1. The dispute in this case relates-to certain properties belonging to one Ranjit who is said to have died some time in 1903, leaving a son Chulhai, a daughter Mt. Mendha, and a widow Mt. Rajwanta. On his death, Chulhai entered into possession of the assets left by his father but he did not survive long and died very shortly after his father's death. On the death of Chulhai, a dispute appears to have arisen in the mutation Court between his mother Mt. Rajwanta on one side and Kirtarath and Sewak, the nephews of Ranjit, on the other. This dispute was settled by a compromise the terms of which were embodied in a petition dated 23-1-1924 which was filed in the mutation Court (Ex. A-5). By this compromise, it was agreed that Mt. Rajwanta shall remain in possession of the property for her life without any right of transfer and upon her death Kirtarath and Sewak will enter into possession. Accordingly Mt. Rajwanta entered into possession of the property and remained in such possession until her death on 17-5-1941. It appears that a, few months before her death she had executed a deed of gift in favour of her daughter Mendha, i.e, the sister of Chulhai, and her two sons on 4-9-1940 and the present action has been brought by Mendha and her two sons.
2. On the death of Rajwanta, a dispute cropped up again between Mendha and her sons on one side and the heirs of Kirtarath and Sewak on the other. The mutation Court appears to have held in favour of the latter and consequently Mendha and her sons filed the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. It is conceded that as a result of the recent legislation, Mendha, as sister of Chulhai, is unquestionably entitled to inherit in the absence of any other legal impediment.
3. In defence the heirs of Kirtarath and Sewak pleaded that, prior to the aforesaid compromise in the mutation Court, there was an oral surrender by Mt. Rajwanta in favour of the reversioners and that this surrender was followed up by the compromise filed in the revenue Court. The finding of both the Courts on this point is against the defendants and is to the effect that no such oral surrender as has been set up by the defendants ever took place. Having lost on this plea, the defendants have now come up in second appeal and it is urged on their behalf that, even though the oral surrender was not proved as a matter of fact, the compromise filed in the revenue Court itself amounted to such surrender and must be deemed to have dealt with questions of title and not only questions of possession. I am afraid I am unable to agree with this contention.
4. It must be remembered that two of the essential conditions of a valid surrender under the Hindu law are, first, that a surrender must be of the entire estate and, secondly, that there must be a transfer of title in prasenti. The effect of a valid surrender is always to accelerate the succession and vest the whole property in the reversioners at once. It is clear that in the present case no such acceleration or vesting took place. All that Mt. Rajwanta was entitled to was the limited right of a Hindu woman to remain in possession of the property for life and that right was clearly retained by the lady by virtue of this compromise. It is also clear that no part of the lady's rights in the widow's estate was transferred to or vested in the reversioners. It seems to me that all that the lady did was to have purchased peace by foregoing her right of alienation so as to be in a position to enjoy possession of the property peacefully. As I read the compromise, I find nothing therein to indicate that the larger question of title was in any way dealt with or settled by it. I am of opinion that the compromise dealt with the question of possession only and nothing more. A compromise to be binding on the heirs must be proved by very cogent evidence and it must also be shown that it was for the benefit of the estate. The present compromise, however, was, if anything, for the personal benefit of the lady herself in order to ensure to her a peaceful enjoyment of her right of possession. In this view of the matter, I agree with the Courts below that the rights of the plaintiffs were not in any way affected by this compromise.
5. There is yet another impediment in the way of the defendants and that is that, even if we assume for a moment that this compromise dealt with questions of title also, it would in that case be inadmissible in evidence as it is conceded that the value of the property involved exceeds one hundred rupees and, as such, the compromise would be compulsorily registrable.
6. This was the view taken by a Full Bench of this Court in 26 A.L.J 9521. The test laid down in that case is fully complied with here. In the petition of compromise that was filed in the revenue Court it is clearly stated that the parties had come to a settlement and then the document goes on to specify the terms of that settlement. As I read the petition of compromise, it seems quite clear that it was not intended only to give information to the Court but that it was clearly intended to embody all the terms of the compromise. This being so, this petition of compromise, if it can be treated as a document of title, would be inadmissible in evidence.
7. In the result, therefore, I would dismiss this appeal with costs. Leave to appeal under Letters Patent is refused.
8. Appeal dismissed.