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  • 14 of 1903.Limitation Act (XV of 1877), sec. 19Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), sec.
  • sec. 21 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • sec. 19 of the Limitation Act
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  • 14 of 1903.Limitation Act (XV of 1877), sec. 19Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), sec.
  • sec. 21 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • sec. 19 of the Limitation Act

    Jogeshwar Roy v. Rajnarain Mittra

    Maclean, C.J:— This is a suit by a builder and contractor, and, the object of it is to recover the balance of a bill, which he says is due to him for the work done in relation to certain repairs and building on the Defendant's premises No. 15-3, Gopal Lal Tagore's Road, in Baranagore. The defence is that the suit is barred by the statute of limitation, to which the Plaintiff replies—I will quote his own pleading from paragraph 10—“More than three years have elapsed since the additional works were completed, but the Plaintiff's claim for the said balance or sum of Rs. 8,866-2-9 due to him, as in the last preceding paragraph hereof stated, is not barred by limitation, inasmuch as the Defendant on the 18th of June 1898 made an acknowledgment of his liability in writing signed by him.” The only question on this appeal argued before us is whether the document in question is an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of sec. 21 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877, so as to enable the Plaintiff to recover. In reply to a letter from the Plaintiff, which is dated the 9th of June, and, which is in these terms omitting the formal parts. “The works of new building and repairs of your garden-house, &c., &c., were finished to the approval of Babu Hari Charan Pal Mohashoy, Engineer. Some work of the one-storied building was damaged by the last earthquake. The repairs of all the damages caused by the said earthquake, and other extra works besides, have been finished. The bill of all the aforesaid works and the account of balance due to me for works done in your dwelling-house at No. 34, Shampukur Street, are sent with this letter.” In reply to that, the Defendant sent a receipt which comprised the document to which I have referred, and is in these terms:—“Received from Babu Jeggessur Roy a letter and bill for the works and repairs done in the garden-house situated at No. 15-3, Gopal Lal Tagore's Road, Baranagore. The bill glanced over is incorrect; large amounts have been wrongly introduced, I will first have the work examined, although I know that the whole of the work is not yet finished. Then I will examine the estimates, and after deducting what has to be deducted I will see what is due.” That, it is said for the Plaintiff, amounts to an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of the statute. The question we have to decide is upon the construction of that document, whether that is so or not.

    It will be noticed that in the letter in reply whereto the alleged acknowledgment was sent, the builder said that the works were finished, which is challenged by the Defendant who says that the whole of the work was not yet finished. Does the so-called acknowledgment, if paraphrased, amount to anything more than this: “I have received your bill, I think it is incorrect, there are many errors in it; the work is not finished, I will look at the estimates and have the work examined and I will see what if anything is due.” Or, it might be put: “I have received your bill: I don't think it is correct: I will look into the matters and see if anything is due.” I do not see how we can say that if a man says he will see if anything, is due, that is an acknowledgment of liability that anything is due.

    We have been referred to several cases in the English Court of which there are very many. But I do not know that they will assist us materially for, unless the language of the document be identically the same, a decision upon the construction of one document, is not of much assistance to the Court in construing another. The only case I will refer to, is the case of Green v. Humpreys in which, dealing with the English law, Lord Justice Cotton says:—“The rule seems to be this, that if there is an absolute unconditional acknowledgment, not controlled by any other language in the letter, then the Court comes to the conclusion that by that acknowledgment the party intends a promise to pay that which he acknowledges to be due.” Assuming for the moment that the English law applies, could we say that is an absolute unconditional acknowledgment? I do not think we could. But as I have already pointed out, what we have to consider is whether it is an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning sec. 19 of the Limitation Act which is the law applicable in this country. For the reasons I have stated, I do not think that we can properly hold that it was such an acknowledgment. I, therefore, agree with the Court below in holding that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    Hill, J.:— I am of the same opinion.

    Stevens, J.:— I also agree.

    Appeal No. 14 of 1903.

    Limitation Act (XV of 1877), sec. 19—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), sec. SO—Belying on additional document operating as an acknowledgment not set out in plaint.

    Under sec. 50 of the Civil Procedure Code, a Plaintiff cannot take advantage of any ground of exemption from limitation which he has not pleaded.

    This was another suit instituted by one Benode Behari Mookerji against the Defendant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 8,000 odd, for alleged additional repairs done by him beyond what had been agreed upon between him and the Defendant. Besides relying on the aforesaid memo of the 18th January, 1898, the Plaintiff set up a certificate, dated the 12th July, 1898 given by one Hari Charan Pal, the engineer of the Defendant, and who was mentioned in the contract between the parties, as operating as an acknowledgment within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Limitation Act. In the plaint, however, this certificate was not mentioned. The Plaintiff only pleaded that “his cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and was within the period provided in the statute of limitation as the Defendant acknowledged in writing the debt on the 18th of June 1898.” Sale, J., also dismissed this suit on the ground of limitation. Vide 7 C.W.N 651. Hence the appeal.

    Mr. Avetoom for the Appellant supported Mr. Dunne's argument in the former suit.

    The Advocate-General (Hon. J.T Woodroffe), Messrs L.P Pugh and Garth with him, for the Respondent.—The engineer's certificate cannot be relied on now, vide sec. 50, C.P.C Moreover, the engineer had left the Respondent's service when he gave the certificate. He was colluding with the Appellant to the detriment of the Respondent.

    Maclean, C.J:— I will now deal with appeal No. 14 of 1903. As regards the point of limitation which I have just discussed and which applies equally to this case, I do not propose to add anything to what I have already said. But two other points are raised in this case: one being whether it was competent for the Plaintiff to maintain the suit. It is unnecessary to go into this as the plea of limitation is a bar.

    But in this case it is said that, apart from the acknowledgment of the 18th of June 1898, there was another acknowledgment, that is to say an acknowledgment given by a certificate of the 12th of July 1898 by Hari Charan Pal, who was the Engineer of the Defendant and who is mentioned in the contract between the parties. This is not set up in the plaint, and, in that respect sec. 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been complied with. The Plaintiff pleads:—“The Plaintiff's cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and is within the period provided by the statute of limitation as the Defendant acknowledged in writing the debt on the 18th day of June 1898, (paragraph 12 of the plaint). Pausing there for a moment, the only acknowledgment pleaded is that with which I have already dealt. Sec. 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure is therefore a bar to this other alleged acknowledgment being now set up. But assuming for the moment that the Plaintiff might get over that difficulty by obtaining leave to amend the plaint, was there in fact any such acknowledgment? This matter was gone into by the learned Judge in the Court below. He did not believe the evidence of Hari Charan Pal or of the builder Joggessur Roy, and it is far from satisfactory. It looks as if they were colluding to the detriment of the Defendant. The Court below held that there was no such further acknowledgment as is now set up. The further acknowledgment is said to be by a certificate given by Hari Charan Pal to the builder. But that cannot bind, the Defendant as Hari Charau Pal had left the Defendant's service some twelve months before this certificate was given, and Hari Charan Pal had no authority from the Defendant to bind him. He was not then the agent of the Defendant. I, therefore, think that this point even if it could properly be gone into entirely fails.

    This appeal, therefore, must also be dismissed with costs.

    Hill, J.:— I agree.

    Stevens, J.:— I also agree.

    Messrs Leslie & Hinds, Attorneys for the Appellant.

    Mr. U.C Dutt, Attorney for the Respondent.

    A.N.C
    Appeals dismissed.

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    Jogeshwar Roy v. Rajnarain Mittra
    (Dec 3, 1903)