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  • section, cl. (5) by the Amending Act of 1898 and cl. (6) by the Amending Act of 1907.
  • sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
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  • section, cl. (5) by the Amending Act of 1898 and cl. (6) by the Amending Act of 1907.
  • sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary — Second Appeal under Section 52, Bengal Tenancy Act

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal arising from a suit under section 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act seeking enhancement of rent on the ground that the tenants occupy land “proved by measurement to be in excess of the area for which rent has been previously paid.” The lower Appellate Court (the Subordinate Judge) allowed enhancement of rent; the tenants (Defendants) appealed to this Court. The appeal concerns competing factual findings regarding the area of holdings, documentary evidence (a purported chitta of 1227 B.S.), and whether the landlord proved entitlement to additional rent under the statutory test.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the tenant is in possession of land “in excess of the area for which rent has been previously paid” so as to justify enhancement of rent.
  2. What burden rests on the landlord to prove an increase in the area for which rent has been previously paid and by what methods that burden may be discharged (e.g., proof of excess land outside original boundaries or proof that rent was fixed by measurement/unit-rate at original settlement).
  3. Whether the Subordinate Judge’s findings—based on suppression of a chitta of 1227, the hastabud/rent-roll and other evidence—were permissible in a second appeal or amounted to surmise or speculation beyond legitimate inference.
  4. Whether the Subordinate Judge erroneously placed the burden of proof on the tenants once excess area had been found by the landlord.
  5. Whether the Subordinate Judge adequately considered the age of the tenancies and the guidance of clause 2(c) of section 52 (length of time tenancy lasted without dispute as to rent or area).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants (Tenants) — Appellants

  • Several suits were tried together and Nirod Koley (a Defendant in one suit) allegedly possessed a chitta of 1227 which he failed to produce; the tenants complained that responsibility for its non-production was unfairly fastened on all tenant-Defendants though it belonged to Nirod Koley alone.
  • It was argued that the Subordinate Judge decided the case on surmise and conjecture rather than on proper evidence; specifically, that the chitta of 1227 is a myth and there is no evidence of its existence.
  • They contended the Subordinate Judge speculated as to the effect of the alleged chitta and thus reached unsafe conclusions about the origins of the figures in the hastabud and dakhilas.
  • They argued that the Subordinate Judge wrongly placed the burden of proof on the tenants rather than on the landlord.
  • They contended that because these were old tenancies (representations that they had held the same land at the same rent for about one hundred years), the Subordinate Judge failed to apply clause 2(c) properly by not taking adequate account of the long period without dispute.

Plaintiff (Landlord / Putnidar) — As reflected in the judgment

  • The Plaintiff succeeded in obtaining enhancement of rent in the lower Appellate Court; the judgment treats the landlord as having proved excess area for which rent had not been previously paid.
  • The Subordinate Judge relied upon a hastabud (rent-roll) prepared when the mehal came under the Burdwan Raj in 1305 and the tenants’ signatures and long acceptance of rent receipts without protest to support the accuracy of the entries.
  • The Subordinate Judge treated the non-production (suppression) of the chitta of 1227 by Nirod Koley as a basis to infer that the hastabud and dakhilas derived their precise area specifications from that chitta (i.e., that a measurement had been made and recorded in 1227), and that a local Commissioner’s enquiry showed increases in area attributable to encroachment or erroneous/fraudulent earlier measurement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gouri Patra's case (Gouri Patra v. Reily) Identified as the ruling authority on the main principles governing claims under sec. 52; explains landlord's route to showing previous settlement was made on measurement and that fresh measurement can reveal additional rent due to earlier loss by carelessness or neglect. The court treated Gouri Patra's case as laying down the main principles and cited the passage concerning proof by measurement to explain the second method by which a landlord may show entitlement to increased rent.
Raj Kumar v. Ram Lal Referred to in connection with clause (5) of section 52: clause (5) corrects a misapprehension said to have arisen from a particular passage in Gouri Patra's case. The opinion notes that clause (5) (by the Amending Act of 1898) was introduced to correct a misapprehension regarding a passage in Gouri Patra's case; the case is cited to explain the legislative amendments' context.
Rajendra v. Chunder Holds that “the area for which rent has been previously paid” means the area with reference to which the rent previously paid had been assessed or adjusted. The court applied this formulation to both methods of proving excess area (encroachment or measurement/unit-rate approaches) and treated the statement as a guiding definition of the statutory phrase.
Akbar Ali v. Hira Bibi (judgment of Coxe, J.) Used to bring together cases on the meaning of the phrase “area for which rent has been previously paid”; Coxe, J.'s judgment gathered the authorities, with concurrence by N.R. Chatterjea, J. The opinion cites the case as a consolidating authority that brings earlier decisions into a coherent approach to sec. 52 questions.
Lukhi Narain v. Sri Ram Chandra Regarded as an example of the first method (proof of excess land outside original boundaries); also supports the proposition that once excess area is proved, the burden shifts and the tenants must meet the raised case. The Subordinate Judge followed the approach in Lukhi Narain; Richardson J. treats Lukhi Narain as justifying the Subordinate Judge's view that proof of excess area by the landlord shifts the onus to the tenants to rebut or explain.
Uma Singh v. Tarini Prosad Referred to regarding the effect of clause (6) of section 52, and noted for the citation of Lukhi Narain's case. The opinion mentions Uma Singh as a point of reference when discussing clause (6); it is not central to the decision but cited for context on the statutory amendments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court (Richardson, J.) began by clarifying the legal framework under section 52 and its later amendments (clauses (5) and (6)). He summarized the statutory test: when the landlord is the claimant, the issue is whether the tenant occupies land “in excess of the area for which rent has been previously paid” (sec. 52(1)(a)); clause (2) supplies matters the court must consider when determining the area for which rent was previously paid (including origin and conditions of tenancy, length of undisputed tenancy, and the measure used).

Richardson, J. set out the two general methods by which a landlord may discharge the burden of proving an increase in the area:

  • Proof that the tenant occupies excess land outside original boundaries (e.g., encroachment or alluvion).
  • Proof that the original rent was fixed by measurement or unit rates and that, on a true measurement, the tenant occupies more land than accounted for under the rent originally paid (i.e., the rent was calculated by area and the present rent is less than that payable under the proper measurement).

Applying these principles to the record, Richardson, J. considered the tenants' objections to the Subordinate Judge's findings. The Subordinate Judge had inferred from the suppression of an alleged chitta of 1227 B.S., from a hastabud prepared in 1305 when the mehal came under the Burdwan Raj, from tenants' signatures and long acceptance of rent receipts without protest, and from a local Commissioner’s enquiry showing increased areas, that (a) the entries in the hastabud and dakhilas were taken from a measurement recorded in the chitta, and (b) the present area of holdings exceeded the area for which rent had been previously paid (either due to encroachment or erroneous/fraudulent prior measurement).

Addressing the charge of conjecture, Richardson, J. distinguished inference from speculation and concluded that the Subordinate Judge's conclusions fell within legitimate inference from the disclosed facts (e.g., the role of the Koleys as gomastas, evidence that the chitta was consulted and used, signatures on the rent-roll, acceptance of rent receipts, and the Commissioner’s findings). Because the finding of excess area was supported by admissible inferences from the evidence, it was conclusive in second appeal.

On the specific point of the alleged misplacement of burden, Richardson, J. explained that once the landlord proved the existence of excess area, the evidentiary situation was such that the tenants were required to meet the case (i.e., the proof of excess area by the landlord shifted the issue to the tenants). He identified this approach as consistent with Lukhi Narain v. Sri Ram and concluded that if the finding of excess area is accepted, the complaint about misplacing the burden fails.

Finally, on the contention that the Subordinate Judge ignored the long duration of the tenancies (clause 2(c)), Richardson, J. found that although the judge did not explicitly address that clause in a discrete passage, he had traced the tenancies to the chitta of 1227 and other parts of the judgment showed the judge had the provisions of section 52 in mind. Thus there was not a demonstrable failure to apply clause 2(c).

Walmsley, J. agreed in the result but noted reluctance: he found the lower court's reasons for believing in a measurement in 1227 B.S. unconvincing and other difficulties dealt with lightly, but he concluded that the appellate court could not go behind the Subordinate Judge’s findings because there was some evidence to warrant them.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The appeals (tenants' second appeals) were dismissed.

Direct consequences:

  • The enhancement of rent ordered by the lower Appellate Court is upheld.
  • The Court made no order as to the costs of this appeal.

No broader change in legal doctrine is announced in this opinion beyond invoking and applying the established authorities discussed in the judgment; the decision upholds the lower court's findings based on the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom rather than establishing a new precedent.

S.C.M
Appeals dismissed.

    Dhrupad Chandra Koley v. Hari Nath Singh Roy

    Richardson, J.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit brought under sec. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for enhancement of rent on the ground that the tenants are in possession of land “proved by measurement to be in excess of the area for which rent has been previously paid.”

    Gouri Patra's case(1) is the ruling authority upon the main principles governing such a claim. It is true that cls. (5) and (6) have since been added to the section, cl. (5) by the Amending Act of 1898 and cl. (6) by the Amending Act of 1907. But cl. (5) merely corrects a misapprehension which had arisen in regard to a particular passage in the judgment in Gouri Patra's case, [Raj Kumar v. Ram Lal(2)] and cl. (6) only applies when such a practice has been proved by the landlord or tenant as is mentioned in the clause.

    If regard he had to the terms of the section itself, the question in every case, the landlord being the claimant, is whether the tenant is in possession of land “in excess of the area for which rent has been previously paid by him” [sec. 52(1)(a)]. Light is thrown on the meaning of the words by cl. (2). That clause lays down that “in determining the area for which rent has been previously paid, the Court shall, if so required by any party to the suit, have regard to” four matters of which I need only mention three:—

    “(a) the origin and conditions of the tenancy, for instance, whether the rent was, a consolidated rent for the entire tenure or holding;

    (c) the length of tune during which the tenancy has lasted without dispute as to rent or area; and

    (d) the length of the measure used or in local use at the time of the origin of the tenancy as compared with that used or in local use at the time of the institution of the suit.”

    The burden of proving an increase in “the area for which rent Has been previously paid” is on the landlord. Speaking generally he may discharge the burden in two ways:—

    (1) By proving that the tenant is in possession of excess land outside the boundaries of the land originally settled with him, for instance, land obtained by encroachment or alluvial increment.

    (2) By proving that at the original settlement of the land the rent was fixed at a rate per bigha or other unit of measurement or at differential rates according to the quality of the land and so forth, and that in fact and substance the agreement was that the tenant should pay at that rate or at those rates for all the land of which he was put in possession according to its true area, and by further proving that the existing rent is less than the rent payable under such agreemeat.

    It is in connection with this second method of proving a right to increase of rent, that questions may arise under cl. (2)(a) as to the conditions of the tenancy and whether the rent originally fixed was or was not a consolidated rent for the whole area. The rent might be a consolidated rent even if it was calculated at so much per measured or estimated bigha. The question would depend on the true intention of the parties to be gathered in the absence of a written instrument from all the circumstances. When, however, it is proved that the tenant is holding land outside and beyond the original boundaries, the question as to the rent being a consolidated rent, cannot well arise, except possibly in connection with land gained by alluvion.

    This second method is that to which the learned Judges in Gouri Patra v. Reily refers when they speak of the landlord showing “that the previous settlement was made on the basis of a measurement and the rates of rent as applied to the area then determined, while on a fresh measurement made by the same length of measure it has been found that he is entitled to receive additional rent which by carelessness or ngelect or some other reason he had hitherto lost.”

    In Rajendra v. Chunder(3), Banerjee, J. said: that the words “the area for which rent has been previously paid” mean the area with reference to which the rent previously paid had been assessed or adjusted. That was a case where enhancement was claimed by the first method but the language is applicable also to the second method. The cases, as I understand, are brought together in this sense in the judgment of Coxe, J., in Akbar Ali v. Hira Bibi(4) in which N.R Chatterjea, J., concurred.

    The case of Lukhi Narain v. Sri Ram Chandra(5) is probably to be regarded as an example of the first method available to the landlord, but if it be assumed that the tenant there had been holding the same land throughout and that the area of the land was in the first instance wrongly or inaccurately measured or calculated, then, the case would be an example of the second method.

    As to the effect of cl. (6) with which we are not immediately concerned, reference may be made to Uma Singh v. Tarini Prosad(6), when Luhhi Narain's case is cited.

    I have said so much because it seemed necessary, for the purposes of the case before us, to endeavour to obtain a clear understanding of what the law is. I come now to the present case. In the lower Appellate Court the Plaintiff has secured an enhancement of rent and before us the tenants, the Defendants, are the Appellants.

    The first objection taken on their behalf to the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in the lower Appellate Court is this. There were several suits tried together. The Subordinate Judge says that a Defendant in one of the suits, Nirod Koley, had in his possession a chitta of the year 1227 which he failed to produce when called upon to do so. The Subordinate Judge refers to this document as the suppressed chitta and the complaint made is that he has fastened upon the tenant-Defendants in all the suits a responsibility for the non-production of the chitta which ought to belong to Nirod Koley alone. It remains, however, that the suits were tried together without objection by the Defendants. The evidence given, so far as it was general in its character, applied to all the suits. The several Defendants or sets of Defendants were all sailing in the same boat. No Defendant dissociated himself from Nirod Koley. In the circumstances it would be difficult to say that the Defendants were not all alike affected by his conduct, at any rate, none of them displayed any anxiety to forego any advantage that might accrue therefrom.

    Then it is objected that the Subordinate Judge has decided the case not on the evidence but on surmise and conjecture, and that no doubt raises a question which is open in second appeal.

    It is said, for instance, that the chitta of 1227 is a myth and there is no evidence to establish the existence of such a document. But the Subordinate Judge says that Nirod Koley and his father and uncle were gomastas under previous putnidars and he refers to evidence that “this chitta, be it the original or the copy, was invariably consulted by the tenants of the mehal whenever the transfer of a holding took place and the Koleys charged a fee for this reference.” It is clear that the document so consulted should have been produced.

    Then, again, it is said the Subordinate Judge has speculated as to the effect of the chitta and his conclusions must be rejected. The case stands thus:—

    In the year 1305, the mehal of which the Plaintiff is now putnidar came directly under the Burdwan Raj and a hastabud or rent roll was prepared by the officers of the Raj as to this the Subordinate Judge says:—

    “The area and annual rent of such (? each) holding are given in this hastabud and the tenants not only testified to the accuracy of the entries by their respective signatures but by accepting rent receipts for a considerable number of years without any protest.”

    The Subordinate Judge has no doubt used the suppression of the chitta as a ground for inferring that the areas mentioned in the hastabud and the dakhilas were taken from the chitta. He refers to the evidence of Adhar Koley, one of the tenants, who, speaking apparently for all the tenants, said that the quantity of land stated in the dakhilas was correct and that he could not say how the quantity of land was incorporated in the dakhilas. The Subordinate Judge goes on:—

    “His statements strike at the root of the Defendant's ‘daksurat’ theory”—that is, that the areas were entered according to common repute—“and show that these minute specifications of areas and the annual rents in the rent-receipts were taken from the chitta of 1227, which the Defendants have intentionally suppressed, and were the result of a measurement to which the present Defendants or their predecessor-in-interest were parties. If the areas had been put down by report as is urged by the Defendants, one would have expected to find them in round numbers and not in scrupulously accurate and exact quantities running to karas and krantis.”

    In that way he arrives at the conclusion that the rent had originally been assessed on a basis of measurement and finds in effect that, whichever of the above two methods be adopted, the present area of the holdings is in excess of the area for which rent had been previously paid. His own words are:—

    “There is no dispute as to the standard of measurement and the increase in the areas (as ascertained by a Commissioner who made a local enquiry) must be due to the gradual encroachment on the jungle and waste lands of the mehal or to erroneous or fraudulent measurement on the previous occasion” (the italics are mine).

    There is no doubt a distinction, however difficult it may be to define, between inference and speculation, but I cannot see that the Subordinate Judge in coming to that finding exceeded the bounds of legitimate inference from the facts and circumstances disclosed on the record. If I am correct in that view, the finding is conclusive in second appeal.

    Objection is next taken to a subsequent passage in the judgment, which shows, it is argued, that the Subordinate Judge erroneously placed the burden of proof on the tenants. The passage runs:—

    “The existence of excess area is a proved fact and it is not for the landlord to explain how it came about and this increase may be due to many events such as encroachment on the adjoining waste or khas land etc. Unless it is established by very satisfactory and reliable evidence that the rent was a consolidated one for an area within specified boundaries, irrespective of its precise quantity, the landlord is entitled to claim additional rent for the excess lands.”

    What the learned Subordinate Judge means is that the proof by the landlord of the existence of “excess area” shifted the burden and raised a case which the tenants had to meet. He was merely following the decision of this Court in the case already cited, Lukhi Narain v. Sri Ram. Though he does not expressly refer to the case, his language clearly shows that he had it before him. If, therefore, the finding as to excess area be accepted, there is no substance in the objection that the Subordinate Judge misplaced the burden of proof.

    Then remains only one point. It is said that these are old tenancies and that the tenants represented that they had been holding the same land at the same rent for about one hundred years. It is suggested that the Subordinate Judge took no account of the age of the tenancies and thereby failed to carry out the direction given to him by cl. 2(c). But the mere fact that he does not refer to the point in his judgment does not show that he did not consider it. He traced the tenancies to the chitta of 1227 and other parts of his judgment show that the provisions of sec. 52, as a whole, were present to his mind.

    On the whole I am of opinion that though the case may be near the bonder line, no sufficient ground is shown for our interference in second appeal and that this and the analogous appeals should be dismissed. As to costs, in the circumstances we propose to make no order as to the costs of this appeal.

    Walmsley, J.:— I agree that these appeals must be dismissed, but I do so with considerable reluctance. The reasons given by the lower Appellate Court for believing that the holdings were measured in 1227 B.S are not at all convincing, and there are other difficulties which he has dealt with very lightly. We cannot however go behind his findings in this case, because it is impossible to say that there is no evidence to warrant them.

    S.C.M
    Appeals dismissed.

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    Dhrupad Chandra Koley v. Hari Nath Singh Roy
    (Mar 23, 1918)