1. This is an application made on behalf of Hogarth Shipping Co., Ltd., for an order for payment of Rs. 1,680 by way of interest upon the sum awarded.
2. The award was made on 14th March 1925 and on the 19th March was filed in Court.
3. An application for execution of the award was made, and eventually, on the 21st May, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., applied for stay of execution pending hearing of the appeal. On that application an order was made which was by consent except as regards the question of interest. As regards interest it was apparently contended that no interest should be allowed on the amount of award. My learned brother, Mr. Justice C.C Ghose ordered, eliminating such passages as do not refer to this question, that Mitsui Bussan Kaisha should pay to Messrs Pugh & Co., the attorneys for the present applicant, the sum of Rs. 2,000 to cover the claim for interest made by Hogarth Shipping Company. It was further ordered that Messrs Pugh & Co. should not, without an order of this Court, pay the sum of Rs. 2,000 to the Hogarth Shipping Company, and finally it was ordered that the consideration of the question of the liability of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha for interest on the amount of the award be reserved for further consideration by this Court when the appeal is heard. Nothing need be said about subsequent proceedings beyond observing that the appeal has been heard and dismissed.
4. It appears that the Hogarth Shipping Company were claiming interest as one of the terms on which stay of execution should be allowed, and did not claim interest on the award, which indeed they could not have done as the award did not provide for it. The only question is whether or not they are entitled to interest as and from the date of the stay. The difficulty arises from the terms of the order; for the passage which I have last quoted cannot be reconciled with payment of interest being imposed as one of the terms upon which stay of execution would be allowed; for, had that been so, it must have been so provided in the order. It is inconceivable that the question of interest, merely as a ground for stay, should be postponed by the learned Judge who was dealing with the question of the terms upon which the stay should be allowed. I confess I have considerable sympathy with the applicants, and but for the last passage in the order, I should have been prepared to accede to the application, but I am unable to see how I can do so consistently with the language employed.
5. Then the claim is further based upon the Interest Act. That is a different proposition because such a claim, if sound, would entitle the applicant to interest on the award as and from the date of the award, but it does not appear that any such claim ever was made. Nevertheless as the point has been taken now as an alternative I must deal with it. It appears to me that as regards the award this Court is now in the position of an executing Court and is not a Court in which such sums or debts may be recovered, to employ the language of the section. Those words in my opinion refer to the Court which adjudicates as to actual debt or claim. There is no question but that the claim in other respects conforms to the terms of the section; but for these reasons I do not think that it is open to this Court to grant interest at this stage to the applicant under the Interest Act.
6. The application is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
7. Application dismissed.
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