AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Usurious Loans Act of 1918 and the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • provision of sec. 30 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940,
  • sec. 36(6)(a)(ii) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act,
  • sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • sec. 36(6)(a) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act,
  • sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Usurious Loans Act of 1918 and the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • provision of sec. 30 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.
  • sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940,
  • sec. 36(6)(a)(ii) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act,
  • sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
  • sec. 36(6)(a) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act,
  • sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act
Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents (mortgagees) sued the appellants (judgment-debtors) to enforce a mortgage bond. A preliminary decree in favour of the respondents was passed on 22 December 1939. The mortgage bond had stipulated interest at 12% (compound) with half-yearly rests; the trial Court considered that rate excessive and, exercising powers under the Usurious Loans Act of 1918 and the Bengal Money-Lenders Act of 1933, reduced the rate to 10% (simple). The decree was made final on 17 May 1940.

The decree-holders applied for execution by sale of the mortgaged properties in Title Execution Case No. 16 of 1940. During execution proceedings the judgment-debtors, on 11 November 1940, presented an application under section 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, seeking (inter alia) relief from liability to pay interest in excess of what was permissible under section 30 of the Act and asking that a new decree be passed permitting payment of decretal dues in 20 yearly instalments.

The Subordinate Judge allowed the application in part: decretal dues were reduced by Rs. 1,363-15 which the Court found to be excess interest in contravention of section 30 of the Act. The Court refused the prayer for instalments, holding that such an order could only be made at the time of passing the preliminary decree and not afterwards. The present appeal is directed against that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order made under section 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, when made in execution proceedings, comes within section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and is therefore appealable as an order under section 47.
  2. Whether orders granting or refusing relief under section 36(6)(a)(i) can be appealed under the Civil Procedure Code, and if not, what remedy is available to an aggrieved party.
  3. Procedurally, whether the appellants may challenge the refusal of instalments by appealing against the order (as one under section 47) or must instead appeal against any amended decree or seek revision.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Ramaprosad Mukherjee)

  • The order of the Subordinate Judge does not fall under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore is not appealable as an order under section 47.
  • The appellants therefore could not properly institute an appeal as one under section 47; if they wished to challenge the decree as amended by the Court below they should have appealed against the decree itself (as an appeal from an original decree) with the requisite formalities and court-fees.

Appellants' Arguments (Mr. Das)

  • The order appealed against does fall within the purview of section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (i.e., the order made in execution proceedings is appealable under section 47).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aditya Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Abinash Chandra Mukhopadhya Cited to illustrate that if the Court grants review and makes a new decree under the Act, an appeal would lie from the new decree under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that an appeal lies from a new decree made after re-opening the original decree (i.e., appeal under the Civil Procedure Code, not necessarily as an order under section 47).
Sm. Soudamini Das v. Nabalak Mia Bhuiya Same proposition as above: that a new decree made on review is appealable under the Civil Procedure Code. The case was used to corroborate the rule that when a decree is re-opened and a new decree is made, an appeal lies against the new decree under the Civil Procedure Code.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by construing section 36(6)(a) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act: the powers conferred by its sub-sections (1) and (2) can be exercised by the Court which passed the decree either in execution proceedings (sub-clause (i)) or on an application for review (sub-clause (ii)). The Act contains no express provision creating a right of appeal against orders granting or refusing relief under section 36(6)(a).

Because the Act is silent on appeals, the Court held that orders made under section 36(6)(a) could be challenged by appeal only if they were appealable under the Civil Procedure Code.

The Court examined section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, which permits appeals from orders made by an executing Court that determine any question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree (i.e., an order that furthers, hinders or affects the manner of carrying out execution, or whether the decree is a subsisting and operative decree). The Court observed two points of difficulty:

  1. It is doubtful whether the powers under section 36(6)(a)(i) are exercised by the Court as an "executing Court" in the sense contemplated by section 47. Relief under section 36(6)(a) must be given by the Court which passed the decree (the trial Court); an executing Court to which a decree is transmitted for execution does not have such authority.
  2. Even if an order under section 36(6)(a)(i) were treated as made by an executing Court, such an order ordinarily does not decide a question "relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction" of the decree in the way section 47 contemplates. In particular, an executing Court under section 47 cannot re-open a decree and pass a new decree; that goes beyond the executing Court's function under the Civil Procedure Code.

The Court therefore concluded that the powers under sub-sections (i) and (ii) of section 36(6)(a) create a special jurisdiction: some directions given under that jurisdiction relate to execution, others to the re-opening and making of a new decree. The statute allows these powers to be exercised either in execution proceedings or on review in the suit itself. Because of the nature of these powers, orders made under section 36(6)(a)(i) — whether granting or refusing re-opening of a decree — do not fall within section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and are not appealable as orders under section 47.

The Court then set out the consequences: if the decree is re-opened and a new decree is made, an appeal lies against the new decree (under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code). If the application to re-open is refused, no appeal lies against that refusal as an order under section 47 and the aggrieved party's remedy is by way of revision to the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Applying that reasoning to the present case, the Court found that although the lower Court did not grant instalments, it had amended the decree in part by reducing the decretal dues (Rs. 1,363-15). That amendment constitutes an amended final decree, and the judgment-debtors therefore have a right of appeal against the amended decree; in that appeal they can raise the issue of instalments which the Subordinate Judge refused. By contrast, no appeal lies against the lower Court's refusal of instalments as an order under section 47.

Practically, the Court observed that the present appeal before it could be converted into an appeal from an original (amended) decree by filing a certified copy of the amended decree (if drawn) and paying the requisite court-fee. The Court allowed a fortnight for these formalities and permitted corrections to the memorandum of appeal within that time. It also indicated that the appellants would be at liberty to move for a stay of execution once the appeal is converted.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court held that an order made under section 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, whether granting or refusing a prayer for re-opening a decree, does not fall within section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and is not appealable as such. However, where the decree has been re-opened and an amended (new) decree is made, an appeal lies against that amended decree under the Civil Procedure Code.

Implications and direct consequences for the parties in this case:

  • The appellants cannot rely on an appeal under section 47 against the order refusing instalments.
  • Because the decree in this case has been amended in part (reduction of decretal dues by Rs. 1,363-15), the appellants have a right to appeal against the amended decree; in that appeal they may raise the instalments issue.
  • The present appeal may be converted into an appeal from the amended decree by filing a certified copy of the amended decree (if drawn) and paying the requisite court-fee; the Court allowed a fortnight for compliance and permitted corrections to the memorandum of appeal. The required court-fee for the confined claim (instalments) was stated as Rs. 15.
  • If the application to re-open had been refused (with no amended decree), the only remedy would have been revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • No broader precedent beyond these legal conclusions was stated; the decision explains the procedural route by which parties may challenge orders under section 36(6)(a) and specifies when an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code lies.

Order provision: The Court allowed the appellants a fortnight to pay any deficit court-fees and file a certified copy of the amended decree (if prepared), and permitted corrections to the memorandum of appeal; the appellants may also apply for a stay of execution after conversion.

    Promode Nath Sinha Roy And Ors. v. Sm. Raseshwari Dassi And Anr.

    This appeal is on behalf of the judgment-debtors and it is directed against an order made by the Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly, on an application presented by the Appellants; under sec. 36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act in connection with the execution of a mortgage decree. The material facts are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows:

    The Respondents who were mortgagees instituted a suit against the Appellants to enforce their mortgage bond, and a preliminary decree was passed in their favour on 22nd December, 1939. The rate of interest stipulated in the mortgage bond was 12 per cent, (compound) with half-yearly rests. The Court considered this to be excessive and reduced it to 10 per cent, (simple) in exercise of its powers under the Usurious Loans Act of 1918 and the Bengal Money-Lenders Act of 1933. The decree was made final on the 17th May, 1940. The decree-holders applied for execution of the decree by sale of the mortgaged properties in Title Execution Case No. 16 of 1940, and in course of these execution proceedings the judgment-debtors, on the 11th November, 1940, presented an application under sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, praying, inter alia, that they might be relieved of the liability to pay interest in excess of what was permissible under sec. 30 of the Act, and that a new decree might be passed allowing them to pay the decretal dues in 20 yearly instalments. The Subordinate Judge allowed this application in part; the decretal dues were reduced by a sum of Rs. 1,363-15 as which was found by the Court to be the excess interest allowed by the decree in contravention of the provision of sec. 30 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act. The Court, however, refused the prayer for instalments, being of opinion that such order could be made only at the time of passing the preliminary decree and not afterwards. It is against this part of the judgment that the present appeal has been preferred.

    Mr. Ramaprosad Mukherjee who appears for the decree-holders Respondents has taken a preliminary objection relating to the competency of the appeal. His contention is that the order of the Subordinate Judge does not come under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and is consequently not appealable as such. The Appellants, therefore, could not have preferred this appeal as an appeal from an order under sec. 47 of the Code. He concedes that it was open to the judgment-debtor to file an appeal against the decree itself as amended by the Court below, and that could have been heard as an appeal from an original decree provided it was presented in due form and the requisite court-fees were paid.

    Mr. Das who appears for the Appellant contends, on the other hand, that the order appealed against does come within the purview of sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    In our opinion, the contention of Mr. Mukherjee is sound and should be accepted. Under sec. 36(6)(a) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, the powers conferred by sub-secs. (1) and (2) of the section could be exercised by the Court which passed the decree, when the suit was one to which the Act applied and the decree was not satisfied by the 1st of January, 1939, either in a proceeding for execution of such decree or on an application for review of such decree made within one year from the date of the commencement of the Act.

    No provision for appeal has been made in the Act, when the Court grants or refuses to grant any relief under the sub-section, either in a proceeding for execution of the decree or in an application for review. As no right of appeal exists or can be assumed, unless expressly given by statute, the orders passed by the Court under sec. 36(6)(a) could be challenged by way of appeal only when they are appealable under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.

    If an order is made on an application for review under sec. 36(6)(a)(ii) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, no difficulty arises, in our opinion, in determining the rights of appeal. If the Court grants the prayer of the judgment-debtor and makes a new decree in the suit under sec. 36(2), an appeal would lie from the new decree under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code [vide Aditya Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Abinash Chandra Mukhopadhya(1) and Sm. Soudamini Das v. Nabalak Mia Bhuiya(2)]. If, on the other hand, the application is refused, no appeal would be competent and the only remedy of the judgment-debtor would be to come up by way of revision to this Court.

    When the order is made in execution proceedings, the question that requires consideration is whether such order comes under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. If this question is answered in the affirmative, an appeal would lie, whether any relief is granted or refused by the Court, provided the order is a final one and not merely interlocutory. In order to attract the operations of sec. 47 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, it is necessary that the order must be made by the executing Court and it must determine, as between the parties to the suit or their representatives, any question relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree.

    It seems to us to be extremely doubtful whether the powers which the Court exercises under sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act are exercised by it as an executing Court. Relief under sec. 36(6)(a) can be given only by the Court which passed the decree, and its jurisdiction can be invoked either in course of an execution proceeding pending before it, as is laid down in sub-cl. (i) or on a proper application for review as contemplated by sub-cl. (ii). But in either case it is the trial Court which has the jurisdiction to grant reliefs; an executing Court as such, e.g, the Court to which a decree is transmitted for execution, has no authority in such matters.

    But even if the order passed by the Court under sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act be taken to be one made by an executing Court as such, we do not think that it can be said to decide a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree. Under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code the executing Court can decide any question, the order in respect of which furthers, hinders or affects the manner of the carrying out of execution of the decree. It can decide also whether the decree that is going to be executed is a subsisting and operative decree, capable of execution. But it cannot re-open the decree and pass a new decree as it considers proper. The powers that are conferred by sub-secs. (i) and (ii) of sec. 36(6)(a) can, in our opinion, never be exercised by an executing Court under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Act has not said anywhere that an order made under sec. 36(6)(a)(i) would be treated as one under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and the mere fact that it is made in execution proceedings is not sufficient to attract the operation of the section when the question for determination is one which cannot by any stretch of reasoning come within its purview. On the other hand, it seems that the whole object of the section is to create a special and anomalous jurisdiction, under which various directions could be given, some of which relate to the execution department while others relate to the re-opening of the decree and to the making of a new decree; and all these powers could be exercised not only in execution proceedings but also in the suit itself on an application for review.

    In our opinion, therefore, an orders made under sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, either granting or refusing a prayer for reopening a decree does not come under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and is not appealable as such. If the decree is re-opened and a new decree made, an appeal would undoubtedly lie against the new decree which supersedes the old, under sec. 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such an appeal could be taken not only by the decree-holder who is primâ facie aggrieved by the amendment, but by the judgment-debtor also on the ground that it did not go far enough in his favour. But if the application of the judgment-debtor under sec. 36(6)(a)(i) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act is refused, there is no provision of law under which an appeal would lie against the order of refusal and the only remedy of the aggrieved party would be to apply for revision under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    The remedy of the aggrieved party is, therefore, practically the same whether the order is made under sub-cl. (i) or sub-cl. (ii) of sec. 36(6)(a).

    In the case before us the decree has been amended in part and the decretal dues have been reduced, although the Court below did not go further in making a new mortgage decree allowing instalments as prayed for by the judgment-debtor, in the manner contemplated by sec. 34 of the Act. The judgment-debtors, in our opinion, have a right of appeal against the amended decree which is now the final decree in the suit and in that appeal they, can raise the question of instalments which were denied to them by the Court below. No appeal, however, lies against the order refusing the prayer for instalments as an appeal from an order under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    We, therefore, agree with Mr. Ramaprosad Mukherjee that the judgment-debtors should have preferred an appeal against the amended decree itself. The present appeal that is before us can easily be converted into an appeal from a decree. It is only necessary to file a certified copy of the amended decree, if any such decree has been drawn up, and as Mr. Das confines his appeal to the claim for instalments only, a court-fee of Rs. 15 only has got to be paid. We allow Mr. Das a fortnight's time within which he can pay the deficit court-fees and file a certified copy of the amended decree, if such decree has been formally prepared. He can also make the necessary corrections in the memorandum of appeal within that time. On these things being done the appeal will be treated as an appeal from an original decree and be heard and disposed of accordingly.

    The Appellants will be at liberty to move an application for stay of execution of the decree as soon as the present appeal is converted into one from original decree.

    C.C

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Promode Nath Sinha Roy And Ors. v. Sm. Raseshwari Dassi And Anr.
    (May 27, 1941)