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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a suit instituted by minor plaintiffs, through their next friend, seeking an account of joint family properties, a partition of those properties and delivery of their respective shares. The plaintiffs are the sons of the defendant and allege the family is an undivided Hindu family in possession of the properties described in the plaint, each entitled to a one-third (1/3) share.

The plaintiffs allege misconduct by the defendant (their father) — including reckless and immoral conduct, living with a prostitute, driving his wife away, addiction to drink, failure to attend to business and threats to alienate family properties — and claim that he is denying their title by asserting the properties are his absolute self-acquired estate under his father's will.

The defendant denied these allegations in his written statement and asserted that certain properties were bequeathed to him absolutely under his father's will, while others were purchased by him after his father's death. The trial addressed both the admissibility and effect of the unprobated will (marked Exhibit I) and whether the properties were joint family (partible) or defendant's self-acquisitions (separate).

The Court framed four issues for trial and adjudicated whether (1) partition was in the minors' interest, (2) the business of Duff & Co. passed to the defendant under the will and whether it was partible, (3) what joint properties were available for partition, and (4) the relief to which the plaintiffs were entitled. The Court ultimately issued a decree declaring the family divided, fixing shares, appointing the defendant as guardian with restrictions, ordering annual accounts for the business and awarding costs to the plaintiffs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is it in the interest of the minors that a partition should be effected?
  2. Did the defendant get the business of Duff & Co. under the will of his father and if so, is it partible?
  3. What are the joint properties available for partition?
  4. To what relief are plaintiffs entitled?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Minor Plaintiffs through next friend) Arguments

  • The properties mentioned in the plaint are joint family properties in which the plaintiffs are entitled to one-third shares each.
  • The defendant is leading a reckless and immoral life, living with a prostitute and has driven his wife out, is addicted to drink, neglecting business and threatening to alienate family properties to prejudice the plaintiffs.
  • The defendant's claim that the properties are absolute under the will should not defeat the plaintiffs' partible interest.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant denied the allegations regarding his conduct and character.
  • He pleaded that certain properties (including the business of Duff & Co. and specified houses) were bequeathed to him absolutely under his father's will (Exhibit I).
  • He asserted that the village mentioned was purchased by him after his father's death and that he contributed purchase money and improvements, asserting self-acquisition for that item.
  • With respect to domestic allegations, he claimed his wife behaved improperly and left voluntarily; he admitted keeping a woman in a connected house compartment but described the arrangement and payments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Janaki v. Dhanu Lal A will, though not probated, may be used by a defendant to contest a plaintiff's suit; existence of a will cannot be ignored for all purposes even if executors cannot establish rights without Probate. The Court relied on this authority to hold that the unprobated will (Exhibit I) was admissible in evidence for the defendant to contest the plaintiffs' claim.
Carlapatti Chinna Gunniah v. Cota Wammalivariah Confirmed that Section 187 of the Succession Act does not preclude a defendant from setting up an unprobated will in answer to a plaintiff's claim. The Court followed this decision (which relied on Janaki) and treated it as supporting admissibility of the unprobated will for the defendant's defence.
V. Lakshmamma (Lakshmamma v. Batnamma / V. Lakshmamma…Defendant v. V. Ratnamma…Plaintiff) Held that Section 187 bars not only executor or legatee but also a stranger who seeks to use an unprobated will as jus tertii in defence (i.e., disallowed use of unprobated will by strangers to establish title). The Court distinguished or declined to follow this decision as endorsing an "extreme view", noting that Janaki and Carlapatti (which permit use by a defendant) were binding and not overruled; thus Lakshmamma's restrictive approach was not accepted here.
Basunta Kumar Chuckerhutty v. Gopal Chunder Das Observed that a will without Probate cannot be used to prove that a person named has title as executor or legatee, but there is no absolute prohibition on using it for other purposes. The Court cited this to support the position that unprobated wills may be used in evidence for purposes other than establishing executor/legatee rights, contrary to the stricter rule in Lakshmamma.
Achyutananda Das v. Jagannath Das Stated that Section 187 only bars establishment of rights as executor or legatee unless Probate or Letters of Administration are granted, and does not debar using the will in evidence for other purposes. The Court used this principle to reinforce admissibility of the unprobated will for purposes other than asserting executor/legatee rights, supporting its conclusion that the will could be used to contest the plaintiffs' suit.
Naqalinqam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar Explained the governing principle that whether property passes to a son as ancestral (partible) or self-acquired depends on the testator's intention as gathered from the instrument; absent contrary words, the natural inference is an intention to preserve ancestral quality. The Court relied on this authority to construe the terms of the will (paragraphs cited) and to conclude the testator intended the sons to take as members of a joint undivided Hindu family (i.e., partible/ancestral quality).
Mohamed Shurnsool Hooda v. Shewukram Principles regarding construction of instruments and inference of intention where no contrary words exist (as referenced in Naqalinqam Pillai). Referenced by the Court (through Naqalinqam Pillai) as part of the principles for construing the will and inferring that property was intended to be ancestral/partible absent contrary indication.
Mahadev Balvant v. Lakshman Balvant Described the test for allowing a minor co-parcener to sue for partition: suit should be allowed only if minor's interests are likely (1) to be advanced thereby, or (2) protected from danger. The Court cited this test in deciding the first issue and concluded partition was in the minors' interests given the defendant's hostile title and conduct.
Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi Held that a minor plaintiff is entitled to a decree for partition against an adult co-parcener who denies the minor's rights and sets up an independent and hostile claim. The Court relied on this authority (and similar ones) to support granting partition/declaration where the defendant set up a hostile claim against minors.
Thangam Pillai v. Suppa Pillai Supported the view that a minor is entitled to partition when an adult co-parcener denies his rights. Cited as additional authority for finding in favour of the minors on the first issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in several distinct steps, each grounded in evidence and cited authorities contained in the record:

  1. Admissibility of the unprobated will: The will (Exhibit I) was attested and proved by P.W. No. 1. The Court surveyed authorities and concluded that the balance of Madras decisions supported admitting an unprobated will for the purpose of defending against a plaintiff's claim. The Court relied on Janaki v. Dhanu Lal and Carlapatti Chinna Gunniah v. Cota Wammalivariah to admit the will, distinguishing a conflicting view in the Lakshmamma decision and noting other authorities that allow use of an unprobated will for purposes other than establishing executor/legacy rights.
  2. Construction of the will and testator's intention: The Court analyzed the will's terms paragraph by paragraph. It noted that paragraph 4 gave the business of Duff & Co. to the eldest son "for his share with absolute rights," and paragraph 6 dealt with immovable properties subject to the widow's life-interest. Paragraph 7 provided that if a son died issueless leaving only a widow, the surviving sons or their male heirs shall take the share in equal shares — language the Court viewed as supporting an intention that sons take as joint family members with rights of survivorship inter se.
  3. Application of principles on ancestral quality: Applying the principles in Naqalinqam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar (and the reasoning in Mohamed Shurnsool Hooda v. Shewukram), the Court held that when a father disposes of self-acquired property in favour of sons, he may nevertheless preserve its ancestral quality; absent words indicating a contrary intention, the natural inference is that the father intended the sons to take as ancestral (i.e., as joint family property). The Court therefore concluded the defendant took the properties under the will as joint family properties, giving the plaintiffs an interest.
  4. Issue-by-issue adjudication:
    • First issue (minors' interest in partition): The Court applied the Mahadev Balvant test (interests advanced/protected) and relevant authorities holding minors may obtain partition when an adult co-parcener denies rights. The defendant's hostile title and the fact he lived apart with a concubine (and denial of sons' rights) led the Court to find partition was in the minors' interest.
    • Second issue (Duff & Co.): Having construed the will as vesting partible/joint-family character, the Court held the business of Duff & Co. was not absolute property of the defendant but was partible.
    • Third issue (joint properties available): The Court found no additional properties available for partition beyond those specifically pleaded in the plaint (three items: specified houses, Duff & Co. business assets, and the village of Thiruneermalai).
    • Fourth issue (relief): The Court determined each plaintiff is entitled to a one-third share in the properties mentioned in the plaint, with particular qualifications: rights to immovable houses subject to life-interest of the grandmother (so partition rights for those houses arise only after her death); items 2 and 3 (the business and village) confer an immediate one-third share subject to liability for a debt incurred in purchasing item No. 2.
  5. Practical protective measures instead of immediate physical partition: Because the plaintiffs produced no evidence of malversation and in the interest of avoiding unnecessary disruption, the Court appointed the defendant as guardian of the minors' person and property with a specific restriction: no power of alienation of immovable properties without Court consent. The defendant was ordered to file an annual balance-sheet of Duff & Co. and was given liberty to appropriate income for maintenance of himself and family without the need to file accounts of such expenditure for the present.
  6. Costs: The Court observed the defendant substantially failed on his claims and therefore ordered him to pay the plaintiffs' costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court decreed that the plaintiffs and the defendant are members of a divided family from the date of the decree, plaintiffs being entitled to one-third (1/3rd) share each in the properties mentioned in the plaint.

Additional operative directions (direct effects):

  • The defendant is appointed guardian of the person and property of the minor plaintiffs, but shall have no power of alienation of immovable properties without the consent of the Court.
  • The defendant must file an annual balance-sheet in Court showing profits and losses of the business of Duff & Co.
  • The defendant is given liberty to appropriate income of the properties towards maintenance of himself and other family members until further orders, without a requirement to file accounts of such maintenance expenditures for the present.
  • The plaintiffs' entitlement to partition of specified houses (item No. 1) will become operative only after the death of their grandmother (who has a life interest); as to items Nos. 2 and 3 (Duff & Co. business and village), the plaintiffs are immediately entitled to one-third shares each, subject to liability for a debt incurred in respect of the purchase of item No. 2.
  • Costs of the suit are awarded against the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs.

Implications: The decision resolves the parties' dispute by declaring shares and imposing protective measures for minors. The opinion addresses rights under an unprobated will and the construction of intent to create ancestral/partible quality; it applies established authorities but does not announce or state the creation of any new legal precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing decisions.

    P.S. Sadagopa Naidu v. P.S. Thirumalaswami Naidu

    JUDGMENT

    1. This is a suit filed by the minor plaintiffs through their next friend for an account of the joint family properties belonging to themselves and their father, the defendant, for a partition of the properties and for delivery to them of their share of the properties.

    2. The plaint sets out that the plaintiffs (who are the sons of the defendant) and the defendant are members of an undivided Hindu family possessed of the joint family properties mentioned in the plaint and that they are each entitled to ⅓rd share therein. The plaintiffs pray for a partition on the ground that the defendant is leading a reckless and immoral life, that he is living in the house of some prostitute or other after having driven his wife out of the house, that he is addicted to drink and that he has not been attending to his business. It is also alleged that he has been threatening to alienate the properties to prejudice the plaintiffs and is denying-their rights to the properties, alleging that they are his own absolute properties—bequeathed under the will of his father. The defendant filed a written statement denying the allegation in the plaint as to his conduct and character and pleading that of the properties mentioned in the plaint the business of Duff & Co. was bequeathed to him absolutely under the will of his father, that house No. 1/17 and 2/17 mentioned in the plaint was bequeathed to his mother for life and to him absolutely after her death, that the village mentioned in the plaint was purchased by him after the death of his father for Rs. 8,000, that he paid Rs. 4,000 on account of principal and Rs. 1,000 on account of interest to the vendor, that he improved the property purchased by building a house in the village at a cost of Rs. 1,000. He denies that he has driven his wife out of the house and states that she was not behaving properly towards him and was leaving his house frequently without sufficient reason and that in January 1914, she left his house without his permission and has since then refused to come back to his house though asked to do so. As regards the allegation in the plaint as to his living in the house of some prostitute or other he states that owing to the conduct of his wife who was also a sickly woman, he has for sometime been keeping a woman who is living in No. 3/7, Venkatachela Achari Street, Komaleswaranpet, Madras, which is connected with house No. 17, Chandrabhan Street, referred to in the plaint as its third compartment. He states that the woman is occupying the house free of rent and that he is paying her only Rs. 15 a month.

    3. The following issues were settled:—

    (1) Is it in the interest of the minors that a partition should be effected?

    (2) Did the defendant get the business of Duff & Co., under the will of his father and if so, is it not partible?

    (3) What are the joint properties available for partition?

    (4) To what relief are plaintiffs entitled?

    4. While the plaintiffs state that the properties mentioned in the plaint are joint family properties, the defendant claims them as his self-acquisitions. There are three items of properties mentioned in the plaint, viz.:

    (1) House and ground No. 1/17 and 2/17, Chandrabhan Street, Komaleswaranpet.

    (2) Stock-in-trade, outstandings, goodwill, etc., of the business of Duff & Co., and

    (3) Village of Thiruneermalai near Pallavaram.

    5. So far as the first two items are concerned, it is admitted that the properties belonged to the grandfather of the plaintiffs. As regards item (3) it is admitted that the property was purchased after the death of the defendant's father by the defendant. It was conceded by the defendant's Vakil at the trial that if items Nos. 1 and 2 are found to be the joint family properties of the plaintiffs and defendant, item No. 3 which was acquired in part with the and of income from No. 2 would also be joint family property. So far as items Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned it is alleged that the properties were bequeathed to the defendant under a will which is marked as Exhibit I. This will has been proved by P.W No. 1, Perumal Naidu, who is a retired Sub-Assistant Surgeon and is one of the attesting witnesses to the will. Probate has not been taken out for this will and the question is whether the will can be admitted in evidence on behalf of the defendant. On this question I am of opinion that the balance of authorities in Madras is in favour of the view that a will, though not probated, may be used by a defendant in order to contest the plaintiff's suit. In Janaki v. Dhanu Lal(1) it was held that, although executors cannot establish any right without taking Probate, the existence of a will cannot be ignored for all purposes whatsoever, and that it is open to the defendant to contest the plaintiff's right by setting up and proving a will of which Probate was not taken. This case was followed in Carlapatti Chinna Gunniah v. Cota Wammalivariah(2), where it was held that a defendant was not precluded by Section 187 of the Succession Act from setting up an unprobated will in answer to a plaintiff's claim and Janaki v. Dhanu Lal was relied on. Reference has been made by the plaintiff's Vakil to V. Lakshmamma…Defendant v. V. Ratnamma…Plaintiff .(3), where it was held that Section 187 of the Succession Act barred not only the executor or legatee from claiming under an unprobated will, but also a strangerwho seeks to use the will, as a jus tertii, for the purpose of his defence. Janaki v. Dhanu Lal and Carlapatti Chinna Gunniah v. Cota Wammalivariah are not referred to in the course of the judgment and their Lordships disposed of the question by stating that no authorities have been cited or reasons suggested for the distinction drawn between a plaintiff seeking to prove his unprobated will and the defendant using the will as a defence to plaintiff's action. Reference has also been made by the plaintiffs' Vakil to the cases reported as Basunta Kumar Chuckerhutty v. Gopal Chunder Das(4) and Achyutananda Das v. Jagannath Das(5). In the former case it was observed that a will uncovered by Probate or Letters of Administration cannot be used to prove that anybody named therein has any title to the testator's estate but that there was no absolute prohibition to use it for any other purpose. In the latter case Justice Mookerjee observes as follows:—“That section (Section 187 of the Succession Act) merely provides that no right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction shall have granted a Probate of the will under which the right is claimed or shall have granted Letters of Administration………… this does not debar the use of the will in evidence for a purpose other than the establishment of a right as executor or legatee.” These cases do not support the extreme view taken in the case of Lakshmamma v. Batnamma. I am of opinion that I am bound by the reported decisions as Janaki v. Dhanu Lal and Carlapatti Chinna Cunniah v. Cota Wammalivariah, which have not been referred to or overruled in Lashmamma v. Batnamma. The will, therefore, is admissible in evidence although it is not probated.

    6. As it is contended by the plaintiffs that the will even though admissible does not confer any absolute property on the defendant but vests the property in him as joint family property, it is necessary to consider the terms of the will. Reading the will as a whole, it seems to me that the scheme of the will is in favour of the view that the testator intended his sons to take property as joint family property. In paragraph 2 of the will he sets out the properties he possessed of. In paragraph 3 he gives certain immovable properties to his daughters. Paragraph 4 which deals with the business of Duff and Co., is follows:—

    “The (Duff and Co.) business, item (a) mentioned in paragraph 2 above, shall after my life-time be taken by my eldest son Chi. P.S Tirumalai Naidu for his sharewith absolute rights and with powers of gift and sale, conducted carefully and enjoyed.” The use of the words ‘his share’ suggests clearly to my mind that it was taken by his son as his share of the property of his father. Paragraph 6 gives his sons certain immovable properties including house No. 1/27 and 2/27. Chandrabhan street, mentioned in the plaint subject to the life-interest of his wife. The most important paragraph is No. 7 which runs as follows:— “If any of my sons die issueless leaving only a widow, the properties comprised in his or their share shall immediately be taken by surviving sons or their male heirs in equal shares and enjoyed and suitable maintenance provided to their widow or widows.” It is clear from the above paragraph that the testator intended his sons to take the property as members of a joint and undivided Hindu family with the rights of survivorship inter se. In coming to a conclusion as to whether the properties are taken absolutely or with the incidents of ancestral property, the terms of the will have to be ascertained as indicating the intention of the testator, and if there are no words indicating a contrary intention, the natural inference is that the father intended his sons to take the property as ancestral property. The principles which are to govern a case like the present have been clearly set out in Naqalinqam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar(6) where their Lordships observe as follows:—“As the father is at liberty to make any disposition he pleases or to leave his self-acquired property to descend as ancestral property, so when making any disposition in favour of his son he is at liberty to preserve for the property the quality of ancestral property. Whether in any given case the property was intended to pass to the son as ancestral property or as self-acquired property must be a question of intention turning on the construction of the instrument of gift. Following the principles laid down in Mohamed Shurnsool Hooda v. Shewukram(7), I think that if there are no words indicating the contrary intention, the natural inference should be that the father intended his sons to take his property as their ancestral estate.” I am of opinion that the defendant under the terms of his father's will took the properties as joint family properties and that the plaintiffs have an interest therein.

    7. I shall now deal with the issues seriatim:—

    First issue:—It is now settled law that a minor plaintiff can file a suit for partition if there are circumstances which show that it would be for his interest to separate his share and that it is not necessary to prove malversation on the part of the adult members. In Mahadev Balvant v. Lakshman Balvant(8), Mr. Ranade observes as follows:

    “It is true some of the earlier decisions required proof of malversation or mismanagement, but the later decisions have laid down both a positive and a negative test, namely, that no suit by a minor co-parcener…………should be allowed, unless his interests are……likely (1) to be advanced thereby, or (2) protected from danger.”

    8. The question is whether in the present case it is in the interests of the minors to effect a partition, and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is. The defendant has set up a hostile title and has denied the rights of the minor plaintiffs to any share of the properties and while this is found against it is the duty of the Court to safeguard the interests of the minors by declaring their rights and giving effect to such a declaration. In Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi(9), it was held that a minor plaintiff is entitled without proof or anything more to have a decree for partition as against an adult co-parcener who denies the minor's rights to the properties and sets up an independent and hostile claim. A similar view was taken in Thangam Pillai v. Suppa Pillai(10). In addition to these there is the admitted fact that the defendant is keeping a concubine who is living in a part of the house although it bears a different number. It is unnecessary in this suit to consider whether he has driven out his wife or whether she left him voluntarily as she is not a party to the suit: but the fact remains that the defendant (father of the plaintiffs) has denied the title of his sons and he is now living apart from his wife with a concubine. I think these circumstances are quite sufficient to show that the interests of the plaintiffs would be jeopardized if their rights are not declared and the 1st defendant prevented from dealing with their rights. I find the 1st issue in plaintiffs' favour.

    9. Second Issue:— I have already given my reasons for holding that the business of Duff & Co., is not the absolute property of the defendant but is partible.

    10. Third Issue:— It is not shown that there are any properties available for partition other than those mentioned in the plaint.

    11. Forth Issue:— There will be a decree declaring that the plaintiffs are each entitled to 1rd share in the properties mentioned in the plaint. As regards item No. 1 their rights to partition can only arise after the death of their grandmother and so at present there would only be a declaration made. As regards items Nos. 2 and 3 the plaintiffs will be entitled to 3rd share each subject to their liability to pay the debt due to K. Rangiah which was incurred on account of the purchase of item No. 2.

    12. Then the next question is whether I ought in this suit to declare a partition by metes and bounds so far as the village is concerned and to wind up the business of Duff & Co., and give the plaintiffs 13rd share each in these properties. The plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence of malversation and the plaintiffs' Vakil states that there is no objection to the plaintiffs' rights being declared and their status divided and the defendant appointed as guardian of their person and property. I think this course would, while protecting the plaintiffs adequately, prevent any unnecessary disturbance or disruption in the family. I, therefore, appoint the defendant to be the guardian of the person and properties of the minor plaintiffs and declare that they are members of a divided family from the date of this decree. The defendant will file in Court a balance-sheet every year showing the profits and losses of the business of Duff & Co. As regards the income of properties, I do not think it necessary for the present to make any special order as the plaintiffs are under the protection of the defendant and he will be meeting all their expenses. A decree will be drawn up in the following terms:—

    (1) declaring that the plaintiffs and defendant are members of a divided family from the date of the decree, plaintiffs being entitled to ⅓rd share each in the properties mentioned in the plaint;

    (2) appointing the defendant as guardian of their person and property without any power of alienation of the immovable properties without the consent of the Court; and

    (3) requiring the defendant to file in Court a balance-sheet every year of the business of Duff & Co., and giving him liberty to appropriate the income of the properties towards the maintenance of himself and the other members of the family until further orders of the Court without any necessity to file any accounts of such expenditure.

    13. As regards the costs of the suit, I am of opinion that the defendant should pay the costs of the plaintiffs as he has substantially failed on all the points set up by him.

    S.N/R.K

    14. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    P.S. Sadagopa Naidu v. P.S. Thirumalaswami Naidu
    (Mar 29, 1915)