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Case Number

T. No. 1443 of 1981

Judges

N.C Mukherji
N.G Chaudhury, JJ.

Acts

provisions of S. 19 of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1971.4.
S. 30(2) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973,
S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
S. 19 of Contempt of Court's Act, 1971.
S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — N.C. Mukherji, J. (with N.G. Chaudhury, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against an order dated 13.5.1981 passed by B.C. Basak, J., which (a) issued a Rule for contempt in C.R. No. 3072(W) of 1981 and (b) directed the appellants (alleged contemners) to restore coal and other articles alleged to have been seized and removed on 23.4.81, 28.4.81 and 29.4.81 within seven days from service of the order.

The appellants challenged that order on grounds including that the seized coal, machineries and implements had been taken by Barbani Police Station officers in connection with three criminal cases instituted on the complaint of the Chief Mining Officer, Asansol under S. 30(2) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, and that directing their return during investigation was illegal and contrary to Supreme Court decisions.

The respondent (an accused and petitioner in the contempt cases) moved the contempt application on 13.5.1981; counsel for the appellants alleged mala fides and linked the timing of that application to rejection of anticipatory bail on 12.5.1981 and to interim orders in related proceedings. The High Court issued an ad interim stay on 2.6.1981; the interim stay continued till disposal of the appeal, and the Rule was disposed of on 12.6.1981. A preliminary objection as to maintainability of the appeal (whether the impugned order was passed in exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt) was raised and left open for decision on expedited hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the appeal is maintainable under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — i.e., whether the impugned order of 13.5.1981 was an order or decision made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
Whether an order made simultaneously with the issuance of a Rule for contempt — specifically an order directing return/restoration of seized property during the pendency of contempt proceedings — is an interlocutory/procedural order not appealable, or is an appealable order because it affects rights and amounts to an exercise of the contempt jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Mrs. Mukti Moitra)

The impugned order is appealable: it is more than issuance of a Rule because it directed the appellants to restore seized coal and materials within a specified period, thereby affecting the rights of the parties.
The order was passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, and therefore an appeal lies under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Relied on multiple authorities (Supreme Court and Calcutta High Court decisions) to argue that where an order decides points affecting rights or contains findings, an appeal will lie; argued in particular that the present contempt was civil in nature and that the order concerning possession is final as to entitlement.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Chatterji)

The impugned order was not passed in exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt; it was an interlocutory/procedural order passed simultaneously with issuance of the Rule and hence not appealable under S. 19.
Relied on Calcutta High Court authority (Purna Chandra Sarkar v. Nilratan Biswas) and Supreme Court authorities to support the proposition that issuance of a Rule nisi or procedural orders ancillary to contempt proceedings are not appealable until a decision to exercise contempt jurisdiction is taken.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court in this Opinion
Purna Chandra Sarkar v. Nilratan Biswas (Calcutta High Court, 1976; Notes portion)	Issuance of a Rule nisi alone does not amount to a decision exercising jurisdiction to punish for contempt; no appeal arises until the Court decides to exercise contempt jurisdiction.	Cited by Mr. Chatterji. The Court noted the principle but distinguished the present case because, on the facts, the learned Judge not only issued a Rule but also passed an order directing restoration of property while being satisfied of a prima facie case; the Court therefore treated the impugned order as made in exercise of contempt jurisdiction.
Barada Kanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court, AIR 1976 SC 1206	Only orders/decisions in which some point is decided or a finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt are appealable under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.	Cited by parties. The Court applied the statutory test from S. 19 and the principle from this case to analyse whether the impugned order was a decision in exercise of contempt jurisdiction; concluded that it was because the learned Judge, satisfied of a prima facie case, both issued the Rule and directed restoration of property.
Purushotamdas Goel v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.S. Dhillon, 1978 Cr. LJ 772	An order is appealable when a point is decided or a finding is given; mere initiation of proceedings (without decision) is not appealable.	Referred to by Mrs. Moitra in support of the proposition that orders containing findings are appealable. The Court considered this principle in its maintainability analysis but concluded that the impugned order did amount to a substantive exercise of contempt jurisdiction for reasons given in the judgment.
Dulal Ch. Bhar v. Sukumar Banerjee & ors, AIR 1958 Calcutta 474	Where contempt is civil and the order contains a finding as to words or deeds constituting contempt, an appeal lies from such an order.	Cited by Mrs. Moitra. The Court observed that Dulal Ch. Bhar involved a case where a finding of contempt had been made; by contrast, in the present case no final finding on contempt had yet been made, although the learned Judge had directed restoration of property pending hearing.
V.C. Shukla v. State Through C.B.I., AIR 1980 SC 962	Explains the meaning of 'interlocutory order' — to be understood as the converse of 'final order'; interlocutory orders decide matters essential to progress but are not final determinations of rights.	Relied upon by Mrs. Moitra to argue limits of 'interlocutory' characterization. The Court considered this explanation but emphasized that S. 19's test is whether the impugned order was made in exercise of contempt jurisdiction; on the facts it held it was.
Mohanlal Maganlal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 733	An order in revision may be a 'final order' for purposes of appellate jurisdiction if it finally disposes of a controversy between parties with respect to certain allegations.	Referred to during debate on 'final' vs 'interlocutory' orders. The Court stated it was not primarily concerned with that classification in this case, because S. 19 permits appeal from any order passed in exercise of contempt jurisdiction; it nevertheless considered principles of finality in context.
Ram Chand Spg. and Wvg. Mills v. Bijli Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1344; relying on Jethanand & Sons v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 794	Principles on what constitutes a 'final order' — finality must relate to final decision of rights in the underlying proceeding; decision on an important issue does not by itself make an order final.	Cited by Mr. Chatterji. The Court recited these authorities and their principles while stating that, for present purposes, the central question remained whether the impugned order was made in exercise of contempt jurisdiction under S. 19.
Abdul Rahaman v. D.K. Kasim & Sons, 60 Indian Appeals 76	Finality must be in relation to the suit; if the suit remains pending and rights are yet to be determined, the order is not final for appellate purposes.	Referenced in the discussion on finality. The Court used the collection of authorities to frame the debate but ultimately resolved maintainability on the basis that the learned Judge had exercised contempt jurisdiction in making the impugned order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court focused its analysis on the maintainability question under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: whether the impugned order of 13.5.1981 was an order or decision made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.

Step-by-step reasoning as recorded in the opinion:

The Court acknowledged established authorities that a mere issuance of a Rule nisi or an order purely procedural in character will normally not be appealable as an order in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. Several authorities were cited by both sides to that effect.
The Court observed that S. 19 must be read to mean that any order or decision is appealable if it has been made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt; therefore the threshold question is whether the impugned order was made while exercising that jurisdiction.
The Court examined the impugned order and the contempt petition before B.C. Basak, J. The petition sought, among other relief, a Rule and an ad interim order directing return/restoration of 4,500 tonnes of coal and other materials allegedly wrongfully seized and removed in violation of an interim order of the Court.
The learned Judge (B.C. Basak, J.), being satisfied that the petitioners had made out a prima facie case, both issued the Rule and passed the order directing restoration. The High Court found that the learned Judge was exercising his jurisdiction to punish for contempt when he made that order, and was not exercising some other separate jurisdiction.
The Court concluded that the impugned order "certainly affects the rights and contentions of the parties" and has direct relevance to the question whether the appellants had violated the Court's order — thus the impugned order was a substantive act in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction and therefore appealable under S. 19.
The Court explicitly refrained from deciding the merits of whether the appellants in fact committed contempt: the contempt proceedings remained pending, the contemners had not yet appeared to show cause, and the matter was left to the learned Judge to determine after considering the materials.
As an interim protective measure, the Court stayed operation of the impugned order (the direction to restore the coal and other articles) until disposal of the contempt Rule.

Holding and Implications

CORE HOLDING: The appeal was allowed and the operation of the impugned order dated 13.5.1981 (directing restoration of coal and other articles) was stayed until the disposal of the Contempt Rule.

Implications and direct consequences:

The order of the learned Judge of 13.5.1981 directing restoration of seized coal and other articles is stayed; the appellants are not required to comply with that restoration order while the contempt Rule remains pending and until final disposal of those contempt proceedings by the trial Judge.
The High Court held that the impugned order was made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, and therefore the appeal under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was maintainable.
The Court did not decide whether the appellants had committed contempt; that factual and legal determination remains for the learned Judge hearing the contempt Rule on the merits.
There will be no order as to costs in the appeal.

The opinion does not state that it establishes any new legal precedent beyond the application of existing principles to the facts before the Court.

End of summary. This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond what is contained in the text.

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Ranjit Chatterjee & Anr. v. Ram Badan Choubey

N.C Mukherji, J.:—This is an appeal against an order dated 13.5.81 passed by B.C Basak, J. issuing a Rule for contempt in C.R No. 3072(W) of 1981 and directing the appellants (alleged contemners) to restore whatever coal and whatever other articles were seized and removed on 23.4.81, 28.4.81 and 29.4.81 within 7 days from the date of service of the copy of the said order. The appeal has been filed on the ground that as the coals, machineries and other implements for extraction of coals have been seized by the officers of Barbani Police Station in connection with three criminal cases, instituted on the complaint of the Chief Mining Officer, Asansol under S. 30(2) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, the order of the Trial Judge issuing a Rule for contempt and the order directing return of the said coal and other articles to the accused in the three police cases during investigation are wholly illegal and against the provisions of the said Act and in clear violation of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

2. The next ground taken is that the action of Rambadan Choubey (the petitioner in Contempt Cases), an accused in three police cases, is wholly mala fide and the said application for contempt has been moved before the Trial Judge on 13.5.81 immediately after his application for anticipatory bail bail was rejected on 12.5.81 by the Criminal Division Beach of this Court and after obtaining three Rules and three interim orders from the Criminal Bench sitting singly on 12.5.81 and stay of all further proceedings in Barbani Police Station Case No. 8 dated 23.4.81, Case No. 10 dated 26.4.81 and Case No. 12 dated 29.4.81 till the disposal of the three Rules being C.R Case Nos. 900, 916 and 917 of 1981 and also in two criminal cases started in April 1980 by Barbani Police Station till the disposal of Criminal Revision 901 and 902 of 1981.

2. On an application for stay of operation of the order B.C Basak, J., we issued a Rule on 2.6.81 and pasted an ad interim stay of operation of the order and further proceedings. The Rule was disposed of by us on 12th June, 1981. On behalf of the respondent-accused a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal was raised and it was contended that it is only against an order or decision of High Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt, an appeal lies according to the previsions of S. 19 of Contempt of Court's Act, 1971. The impugned order is not an order which was passed in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. We left open the question of maintainability and passed an order that the hearing of the appeal should be expedited. We further ordered that the interim order of stay passed by us on June 2, 1981 should continue till the disposal of the appeal.

3. Mrs. Mukti Moitra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits with much emphasis that the appeal is quite maintainable. In the first instance she wanted to say that against an order issuing a Rule for contempt an appeal lies. But in view of decision of this Court and Supreme Court she does not press that point. Nevertheless, she urges that the impugned order is not simply an order for issuance of a Rule. It is something more. The appellants have been directed to deliver to the respondent the coal and other materials seized by them on three different dates within a particular period. This order, according to Mrs. Moitra, certainly very much affects the rights of the parties and such an order was passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and that being so, the present appeal is maintainable according to the provisions of S. 19 of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1971.

4. Mr. Chatterji, learned Advocate appearing of behalf of the respondents, contends that the impugned order is not appealable as the same was not passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. That order was passed simultaneously with the issuance of the Rule. Such an order had nothing to do with the contempt matter. That being so, this is purely an interlocutory order which did not decide the rights and contentions of the parties. In such circumstances, it must be held that the order is not appealable. In support of his contention, Mr. Chatterji refers to a decision reported in 1976 Calcutta High Courts (Notes portion) Page 1 (Purna Chandra Sarkar v. Nilratan Biswas). In this case, a Rule nisi was issued on the petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for violation of an order passed by the learned Judge in a particular case. The petitioners filed an appeal against the said order and in that appeal filed an application purported to be under S. 19(2) of the Act praying for a Rule on the opposite parties to show cause why further proceedings in the Contempt Rule should not be stayed till the disposal of the appeal. It was held by P.C Borocah and H.N Sen, JJ., that “in issuing the Rule the High Court merely decided to ??? the allegations made in the contempt application in order to see whether the High Court will exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Till the contemners appear in answer to the Rule nisi and show cause and the High Court passes an order deciding to exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, no question of any appeal under S. 19(1) of the Act arises”. Mrs. Moitra distinguishes the case, referred to above, stating that in the above case only a Rule nisi was issued. There was no other order at the time of the issuance of the Rule. But, in the present case, as has been state earlier, the appellants have been directed to restore seized coal and other articles within a particular date. This order, according to Mrs. Moitra, goes at the root of the case and this order very much affects the rights of the parties and that being so, it cannot be said that such an order is an interlocutory order or procedural order. Mrs. Moitra is conscious of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 1206 (Barada Kanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court). In this case, it was held “only those orders or decisions in which some point is decided or finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt, are appealable under S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The order in question is not such an order or decision. It is an interlocutory order pertaining purely to the procedure of the Court. All that the order in question says is that all the points arising in the case, including the one of maintainability of the proceedings, would be heard together and it rejected the prayer for hearing the case piecemeal, that is, first with regard to the question of maintainability”. In such circumstances, their Lordships held that the appeal was maintainable. Mrs. Moitra next refers to a decision reported in 1978 Cr. LJ 772 (Purushotamdas Goel v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.S Dhillon). In this case, it has been held by the Supreme Court that when some point is decided or a finding is given then the order is appealable. Otherwise, simply initiating proceeding without anything further is not appealable Mrs. Moitra next submits that the present contempt is however civil contempt and the impugned order cannot be considered as an interlocutory order and regarding the question who is entitled to get possession of seized coal the order is final, and as such it is appealable. In support of her contention, Mrs. Moitra refers to a decision reported in AIR 1958 Calcutta 474 (Dulal Ch. Bhar v. Sukumar Banerjee & ors.). In this case, it has been held that “where, however, the contempt concerned is civil contempt and the order contains a finding as to the words or deeds, which in the view of the Judge, constituted contempt, an appeal would lie.” We do not see how this decision helps Mrs. Moitra as in this case it was found that the words or deeds constituted contempt and as such it was held that an appeal would lie from such an order. But, in the present case with regard to the question whether the appellant have committed contempt or not nothing has been decided as yet. Mrs. Moitra next relies on a decision reported in AIR 1980 SC 962 (V.C Shukla v. State Through C.B.I .). In this case, their Lordships were required to explain the meaning of ‘interlocutory order’ while deciding the question whether an application under S. 397(2) lies against an interlocutory order. It has been held “the expression ‘interlocutory order’ is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term ‘final order’. An interlocutory order merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought……………………………” Mrs. Moitra next relies on a decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 733 (Mohanlal Maganlal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat). In this case, after the enquiry under S. 476, Cr. P.C the Magistrate ordered filing of a complaint against the appellant in respect of offences under Ss. 205, 467 and 468 read with S. 114 of the Penal Code. In appeal filed by the appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge held that the said complaint was justified but only in respect of the offence under S. 205 read with S. 114. In revision by the appellant, the High Court dismissed the application saying that the High Court, as a matter of law would never exercise its revisional jurisdiction in such cases. In the Supreme Court, a preliminary contention was raised on behalf of the respondent that the High Court's order dismissing the revision was not a final order. It was held per majority that “the order passed by the High Court in revision was a ‘final order’ withing the meaning of Art. 134(1)(c). The controversy between the parties as to whether the complaint in respect of offences under Ss. 467 and 468 read with S. 114 Penal Code, was justified or not was disposed of by the order of dismissal and the proceeding regarding that question was finally decided. The finality of that order was not to be judged by co-relating that order with the controversy in the complaint, viz., whether the appellant has committed the offence charged against him therein”. Mr. Chatterji, on the other hand, refers to a decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1344 (Ram Chand Spg. and Wvg. Mills v. Bijli Cotton Milla (P) Ltd., Hathras). Their Lordships were required to decide as to what a final order is. In doing so, their Lordships relied on the decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 794 (Jethanand & Sons v. State of Uttar Pradesh). It was held, “the order is final if it amounts to a final decision relating to the rights of the parties in dispute in the civil proceeding. If after the order the civil proceeding still remains to be tried and the rights in the dispute between the parties had to be determined, the order is not a final order within the meaning of Article 133”. Their Lordships relied on another decision reported in 60 Indian Appeals 76 (Abdul Rahaman v. D.K Kasim & Sons). It was held in that case “the finality must be finality in relation to the suit. If after the order the suit is still alive in which rights of the parties have still to be determined no appeal lies against it. The fact that the order decides an important and even a vitai issue is by itself not material. If the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit the order will undoubtedly be a final one.” In our opinion, in the present case we are not very much concerned whether the order, appealed against, is interlocutory order or a final order. There is no prohibition in S. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act from preferring an appeal against an interlocutory order. Section 19(1) very clearly states that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Thus, any order or decision is appealable if the same has been made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It has been contended by Mr. Chatterji that directing the contemners to do something at the time of the issuance of the Rule cannot be said to be an order passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, Mr. Chatterji wants to say that an appeal lies only when an order or decision is made by the High Court by which some punishment is inflected on the contemners. Such order or decision can only be considered as having been passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The decision of this High Court as well as the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above have clearly laid down that no appeal lies against an order by which simply a Rule is issued. It has further been laid down that no appeal lies against an order which is passed regarding some procedural matter. When it has been provided in S. 19 that an appeal lies against any order or decision we are only required to see whether the impugned order has been passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Before B.C Basak, J. the respondent filed an application for contempt praying that a Rule may be issued on the contemner-opposite parties (appellants before us) to show cause as to why they shall not be sent to prison and otherwise punished or dealt with for the contumacious act or conduct…. …….It was also prayed that pending the hearing of the Rule an ad interim order be passed directing the respondents to return or restore forthwith 4500 tonnes of coal and other materials wrongfully seized and removed from the said colliery by the respondents in violation of the interim order of the Court. The learned Judge on being satisfied that the petitioners could make out a prima facie case issued a Rule and passed the impugned order. It must be said that the said order was passed by the learned Judge while exercising his jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The learned Judge was not exercising any other jurisdiction. The impugned order, in our opinion, certainly affects the rights and contentions of the parties and this order has certainly great relevance to the question whether, in fact, the appellants have violated the order passed by the Court. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal position, we are of the opinion that the appeal is maintainable.

5. Mrs. Moitra contends with much emphasis with reference to the orders passed by this Court on several writ applications and also with reference to come police cases that the appellants have not committed any contempt and that being so, the impugned order ought not to have been passed by the learned Judge Mr. Chatterji, on the other hand, submits that there has been clear violation of the order passed by this Court and the appellants are, therefore, guilty of contempt and that being so, the order has been rightly passed by the learned Judge. At this stage, we do not enter into the merits of the contempt application. The contempt matter is pending before the learned Judge. The contemner have not yet appeared and shown cause. It is for the learned Judge, on a consideration of the entire materials, to come to a finding whether the contemners have violated the order of the Court. At the time of the disposal of the contempt Rule, His Lordship may pass appropriate orders, it necessary. But we feel that till the disposal of the contempt Rule the operation of the impugned order should be staged.

6. In the result, the appeal is allowed on contest. The order passed by learned Judge on 13.5.81 directing the appellants to restore whatever coal and whatever other articles were seized and removed on 23rd, 28th and 29th April, 1981 within 7 days from the date of service of a copy of the order on the respondents concerned be stayed till the disposal of the contempt Rule.

There will be no order for costs in this appeal.

N.G Chaudhury, J.:—I agree.

Appeal allowed; Operation of impugned order stayed till disposal of Contempt Rule.

Ranjit Chatterjee & Anr. v. Ram Badan Choubey

Judgment Summary — N.C. Mukherji, J. (with N.G. Chaudhury, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Mrs. Mukti Moitra)

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Chatterji)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ranjit Chatterjee & Anr. v. Ram Badan Choubey

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