:—

    1. That the finally published record-of-rights raised a presumption in favour of the Plaintiff; the onus lay on the Defendants to prove that the lands in question were the niskar property of the Defendants;

    2. (a) That in support of the Defendants' case they relied on Exs. A to Z, A|A and A|H; and on the oral evidence of D.W 1;

    (b) That the evidence adduced did not establish the niskar right claimed by the Defendants.

    7. The Defendants preferred an appeal against this decision and the Special Judge who heard this appeal allowed the Defendants to adduce further evidence at the Appellate stage and arrived at the following conclusions:—

    1. That the C.S Plots Nos. 21, 32, 16, 75, 96, 87, 88, 71 and 73 of the Khatian No. 201 are not in possession of the Defendants, these having been purchased by the Plaintiff himself at an auction sale; that the Defendants are no longer liable to pay rent in respect of these plots;

    2. That the Defendants failed to establish their niskar right;

    3. That the Assistant Settlement Officer was right in negativing the contention of the Defendants Appellants that the lands in suit were niskar.

    8. The learned Special Judge therefore affirmed the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer that the tenancy was not a niskar one, and that it was liable to assessment of rent, but set aside the decree so far as it settled the amount of rent and settled it from the next agricultural year and remanded the case to the Assistant Settlement Officer with a direction to grant a proportionate reduction of rent in respect of the lands found by the learned Special Judge as no longer in the possession of the Defendants and thus to settle the fair and equitable rent for the remaining plots.

    9. Against this decision the present appeal was preferred by the Defendants on 9th December, 1938. In the Memo of Appeal the Plaintiff was the sole Respondent. No appeal or cross-objection was filed by the Plaintiff.

    10. During the pendency of this appeal the Plaintiff Maharaja granted a putni to Panchanan Palit on 27th April, 1939. This putni included the suit lands also.

    11. The putnidar applied for being added as a party Respondent to this appeal under Or. 22, r. 10, C.P.C, and he was so added on 22nd July, 1940, as Respondent No. 2, the Plaintiff Maharaja being retained as Respondent No. 1.

    12. Thereafter the original Plaintiff Respondent died on 29th August, 1941, and no substitution was made in his place. It is contended by the surviving Respondent that in the result the appeal abated as against the Maharaja.

    13. A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that the appeal having abated as against the deceased Plaintiff Respondent, it has become incompetent as against the added Respondent also.

    14. Or. 22, r. 4, read with r. 11, C.P.C, is the appropriate provision.

    15. Rule 4 runs as follows:—

    “(1) Where one of two or snore Defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving Defendant or Defendants alone, or a sole Defendant or sole surviving Defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased Defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

    “(2)…………”

    “(3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub r. (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased Defendant.

    “(4).,………..”

    16. Rule 11 says:—

    “In the application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word ‘Plaintiff’ shall be held to include an Appellant, the word ‘Defendant’ a ‘Respondent’, and the word ‘suit’ an appeal,”

    17. At the date of the death of the Plaintiff there were two Respondents and one of them died.

    18. The question is—whether the right to appeal did or did not survive against the surviving Respondent alone.

    19. If it did survive against the surviving Respondent alone then no substitution of the legal representative of the deceased Respondent would be warranted by r. 4 of Or. 22. Or. 22, r. 2, would apply to such a case and no question of abatement would arise.

    20. If it did not so survive, but the right to appeal survived the deceased Respondent, then the legal representative of the deceased Respondent should have been substituted; that not having been done in time, the appeal would abate as against the deceased Plaintiff and then the further question would arise how far this abatement would affect the appeal against the surviving Respondent.

    21. The effect of the partial abatement on the whole appeal in such a case will depend upon the nature of the appeal. If, on account of the partial abatement, it becomes, for any reason, impossible to proceed with the appeal to its final conclusion, the entire appeal will fail: This will happen, for example, in an appeal against a decree for partition, when one of the co-sharer Respondents dies and his heirs are not impleaded in time. No decree for partition can be made in the absence of even a single co-sharer.

    22. The impossibility in question may arise from the suit or appeal—

    (1) becoming imperfectly constituted for want of necessary or essential parties, or

    (2) from the undesirable possibility of having two inconsistent or contradictory decrees in one and the same suit, or

    (3) from the futility of proceeding further in a suit or appeal in which the decree, if given, cannot be effectually executed by reason of the outstanding right of the legal representative of the deceased: Md. Wajid All Khan v. Puran Singh(1).

    23. If, however, the appeal can proceed to a final adjudication in the absence of the legal representative of the deceased Respondent, the partial abatement will not affect the rest of the appeal. Such a final adjudication is possible, for example, in cases where the interest of the deceased Respondent can be separated from that of the surviving Respondent. In such a case a decree can be given against the surviving Respondent without affecting the rights of the legal representative of the former:

    24. In a suit the effect of the partial abatement will depend upon the relief involved in it. In an appeal, however, the effect will have to be determined not upon the nature of the relief involved in the suit but upon the nature of the relief awarded by the decree appealed from.

    25. The question, therefore, is whether the appeal abated even partially and if so, whether the abatement of the appeal against the deceased Plaintiff makes it impossible to proceed effectively with the hearing of the appeal as against the added Respondent—whether the judgment and decree in this appeal passed in the absence of the legal representatives of the Plaintiff would be rendered a complete nullity and a brutum fulmen.

    26. The suit was one under sec. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Either the tenant or the landlord can proceed under this section. At the date of the institution of the suit the Maharaja of Burdwan was the landlord in respect of the Defendants' tenancy and it was he who instituted the suit. The suit as instituted by the Maharaja was only for the settlement of rent. In such a proceeding it was competent for the tenant to raise the issue whether the land was nor was not liable to the payment of rent under sec. 105A of the Act, without instituting a separate suit for the purpose under sec. 106 of the Act.

    27. The word “landlord” is defined in sec. 3 (6) of the Act to mean “a person immediately under whom a tenant holds.” At the date of the institution of the suit the Maharaja of Burdwan was the landlord within the meaning of this definition. As soon as the putni in favour of the added Respondent was created on 27th April, 1939, it was the added Respondent who became the landlord in respect of the Defendants' tenancy and the Maharaja of Burdwan ceased to be the landlord. Thenceforward the Maharaja became the superior landlord. The explanation added to sec. 105 (1) of the Act shows that even such a superior landlord can institute a proceeding under the section notwithstanding that his estate or tenure or part thereof has been temporarily leased. But for this explanatory provision he would not have been competent to institute such a proceeding after leasing out his estate even though such lease was only a temporary one; because even by such a temporary lease he would have ceased to be the landlord for the time being. It seems clear from this that after giving up the estate in a permanent putni lease the proprietor of the estate ceases to be the landlord of all subordinate tenures and consequently ceases to have the right to institute a proceeding under sec. 105 of the Act.

    28. The position of the parties after the creation of the putni in this case therefore became as follows:—

    1. The putni having been created pendente lite, the Defendants Appellants were entitled to prosecute their appeal as against the Plaintiff Maharaja alone ignoring the transfer pendente lite; the transferee pendente lite would have been bound by the ultimate result of the litigation;

    2. (a) The Defendants Appellants were entitled also to bring on record the transferee pendente lite under Or. 22, r. 10, C.P.C, in the place of the Maharaja Plaintiff Respondent.

    3. Had the proceedings been instituted after the creation of the putni, the Maharaja Plaintiff would not have been competent to institute the proceeding under sec. 105 of the Act. This shows that the interest of the Plaintiff involved in the suit came to or devolved upon the holder of the putni within the meaning of Or. 22, r. 10, C.P.C

    4. The relief awarded by the decree appealed from was that the tenancy was not a rent-free one but was liable to assessment of rent; and this being the nature of the relief involved in the appeal, it was the immediate landlord having permanent interest who was vitally concerned with it, and not the superior landlord who had permanently leased out his interest.

    29. In our opinion, therefore, the right to appeal survived the deceased Plaintiff and it did survive against the putnidar Respondent alone within the meaning of Or. 22, r. 2, C.P.C

    30. We, therefore, hold that the appeal is competent without the legal representative of the deceased Maharaja being brought on the record.

    31. Coming, however, to the merits of the appeal we are of opinion that it is concluded by the findings of fact arrived at by the Court of Appeal below. The C.S record recorded the tenancy of the Defendants as liable to be assessed with rent. The learned Special Judge held that the Defendants failed to rebut the statutory presumption in favour of the landlord arising from this C.S record. The learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal contends that as the tenancy in question comprises undivided shares in certain plots of lands and as the tenancies in respect of the other undivided shares in these very plots have been recorded as “niskar,” it follows that the present tenancy is also a niskar one. We are unable to accept this reasoning. Simply because the tenancies in respect of other shares have been recorded as niskar it does not follow that they are as a matter of fact niskar. Of course the presumption is that these entries are correct. But we do not see how these entries will at all be relevant for the purpose of proving the character of the Defendants' tenancy. Even assuming that the tenancies in respect of the other shares are niskar, it does not follow that the tenancy in question must also be niskar. It has sot even been established that all these tenancies at any time formed one tenancy. In any case the learned Special Judge took all these entries also into consideration in arriving at the conclusion that the present tenancy had not been proved to be rent-free, and we do not see how we can interfere with that finding based as it is on evidence.

    32. It is not disputed that the land in question lies within the revenue-paying Mahal of the Plaintiff.

    33. Primâ facie the Defendants who hold it under the Plaintiff would be under an obligation to pay rent for it. It lies upon him who claims to hold such land free of the obligation to pay rent to show by satisfactory evidence that he has been relieved of this obligation: Jagdeo Narain v. Baldeo Narain(2). Here, to add to this, the entry in the C.S record raises a presumption against the Defendants. The onus therefore lies heavily on them to establish the rent-free character of their tenancy and the only relevant thing established by them is the factum of long possession without payment of rent. This fact no doubt is a relevant consideration and it was taken into consideration by the Court below in negativing the Defendants' claim.

    34. In our opinion the Defendants have hopelessly failed to establish the case set up by them that their tenure is not liable to pay rent.

    35. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs; the hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.

    Sen, J.:— I agree.

    C.C

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    Comments

    Haradhone Palit And Anr. v. Panchanan Palit .
    (Aug 11, 1942)