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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses an appeal concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a sale deed (Ex. A) involving the payment of purchase money and related debts. The primary dispute concerns whether certain clauses in the sale deed amount to a mere contract of indemnity or an absolute covenant to pay the purchase money and debts. The District Judge had ruled in favor of the vendors, and the appeal challenges aspects of that judgment, including costs awarded.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the objection to the registration of the sale deed on the ground that a particular plot was not sold has any substance.
  2. Whether the clauses in the sale deed constitute a mere contract of indemnity or an absolute covenant to pay the purchase money and debts.
  3. Whether the vendors are entitled to sue the vendee before any actual loss has been caused due to nonpayment.
  4. The liability of the appellant for costs incurred by the respondents in suits to recover debts the appellant undertook to pay.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contends that the clauses in the sale deed amount merely to a contract of indemnity.
  • Accordingly, the respondents (vendors) were not entitled to bring the suit until an actual loss had been caused by nonpayment of the specified debt.
  • The appellant relies on the decision of the Privy Council in Izzatunnisa Begam v. Kunwar Pertab Singh to support this contention.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argue that the sale deed contains an absolute covenant to pay the purchase money and debts, not merely a contract of indemnity.
  • The appellant undertook to pay debts with the purchase money, and failure to do so entitles the vendors to sue immediately.
  • The respondents rely on precedents establishing that such covenants allow the vendor to sue without proving actual loss.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kaliyammal v. Kolandavela Goundar Establishes that when a vendor leaves part of sale proceeds with the vendee to pay debts, the vendor can sue immediately upon nonpayment as the covenant is absolute, not merely indemnity. Used to support the view that the sale deed imposes an absolute covenant to pay debts, enabling immediate suit by vendors.
Raghunatha Chariar v. Sadagopa Chariar (36 Mad. 348) Holds that a vendor can sue the purchaser for sums agreed to be paid to third parties without showing actual loss. Applied to affirm that the vendors are entitled to sue the vendee upon breach of covenant regardless of proof of loss.
Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunchalam Chetti Determines that an agreement to pay debts is not a mere contract of indemnity if there is an absolute promise to pay. Supports the interpretation that the sale deed’s covenant to pay debts is absolute and not merely indemnity.
Izzatunnisa Begam v. Kunwar Pertab Singh Establishes that in sales of property subject to encumbrances, there is an implied contract of indemnity; a purchaser’s covenant to pay encumbrances is still a contract of indemnity. Considered and distinguished; court held that this precedent does not apply to ordinary debts not charged on property and does not convert an absolute covenant into mere indemnity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first rejected the objection regarding the registration of the sale deed, finding the District Judge’s conclusion prima facie correct. The central issue was the interpretation of the sale deed’s clauses concerning payment of purchase money and debts. The court analyzed the language of Ex. A and found that the vendee was entrusted with the payment of certain debts using the purchase money, constituting an absolute covenant rather than a mere contract of indemnity.

The court distinguished the facts from those in Izzatunnisa Begam v. Kunwar Pertab Singh, where encumbrances were charged on the property and the purchaser’s covenant was a contract of indemnity by law. Here, the debts were simple promissory notes not charged on the property, and the vendee had an unconditional obligation to pay them. The provision for compensation in case of breach did not reduce the covenant to indemnity.

Supporting this interpretation, the court relied on precedents including Kaliyammal v. Kolandavela Goundar, Raghunatha Chariar v. Sadagopa Chariar, and Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunchalam Chetti, which establish that vendors can sue immediately upon breach of such covenants without proving actual loss.

The court also addressed costs, holding the appellant liable for costs paid by the respondents in suits to recover debts the appellant undertook to pay, modifying the decree accordingly and extending the time for payment.

Justice Seshagiri Aiyar concurred, emphasizing that where purchasers agree to pay debts not charged on property, the suit is upon the covenant, not indemnity, and the purchaser acts as agent of the vendor for the payment of those debts.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The court held that the sale deed contains an absolute covenant to pay specified debts with the purchase money, not merely a contract of indemnity. Consequently, the vendors were entitled to sue the vendee immediately upon breach without proving actual loss. The appellant is liable for costs incurred by the respondents in related suits, and the decree was modified to increase the amount payable and extend the payment period by four months.

No new precedent was established; the decision follows established principles regarding covenants to pay debts in sale transactions.

    Komu Kutti v. Kumara Menon

    Abdur Rahim, J.:— As regards the objection to the registration of the sale deed Ex. A on the ground that item 17, plot C, which was situated in the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar was not in fact sold, I do not think that there is any substance in this objection. The District Judge has found otherwise and that finding is prima facie correct. The next question depends primarily upon the interpretation of the sale deed Ex. A. It provides that as regards the purchase money

    “the said sum of Rs. 10,237-8-0, as has been received by us by way of Rs. 9,086-2-10 reserved with you, it being settled that the kudicadan (encumbrance) Rs. 1,237-8-0 due to the aforesaid persons on properties items 10 to 16 should be paid by you and the properties should be recovered possession of and that the previous debts Rs. 7,848-10-10 which were incurred for our tarwad necessities…. should be paid off by you….and by way of the balance amount Rs. 1,151-5-2 which was obtained by us in ready cash this day for the purpose of constructing a house, etc.”

    2. The document states later on:

    “And it has hereby been agreed on karar that if without your paying in time, with future interest thereon from this day forwards, the Rs. 7,848-10-10, which as aforesaid is described in Sch. B and which was agreed to be paid off by you, and obtaining back the documents described in Sch. C, any occasion is given for any loss to be sustained by us consequent thereupon or for us to pay any amount, yourself and your properties would be liable for all such losses and amounts, etc.”

    3. It is contended that these clauses amount merely to a contract of indemnity and therefore the respondents the vendors of the property, were not entitled to bring this suit, until any loss had been caused to them by the appellant, the vendee, failing to pay Rs. 7,848-10-10 as covenanted by him. Whether it is an absolute covenant to pay the purchase-money in the way agreed upon by the parties or a covenant merely by way of indemnity, must necessarily depend upon the construction of the document. As I read Ex. A, it provides that the greater part of the purchase-money should remain in the hands of the purchaser, he undertaking to pay the different creditors.

    4. These were all simple debts due on promissory notes, and none of them were charged upon the property. No doubt there is a contract by the vendee to compensate the vendors for any loss sustained by them by his default in paying the amount which he undertook to pay. But that in itself, would not make it a mere contract of indemnity. All that it means, reading it with the other clauses, is that if the vendee having the money of the vendors in his hands fails to pay according to the contract certain creditors of theirs then he must compensate the vendors for any loss that may be caused to them by such breach of contract. This is to my mind, a mere case of contract to pay the purchase money, providing for compensation in case of breach. It is just the case which is set out in the decision to which I was a party, viz., Kaliyammal v. Kolandavela Goundar(1). It is there stated:

    “No doubt there are cases in which the gist of the transaction is that the vendor leaves part of the sale proceeds in the hands of the vendee with a direction that he shall pay the debts for which the vendor was liable. In such cases of absolute covenant it is open to the vendor to sue the vendee as soon as he fails to pay the debts as they become due and the words of such a covenant may be inconsistent with a covenant to indemnify, properly so called.”

    5. There is another decision to which I was a party, Raghunatha Chariar v. Sadagopa Chariar(2). The head note (36 Mad. 348), of that decision is in these words:

    “A transfers his property to B in consideration of B agreeing to pay certain sums to third persons. A is himself entitled to sue B for the recovery of those sums as if they are due to him in case of B's failure to pay the third persons within a reasonable time; and A is not in such a case bound to show that he was in any way damnified by B's failure.”

    6. There was a previous decision of Subramania Aiyar and Moore. JJ., on the same subject in Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunchalam Chetti(3), which perhaps went further. There the agreement provided that if the defendant failed to discharge the debt, he should be liable to pay the plaintiff for any damage the latter might sustain. It was held that the agreement was not a mere contract of indemnity. There the learned Judges point out in support of their view that this provision could not detract from the absolute promise to pay contained in the beginning of the document. Here also there is an absoulute promise to pay, though the document further provides for compensation in default of payment. It has been argued by Mr. C.V Ananthakrishna Aiyar that the decision of the Privy Council in Izzatunnisa Begam v. Kunwar Pertab Singh(4) supports his contention and that the view of the law laid down especially in Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunachalam Chetti requires reconsideration. In Izzatunnisa Begam v. Kunwar Pertab Singh the equity of redemption in certain property was sold in auction and was bought by the decree-holder. The sale was subject to two prior mortgages. As it happened, those mortgages were found to be invalid, and the purchaser had nothing to pay on that account. The owner of the property sued afterwards to recover the amount of those mortgages from the purchaser. The Judicial Committee held that the purchaser of the equity of redemption was entitled to whatever benefit accrued to him by reason of the mortgages, which were supposed to exist on the property, being found to be inoperative. He had bought the equity of redemption and there was thus a contract implied by law that he would indemnify the owner of the property against encumbrances affecting it. As it happened, he had not to pay any of the supposed encumbrances. In those circumstances it was pointed out that the owner of the property had got what he bargained for and had nothing to complain of. There is one sentence in the judgment which is especially relied on by Mr. Ananthakrishna Aiyar and it is this:

    “If the purchaser covenants with the vendor to pay the encumbrances, it is still nothing more than a contract of indemnity.”

    7. But reading that sentence in the light of the rest of the judgment, it means nothing more than this: that in a transaction of the nature under consideration in that case there was an implied contract of indemnity, and if the purchaser expressly covenanted with the vendor to pay the encumbrances, such a covenant as that without more having regard to the nature of the transaction, would in no way change the character of the contract which the law implied between the parties. It does not, in my opinion, countenance a general proposition that wherever there is a contract to pay compensation to the vendor for any loss caused to him by nonpayment, that must be treated as a mere contract of indemnity; that is to say, that we must always in such a case disregard the express and unqualified covenant for payment and treat the transaction merely as a contract of indemnity. The gist of the transaction in this case was that the appellant constituted himself the agent of the respondents for the purpose of paying certain debts. In the case in the Privy Council there were debts charged upon the property, and as the property was sold subject to those encumbrances, the law required that the purchaser should discharge those encumbrances if called upon to do so; and if he did not, then he must indemnify the vendor against all loss. But here the debts were ordinary money debts, and there is an unconditional contract that with the greater part of the consideration money the appellant will pay these debts. It seems to me altogether unreasonable to treat such a contract as a mere contract of indemnity, simply because the document provides for compensation for any loss caused to the respondents by the breach of the contract, I therefore hold that the conclusion of the learned Judge on this point is right.

    8. The memorandum of objections relates to the costs which have been disallowed to the respondents by the District Judge. These are the costs which they had to pay to the plaintiffs in certain suits brought to recover the debts which the appellant undertook to pay. I have no doubt that the appellant is liable for this amount. The result will be that the appeal is dismissed with costs. The memorandum of objections must be allowed with costs, and the decree will be modified by increasing the amount by Rs. 355-8-0. The time for payment of the decree amount will be extended by four months from this date.

    Seshagiri Aiyar, J.:— In a given case it may not be easy to determine whether a suit is upon a covenant or upon a contract of indemnity. We may take it that the decision of the Judicial Committee in Izzatunnisa Begam v. Kunwar Pertab Singh establishes that wherever there is a sale of property subject to previous encumbrances, it must be regarded that there is a contract of indemnity by the purchaser as well. Although the Transfer of Property Act does not specifically refer to such an indemnity, from the decision of the Judicial Committee it seems to follow that whenever there is a sale of property and the purchaser has to discharge incumbrances upon the property, there is on the one hand on the part of the vendor a contract to indemnify the purchaser for any loss he may be put to, and on the other hand there is a contract on the part of the purchaser that he would relieve the vendor from any personal liability to pay the mortgage amount subsisting on the property. Subject to this reservation, ordinarily where there are agreements by the purchaser to pay off outstanding debts which are not charges on the property, they must be regarded as mere covenants or agreements and the suit would be generally upon the agreement which has been broken. In such cases, the purchaser must be regarded as the agent of the seller. It is the seller's money that he has, and the purchaser is bound to apply the money as directed by the seller. If he fails to apply, the seller can say:

    “You have not discharged my debts as directed. Return the money left with you.”

    9. In these circumstances there will be a right on the part of the seller to call back the money so that he may himself apply it towards the discharge of the debts. In such cases, the suit will be upon the covenant, and not upon an implied or express contract of indemnity. In the present case, I feel no doubt that the suit is brought upon the covenant. The two clauses in Ex. A to which Mr. Ananthakrishna Aiyar drew our attention refer to losses sustained by voluntary payments on the one hand and by in voluntary payments of the other. The clauses contemplate that in some cases there may be a decree and the property of the vendor may have to be sold; in others there may be voluntary payments to avoid litigation. These are cases of covenants and not of indemnity. Following the decisions of this Court, to two of which my learned brother was a party, viz., Kaliyammal v. Kolandavela Govndar and Raghunatha Chariar v. Sadagopa Chariar, I hold that this is a suit brought upon the covenant and that the decree was rightly given by the Court below. I agree that the decrees should be modified as suggested by my learned brother.

    S.N/R.K

    10. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Komu Kutti v. Kumara Menon
    (Mar 26, 1918)