| Kali Charan Nath v. Sukhada Sundari Debi, 30 Ind. Cas. 824; 22 C.I.J. 272; 20 C.W.N. 58 |
Principle that an action may be maintained on a judgment only where the judgment cannot be enforced in some other way (i.e., avoid bringing an action where execution would suffice). |
The court relied on this case as the leading exposition of when suits on prior decrees are permissible and applied its qualification to the facts (distinguishing declaratory decrees from executable decrees). |
| Williams v. Jones (1845) 13 M. & W. 628; 67 R.R. 767; 2 D. & L. 680; 14 L.J. Ex. 145 |
English authority cited for the proposition that a legal obligation arises from a judgment adjudicating a sum due, on which an action may be maintained. |
Used to illustrate the general principle that actions on judgments can lie when those judgments establish enforceable debts; considered within the qualification that such actions are improper if the judgment can be enforced otherwise. |
| Henley v. Soper (1828) 8 B. & C. 16; 2 Man. & Ry. 153; 6 L.J. (O.S.) K.B. 210 |
Illustrates the qualification that courts should refuse actions on decrees when the court that made the decree can itself enforce it. |
Quoted to support the view that actions on decrees are not to be allowed where enforcement by the decree-making court is available. |
| Sadler v. Robins (1808) 1 Camp. 253 |
Authority supporting refusal to entertain actions on decrees where execution is available. |
Referred to as part of the authorities demonstrating the principle that suits on decrees are improper when execution would be the proper remedy. |
| Carpenter v. Thornton (1819) 3 B. & Ald. 52 |
Supports the general rule limiting suits on decrees where enforcement by the court is possible. |
Included among English authorities used to frame the rule against collateral suits on enforceable decrees. |
| Henderson v. Henderson (1844) 6 Q.B. 288 |
Authority on the proper scope of actions after prior adjudication. |
One of the cited authorities illustrating the limited circumstances in which a fresh action on a prior decree is permissible. |
| English or Foreign Grant v. Easton (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 302 |
Holds an action will lie on a judgment which finally establishes a debt. |
Cited among authorities illustrating that actions can be brought on judgments that finally determine debts, subject to the qualification discussed in Kali Charan Nath. |
| Nouvion v. Freeman (1889) 15 App. Cas. 1 |
Authority that actions can lie on judgments establishing debt. |
Referenced in the line of authorities describing when actions on judgments are permissible. |
| Pemberton v. Hughes (1899) 1 Ch. 781 |
Another decision on actions founded on judgments. |
Used to support the explanatory survey of the law on actions on prior judgments. |
| Hodsoll v. Baxter (1858) El. B1. & El. 884 |
Authority referenced in discussion of actions on judgments. |
Included in the compilation of English authorities showing limits on actions on prior judgments. |
| Clydesdalf Bank v. Schroder and Co. (1913) 2 K.B. 1 |
Authority on enforcement and actions on judgments. |
Referred to in the context of precedent about actions on prior adjudications. |
| Gibson and Co. v. Gibson (1913) 3 K.B. 379 |
Another English decision on actions on judgments. |
Cited among cases illustrating the principle limiting suits on enforceable decrees. |
| Shaw v. Allen (1914) 30 T.L.R. 631 |
Authority in the same line on the limitation of actions on prior decrees. |
Listed among English cases supporting the established principle. |
| Pritchett v. English and Colonial Syndicate (1899) 2 Q.B. 428 |
Held that where an English judgment can be enforced in some other way bringing an action upon it is an abuse of process. |
Used to illustrate the abuse-of-process rationale that underlies the rule against suits duplicating execution remedies. |
| Lakhrani Kaur v. Dhanraj Singh, 32 Ind. Cas. 634 |
Instance where a suit was held maintainable on a prior decree even though the decree was barred by limitation (decision by Walsh, J.). |
The court noted this authority but observed that the view expressed was doubted on appeal and later overruled, and thus not followed as prevailing law. |
| Dhanraj Singh v. Lakhrani Kaur, 35 Ind. Cas. 601 |
Appeal where earlier opinion was doubted though the decision was affirmed on other grounds. |
Noted as part of the development of authority; the court treated the later overruling as persuasive against the earlier view. |
| Ramanand v. Jairam, 59 Ind. Cas. 632 |
Case that overruled the view that suits may be maintained on decrees barred by limitation in the circumstances of Lakhrani Kaur. |
Relied upon as part of the body of authority favoring the principle that a remedy by execution bars a fresh suit for identical relief. |
| Doobee Singh v. Jowkee, 3 Agra H.C.R. 381 |
Authority supporting that a person who loses his remedy by execution by his own laches cannot bring a fresh suit for the identical relief. |
Cited as supporting the view that where execution was the proper remedy, fresh suits are barred. |
| Ram Jus v. Ram Narain, 2 N.W.P.H.C.R. 382 |
Supports the principle restricting fresh suits on decrees where execution was available. |
Included among authorities showing the recognized rule in favour of enforcing decrees by execution rather than collateral suits. |
| Sheikh Golam Hossein v. Alla Rukhee Beebee, 3 N.W.H.C.R. 62 |
Authority on the same principle as above. |
Used as part of the support for the limitation on suits on prior decrees. |
| Sanjeeviyah v. Nanjiyah, 4 M.H.C.R. 453 |
Madras High Court decision affirming that where remedy is by execution a suit on the judgment will not lie. |
Cited among Madras decisions endorsing the rule that a decree-holder must proceed by execution, not by new suit, for identical relief. |
| Muttuvelu Pillai v. Vythilinga Pillai, 5 M.H.C.R. 185 |
Madras authority supporting the execution-only remedy where judgment has determined rights. |
Referenced in the catalogue of supporting decisions from Madras High Court. |
| Ranganasary v. Shappani Asary, 5 M.H.C.R. 375 at p. 377 |
Madras decision illustrating the same principle. |
Used as another supporting Madras precedent. |
| Sungam Narayan Pillay v. Sandira Pillai, 6 M.H.C.R. 13 |
Madras decision on enforceability of decrees and suits thereon. |
Cited among Madras cases upholding the execution remedy rule. |
| Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar, 27 M. 243; 14 M.L.J. 84 (F.B.) |
Madras/F.B. decision relevant to limitation on suits following decrees. |
Included to show consistent Madras authority on the point. |
| Manchharam Kalliandas v. Bakshe Saheb, 6 B.H.C.R. 231 |
Bombay High Court decision affirming the rule that suits on judgments are not maintainable where execution was available. |
Referred to among Bombay decisions supporting the execution remedy principle. |
| Kisan Nandram v. Anandram Pachaji, 10 B.H.C.R. 433 |
Bombay authority on the same issue. |
Listed as part of Bombay precedents upholding the rule against suits on decrees when execution is the remedy. |
| Sayad Nairudin v. Venkatesh Prabhu, 5 B. 382 |
Bombay decision relevant to suits on judgments. |
Included among Bombay cases cited for the general principle. |
| Fakirapa v. Pandurangapa, 6 B. 7 |
Bombay authority mentioned in support of the rule. |
Referenced among the cluster of Bombay precedents. |
| Merwanji Nowroji v. Ashabai, 8 B. 1 |
Bombay case discussing practice regarding suits on judgments of Small Cause Courts. |
Cited to show historical practice and the development of the rule in Bombay. |
| Savill v. Dalton (1915) 3 K.B. 174 |
English decision concerning suits on judgments of Small Cause Courts and related practice. |
Mentioned as part of the comparative jurisprudence on when suits on judgments have been permitted or prohibited. |
| Sandes v. Jomir Shaikh, 9 W.R. 399 |
Earlier case reviewed in the development of the law. |
Included in the review of earlier decisions underlying the court's understanding. |
| Moonshi Golam Arab v. Curreembux, 5 C. 294; 4 C.L.R. 477 |
Early decision forming part of the judicial development on suits on decrees. |
Reviewed as part of the historical development summarized in Kali Charan Nath. |
| Attermoney Dossee v. Hurry Doss Dutt, 7 C. 74 |
Another early authority forming part of the review. |
Noted in the survey of earlier case law the court relied upon. |
| Annoda Prasad v. Nobakishore Roy, 21 Ind. Cas. 519 |
Case considered in the development of the rule limiting suits on prior decrees. |
Reviewed as part of the body of Indian decisions analyzed by the court. |
| Ashi Bhushan Dasi v. Pelaram Mandal, 21 Ind. Cas. 519 |
Decision forming part of the judicial history on the point. |
Included in the review supporting the rule that a fresh suit cannot be brought where the decree would be enforceable by execution. |
| Kalikananda Mukherjee v. Bipro Das Pal Choudhury, 26 Ind. Cas. 436 |
Case forming part of the Court's review of earlier authority. |
Referred to in the historical survey underlying the court's approach. |
| Doobee Singh v. Jewkee Ram, 3 Agra H.C.R. 381 |
Authority that a merely declaratory decree which does not direct action is incapable of execution and therefore a fresh suit may lie. |
The court applied the principle to hold that the consent decree in the prior litigation was declaratory and not executable, so a fresh suit to enforce possession could be maintained. |
| Sri Krishna Tata Chariar v. Singara Chariar, 4 M.H.C.R. 453 |
Madras authority that a declaratory decree not directing action is incapable of execution. |
Used to support the finding that where a decree is merely declaratory, a separate suit will lie to enforce the rights declared. |
| Nawazish Ali Beg v. Vilaytee Khartum, 2 Agra H.C.R. 23 |
Authority on decrees declaring rights to maintenance where execution for periodic payments is not provided. |
Illustrative of the class of declaratory decrees for which separate suits may be required for enforcement; cited in contrast to executable decrees. |
| Madhavrao v. Ramrao, 22 B. 267 |
Decision on the execution-appropriate form of decrees for maintenance allowances. |
Cited as an example where a declaratory decree requires a fresh suit for enforcement if it does not provide for execution periodically. |
| Ashutosh Bannerjee v. Lukhimoni Debya, 19 C. 139 |
Authority illustrating decrees capable of execution from time to time. |
Contrasted with declaratory decrees to show when execution would be available and a fresh suit would be barred. |
| Matangini Dassee v. Chooneymoney Dassee, 22 C. 903 |
Case illustrating decrees framed to be executable periodically. |
Contrasted with the present consent decree which was found to be declaratory and non-executable. |
| Girija Kanta v. Mohim Chandra, 35 Ind. Cas. 294 |
Authority dealing with recovery of possession in the context of decrees and their executability. |
Cited as an example in the class of cases where separate suit may lie to enforce a declaratory decree declaring the right to possession. |
| Shama Charan Chatterji v. Madhub Chandra Mookerjee, 11 C. 93 |
Decision relevant to recovery of possession and executability of decrees. |
Included among authorities applied to the question whether a declaratory decree bars a separate suit for possession. |
| Goba Nathu Barola v. Sakharam Teju Patil, 59 Ind. Cas. 366 |
Case concerning executability of decrees for possession. |
Referenced in support of the proposition that a merely declaratory decree does not preclude a separate suit for possession. |
| Mahomed Ibrahim v. Meera Oommal, 7 Ind. Cas. 558 |
Decision on executability and enforcement of decrees. |
Cited as part of the authorities indicating when declaratory decrees permit separate suits for enforcement. |
| Mohammad Nasiruddm v. Bhagwana, 22 Ind. Cas. 663 |
Case concerning decrees and the right to recover possession. |
Included in the set of precedents showing that declaratory decrees may allow fresh suits for enforcement. |
| Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin, 24 I.A. 170 |
Authority on effect of involuntary purchase and operation of Section 52, Transfer of Property Act. |
Quoted to show that a purchaser pendente lite is bound by the decree in the previous suit and cannot escape Section 52's operation, even if purchase was involuntary. |
| Bharat Ramanuja Das v. Sarat Kamini, 66 Ind. Cas. 273 |
Authority that a purchaser pendente lite is bound by the decree even when the suit terminated in a consent decree. |
Applied to conclude the first defendant, who purchased pendente lite, is bound by the prior consent decree. |
| South American & Mexican Co., In re (1895) 1 Ch. 37 |
Authority cited for the general proposition that a compromise or judgment can bind the parties and bar inconsistent claims. |
Used in the discussion that the consent decree binds the plaintiff and prohibits claiming a greater share than fixed by the compromise. |
| Huddersfield Banking Co. v. Lister (1895) 2 Ch. 273 |
Another authority on the binding effect of settlements and decrees. |
Referenced in support of the proposition that the plaintiff is bound by the consent decree and cannot claim more than the share fixed by it. |
| Wentworth v. Bullen (1829) 9 B. & C. 840 |
Old authority concerning the effect of agreements and decrees on subsequent claims. |
Cited in the passage establishing that the consent decree operates to bind the parties and estop inconsistent claims. |
| Kanhai Lal v. Lala Brij Lal, 47 Ind. Cas. 207 |
Indian authority on the binding effect of prior decrees/compromises. |
Used as part of the array of authorities showing that a plaintiff cannot claim a share larger than fixed by a consent decree. |
| Fateh Chand v. Narsingh Das, 16 Ind. Cas. 988 |
Authority on the effect of prior adjudication binding parties' subsequent claims. |
Cited in support of the court's conclusion that the consent decree barred the plaintiff's claim for one-third. |
| Rampat v. Durga Bharthi, 60 Ind. Cas. 440 |
Case concerning the binding effect of prior decrees/compromises on subsequent claims. |
Included among authorities establishing that the consent decree precludes the plaintiff from claiming an increased share. |