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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rowland, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs sued for the balance shown on a hathohitha (account book) in respect of money standing to the credit of Sheogobind Tewari in an account opened with defendants 1 and 2, who were partners and bankers. Sheogobind Tewari was deceased; he was the husband of plaintiff 3, father of plaintiff 1 and grandfather of plaintiff 2. The plaintiffs also impleaded the receiver of the estate of Lachmi Narayan, but the suit against the receiver was dismissed. The Munsif decreed the suit against defendants 1 and 2; the Subordinate Judge upheld that decree on appeal. Defendant 2 (Balabux Marwari) brought the present second appeal, raising two principal grounds: (1) that the claim against him was barred by limitation and should have been governed by Article 59 or Article 57 (rather than Article 60) of the Limitation Act; and (2) that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree without first obtaining a succession certificate under Section 214 of the Succession Act. The courts below had treated the transactions as a current account between banker and customer and had applied Article 60, counting limitation from the date when demand was made.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the claim against defendant 2 is barred by limitation and, if so, whether limitation should be governed by Article 60 of the Limitation Act (i.e., money deposited in the hands of a banker repayable on demand) or by Article 59 / Article 57 (treating the transactions as loans) — in short, the proper article of limitation to apply.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs were required to obtain a succession certificate (Section 214, Succession Act) before obtaining a decree to realize debts due to the deceased Sheogobind Tewari.
  3. Ancillary: whether a demand to one partner suffices as a demand against all partners and whether any asserted dissolution of the partnership (in 1921) affected the appellant's liability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant 2 — Balabux Marwari)

  • The hathohitha entries should be read as acknowledgments of loans rather than deposits: the entries use expressions such as "dena nikala" and "dena raha" which the appellant's counsel submitted should be translated as "debt owing" and "found owing", rather than the usual Hindi word for deposit "amanat".
  • On the loan characterization the proper limitation period would be under Article 59 or Article 57 from when the loan was made, possibly subject to Ss. 19–21 for extension, rather than Article 60 counted from demand.
  • It was faintly suggested that the suit was premature as against defendant 2 because the plaintiffs had not proved that a demand had been made from him specifically.
  • The appellant relied on authority (referred to in the opinion as 73 IC 978(1)) for the proposition that where money is handed over to be repaid on demand the transaction is ordinarily a loan and the onus is on the person claiming repayment to show circumstances converting it into a deposit.
  • The appellant also contended that the partnership between his client and Lachmi Narayan had been closed down in 1921 and sought to escape liability on that ground (i.e., to argue the partnership context no longer applied).
  • The appellant raised, in the appellate court, the point that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover without a succession certificate under Section 214 of the Succession Act (i.e., that the debt passed by succession and not by survivorship).

Plaintiffs' (and Courts below) Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The transactions between the parties were treated by the courts below as being of the nature of a current account between a customer and his banker: money standing to the customer's credit repayable on demand, and therefore governed by Article 60 of the Limitation Act, limitation to be counted from the date of demand.
  • The plaintiffs had drawn amounts from the account after the death of Sheogobind, and deposits had been made on behalf of the plaintiffs since his death; these facts were relied on (by the trial court and on the face of the hathchitha) to show the nature of the account and to answer the succession contention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
73 IC 978(1 Proposition that when money is handed over to another to be repaid on demand the transaction is ordinarily a loan; onus on claimant to prove circumstances converting it into a deposit. Relied upon by appellant to argue the transactions were loans, not deposits. The Court noted this authority but contrasted it with other authorities and subsequent legislative amendment, ultimately not following this line so far as it led to excluding Article 60.
16 Cal 25(2) Held that, in ordinary language, money of a customer standing to his credit in a banker’s accounts is money deposited for the purposes of Article 60; although for some purposes the term “deposit” may be limited, for Article 60 return in specie is not contemplated. The opinion approves and follows this view: the Court treated the banker-customer relationship as appropriate for Article 60 and relied on the popular meaning of "deposit" to apply Article 60 to the case at hand.
13 Bom 338(3) Division Bench of Bombay High Court had construed Article 60 narrowly, holding that Article 60 could not apply to transactions regarded by law as loans (requiring express trust to be a deposit in technical sense). The Court recognized this contrary view but rejected it for the present case, preferring the Calcutta/Madras view and noting later legislative amendment aligning with that view.
18 Mad 390(4) Madras High Court accepted the Calcutta view that Article 60 applies to banker-customer accounts (i.e., such balances are deposits in ordinary language). The opinion approves and follows this decision as supporting the conclusion that Article 60 governs banker-customer current accounts.
29 All 773(5) Following the Bombay authority, it was held (under the Limitation Act of 1877) that a suit to recover money deposited with a banker on a current account was governed by Article 59 and not Article 60. The opinion notes this decision as part of the contrary line but observes that Article 60 was amended in the next year (1908) to make clear the legislature intended the Calcutta/Madras view to be the law; therefore this authority was not followed.
39 Mad 1081(6) Extended the principle to money left in the hands of a trader (non-banker): such money will be money deposited for Article 60 provided the circumstances are such as would make it money of a customer if the depositee were a banker. The opinion cites and approves this decision as consistent with the Calcutta/Madras view and as persuasive on the nature of deposits in ordinary commercial transactions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the proper characterisation of the transactions recorded in the hathchitha and the relevant authorities on the construction of Article 60. The Court emphasized that, in the absence of a legal definition, the popular meaning attached to the word "deposited" should be used when considering Article 60 rather than a narrow technical meaning reserved for other legal contexts (for instance, trusts creating priority in insolvency). The Court followed the Calcutta and Madras decisions which treated banker-customer balances as "deposits" in ordinary language and noted that the Limitation Act was amended in 1908 in a way that demonstrated legislative intent to adopt that view.

Applying that approach to the facts, the Court examined the course of dealings shown by the hathchitha: the sums deposited were substantial but not such as the defendants' firm would likely have wanted to borrow as a convenience; withdrawals appeared to be at the creditor's will and the debtor (the firm) appeared ready to pay on demand. The Court held that the course of business established a current account between customer and banker and that specific words declaring the money to be a "deposit" were not necessary where the account's operation showed that character.

On limitation the Court concluded Article 60 applied; limitation did not begin to run until a demand date in May 1928 (as treated by the courts below), and the suit was instituted within three years of that date, so the appellant's limitation objection failed.

The Court also addressed procedural and evidentiary points: the objection that no demand had been made from defendant 2 was rejected on the ordinary rule that a demand on one partner gives a cause of action against all partners, and the appellant's claim that the partnership had been dissolved in 1921 did not assist because there was no evidence the dissolution had been notified to customers. The succession-certificate point under Section 214 (raised in the appellate court but not pleaded) was treated with caution: it was not pleaded so plaintiffs had not an opportunity to meet it fully, yet the hathchitha and pleadings showed deposits and withdrawals after Sheogobind's death (1913) and deposits made by plaintiffs after his death amounting to about Rs. 1,300 principal (with interest) — an amount sufficient to cover the present claim. To give effect to the appellant's succession contention would require detailed factual accounting into whether post-death withdrawals exhausted earlier deposits — the Court declined to remand for such precise accounting in a second appeal given the small discrepancy between claimed figures.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The decree in favour of the plaintiffs against defendants 1 and 2 was affirmed as against defendant 2 (Balabux Marwari); the appeal by defendant 2 was dismissed with costs.
  • The Court held Article 60 of the Limitation Act applicable to the banker-customer current account shown by the hathchitha; limitation began to run from the date of demand (May 1928 in the facts of this case), and the suit was within the statutory period.
  • The appellant's procedural/contention that a succession certificate was necessary was not upheld: the point was not pleaded, and the account entries and subsequent deposits by the plaintiffs after the death of Sheogobind supported the plaintiffs' position; the Court declined to remit for detailed accounting given the small discrepancies and the facts shown on the record.

Broader implications (as discussed in the opinion):

  • The opinion endorses the view of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts that balances of customers in banker accounts are deposits in ordinary language for the purposes of Article 60; it notes the 1908 amendment to Article 60 as reflecting legislative intent to accept that view.
  • The opinion also indicates the principle can extend (on appropriate facts) to money left with traders who are not bankers: where the circumstances are such as would make it money of a customer if the depositee were a banker, Article 60 will apply.

The opinion did not set a new legal precedent beyond affirming the Calcutta/Madras approach and applying established principles to the facts; its practical effect is to uphold the plaintiffs' decree and dismiss the appellant's appeal.


Opinion recorded by Rowland, J.; James, J. agreed. (Final disposition: Appeal dismissed.)

    Balabux Marwari v. Inder Kumar Tewari

    Rowland, J.:— The appellant before us was defendants in the original suit. The claim was for balance due to the plaintiffs on a hathohitha account in respect of money deposited with defendants 1 and 2 as bankers in an account opened in the name of Sheogobind Tewari, husband of plaintiff 3 and father of plaintiff 1 and grandfather of plaintiff 2. The plaintiffs impleaded not only these two defendants who had been partners in the firm, but also the receiver of the estate of Lachmi Narayan; but as against the receiver the suit was dismissed. The Munsif decreed the suit against defendants 1 and 2 and this decision was upheld by the Subordinate Judge on appeal. In this second appeal which is presented by defendant 2, Balabux Marwari, two points are taken. The first is that the claim against Balabux is barred by limitation. The other point is that the plaintiffs are debarred from getting a decree in the suit without having first taken a succession certificate authorizing them to realize debts due to the late Sheogobind Tewari. The Courts below have treated the transactions between the parties as being of the nature of a current account between a customer and his banker, the money standing to the credit of the customer being repayable on demand and have counted the period of limitation under Article 60 of the Lim. Act, from the date when the demand is made. It is contended for the appellant that limitation should have been calculated under Article 59 or Article 57 from the time when the loan was made, subject to any extension of time to which the plaintiffs might be entitled having regard to Ss. 19-21 of the Act.

    2. Mr. Khurshed Husnain for the appellant invited our attention to the expressions used, in some of the entries in the hathchitha which are substantially acknowledgments of receipt of money and acknowledgments of the amount standing at the time of the entries to the credit of Sheogobind Tewari. He points out that the entries do not refer specifically to deposit for which the usual Hindi word is “amanat” and contains expressions “dena nikala” and “dena raha,” which he says should be translated as “debt owing”, and “found owing.” Mr. Khurshed Husnain relies on 73 IC 978(1) for the proposition that when one person hands over money to another on the understanding that it is not a gift, but has to be repaid when demanded, that would be a transaction ordinarily of the nature of a loan and the onus lies on the person claiming repayment to prove the existence of circumstances which turned the loan into a deposit. When therefore the money had been left in the hands of a trader who was not a banker, the Bombay High Court found difficulty in accepting the contention that it should be treated as money deposited for the purposes of Article 60. This view seems to be consonant with earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court, but a different view has been taken elsewhere.

    3. In 16 Cal 25(2) the question was considered with reference to Article 60 of the Lim. Act of 1877. It was observed that probably the money of a customer in the hands of his banker is money lent; and that if Article 60 were not present the matter might fall within one of the other articles. But it is also pointed out that assuming it to be money lent the loan is of a special kind. For the purposes of Article 60 the learned Judges observed that in ordinary and popular language the money of a customer standing to his credit in the accounts of a banker is money deposited, although for certain other purposes the term ‘deposit’ is limited to goods which are placed in the custody of a person with a view to their being returned in specie.

    In Article 60, dealing with money it is equally clear that a return in specie is not contemplated. It is so first, because it would be contrary to the ordinary usage of the language to hold such a thing; deposits of money are made, for instance, under many Acts of the legislature with public officers and others, and no one ever-heard of the idea of the return of the identical coins deposited.

    4. Therefore as the learned Judges pointed out, to give any meaning at all to Article 60 we have to look for a case in which one man places his money in the hands of another on the terms that an equivalent sum has to be paid back on demand and a case to which according to the ordinary usage of the language the term ‘deposit’ is applicable;

    and they said: “we think the case of the banker and his customer is exactly such a case.” Article 60 had been construed in the opposite sense by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in 13 Bom 338(3). Sargent, C.J, acceding to the argument that in the case of a deposit in its technical sense there must be an express trust, and holding that Article 60 could not apply to any transaction which the law regarded as a loan. This decision and the Calcutta decision to which I have referred were considered by the Madras High Court in 18 Mad 390(4) and the Calcutta view was accepted as being the better law. In 29 All 773(5) the above decisions were considered and following the Bombay authority it was held that a suit to recover money deposited with a banker on a current account was governed by Article 59 and not Article 60. Those are the decisions under the Limitation Act of 1877, the last being decided in the year 1907. In the very next year Article 60 was amended in a sense which makes it clear that the legislature intended the Calcutta and Madras view, to be the law. That concludes the matter so far as the relations between a banker and his customer are concerned. In 39 Mad 1081(6) the same principle was held to be applicable to money left in the hands of a trader who is not a ??? Such money it was held will be money deposited provided the circumstances are such as would make it money of a customer if the depositee is a banker. The decisions in 13 Bom 338 and 29 All 773 were considered but were not followed. Those in 16 Cal 25 and 18 Mad 390 were approved and with great respect I would say that the view taken is the correct view.

    5. As was stated in one of the Bombay decisions the exact point which imposes on dealings between a creditor and debtor the characteristics of a deposit of money for the purposes of Article 60 has never been precisely set forth by the legislature. I feel sure it is not the same characteristic which is necessary to constitute a deposit for certain other purposes such as a trust which would create priority over other debts in case of insolvency or liquidation. In the absence of a legal definition I think we may say, following the Calcutta and Madras High Courts, that regard will be had to the popular meaning attached to the expression “deposited” rather than to the technical meaning which the word “deposit” has for certain legal purposes; that is to say we ought to see whether what happened between the parties was of the nature of that sort of current account which a customer keeps with his banker. The Court of first instance in this connexion pointed out that the sums deposited though substantial were not sums which the defendants' firm would have been likely to want to borrow as a convenience for themselves they being traders in a large way of business. One may add that the withdrawals shown in the account do not appear to resemble payments on account by a distressed debtor unable to pay more. They are clearly amounts drawn by the creditor at his own wish, the debtor being apparently ready to pay any sums which the creditor wished to draw at a moment's notice. The use of any specific form of words in the hathchitha to state in express terms that the money was money deposited is not necessary if the course of business between the parties establishes that in fact it was so. I am of opinion that the course of business has been correctly understood by the Courts below and was of the nature of a current account between a customer and his banker. The first objection of the appellant on the ground of limitation therefore fails as on the view that Article 60 is applicable, limitation did not begin to run until a date in May 1928 and the suit was instituted within three years of that date.

    6. It was however faintly suggested by Mr. Khurshed Husnain that if the money is payable on demand, the suit is premature as against his client, as the plaintiff bad not proved that he had made a demand from defendant 2, Balabux. The ordinary rule is however that on the plaintiff demanding payment from either of the partners his cause of action has arisen against them all. Mr. Khurshed Husnain desires to escape this conclusion by saying that the partnership between his client and Laohmi Narain was closed down in 1921. But this does not help him, for there is no evidence that, the dissolution of partnership was notified to customers of the firm. The other point taken was that the decree should not have been made in the absence of a succession certificate, having regard to the provisions of Section 214 of the Succession Act. This is a point not taken in the pleadings; it was raised in the appellate Court below. The point taken in the pleadings was that the suit was bad for defect of parties, because some brothers of Sheogobind Tewari had not been joined as plaintiffs. One of these brothers was examined as a witness for the plaintiff and deposed that Sheogobind dealt with his own earnings. Out of them he opened this deposit account with which his brothers had nothing to do. It is said that if this is so, the deposit money must be regarded as self-acquired property of Sheogobind and must have passed to his heirs by succession and not by survivorship.

    7. One difficulty in giving effect to this contention is that it was not raised in the pleadings, so that the plaintiff did not get a full opportunity of answering it. Then again the account is a running account on which the plaintiffs have drawn from time to time without objection on the part of the bankers; and it also appears on the face of the hathchitha book that deposits have been made from time to time on behalf of the plaintiffs since the death of Sheogobind Tewari which took place as far back as 1913. To give effect to the contention raised by the appellant it would be necessary for us to go into questions of fact as to whether the withdrawals made by the plaintiffs after the death of Sheogobind were not sufficient to account for the whole of the old deposits made by Sheogobind and to extinguish that part of the debt, leaving at present recoverable, debt not exceeding what bad been deposited by the plaintiffs after the death of Sheogobind with interest thereon. It appears on the face of the pleadings and the hathchitha that about thirteen hundred rupees principal was deposited after the death of Sheogobind and this amount with interest thereon is more than enough to come to the total of the present claim which was laid at about eighteen hundred rupees.

    8. In the plaint, it is true, of this, Rs. 1,500 is described as principal and Rs. 303 as interest; but I do not think that for such a small discrepancy we should in second appeal be justified in remanding the case for a precise finding as to how much of principal and interest respectively should on proper accounting be ascribed to the deposits made by the plaintiffs themselves and how much to the deposit of Sheogobind that may be still outstanding. In the result I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    9. James, J.:— I agree.

    R.W/R.K

    10. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Balabux Marwari v. Inder Kumar Tewari
    (Aug 4, 1936)