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  • Article 122 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 16 September 1911 the appellants (decree-holders) instituted a suit against Mahim Chandra Chakrabarti for recovery of a large sum. The defendant died on 27 November 1911 while the suit was pending. At the plaintiffs' application the defendant's three sons were substituted on the record as his ostensible heirs and representatives; they did not object. The suit was tried on the merits and on 8 May 1912 a decree was entered against those substituted defendants directing realization of the judgment-debt out of the deceased's estate in their hands.

On 9 June 1913 the decree-holders applied for execution and notices were issued. The wives of the three sons intervened, asserting that the deceased had made a Will dated 1 May 1911 appointing them executrices, that the Will had been proved in 1913, and that probate had not been actually issued because valuation of the estate was under investigation. The primary Court held that the decree had been obtained against persons who were not the true representatives of the deceased and could not be executed against the estate in the hands of the executrices; it dismissed the execution application.

The decree-holders appealed to the District Judge; that appeal was dismissed as incompetent. The decree-holders then appealed to this Court, contending that the District Judge should have heard the appeal on the merits and allowed execution against the estate in the hands of the executrices.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the primary Court dismissing the execution application was appealable — which turns on whether the decree could be executed against the estate in the hands of the executrices (i.e., whether the executrices are representatives of the parties to the suit within section 47 of the Code).
  2. Whether the executrices, whose probate takes effect retrospectively, should be treated as representatives of the parties to the suit who had been represented on the record by the substituted defendants (the deceased's sons), and consequently whether the decree can be executed against the estate in their hands.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appeal should have been heard on its merits by the District Judge.
  • Execution should be allowed against the estate in the hands of the executrices (i.e., the decree should be executable against the executrices' estate).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The executrices are representatives of the original debtor but are not representatives of the three sons who were brought on the record as successors-in-interest; therefore they are not representatives of the parties to the suit for the purposes of execution or appeal under section 47.
  • This argument rests on a narrow view of the term "representative" — that representatives must derive title from the party they substitute and that the executrices did not so derive title from the substituted defendants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Premmoyi v. Preonath Dhur (28 C. 636) Cited for an analogous question: successive representatives who represent the same interest may be treated as representatives of one another (widow replaced by reversionary heirs). Used to support the proposition that executrices may, without undue stretch, be treated as representatives of parties who had been before the Court in a representative capacity.
Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirhar (24 C. 62 : 1 C.W.N. 36) Explains that "representative" includes not only legal representatives (heir, executor, administrator) but also representatives-in-interest (persons who are bound by the decree as to the represented interest). Relied upon to define "representative" broadly and to bring into focus whether executrices are bound by the decree as representatives-in-interest.
Gidzari Lal v. Madho Ram (26 A. 447 (F.B.) : A.W.N. (1904) 61 : I.A.L.J. 65) Supports the broader meaning of "representative" to include representative-in-interest. Reinforces the Court's view of the term "representative" when assessing whether executrices can be treated as representatives of the parties to the suit.
Ashi Bhushan Dasi v. Pelaram Mandal (21 Ind. Cas. 519 : 18 C.L.J. 362 : 18 C.W.N. 173) Holds that where a decree was obtained against a person subsequently shown not to be the proper representative (e.g., an invalid adoption), the decree-holder could not proceed in execution against the judgment-debtor on the record if that person had not received assets of the wrong-doer; substitution of the real representative in the decree would in effect be making a new decree. Applied to conclude that the existing decree could not be executed against the estate in the hands of the executrices and that the decree-holders' remedies are to re-open the suit and obtain a decree against the executrices or to bring a fresh suit on the judgment against them.
Prosunnre Chunder Bhuttacharjee v. Kristo Chytunno Pal (4 C. 342 : 3 C.L.R. 154) Held that if a decree cannot be executed against the estate in the hands of an executor, it is sufficient to enable the plaintiff to bring a suit against the executor to have the decree satisfied. Cited to support the proposition that a suit lies against executrices to enforce a decree where direct execution against their hands is not available.
General Manager of the Raj Durbhnuga v. Ramaput Singh (14 M.I.A. 605 : 10 B.L.R. 294 : 17 W.R. 459 ...) One of several decisions cited as part of the body of case law dealing with the binding effect of decrees obtained against ostensible representatives and subsequent events showing they were not proper representatives. Included in a list of authorities showing divergence of judicial opinion on whether orders/sales in execution against ostensible representatives bind real representatives; cited as part of that comparative survey rather than for a precise rule applied to the present facts.
Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Lutchmeeput Singh (4 C. 142 : C.L.R. 223 : 1 Shome L.R. 219) Cited among authorities illustrating different judicial approaches to enforcement/ execution where representation on record later proves not to be correct. Used in the survey of conflicting authorities; not singled out for independent application to resolve the present case.
Chuni Lal v. Osmond Beeby (30 C. 1044) Cited in the list of cases illustrating divergent rulings on execution against ostensible representatives. Placed among other authorities to show lack of unanimity in the case law on that subject.
Baswantapa Shidapa v. Ranu (9 B. 86) Cited as part of the jurisprudential background evidencing divergence of opinion. Referenced in the Court's survey of precedents; no direct altering effect on the present holding beyond evidencing conflicting judicial views.
Janaki v. Dhanu Lal (14 M. 454) Included among cases touching upon the question of execution and representation. Noted as part of the broader judicial context; the Court did not derive a specific rule from it for disposition of the appeal.
Chathakelan v. Govinda Karumiar (17 M. 186 : 4 M.L.J. 59) Another authority in the group of cases concerning execution against ostensible representatives. Listed to illustrate divergence of judicial opinion; not specifically applied.
Kadir Mohideen Marakkayar v. Muthukrishna Ayyar (26 M. 230 : 12 M.L.J. 368) Cited among authorities showing differing approaches on the enforcement of decrees against representatives. Part of the Court's recital of authorities illustrating that the courts have not been unanimous on the issues; no discrete application beyond that recital.
Ramasawmi Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetti (4 Ind. Cas. 1059 : 33 M. 6 : 6 M.L.T. 269 : 19 M.L.T. 671) Included in the list of decisions relevant to whether decrees/orders in execution against ostensible representatives bind real representatives. Referenced as part of the survey of conflicting decisions; not singled out for direct doctrinal reliance in the judgment.
Sitanath Das v. Roy Luchmiput Singh (11 C.L.R. 268) Cited among authorities on the same general subject of execution against representatives. Included to show differing judicial approaches; not specifically applied to resolve the present dispute.
Harish Chunder Biswas v. Puri Das Das (6 Ind. Cas. 627 : 12 C.L.J. 561 : 14 C.W.N. 1041) Another case cited in the course of surveying conflicting authorities. Placed in the list of cases indicating divergence of judicial opinion; no particular role beyond that survey.
Lal Behary v. Nagendra Nath (16 Ind. Cas. 690 : 22 C.L.J. 266) Cited as part of the body of case law showing different judicial outcomes on related questions. Noted among the conflicting authorities; not specifically relied upon to determine the appeal.
Rameshwar Singh v. Janeshuari Babooshin (21 Ind. Cas. 397 : 18 C.W.N. 129 : 19 C.L.J. 19) Relates to the subject but was described as distinguishable because of special circumstances under which the earlier decree was obtained. Cited and distinguished; Court observed it does not govern the present case due to differing special circumstances.
Sondes v. Jomir Shaikh (9 M.W.N. 432) Cited in connection with discussion on whether a suit lies on a domestic judgment and divergence of opinion on that subject. Included among authorities examined to show the extent of judicial divergence concerning suits on judgments.
Attermoney Dossee v. Hurry Doss Dutt (7 C. 94 : 9 C.L.R. 357 : 4 Shome L.R. 192) Cited in the survey of cases about actions on judgments and the circumstances under which such suits are maintainable. Used as part of the Court's review indicating divergent authorities; not specifically determinative for the present appeal.
Golam Arab v. Curreembux Shaikjee (5 C. 294 : 4 C.L.R. 477) Part of the catalogue of cases on suits upon judgments and related topics. Referenced as one among many authorities showing differing judicial positions on actions on judgments.
Bhavanishankar v. Pursadri (6 B. 292) Included in the set of authorities concerning suits on judgments/domestic judgments. Not specifically applied; cited in the broader review of authorities.
Merwanji Nowroji v. Achabai (8 B. 1) Cited among cases relevant to the question whether an action lies on a judgment in British India. Mentioned as part of the survey of authorities illustrating differing views; not decisive here.
Ramayya v. Venkataratnam (17 M. 122 : 4 M.L.J. 52) Another case in the survey of authorities on actions upon judgments. Referenced to show conflicting judicial authority on the subject.
Annoda Prasad v. Nobo Kissore Roy (9 C.W.N. 952 : 33 C. 560) Cited in the context of discussing whether suits lie on domestic judgments and the divergence of opinion. Included in the list evidencing divergence; not specifically applied.
Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda (23 M. 292) Part of the authorities reviewed concerning suits on judgments. Listed as one of several cases showing inconsistent judicial approaches; not directly applied.
Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar (27 M. 243 (F.B.) : 14 M.L.J. 84) Cited among Full Bench and other authorities dealing with suits on judgments. Included in the Court's survey of case law to demonstrate divergence; no distinct application beyond that.
Williams v. Jones ((1845) 13 M. & W. 628 : 57 R.R. 767 ...) Quoted (Baron Parke) for the principle that where a Court of competent jurisdiction adjudicates a sum due, a legal obligation arises to pay it and an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained. Adopted as a clear statement of the basic principle underlying actions on judgments, subject to the modern qualification that an action should only be brought where the judgment cannot be enforced in some other way.
Pritchett v. English and Colonial Syndicate ((1899) 2 Q.B. 428) and related English authorities (Grant v. Easton; Nouvion v. Freeman; Pemberton v. Hughes; Hodsoll v. Baxter) English authorities cited for the more modern qualification: actions on foreign/English judgments lie but it is an abuse to bring such actions if the judgment can be enforced by other means; reflect the development of English law on actions on judgments. Used to support the qualification that while an action on judgment is permissible in principle, it should only be used when the judgment cannot be enforced by other available processes; the Court accepted this qualification for its purposes.
Hari Nath v. Mothuramohan (20 I.A. 183 : 21 C. 8) and Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain (10 Ind. Cas. 477 : 15 C.W.N. 545 (P.C.) ...) Cited for the proposition that the Limitation Act does not create substantive causes of action but only bars remedies after a period; limitation cannot give rise to a cause of action where none exists. Referred to in the Court's discussion of Article 122 of the Limitation Act and to caution that limitation provisions do not themselves create the right to sue on a judgment where no substantive right exists.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its reasoning around whether the executrices can be deemed representatives of the parties to the suit and therefore whether the primary Court's order was appealable under section 47. The Court proceeded in these analytical steps:

  1. Framed the practical issue: the appealability of the primary Court's order depends on whether the decree is executable against the estate in the hands of the executrices; if the executrices are representatives of the parties to the suit, the order falls within section 47 and is appealable as a decree.
  2. Addressed and rejected a narrow argument advanced by the respondents that the executrices are representatives only of the original debtor and not of the substituted defendants (the sons). The Court observed this was a limited view of "representative."
  3. Explained that the sons had been brought on the record as representatives-in-interest because at that time the Will was unknown and unproved; consequently they were the only persons who could be substituted on the record.
  4. Noted the retrospective legal fiction of probate (probate takes effect retrospectively from the date of death), and reasoned that the estate which was ostensibly represented by the sons at the time of substitution is now represented by the executrices.
  5. Referred to precedents (including Premmoyi and Ishan Chunder Sirkar) to show that successive representatives of the same interest may be treated as representing the same interest and to support the broader definition of "representative" which includes representatives-in-interest.
  6. Returned to the core question: are the executrices bound by the decree? The Court concluded that the decree, as it stands against the substituted defendants (the sons), cannot be executed against the estate in the hands of the executrices.
  7. Relied particularly on Ashi Bhushan Dasi to explain that substitution of the real representative in an existing decree would amount to making a new decree in favour of the decree-holder, and that the decree-holder cannot simply proceed in execution against a person who was not the proper representative and who had not received the assets of the wrong-doer.
  8. Reiterated that the decree-holders' remedies are either to have the original decree vacated and the suit restored so that the executrices may be brought on the record and a fresh decree obtained against them, or to institute a suit on the judgment (i.e., bring a fresh suit on the basis of the judgment) to obtain a decree against the executrices.
  9. Surveyed a large body of case law showing divergence of opinion on related questions (execution against ostensible representatives and maintenance of suits on judgments), and noted authorities (including English cases) recognizing that while an action lies on a judgment, modern doctrine dissuades actions where the judgment can be enforced by other means.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED.

The Court held that the decree-holders are not entitled to execute their decree against the estate in the hands of the executrices. The appeal was dismissed and the Court ordered that there shall be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the decree-holders cannot enforce the decree against the estate held by the executrices by execution on the existing decree.
  • The decree-holders' available remedies (as identified by the Court) are limited to: (a) having the original decree vacated, restoring the suit, bringing the executrices on the record and obtaining a fresh decree against them; or (b) instituting a fresh suit on the judgment against the executrices to obtain satisfaction of the decree.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down a novel general proposition beyond these conclusions; the opinion places its decision within existing authorities and a noted divergence of judicial opinion, and does not assert creation of a new precedent beyond the case's specific resolution.

    Kali Charan Nath And Anr. v. Sukhada Sundari Debi And Ors.

    1. This is an appeal by the decree-holders against an order in execution proceedings, and illustrates, what has been often stated before, that the difficulties of a litigant begin when he has obtained his decree. On the 16th September 1911 the appellants instituted a suit against one Mahim Chandra Chakrabarti for recovery of a large sum of money. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant died on the 27th November 1911. On the application of the plaintiffs, the three sons of the deceased, who were ostensibly his heirs and representatives, were brought on the record in his place. They did not object to the adoption of this course. The case was tried on the merits, and on the 8th May 1912 a decree was made against the persons supposed to be the heirs and representatives of the original debtor. The decree directed as usual that the judgment-debt be realised out of the estate of the deceased in the hands of the substituted defendants. On the 9th June 1913, the decree-holders applied for execution of their decree, and notices were duly issued. Thereupon the wives of the three sons of the deceased intervened and stated that execution could not proceed as Mohim, Chandra, their father-in-law, had made a testamentary disposition of his properties on the 1st May 1911, whereby they had been appointed executrices. They alleged that the Will had been duly proved in 1913, but that the Probate had not been actually issued as the question of valuation of estate was still under investigation by the Collector. The Court held that the decree had been obtained against persons who were not the true representatives of the deceased debtor and could not be executed against the estate in the hands of the executrices. The application for execution was consequently dismissed. The decree holders appealed to the District Judge, but the appeal has been dismissed as incompetent. The decree-holders have now appealed to this Court and have contended that the appeal should have been heard on the merits by the District Judge and execution allowed against the estate in the hands of the executrices. It is plain that the answer to the question whether the order of the primary Court was appealable or not, depends upon the question, whether the decree is capable of execution against the estate in the hands of the executrices; if the latter are representatives of the parties to the suit, the order falls within the scope of section 47 of the code and is appealable as a decree; if they cannot be deemed such representatives, the order is not covered by that section and cannot be challenged by way of appeal.

    2. We may at the outset deal with a narrow ground assigned by the respondents in support of the view that the executrices are not representatives of the parties to the suit; they have argued that they are the representatives of the original debtor but are in no sense representatives of the sons of the debtor, who were brought on the record of the suit as his successors-in-interest. This contention is based on a limited view of the meaning of the term representative. The sons of the deceased defendant were brought on the record as his representatives-in-interest; they were unquestionably his representatives to all appearances; the Will had not been proved at that time, nor were the plaintiffs ever; aware of its existence. Consequently, they were the only persons who could be brought on the record as successors-in-interest of the deceased. Since then the Will has been proved, and the Probate, by a legal fiction, takes effect retrospectively from the date of the death of the testator. Consequently the estate which was then ostensibly represented by the sons and heirs of the deceased, is now represented by the executrices. Without undue stretch of language, the view may, in these circumstances, be maintained that the executrices are representatives of the parties to the suit who were themselves before the Court in a representative character. Reference may in this connection be made to the decision in Premmoyi v. Preonath Dhur 28 C. 636, where an analogous question arose for consideration. There a Hindu widow had instituted a suit as representative of the estate of her husband; on her death during the pendency of the suit, the reversionary heirs were brought on the record. It was contended that they were not her representatives as they derived title not from her, but from her husband. This contention was negatived, and it was ruled that as the widow and the reversioners successively represented the same interest, the reversioners might be treated as representatives of the widow. We are, therefore, not prepared to hold that the order of the primary Court is beyond the scope of Section 47, merely because the executrices cannot, in popular language, be called representatives of the deceased debtor. Whether they can be deemed representatives of parties to the suit or not, depends, in our opinion, upon the answer to a more fundamental question.

    3. It was explained by a Full Bench of the Court in Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirhar 24 C. 62 : 1 C.W.N. 36 that the term representative includes not merely a legal representative such as heir, executor or administrator, but also a representative-in-interest, that is, a representative of the decree-holder or judgment-debtor who, so far as such interest is concerned, is bound by the decree: Gidzari Lal v. Madho Ram 26 A. 447 (F.B.) : A.W.N. (1904) 61 : I.A.L.J. 65. We are thus brought back to what must, be deemed the root of the matter in this case, namely are the executrices bound by the decree. We are of opinion that the decree as it stands cannot be executed against the estate in their hands and that the remedy of the decree-holders is, either, to have the decree vacated, the suit restored, the executrices brought on the record and a new decree made against them, or, to institutes suit on the judgment and to obtain a decree thereon against the executrices. This is clear, from the decision in Ashi Bhushan Dasi v. Pelaram Mandal 21 Ind. Cas. 519 : 18 C.L.J. 362 : 18 C.W.N. 173. There a decree had been obtained for mesne profits against an alleged adopted minor son as the representative of the wrong-doer. The adoption was subsequently declared invalid, whereupon the decree-holder sought to proceed in execution against the real representative. It was ruled that the decree-holder could not proceed against the judgment-debtor on the record as he had not received any assets of the wrong-doer; nor could he ask the Court to substitute the name of the real representative in the decree, because the result would be really a new decree in his favour against such representative. At the same time, it is clear that a suit can be brought against the executrices on the basis of the judgment already obtained.

    4. Reference may be made to the decision of Markby, J., in Prosunnre Chunder Bhuttacharjee v. Kristo Chytunno Pal 4 C. 342 : 3 C.L.R. 154, where, under circumstances somewhat similar to those of the present case, it was held that if the decree could not be executed against the estate in the hands of the executor, it was at any rate sufficient to enable the plaintiff to bring a suit against the executor to have the decree satisfied. We are not now concerned with the question of the binding character of orders made or sales held in execution of a decree obtained against persons who, as subsequent events show, are either not the proper representatives of the deceased defendant or constitute only some of his representatives. There has been some divergence of judicial opinion upon this matter, as is clear from an examination of the decisions in General Manager of the Raj Durbhnuga. v. Ramaput Singh 14 M.I.A. 605 : 10 B.L.R. 294 : 17 W.R. 459 : 2 Suth. P.C. 7 575 : 3. Sar. P.C.J. 117 : 20 E.R. 912; Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Lutchmeeput Singh 4 C. 142 : C.L.R. 223 : 1 Shome L.R. 219; Chuni Lal v. Osmond Beeby 30 C. 1044; Baswantapa Shidapa v. Ranu 9 B. 86; Janaki v. Dhanu Lal 14 M. 454; Chathakelan v. Govinda Karumiar 17 M. 186 : 4 M.L.J. 59; Kadir Mohideen Marakkayar v. Muthukrishna Ayyar 26 M. 230 : 12 M.L.J. 368 and Ramasawmi Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetti 4 Ind. Cas. 1059 : 33 M. 6 : 6 M.L.T. 269 : 19 M.L.T. 671 on the one hand, and Sitanath Das v. Roy Luchmiput Singh 11 C.L.R. 268; Harish Chunder Biswas v. Puri Das Das 6 Ind. Cas. 627 : 12 C.L.J. 561 : 14 C.W.N. 1041 and Lal Behary v. Nagendra Nath 16 Ind. Cas. 690 : 22 C.L.J. 266 on other hand. These decisions do not directly touch the question in controversy now before us, viz., whether the decree obtained against the ostensible representatives should be allowed to be executed against the estate in the hands of the executrices though objection is taken before execution has been issued, or whether the decree-holders should be limited to their remedy by way of a decree against the executrices, either by re-opening the suit or by instituting a fresh suit on the judgment previously obtained. The decision in Rameshwar Singh v. Janeshuari Babooshin 21 Ind. Cas. 397 : 18 C.W.N. 129 : 19 C.L.J. 19, which bears on the subject, is clearly distinguishable, in view of the special circumstances under which the decree in the first suit was obtained. There cannot, we think, be a reasonable doubt that a suit would lie on the judgment; this, indeed, is to some extent borne out by Article 122 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, which shows that the Legislature contemplated the possibility of suits upon judgments obtained in British India, though we are not unmindful that the Limitation Act cannot give rise to a cause of action where none exists independently of the provisions thereof; as Sir Richard Couch observed in Hari Nath v. Mothuramohan 20 I.A. 183 : 21 C. 8, the intention of the law of limitation is not to give a right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right: Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain 10 Ind. Cas. 477 : 15 C.W.N. 545 (P.C.) : 38 I.A. 87 : 8 A.L.J. 552 : 13 BOm. L.R. 427 : 13 C.L.J. 575 : 10 M.L.T. 25 : 21 M.L.J. 645 : 33 A. 356 : (1911) 1 M.W.N. 432. It is not necessary, for our present purpose, to enter upon a discussion of the circumstances under which a suit lies upon a judgment in British India. A n examination of the cases, specially those of Sondes v. Jomir Shaikh 9 M.W.N. 432; Attermoney Dossee v. Hurry Doss Dutt 7 C. 94 : 9 C.L.R. 357 : 4 Shome L.R. 192; Golam Arab V. Curreembux Shaikjee 5 C. 294 : 4 C.L.R. 477; Bhavanishankar v. Pursadri 6 B. 292; Merwanji Nowroji v. Achabai 8 B. 1; Ramayya v. Venkataratnam 17 M. 122 : 4 M.L.J. 52; Annoda Prasad v. Nobo Kissore Roy 9 C.W.N. 952 : 33 C. 560; Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda 23 M. 292; Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar 27 M. 243 (F.B.) : 14 M.L.J.Q. 84, shows that there is considerable divergence of judicial opinion upon the subject, and that the Courts are by no means agreed as to the circumstances Under which a suit may be instituted in this country on what may be called a domestic as distinguished from a foreign judgment. It is well known that in England there has been divergence of judicial opinion on the subject [Freeman on Judgments, Chapter XVII; Black or Judgments, Chapter XXIV], and it is only in recent years that the principle has been adopted that although an action lies on judgment which finally establishes a debt, whether the judgment be English or foreign, it is an abuse of the process of the Court to bring an action upon an English judgment if it can be enforced in some other way: Pritchett v. English and Colonial Syndicate (1899) 2 Q.B. 428 : 86 I.J.Q.B. 801 : 47 W.R. 577 : 81 L.T. 206; Grant v. Easton (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 302 : 53 L.J.Q.B. 68 : 49 L.T. 645 : 32 W.R. 239; Nouvion v. Freeman (1889) 15 App. Cas. 1 : 59 L.J. Ch. 337 : 62 L.T. 189 : 38 W.R. 581; Pemberton v. Hughes (1899) 1 Ch. 781 : 68 L.J. Ch. 281 : 47 W.R. 354 : 80 L.T. 369 : 15 T.L.R. 211; Hodsoll v. Baxter (1858) E1. B1. & E1. 884 : 28 L.J.B. 61 : 4 Jur. (N.S.) 556 : 6 W.R. 686 : 120 E.R. 739 : 113 R.R. 929. The principle on which an action is allowed to be maintained on a judgment was concisely explained by Baron Parke in Williams v. Jones (1845) 13 M. & W. 628 : 57 R.R. 767 : 2 D. & L. 680 : 14 L.J. Ex. 145. The principle is, that, where a Court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained." No mischief can result from the acceptance of this principle, if it is adopted subject to the qualification recognised in modern English law, viz., that an action is permissible only where the judgment cannot be enforced, in some other way; and beyond this, it is not necessary for our purpose to proceed.

    5. We hold accordingly that the decree-holders are not entitled to execute their decree against the estate in the hands of the executrices. The appeal is consequently dismissed, but there will be no order for costs.

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    Kali Charan Nath And Anr. v. Sukhada Sundari Debi And Ors.
    (Aug 2, 1915)