Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

First Appeal No. 18 of 1917

Judges

Dawson-Miller, C.J
Adami, J.

Acts

Section 4(2) of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917),
Section 146 of the Local Self-Government Act,
Section 363 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884.
Bengal Local Self-government Act, 1385, S. 146
Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1885,
SECTION 24 LIMITATION ACT
Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, S. 363

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Dawson-Miller, C.J. (Appeal dated 18 December 1916)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 5 August 1915 the plaintiff, while driving a trap near the Indigo Factory Road at Purulia to take a friend to the railway station, steered to the left to avoid an oncoming ticca gharry. The trap's left wheel struck a heap of road gravel lying on the left side of the road; the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and suffered a compound fracture of the right leg. He was treated locally and later taken to Calcutta where, on 7 October 1915, amputation below the knee became necessary.

The plaintiff instituted a suit on 6 January 1916 against two defendants: (1) the District Board of Manbhum (rural authority) and (2) the Commissioners of Purulia Municipality (urban authority), claiming Rs. 1,00,000 in damages. Both defendants filed written statements and raised a plea in bar by limitation. The District Board relied on Section 146 of the Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885 (requiring notice and prescribing that actions be commenced within three months after accrual of cause of action). The Municipality relied on Section 363 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, which has similar notice and limitation provisions.

Several issues were framed; the trial Judge (Additional Subordinate Judge, Purulia) heard the limitation question first on 18 December 1916 and held that the cause of action arose on 5 August 1915, that no fresh cause accrued on 7 October, and that the suit (instituted 6 January 1916) was barred by the three-month limitation. The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the negligence alleged (failing to remove a heap of road gravel) amounted to "anything done under this Act" so as to attract the notice and limitation provisions of the Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885 (s.146) and the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884 (s.363).
Whether the cause of action for the loss (including the amputation of the leg on 7 October 1915) arose on 5 August 1915 (the date of the injury) or whether a fresh cause of action arose on 7 October 1915 when amputation became necessary.
Whether Section 146 of the Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885 applies to a suit brought against the District Board in its corporate capacity or only to suits against the members of the District Board in their personal capacity (i.e., construction of the phrase "the members of any District Board").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

That the negligence or breach of duty alleged did not necessarily arise in the performance of something done under the Local Self-Government and Municipal Acts and therefore the statutory limitation and notice provisions might not apply; that this factual question should be determined before applying the sections.
That the cause of action for the loss of his leg arose on 7 October 1915 when the amputation occurred, giving rise to a fresh cause of action; alternatively, if the earlier date gave a right to claim for contingent damage, the actual occurrence of the contingency (amputation) gave a fresh cause.
That Section 146 of the Local Self-Government Act did not apply to a suit against the District Board as an incorporated body but applied only to suits against the individual members of a District Board in their personal capacity (point not raised below but argued on appeal).
The plaintiff also relied on Section 24 of the Limitation Act (as he understood it) and on authorities such as Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell to support the view that a cause of action may be said to accrue when damage actually occurs.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

Both defendants pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation: that notice and suit within three months were required under the respective statutes (s.146 of the Local Self-Government Act for the District Board; s.363 of the Municipal Act for the Commissioners).
The respondents argued that the acts complained of (failure to remove the gravel) fell within "anything done under this Act" and therefore attracted the statutory bar.
The respondent (one or both) further argued that the wording of s.146 must be read as contemplating suits against the District Board itself because the section speaks of suits against "the members of the Board" and also against "any of their officers or any person acting under their direction"; on that reading, the statutory privilege should extend to the corporate body as well as to members and officers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Fetter v. Beal	Illustrates that where a plaintiff sues for an initial injury, he cannot maintain a subsequent action for later manifestations of the same injury; damages for all that flowed from the wrongful act must be recovered once and for all.	The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that no fresh cause of action arises on later aggravation of an originally wrongful injury; it helped reject the appellant's contention that amputation gave rise to a new cause of action.
Hodsoll v. Stallebrass	Explains that an action is founded upon both an unlawful act and the special damage; a fresh action requires both a new unlawful act and fresh damage.	Quoted to reinforce that aggravated damage alone (without a new unlawful act) does not create a new cause of action; applied in reasoning that the amputation was a consequence of the original wrong, not a new wrong.
Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell	Holds that in some circumstances (e.g., continued nuisance or new subsidence in a different place) the cause of action may not be complete until the subsequent damage occurs; distinguishes cases where later damage is a fresh and distinct injury.	The appellant relied on this case, but the Court distinguished it: Darley Main involved a distinct fresh injury (new subsidence in a different part of land) and therefore a new cause of action. The Court held the present case was different — the amputation was a development of the original injury and did not create a new cause of action.
Carey v. Metropolitan Borough of Bermondsey	Support for the principle nemo debet his vexari pro una et eadem causa — that a plaintiff should recover once and for all for a single cause of action.	The Court cited this authority in rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the maxim did not apply; it was used to confirm that the plaintiff could not treat the amputation as a new cause of action where it was a consequence of the original wrong.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in three principal analytical steps, addressing the plaintiff's three main contentions in turn. The court made two preliminary observations: it assumed the facts pleaded in the plaint were accurate for the purposes of deciding the preliminary limitation question, and it noted that some paragraphs in the plaint did not strictly conform to the pleading rule O.6, R.2 of the Civil Procedure Code (which requires a concise statement of material facts and not evidence or statements of belief).

First, on whether the negligence alleged was "anything done under this Act": the court examined the plaint and observed that the pleaded negligence was essentially the defendants' omission to remove a heap of road gravel which had been negligently stacked by an unknown person. The court concluded that the duty to remove such an obstruction arose only under the statutes governing local authorities. The court therefore held that the alleged omission was an act (or omission) arising under the statute and fell within the phrase "anything done under this Act." The court reinforced this conclusion by reference to the principle that statutory language referring to acts done includes illegal omissions (citing Section 4(2) of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917, as authority for that proposition).

Second, on whether a fresh cause of action arose on 7 October when amputation was performed: the court rejected the contention that every aggravation of damage produces a new cause of action. It applied established common-law principles (illustrated by the cited authorities) that a plaintiff who brings an action for personal injury is entitled to recover for present and prospective damages arising from the wrongful act; later manifestations or aggravations that are consequences of the original wrong do not create a new cause of action in the absence of a further wrongful act. The court distinguished Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell on the ground that, in that case, the later damage was distinct in kind or location and was not merely a further manifestation of an initial injury. In the present case the amputation was a development of the original injury; no fresh unlawful act had occurred. Consequently, the cause of action accrued at the date of the injury (5 August 1915), not at the later date of amputation.

Third, on the construction of Section 146 of the Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885: the court examined the statutory language and the Act's consistent use of terms. The Act elsewhere explicitly provides that each District Board is a body corporate and refers to the corporate entity as "the District Board," while referring to individuals as "members constituting the District Board" when it intends to target members personally. Section 146, by its wording, refers to "the members of any District Board" and to officers and persons acting under their direction. The court held that it would be a strained construction to read the phrase "the members of any District Board" as meaning the corporate District Board itself. On that basis the court concluded that s.146 was intended to operate as a bar in respect of suits against individual members (and officers/persons acting under their direction) rather than suits against the corporate District Board as such.

Applying these analyses to the facts and procedural posture: the trial Judge's finding that the cause of action arose on 5 August 1915 was accepted by the appellate court as correct; similarly, the appellate court found that the statutory limitation provision relied upon by the District Board (s.146) did not apply to a suit brought against the District Board in its corporate capacity. Conversely, the Municipal Commissioners were within the scope of the Municipal Act provision relied upon and the limitation bar applied to them as pleaded.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

Appeal allowed in part: the appeal is allowed insofar as it is against the District Board of Manbhum; the appeal is dismissed insofar as it is against the Commissioners of the Purulia Municipality.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

The appellate court varied the decree of the lower court as to the District Board of Manbhum and allowed the appeal against that defendant (with costs of the appeal awarded to the appellant in respect of the District Board).
The appeal against the Commissioners of the Purulia Municipality was dismissed and the costs as to those respondents were awarded in their favour (i.e., the lower court's decision as to the Municipality was upheld).
The court did not disturb the order as to costs made by the lower court because the construction point regarding s.146 (as to members versus corporate board) had not been raised below.

Broader Implications

The opinion explains the application of established principles concerning accrual of cause of action in personal injury claims (that prospective and consequential damages must normally be claimed in the single action arising from the original wrongful act) and construes the language of the statutory limitation/notice provisions at issue. The text does not expressly state that a new legal precedent of wide applicability is being established beyond these interpretations; the decision's practical consequence is the partial reversal of the lower court only as to the corporate District Board of Manbhum and the affirmation of the lower court as to the Purulia Municipality.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal allowed." (Adami, J. agreed.)

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Allan Mathewson v. District Board Of Manbhum

Dawson-Miller, C.J:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Purulia dated 18th December, 1916, in a suit instituted against the District Board of Manbhum and the Commissioners of the Purulia Municipality, claiming damages for personal injury alleged to have been caused by the negligence and breach of duty of one or both of the defendants. According to the plaintiff's case, as alleged in the plaint, he was driving along the Indigo Factory Board at Purulia where he resided taking a friend to the railway Station at about 6 o'clock in the morning on 5th August, 1915. Whilst so doing in order to avoid a collision with a ticca gharry, which was approaching from the opposite direction, he took his trap to the left side of the road with the result that the left wheel of the trap struck against a heap of road gravel which was lying on that side and owing to the impact the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and suffered a compound fracture of the right leg. After being treated at the local hospital, where he was attended by the Civil Surgeon he was taken to his own bungalow a few days later. At first the injury was not considered to be of a very serious nature but later on complications supervened, and on 24th September under medical advice he was removed to Calcutta for further treatment and on 7th October following it became necessary to amputate his leg below the knee.

2. Being uncertain whether the District Board of Manbhum which we are told was the rural authority or the Municipality of Purulia which is apparently the urban authority was responsible for the upkeep and repair of the road where the accident happened he made them both defendants to the present suit which was instituted on 6th January, 1916, and he claims one lakh of rupees as damages against the defendants or such of them as may be found liable. Bach of the defendants appeared and filed a written statement setting up various pleas in defence. Each of them also sets up a plea in bar by limitation under the provisions of certain Acts of the Bengal Legislative Council requiring, as they contend suits of this nature to be brought within three months of the date when the cause of action accrued. The Act relied on by the Manbhum District Board (defendant 1) is the Bengal Local Self-government Act, 1385, S. 146 of which provides that:

“No suit shall be brought against the members of any District Board, Local Board or Union Committee, or any of their officers or any person acting under their direction for anything done under this Act, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of such Board, or Committee and also (if the suit is intended to be brought against any officer of the said Board or Committee or any person acting under their direction) at the place of abode of the person against whom such suit is intended to be brought stating the cause of action, and the name and place of abode of the person who intend to bring a suits. Every such action shall he commenced within three months next after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards.”

3. The Act relied on by the Purulia Municipality is the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, S. 363 of which provides that:

“No suit shall be brought against the Commissioners of any Municipality or any of their officers or any person acting under their direction for anything done under this Act until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of such Commissioners.”

and proceeds in exactly the same form as the Act of 1885 just quoted, the words “such Commissioners” taking the place of the words “such Board or Committee” is the other Act.

4. Several issues were framed in the suit, the fourth of which raised the question whether the claim was barred by limitation under the provisions of the section quoted. The case came on for trial before the Additional Subordinate Judge on 18th December, 1916, and, at the request of the defendants, the learned Judge proceeded to decide the question of limitation first, as, in the event of the plea being upheld, it would be unnecessary to decide the other issues in the case, he came to the conclusion that the acts complained of on the part of the defendants came within the purview of the two sections relied on. He further found that the cause of action arose on the 5th August when the accident had happened, and that no fresh cause of action accrued on the 7th October when it became necessary to amputate the plaintiff's leg, and that the suit not having been brought until after the expiry of three months from the earlier date it was barred by limitation. From this decision the plaintiff has appealed. He contends, first, that the negligence or breach of duty of the defendants was not anything done under the provisions of the two Acts in question and that, this being a question of fact, ought to be determined before it can be held that the case comes within the operation of the sections. Secondly, he contended that the of cause of action for the present suit in which he claimed damages for the loss of his leg arose not on the 5th August, but on the 7th October when the leg was amputated, and that, in any case, if the cause of action arose on the earlier date giving him a right to claim for actual and contingent damage including the loss of his limb, nevertheless a fresh cause of action arose when that contingency in fact occurred. Thirdly, he contended, although this point was not raised in the Court below, that Section 146 of the Local Self-Government Act, did not apply to a suit brought against the District Board as an incorporated body but to a suit brought against the members of any District Board in their personal capacity and was, therefore, no bar to the present suit.

5. For the purpose of deciding this preliminary question it must be assumed that the allegations in the plaint are accurate. With regard to the first point, the plaintiff contends that the negligence alleged against the defendants giving rise to his cause of action is not necessarily negligence arising in the performance of something done under the Acts in question, and that, before it can be held that the section applies it must be determined whether the acts complained of were in fact acts done under the powers conferred by the statute. It is necessary therefore to examine the plaint in order to sea how the plaintiff's case is framed. After stating the facts I have already referred to, he pleads in para. 12 of the plaint that:

“the plaintiff has further been informed that the heap of road gravel had been negligently stacked there and allowed to remain there causing a considerable encroachment on the road itself and as it was not removed but allowed to remain for several months it became a compact mass hard enough to throw off the wheel that came in contact with it and the plaintiff was thus thrown off his trap and fell down on the road.”

6. Paragraph 13 reads:

“That the plaintiff believes that the defendants had no right to leave the gravel on the road causing thereby a considerable encroachment on the same and that it was their duty not to stack the said heap on the road and, at any rate, to remove the same after it was no longer required and if the same had been removed there would not have been any such accident and the plaintiff would not have met with the serious injury that has been caused to him.”

7. Paragraph 14 reads:

“That the plaintiff has not been able to ascertain which of the two defendants collected the heap on the road or was bound to remove the same so as to allow the entire width of the road to be used as such, but he believes that one of the defendants, if not both, was bound to do the same and he is entitled to his damage from either of the defendants or both.”

8. The first observation I wish to make upon this form of pleading is that it is not in accordance with the provisions of O. 6, R. 2 of the CPC, relating to the manner in which the facts relied on shall be pleaded. That rule provides that:

“Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved.”

9. The paragraphs in the plaint to which I have just referred are hardly statements of fact at all, except in so far as the plaintiff's state of mind or belief is concerned which is not material in a pleading of matters of this sort and is, if anything, merely evidence. I will assume, however, that what is stated as the plaintiff's information and belief is meant to be stated as an allegation of fact. Even then, however it is nowhere alleged that the defendants or either of them stacked the gravel or caused it to be stacked on the road. In fact, the plaintiff alleges in para. 14 that he has not been able to ascertain which of them collected the heap on the road or was bound to remove it, but he believes that one of the defendants, if not both, were bound to do so and that he is entitled to damages. It is clear therefore that the negligence relied on in the plaint is the failure of the defendants to remove the obstruction which had been negligently placed there by some body unknown, and as it was the duty of one or both of them to remove it they have failed in this duty, which is the negligence complained of. Now, it is manifest that the only duty imposed upon the defendants in connexion with the road is that arising out of the statutes themselves and it is the omission to perform this duty which gives rise to the cause of action. The words used in the sections relied on by the defendants are “anything done under this Act,” and where the words in a statute used in connexion with an offence or a civil wrong refer to acts done they must be held to extend also to illegal omissions (see Section 4(2) of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917), and it is this omission which arises under the statute, or not at all, which is complained of. In my opinion, it must be taken that the negligence relied on by the plaintiff comes within the purview of the sections mentioned.

10. The second question is, whether a fresh cause of action arose when the plaintiff's leg was amputated. I am unable to assent to the proposition that, where personal injuries are occasioned by a negligent act of the defendant a fresh cause of action arises whenever the damage suffered becomes aggravated. It is well settled that the plaintiff in such a case is entitled to compensation not only for damage actually visible at the time when the suit is instituted, or at the time of the trial but even for such consequential damage as may reasonably be expected to arise in the future from the wrongful act complained of. Had the plaintiff instituted the present suit and brought it to trial before the 7th October he would have been entitled to claim both for present and prospective damages arising from the injury and if, subsequently, it became necessary to amputate his leg a fresh suit for damages would not have been maintainable. This arises from the maxim nemo debet his vexari pro una et eadem causa and it follows that, if a fresh cause of action arose upon a subsequent loss of the injured limb, his further suit would not be barred. This was decided as long ago as the reign of William 3: see Fetter v. Beal(1), where it was decided that the plaintiff who had sued the defendant for assault and battery and recovered a sum of £11, could not afterwards bring a fresh suit on the ground that subsequently part of his skull had come out of his head by reason of the battery.

11. It was contended on his behalf that the recovery in the former action was only for the bruise and battery, but that; here there was a mayhem by the loss of the skull giving a fresh cause of action, but this contention was rejected by the Court on the ground that the jury, in the former action, considered the nature of the wound and gave damages for all the damages that it had done to the plaintiff. In Hodsoll v. Stallebrass(2), Littledale, J., observed with respect to an action by a master for beating his servant per quod servitium amisit;

“It is argued that a fresh action might he brought from time to time; but that is not so, the action being founded not upon the damage only, but upon the unlawful act, and the damage. Without the special damage this action ‘would not be maintainable at the plaintiff's suit. A fresh action could not be brought unless there were both a new unlawful act and fresh damage.”

12. In the present case although there was aggravated damage and possibly fresh damage, there was no new unlawful act. If the plaintiff's contention be accepted it would logically follow that in many cases a new cause of action would arise every day after the injury was received. If a person were deprived of his arm, and were thereby prevented from following his occupation of a musician, he would each day suffer further loss by reason of diminished earnings in that profession and he might not be able to follow any other. But it cannot be contended that a fresh cause of action arose each day. The plaintiff relied on the case of Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mithcell(3), where the House of Lords held that the lessees of coal under the plaintiff's land were liable for subsidence of the plaintiff's land caused by lack of support owing to the defendants working a mine, although the plaintiff had recovered damages for a previous subsidence some 12 years earlier, and the defendants had ceased working the mine since the earlier date. The second subsidence was not a further development of the first. It was in a different part of the plaintiff's land. Their Lordships held that, in such a case the cause of action was not complete until the damage actually occurred, but Lord Halsbury in his speech was careful to point out:

“No one will think of disputing the proposition that for one cause of action you must recover all damages incident to it by law once and for ever. A house that has received a shock may not at once show all the damage done to it, but it is damaged nonetheless then to the extent that it is damaged, and the fact that the damage only manifests itself later on by stages does not alter the fact that the damage is there;, and so of the more complex mechanism of the human frame, the damage is done in a railway accident, the whole machinery is injured though it may escape the eye or even the consciousness of the sufferer at the time: the later stages of suffering are but the manifestations of the original damage done, and consequent upon the injury originally sustained.”

13. Lord Bramwell, in the same case observes:

“It is a rule that when a thing directly wrongful in itself is done to a man, in itself a cause of action, he must, if he sues in respect of it, do so once and for all. As, if he is beaten or wounded, if he sues he must sue for all his damage, past, present and future, certain and contingent. He cannot maintain an action for a broken aim and subsequently for a broken rib though he did not know of it when he commenced his first action.”

14. In the case before their Lordships House the cause of action was not complete until the damage was actually done, the lack of support was not in itself a matter which gave rise to a cause of action but it was this lack of support coupled with the injury sustained thereby. As Lord Fitz-Gerald in his speech stated:

“There was a complete cause of action is 1868 in respect of which compensation was given but there was a liability to further disturbance. The defendants permitted the state of things to continue without taking any steps to prevent the occurrence of any future injury A fresh subsidence took place, causing a new and further disturbance of the plaintiff's enjoyment which gave him a new and distinct cause of action.”

15. In cases such as that of the Darley Main Colliery Co., the cause of action does not arise until actual damage ensues and it is for that damage only that the suit is maintainable, but in cases of personal injury a fresh cause of action does not arise by reason of the mere aggravation of the original injury and without any further wrong on the part of the defendant. If the plaintiff should suffer a fresh injury by a subsequent collision with the same heap of gravel, assuming the defendants to be liable at all, a fresh cause of action would arise but in the case before us the amputation of the limb was merely a development of the original injury the cause of action for which arose at the time when the injury was suffered.

16. The plaintiff contended that in the present case, as no previous suit had been brought, he could found his action upon the loss of his leg by amputation on 7th October and that the maxim nemo debet his vexari had no application. The maxim however is based upon the hypothesis that a fresh cause of action does not arise in such cases and this is in accordance with the decision in Carey v. Metropolitan Borough of Bermondsey(4). Reliance was placed by the plaintiff upon Section 24 of the Limitation Act but, in my opinion, that section has no application to the circumstances of the present case. The question is, when did the cause of action arise, and that question I have already dealt with. The illustration to that section also seems clearly to show the class of cases which the legislature had in contemplation. Upon this part of the case, I think, the plaintiff's contention must fail.

17. The third point taken by the appellant was not urged in the Court below, but, as it depends upon the construction of the statute it is open to the appellant to raise it here. It is admitted that it only applies in the case of the District Board of Manbhum as it is conceded that an action against the Municipality is covered by Section 363 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884. In that Act, S. 29 provides that:

“The Commissioners shall, in the name of their Chairman, by the description of ‘The Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners of ……’ be a body corporate, and have perpetual succession and a common seal, and in such name shall sue and be sued,”

and the Act throughout in speaking of the body so incorporated refers to it as the Commissioners. In the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1885, however the matter stands differently. By S. 20 of that Act it is provided that:

“Every District Board shall be a body corporate by the name of ‘the District Board of (name of district)’ and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property, both moveable and immovable, and, subject to any rules made by the Lieutenant-Governor under this Act, to transfer any such property held by it, and to contract and do all other things necessary for the purposes of this Act, and may sue and be sued in its corporate name.”

18. Throughout the Act, when referring to the body so incorporated, it speaks of it as the “District Board” and not as the “members of the Board” and, when intending to refer to the members of the Board as individuals, it speaks of them as “members constituting the District Board” or in other terms apt to describe them: See S. 132-A., S. 142 contemplates certain kinds of suits against individual members of a Union Committee Local Board or District Board for loss, waste or misapplication of any money or other property belonging to the District Board Local, Board or Union Committee, and provides that such member shall not be liable unless the loss, waste or misapplication is a direct result of his negligence or misconduct while a member of one of these bodies. S. 146, which is the limitation section relied on by the defendants, the Manbhum District Board, provides that:

“No suit shall be brought against the members of any District Board, Local Board or Union Committee or any of their officers or any person acting under their direction for anything done, under this Act, etc., and that every such action shall be commenced within three months next after the accrual of the cause of action and not afterwards.”

19. It cannot be disputed that an action may be brought against some or all of the members of the District Board in their individual capacity and not as a body corporate and, in my opinion, it would be straining the language of the Act to interpret it as including a suit against the District Board which has a separate legal existence in the words “The members of any District Board.” It was urged before us by the respondent that the wording of the section indicates that a suit against the District Board was clearly contemplated as the section speaks of a suit not only against “the members of the Board,” but also against any of their officers or any person acting under their direction. It is argued that the officers and other persons there mentioned are the officers of the Board or persons acting under the direction of the Board and not of the individual members of the Board and that therefore the words “members of any District Board” must be taken to refer to the Board itself. It is also contended that it would be a strange result if a suit against the individual members were barred by this section whilst the Board itself was left without the privilege of that immunity. Whatever force there may be in this argument, I think we are bound to construe the words of the section in their plain and natural meaning, and where the Act throughout speaks of “the District Board” when intending to refer to that corporation and refers to a member or members of the Board or other local authority when intending to indicate them personally, I think it would be a straining of the language of the section to hold that the words there used were intended to indicate not what they say, namely, the members of the District Board, but the District Board itself as a separate legal entity.

20. I think that this appeal, in so far as it is against the District Board of Manbhum, should be allowed with costs of the appeal, and to this extent the decree of the lower Court should be varied. I do not think we should vary the order as to costs in the Court below as this point was not there raised. In so far as the appeal was against the Commissioners of the Purulia Municipality, it is dismissed with costs to those respondents.

21. Adami, J.:— I agree.

V.S/R.K

22. Appeal allowed.

Allan Mathewson v. District Board Of Manbhum

Judgment Summary — Dawson-Miller, C.J. (Appeal dated 18 December 1916)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Direct Consequences for the Parties

Broader Implications

Allan Mathewson v. District Board Of Manbhum

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