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  • sec. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act, Hafizuddin v. Abdool(26), Shital Chandra v. Manik Chandra(27), Kammathi v. Mangappa(28), Torregrosa v. Pragji(29), Balkishan v. Wagarsing(30), Behari Lal v. Majid Ali(31).
  • sec. 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 (corresponding to Order 21, Rule 52, of the Code of 1908).
  • sec. 78 of the Land Registration Act
  • sec. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Pensions Act, 1861,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • sec. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act, Hafizuddin v. Abdool(26), Shital Chandra v. Manik Chandra(27), Kammathi v. Mangappa(28), Torregrosa v. Pragji(29), Balkishan v. Wagarsing(30), Behari Lal v. Majid Ali(31).
  • sec. 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 (corresponding to Order 21, Rule 52, of the Code of 1908).
  • sec. 78 of the Land Registration Act
  • sec. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Pensions Act, 1861,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from an execution sale and a subsequent application for rateable distribution under section 73 of the Code of 1908. Properties of judgment-debtors (the Mookerjees) were sold on 20 June 1910 to satisfy a decree held by the Roys and a Receiver appointed by the Court. One-fourth of the purchase-money was deposited on the date of sale; the balance was paid into Court by the purchaser on 1 and 2 July 1910. Sarat Kumar Banerjee (the Petitioner), who had previously obtained a decree against the Mookerjees on 25 January 1905, applied for rateable distribution on 18 June 1910. The Receiver objected to the petition on the ground that the Petitioner had not obtained leave from the Court by which the Receiver was appointed. The Subordinate Judge upheld the Receiver's contention and dismissed the application. The present opinion is the decision of the higher Court on that dismissal, considering three grounds advanced by the Petitioner and objections raised by the Receiver.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether leave of the Court by which a Receiver was appointed was necessary for an execution-creditor (the Petitioner) to obtain rateable distribution under section 73 where sale-proceeds are in the custody of the Court.
  2. Whether two earlier orders of this Court (7 April 1905 and 4 May 1908) amounted in substance to the requisite leave to proceed against the Receiver's property.
  3. If leave was required and not previously granted, whether the Petitioner should be afforded an opportunity at the present stage to obtain that leave so that his application may be entertained.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • No leave was necessary because the Court had already granted leave to the execution-creditors (the Roys) who caused the sale; sale-proceeds are in the custody of the Court and therefore prosecution of the petition would not interfere with the Receiver's possession.
  • Even if leave was necessary, it had been granted in substance by two orders of this Court dated 7 April 1905 and 4 May 1908.
  • If leave had not already been granted, the Court should allow the Petitioner an opportunity at this stage to obtain the requisite leave (invoking doctrines in Banku Behati Dey v. Harendra Nath Mukerjee and analogous authorities).

Receiver's Arguments

  • The Petitioner could not be permitted to proceed because leave had not been obtained from the Court by which the Receiver was appointed; absent such leave, execution against property in the hands of a Receiver is not permitted.
  • If the Petitioner wished to obtain leave, it ought to have been sought earlier — at least during the pendency of proceedings before the Subordinate Judge — and the present application for leave is too late.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Mundslay & Sons and Field Where a Court appoints a Receiver over property outside its jurisdiction, the Receiver is not put in possession by mere order; local steps required; in such foreign cases a third party may proceed locally without contempt. Distinguished: the Court held Mundslay inapplicable because here assets were within the Court's jurisdiction and funds were held for the benefit of the Receiver.
In re Derwent Rolling Mills Company Principle that Mundslay does not apply when assets are within the jurisdiction of the Court. Relied on to support the proposition that the present case (assets within jurisdiction) cannot be treated like Mundslay.
In re West Cumberland Iron and Steel Company Same limiting principle as Derwent Rolling Mills: assets within jurisdiction are different from foreign assets in Mundslay. Used to show the Mundslay principle is inapplicable to the present facts because the assets are within the Court's jurisdiction.
Levina Ashton v. Madhabmoni Dassi Authority reviewed to support that a Court will not permit execution against property in the hands of a Receiver until leave is obtained from the appointing Court. Used among authorities to establish the settled rule requiring leave from the appointing Court before execution against Receiver's property.
Jotindra Nath v. Sarfaraj Mia Authority reviewed alongside Levina Ashton for the same settled rule. Relied on as supporting authority for the need for leave before execution against Receiver's property.
Ames v. The Trustees of the Birkenhead Dock Principle applicable where the Court holds custody of property for the benefit of a Receiver; supports protection of the Receiver's interest. Applied to show that although funds were nominally in court custody, they were held for the Receiver and protected from claims by creditors who had not obtained leave.
In re Clarke Observation that an order appointing a Receiver does not relate back; Receiver must have possession before the rule can be invoked. Considered but distinguished: the Court noted that although relation-back observations exist, in the present case the Court holds funds for the Receiver and the Receiver has such possession as to resist enforcement without leave.
Mahommed Zohwuddin v. Mahommed Noorooddeen Even a prohibitory order under section 272 (CPC 1882) cannot be made without leave of the Court by which the Receiver was appointed. Used to show that the 7 April 1905 prohibitory order could not, without more, be treated as equivalent to leave to execute against Receiver's property.
Kahn v. Ali Mahomed Haji Same principle as Mahommed Zohwuddin: prohibitory orders over Receiver's property require leave of appointing Court. Relied on for the same purpose as above regarding the 7 April 1905 order.
Morris v. Baker Illustrates courts' reluctance to allow execution against Receiver's properties; generally fresh leave required before a writ of possession issues. Invoked to show consistent judicial reluctance to allow execution to proceed without express leave.
Angel v. Smith; Hawkins v. Gathercole; In re Batters Estate; Minet v. Johnson Series of authorities supporting the need for fresh leave before issuance of writs of possession or execution against a Receiver. Grouped as supporting precedents demonstrating reluctance to permit execution without explicit leave.
Lane v. Capsey Court will not refuse liberty to try a right claimed against its Receiver unless it is perfectly clear that the claim has no foundation. Noted to temper the requirement of leave with the principle that claimants should be allowed an opportunity to try their rights unless wholly unfounded.
Banku Behati Dey v. Harendra Nath Mukerjee Doctrine invoked by Petitioner to seek extension allowing opportunity to obtain leave at a later stage. Cited by Petitioner; Court considered the doctrine as part of the argument for granting an opportunity and ultimately allowed such an opportunity on broader authorities.
Pramatha Nath Ganguly v. Khetter Natk Banerjee Rule that proceedings commenced without prior leave could not be validated by subsequent grant of leave during their pendency (characterised in the opinion as an erroneous rule applied by the Court below). The opinion explains that this rule was applied by the Court below but has been dissented from in later authority and therefore should not prevent permitting leave at present stage.
The Maharajah of Burdwan v. Apurba Krishna Roy Recent authority dissenting from the rule in Pramatha Nath; supports allowing validation or continuation upon obtaining the requisite leave. Relied upon to justify allowing the Petitioner an opportunity to obtain leave at this stage despite earlier procedural rules to the contrary.
Jagat Tatini Dassi v. Nabagopal Chaki Reviewed by this Court; cited as consistent with the more permissive approach adopted in the present case. Used to show the Court's review of classes of cases supports the approach of allowing opportunity to obtain leave.
Nawab Muhammad Azmat Ali Khan v. Mussammat Lalli Begum (Judicial Committee) Authority that a suit requiring a certificate under the Pensions Act, 1861 need not be dismissed for lack of certificate but may be suspended until the certificate is obtained. Applied by analogy to support the proposition that a proceeding begun without a prerequisite (here leave) need not be dismissed but may be stayed or allowed to proceed once the prerequisite is obtained.
Alimuddin Khan v. Hira Lall Sen Full Bench decision applying the same permissive principle to section 78 of the Land Registration Act. Relied on as precedent for extending the permissive approach to statutory prerequisites in civil procedure.
Harehkrishna Das v. Brindabun Shaha; Belchamber v. Nawab Sir Syed Hussan Alli; Abdul Khair v. Meher Ali Cases extending the permissive approach to section 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and similar statutory contexts. Grouped and cited to demonstrate broader application of the remedial principle permitting suspension rather than dismissal when a statutory prerequisite is obtained belatedly.
Rendall v. Blair Where consent of the Charity Commissioner was necessary, the Court held that suit need not be dismissed if consent was lacking; suit may be stayed to enable obtaining consent. Used by analogy to support allowing the Petitioner an opportunity to obtain the required leave rather than dismissal.
Hafizuddin v. Abdool; Shital Chandra v. Manik Chandra; Kammathi v. Mangappa; Torregrosa v. Pragji; Balkishan v. Wagarsing; Behari Lal v. Majid Ali Authorities applying the permissive principle to cases under section 4 of the Succession Certificate Act and similar contexts. Relied upon to show consistent application of the remedial principle across various statutory regimes, supporting the Court's decision to allow belated cure by obtaining prerequisite leave.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis around the Petitioner's three grounds and the Receiver's objections, and reached conclusions by applying established principles and reviewing precedents cited in the record.

On the first ground (no leave necessary because sale-proceeds are in Court custody):

  • The Court rejected the contention that no leave was necessary. It stated the well-settled rule that execution against property in the hands of a Receiver cannot be permitted until leave is obtained from the Court by which the Receiver was appointed (authorities reviewed in Levina Ashton v. Madhabmoni Dassi and Jotindra Nath v. Sarfaraj Mia).
  • The Petitioner's argument that funds are in the custody of the Court and therefore prosecution would not interfere with the Receiver was examined and rejected. The Court distinguished In re Mundslay & Sons and Field as a foreign-possession case; where assets are within the jurisdiction (as here), that principle does not apply (citing In re Derwent Rolling Mills Company and In re West Cumberland Iron and Steel Company).
  • The Court held that although funds are nominally in the custody of the Court, the Court holds them for the benefit of the Receiver and must make over the surplus to the Receiver after the claims of creditors who have obtained leave are satisfied. Consequently, prosecution of the Petitioner’s application would interfere with property belonging to the Receiver and therefore leave was necessary.
  • The decision in Ames v. The Trustees of the Birkenhead Dock was cited as supportive of this view.

On the second ground (prior orders of 7 April 1905 and 4 May 1908 amounted to leave):

  • The Court examined the 7 April 1905 order (a prohibitory order under section 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, corresponding to Order 21, Rule 52 of the Code of 1908). It observed that such an order cannot properly be equated with a grant of leave to execute against Receiver's property; it merely restrained the Receiver from dealing with property until further order.
  • The 7 April 1905 order was made by the same Court that appointed the Receiver; the Court noted that it is not informed whether express leave had been obtained for that order but stressed that even such a prohibitory order is not equivalent to leave to proceed against the Receiver's property (citing Mahommed Zohwuddin v. Mahommed Noorooddeen and Kahn v. Ali Mahomed Haji).
  • The 4 May 1908 order directing the Receiver to sell certain properties if carried out would have been a sale under the guidance of the Court. The present sale, however, occurred in the Hughly Court and produced sale-proceeds now in Court. The Court concluded that neither earlier order can reasonably be construed as granting the Petitioner leave to prosecute execution against the Receiver's properties.
  • The Court reiterated the general reluctance of Courts to allow execution against Receiver's properties without express leave and cited Morris v. Baker and other authorities illustrating that fresh leave is required before issuing writs of possession.

On the third ground (allowing the Petitioner opportunity now to obtain leave):

  • The Petitioner relied on doctrine exemplified in Banku Behati Dey v. Harendra Nath Mukerjee and analogous authorities to seek leave at the present stage. The Receiver argued the application was too late and leave should have been sought during the proceedings below.
  • The Court acknowledged force in the Receiver's objection but concluded that justice required allowing the Petitioner an opportunity to obtain the requisite leave at the present stage.
  • The Court explained that the rule applied by the Court below (Pramatha Nath Ganguly v. Khetter Natk Banerjee) — that proceedings commenced without prior leave could not be validated by subsequent leave during their pendency — was erroneous in the special circumstances and had been dissented from in The Maharajah of Burdwan v. Apurba Krishna Roy and supported by other cases (including Jagat Tatini Dassi v. Nabagopal Chaki).
  • The Court relied on a body of authorities (including Nawab Muhammad Azmat Ali Khan v. Mussammat Lalli Begum, Alimuddin Khan v. Hira Lall Sen, and several others) illustrating that where a statutory or procedural prerequisite was omitted, courts have in many contexts allowed proceedings to be suspended and resumed or validated after the prerequisite has been obtained, rather than requiring dismissal.
  • Applying those authorities by analogy, the Court decided that the Petitioner should be afforded reasonable opportunity to obtain the necessary leave from the appointing Court and that his application on the merits should be considered thereafter.

Procedural disposition and practical steps:

  • The Court made the rule absolute and discharged the order of the Subordinate Judge.
  • The case was remitted to the Subordinate Judge to deal with the application on the merits after the Petitioner has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain the necessary leave from this Court.
  • The Court ordered that there be no order as to costs of the Rule, noting that the Petitioner's substantial contentions (that no leave was necessary or that leave had been obtained) had failed.
  • The sale-proceeds were to be retained in Court and not distributed among other claimants until the Petitioner has been afforded the opportunity to obtain leave from the appointing Court.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: RULE MADE ABSOLUTE; the order of the Subordinate Judge is discharged; the matter is remitted to the Subordinate Judge; and the Petitioner is to be afforded reasonable opportunity to obtain the necessary leave from the appointing Court before his claim for rateable distribution is finally disposed of.

Implications and immediate consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • The Petitioner must obtain express leave from the Court by which the Receiver was appointed before prosecuting an application under section 73 against property belonging to or held for the Receiver.
  • The prior orders relied on by the Petitioner (7 April 1905 and 4 May 1908) are not to be treated as equivalent to express leave for execution against the Receiver's property.
  • The Court exercised discretion to allow the Petitioner an opportunity at this stage to obtain the requisite leave, applying a remedial principle reflected in several authorities that procedural or statutory prerequisites may be cured or complied with belatedly in suitable circumstances rather than resulting in dismissal.
  • The sale-proceeds will remain in Court and will not be distributed to other claimants until the Petitioner has had the opportunity to obtain the leave; there is no order as to costs of the Rule.

Final notation from the opinion: "Rule made absolute." The Court thereby remitted the case for further proceedings consistent with the directions above.

    Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Apurba Krishna Roy And Others Opposite Party.

    The events antecedent to the order by which the Court below has refused the application of the Petitioner for rateable distribution under sec. 73 of the Code of 1908, are not the subject of controversy between the parties. In execution of a decree held by the Roys against the Mookerjees and a Receiver appointed by this Court, the properties owned by the judgment-debtors were sold on the 20th June 1910. One-fourth of the purchase-money was deposited on that date and the balance was paid into Court by the purchaser on the 1st and 2nd July following. Sarat Kumar Banerjee who had previously obtained a decree against the judgment-debtors Mookerjees on the 25th January 1905, then made an application for rateable distribution on the 18th June 1910. Objection was taken by the Receiver that as leave had not been obtained from the Court by which the Receiver had been appointed, the application could not be entertained. The Subordinate Judge gave effect to this contention and dismissed the application. We are now invited to hold that the order of the Subordinate Judge is erroneous on three grounds, namely, first, that no leave was necessary because leave had already been granted to the execution creditors at whose instance the sale took place; secondly, that if leave was necessary, such leave had been in substance granted by this Court, by two orders made on the 7th April 1905 and the 4th May 1908; and, thirdly, that if leave was necessary and if it be held that leave has not been granted, opportunity should be afforded to the Petitioner at this stage to obtain the requisite leave.

    In support of the first contention, it has been argued that as leave was granted by this Court to the Roys to proceed with execution of their decree against the Mookerjees and the Receiver, it was not necessary for any other execution-creditor of the Mookerjees to apply for leave in order to enable him to obtain a rateable distribution under sec. 73 of the Code of 1908. It has been argued that the sale-proceeds are in the custody of the Court, and that, consequently, the grant of the application of the Petitioner for rateable distribution would not in any way interfere with the possession of the Receiver. In support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the case of In re Mundslay & Sons and Field(1). In our opinion, the view put forward by the Petitioner cannot possibly be supported. It is well settled that a Court will not permit execution against property in the hands of a Receiver till leave has been obtained from the Court by which the Receiver was appointed. [See the authorities reviewed in the judgment of this Court in the cases of Levina Ashton v. Madhabmoni Dassi(2) and Jotindra Nath v. Sarfaraj Mia(3)] But it has been contended in this case that the fund against which the Petitioner desires to proceed is not in the hands of the Receiver, that although it belongs to the Receiver, it is in the custody of the Court, and, the consequently, if the application is granted, the principle mentioned will not be contravened. In our opinion, there is no foundation for this contention. The case of In re Mundslay & Sons and Field is clearly distinguishable. There it was ruled that where the Court appoints a Receiver over property out of its jurisdiction, the Receiver is not put in possession of such foreign property by the mere order of the Court. Something further has to be done, and until that has been done in accordance with the foreign law, any person, not a party to the action, who takes proceedings in the foreign country for the purpose of establishing a claim upon the foreign property is not guilty of a contempt of Court on the ground of interference with the Receiver's possession or otherwise. The subsequent decisions in In re Derwent Rolling Mills Company(4) and In re West Cumberland Iron and Steel Company(5) show, however, that this principle does not apply to cases in which the assets are within the jurisdiction of the Court. In the case before us, it cannot be disputed that a portion of the assets held by the Court belongs to the Receiver. If the claim of the Roys and the Maharajah of Burdwan, both of whom have obtained leave to proceed against the Receiver, are satisfied, there will still remain a balance which the Receiver will be entitled to withdraw, unless the Petitioner before us is allowed to prosecute his claim for rateable distribution. It is manifest, therefore, that the prosecution of the application made by the Petitioner must result in interference with property belonging to the Receiver. Although nominally the property in the case before us is in the custody of the Court, there is no room for controversy that the Court holds possession for the benefit of the Receiver and is bound to make over the balance to him after the claims of the two creditors mentioned shall have been satisfied. The view we take is supported by the decision in Ames v. The Trustees of the Birkenhead Dock(6), the principle of which is clearly applicable to the circumstances of the case before us. Reference was also made to some observations in the case of In, re Clarke(7) in which it was ruled that an order appointing a Receiver does not relate back and that the Receiver must have possession of the goods before the principle invoked can be applied. In the case before us, however, as we have already explained, the funds are held by the Court for the bent fit of the Receiver and after the claims of the creditors who have obtained leave are satisfied, the Receiver will be entitled as a matter of right to take out the surplus and apply it for the purposes of the litigation in which he was appointed. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to hold that the Receiver has not such possession as would entitle him to resist the enforcement of a claim by a creditor who has not obtained leave to proceed against him. We must, therefore, hold that it was necessary for the Petitioner to obtain leave from the Court by which the Receiver was appointed before he could be permitted to prosecute his application against him under sec. 73.

    In support of the second ground it has been urged that the requisite leave has been in substance obtained: and reliance has been placed upon two orders made on the Original Side of this Court on the 7th April 1905 and the 4th May 1908. The first order was made after the Petitioner had obtained a transfer of his decree from the Hughly Court to this Court for execution. The order mentioned was a prohibitory order by which the Receiver was enjoined not to deal with the properties in his custody, until the further order of this Court. This order must be taken to have been made under sec. 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 (corresponding to Order 21, Rule 52, of the Code of 1908). It is worthy of note that even an order of this description cannot be made without leave of the Court by which the Receiver was appointed [Mahommed Zohwuddin v. Mahommed Noorooddeen(8) and Kahn v. Ali Mahomed Haji(9)]. We are not informed whether leave was obtained before the order was made; but as the order was made by the very Court by which the Receiver was appointed, express leave might perhaps be deemed unnecessary. It is clear, however, that a prohibitory order under sec. 272 of the Code of 1882 can in no sense be regarded as equivalent to a grant of leave to the decree-holder to execute his decree against the properties in the hands of the Receiver. The order merely directs the Receiver not to deal with the properties until the further orders of this Court; admittedly, no such supplemental orders were ever issued. In our opinion, the order must be unreasonably and considerably strained, before it can be interpreted to mean the grant of leave to the Petitioner to prosecute his application. The second order on which reliance is placed is one made on the 4th May 1908. It appears that upon the application of the Petitioner, this Court directed the Receiver to sell some of the properties inclusive of those subsequently sold in the Hughly Court, and then to satisfy the claims out of the sale, proceeds. It has been suggested that this order is equivalent to the grant of leave to the Petitioner to proceed against the properties in the hands of the Receiver. But the order in question does not admit of the interpretation suggested. If the Receiver had proceeded to carry out the order, the sale would have taken place under the guidance of the Court. On the other hand, the sale which has taken place in the Hughly Court is not the subject of controversy in this Rule, and the property against which the Petitioner now seeks to proceed represents the sale-proceeds realised at that sale. We are of opinion that it would not be right to construe the order of either the 7th April 1905 or the 4th May 1908, as an order granting leave to the Petitioner to proceed with execution against the properties in the hands of the Receiver. It may be pointed out that Courts have been generally, reluctant to allow execution to proceed against the properties in the hands of a Receiver until leave has expressly been granted for this purpose. This is well illustrated by the case of Morris v. Baker(10). In this case, although a Receiver had been made party to a suit after leave had been granted to bring an action for recovery of land against him, Angel v. Smith(11), Hawkins v. Gathercole(12), In re Batters Estate(13), it was ruled that before a writ of possession would issue, fresh leave of the Court must be obtained. Minet v. Johnson(14), Under these circumstances, we must hold that it is necessary for the Petitioner to obtain express leave entitling him to proceed against the property in the hands of the Receiver, Nor can the Petitioner justly complain of any hardship in this matter, for it is not the course of the Court to refuse liberty to try a right claimed against its Receiver, unless it is perfectly clear that there is no foundation for the claim, Lane v. Capsey(15).

    In support of the third ground, it has been urged that the doctrine recognised by this Court in the case of Banku Behati Dey v. Harendra Nath Mukerjee ought to be extended and that an opportunity should be afforded to the Petitioner to obtain the requisite leave even at the present stage of the proceedings. In answer to this contention, it has been argued on behalf of the Receiver that the application is made too late, and that leave ought to have been sought at least during the pendency of the proceedings in the Court below. In our opinion, there is considerable force in the contention of the Receiver; but we are satisfied that, on the whole, it ought not to prevail. During the pendency of the proceedings in the Court below, the Court was bound to apply the rule laid down in the case of Pramatha Nath Ganguly v. Khetter Natk Banerjee in which it had been ruled that if proceedings have been commenced without leave previously obtained, they could not be validated by the subsequent grant of leave during their pendency. Consequently if even the Petitioners had obtained leave during the pendency of the proceedings in the Court below, it would have been of no avail, because that Court would have been obliged to apply the erroneous rule laid down in Pramatha Nath v. Khetter Nath which has been dissented from only recently in The Maharajah Of Burdwan… v. Apurba Krishna Roy…Opposite Party.(18). There can, in our opinion, be no doubt that the rule that ought to be applied in the special and peculiar circumstances of this case is the one laid down in the case last-mentioned which is in accord with the view taken in various classes of cases reviewed in the judgment of this Court in the case of Jagat Tatini Dassi v. Nabagopal Chaki(19). Thus upon the authority of the Judicial Committee in Nawab Muhammad Azmat Ali Khan v. Mussammat Lalli Begum(20), a suit relating to a grant of property within the meaning of the Pensions Act, 1861, need not be dismissed, because no certificate had been obtained before the commencement thereof, but the suit might be suspended upon an objection that no certificate had been obtained and might proceed when the certificate had been obtained and delivered to the Court. A similar principle was adopted by a Full Bench of this Court with regard to sec. 78 of the Land Registration Act in Alimuddin Khan v. Hira Lall Sen(21) and was subsequently extended to cases under sec. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act in Harehkrishna Das v. Brindabun Shaha(22), Belchamber v. Nawab Sir Syed Hussan Alli(23) and Abdul Khair v. Meher Ali(24). The same principle was applied by the Court of Appeal in Rendall v. Blair(25) in which it was held that where the consent of the Charity Commissioner was necessary for the institution of a suit, it was not obligatory upon the Court to dismiss a suit instituted without such consent; the suit might be stayed to enable the Plaintiff to secure the consent which, as a matter of duty, ought to have been obtained in the first instance but is, as a matter of fact, obtained at last. A similar principle has also been applied to cases under sec. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act, Hafizuddin v. Abdool(26), Shital Chandra v. Manik Chandra(27), Kammathi v. Mangappa(28), Torregrosa v. Pragji(29), Balkishan v. Wagarsing(30), Behari Lal v. Majid Ali(31). Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the demands of justice require that the Petitioner should be allowed so opportunity to obtain the requisite have even at the present sage of the proceeding.

    The result is that this rule is made absolute, the order of the Court below discharged, and the case remitted to the Subordinate Judge who will proceed to deal with the plication on the merits after the Petitioner has been afforded reasonable opportunity to obtain the necessary leave from this Court. As, however, the substantial contentions of the Petitioner, namely, that no leave was necessary, and that if any leave was necessary it had been obtained, have failed, there will be no order as to the costs of this Rule. The sale-proceeds will be retained in Court and will not be distributed amongst the other claimant's till the present Petitioner has been afforded an opportunity to obtain the leave of this Court.

    Rule made absolute.

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    Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Apurba Krishna Roy And Others Opposite Party.
    (Mar 29, 1911)