Spencer, J. — The appellant, who is the plaintiff in the suit, purchased certain lands in a court-sale, upon a mortgage decree. He alleged in his plaint, that he obtained delivery of this property, through Court, but that he was dispossessed a month later, by the defendant. He now sues to recover possession of the property from the mortgagor (defendant) and for an injunction against further interference by the latter.
The suit was dismissed in the first Court, on the ground that the sale was invalid, and on appeal the District Judge confirmed the District Munsif's decree. It was also found that the plaintiff had not obtained possession of the lands in suit and that his allegation of trespass was untrue In Second Appeal, it is contended that the defendant is debarred by res judicata from questioning the correctness of the sale and also that he is debarred under Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code from raising a question relating to execution in this suit.
It appears that, after the sale took place, the defendant applied under O. 21, R. 89 to have the sale set aside, on making a deposit as required by that rule, and that he was unsuccessful in that application. Afterwards he applied under R. 90 of the same order to have the sale set aside on account of irregularity and fraud, and upon this the order of the executing court was that his application was too late. The defendant's contention is that the lands described in the sale certificate given to the auction-purchaser (plaintiff) are not either included in the mortgage, or in the decree passed in the mortgage suit, and that this is so has not been seriously disputed. The appellant's pleader urged that the defendant, having once applied to have the sale set aside and having failed, was bound by res judicata from raising the contention that the sale was invalid, even though his application was dismissed, upon the ground that he was out of time, without a determination of the question relating to the validity of the sale. He has however failed to show us how this case comes within the rule of res judicata, as defined in Sect. 11 Civil Procedure Code. It is quite clear that there was no adjudication upon the substantial question raised in the defendant's petition, as to the validity of the sale and therefore it cannot be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in any prior proceedings.
As regards the contention, that Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code is a bar to the defendant's plea in this suit, the respondent's pleader has brought to our notice the case of Venkataramanachariar v. Meenatchisundaramaier, which is a direct authority both on this point and on the point of res judicata. That was a similar case to this, in which certain lands were sold under a mortgage-decree and a sale-certificate was given in respect of other lands not included in the mortgage, or in the decree. The plaintiff having contended that it was not open to the defendant to raise the defence that certain items of property mentioned in the sale-certificate were not in fact comprised in the mortgage, or in the decree, the Chief Justice, Sir Arnold White, and Davis J. observed that the effect of Sect. 244 was to debar the plaintiff from bringing a suit for the determination of a question relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree, which had arisen between himself and the defendant, as parties to the suit, in which the decree was obtained, but not to debar the defendant from Setting up, by way of defence, a matter which related to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree, obtained in a suit to which he and the plaintiff were parties. In support of this view, they quoted two cases of the Calcutta High Court, Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha, and Nilkamal Mukerjee v. Jahnabi Chowdhurani, in which a similar view was taken in respect of Sect. 244, corresponding to Sect. 47 of the present Procedure Code. Again, in Thathu Naick v. Kondu Reddi, two learned Judges of this Court out of three held that a sale should be impeached, in case of fraud discovered after the confirmation of the sale and that the defendant could raise this contention by way of answer to the plaintiff's claim, upon the strength of the sale in his favour. The only exception, which, in Sankaran Nair L.J's opinion might arise, would be if the defendant was estopped or otherwise barred by any rule of law from putting forward his claim.
Now on the facts of the present case the appellant's pleader has not shown that any estoppel arises, or that the defendant is barred, by any rule of law. He relied on two decisions to which I was a party. One is that in Annabattula Venkataratnam v. Annabattula Nayudu, and the other is in Venkatachalapathy Aiyen v. Perumal Aiyen. In the former case, what was decided was that an order passed in execution by which both parties were bound, refusing to recognise an assignment of a decree which had not been appealed against, could not be challenged in a subsequent suit. It is not a decision on the point, whether a defendant can put forward a plea in answer to a suit wherein if he were in the position of the plaintiff he would be debarred from suing, on the ground that the plea involved a matter relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. In Venkatachalapathy Aiyen v. Perumal Aiyen, an order was made for sale in execution of a mortgage-decree directing the 1st defendant's rights in his own property to be sold and they were sold accordingly. The order was made apparently under Sect. 87 of the Transfer of Property Act. The judgment states that the question in that suit was as to the construction of the decree passed in favour of the sub-mortgagee. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to enforce the rights obtained, under the sale, as the defendants had not taken steps to set it aside. It also appears that in that case the defendants were bound by the order passed against them under Sect. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the present case, the circumstances are different. Here the sale-certificate was in contravention of the decree and of the terms of the mortgage, as it included properties not covered by the mortgage or the decree. The defendant pleads fraud in drawing up the sale-certificate and the lower Courts have found that this plea is good. Defendant does not now ask to have the sale set aside and there is no provision of law requiring him to get the sale set aside on the grounds of material irregularity, before allowing him to plead fraud in answer to the plaintiff's claim for possession of property of which he, the defendant, is the present possessor. The Second Appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
Sir William Ayling, J.—I agree. The rulings in Bhiram Alt Sheik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha and Nil Kamal Mukerjee v. Jahnabi Chowdhurani followed and approved in Venkataramanachariar v. Meenatchisundaramaiyer clearly lay down that the defence set up in this case is maintainable and although they seem to have the result of making the finality of the sale depend on, whether the auction-purchaser gets possession or not, I am not prepared to dissent from them. The judgment in Nadamuni Narayana Iyengar v. Veerabhadra Pillai tends the other way; but in that case the suit was brought by the judgment-debtor against the auction-purchaser and the cases above referred to were not considered.
S.SAppeal dismissed.
.