Coutts, J.:— This is an appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur, continuing the appointment of a receiver.
2. It appears that during the pendency of a certain suit a receiver was appointed to the estate of Mt. Mulkrani Kuer. There were four defendants in the suit. The suit was compromised by the plaintiff and defendant 1, the plaintiff admitting the claim of defendant 1. Defendants 3 and 4 objected to the compromise but the Court by a judgment, dated 20th January, 1919, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On 23rd March, 1919 the receiver, who had been appointed in this suit filed his accounts and apparently would have been discharged, but defendants 3 and 4 objected to his discharge and wished the property in respect of which the receiver had been appointed in the suit to continue in his possession for better preservation. This has been allowed and it is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. Although the order is an order continuing the appointment of the receiver, the order of continuance has merely been passed for the sake of convenience and actually what has been done is that a fresh receiver has been appointed.
3. The point which is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that there being no litigation pending regarding the property in respect of which the receiver has been appointed, the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to make this appointment. In my opinion this contention must succeed. Under the old Code of Civil Procedure when a suit had been decreed the Court had no power to appoint a receiver, but under the present Code the power of appointment of a receiver has been extended and the Court has power under O. 40, R. 1(a), to appoint a receiver of “any property whether before or after the decree.” This, however, obviously refers only to the appointment of a receiver in respect of the property in regard to which litigation is pending; that is to say, as long as a suit before the Court remains lis pendens, the functions of the receiver will continue until he is discharged by the order of the Court. Although the dismissal of a suit may in some cases mean the discharge of the receiver, still the Court has jurisdiction over the receiver who is an officer of the Court.
4. The Court has jurisdiction to require accounts from the receiver, to allow parties to examine accounts and to deal with all matters connected with the management of the receiver. If in this case the receiver had merely been continued until his accounts had been examined and disposed of there would have been no objection to the order but this is in fact not what has occurred. As I have already said, a new receiver has been appointed and has been appointed as a receiver of property in regard to which no litigation is pending before the Court, either in the form of a suit or in the form of an execution proceeding. The order is, in my opinion, entirely without jurisdiction. I would therefore set it aside and decree this appeal with costs.
5. Sultan Ahmed, J.:— I agree.
V.S/R.K
6. Appeal decreed.