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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal (Maintenance Suit)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, the widow of Ramayya, sued for maintenance claiming Rs. 40 per year for life and past maintenance, to be charged on the properties described in the plaint. Ramayya executed a will on 19 January 1911 (Ex. A). At the time the will was executed Ramayya's brother Brahmayya was alive. Ramayya died without issue in 1912. Brahmayya died some years later; his son is defendant 3 (referred to as Venkatanarasayya/Yenkatanarasayya in the record).

Under the will, Ramayya gave his wife certain personal property and provided that Rs. 33 per year for maintenance and Rs. 4 for clothing (total Rs. 40) should be paid to her out of the ancestral property by Venkatanarasayya for her lifetime; clause 7 of the will permitted her to live with the testator's elder brother's son (Venkatanarasayya). Defendant 3 attested the will and, according to the courts below, the will was found genuine.

Defendant 3 admitted paying the widow Rs. 40 per year for six years in accordance with the will, and later stopped payment alleging illness and poor yield from the lands. Defendant 3 executed two mortgage-deeds (Ex. II dated 8 June 1913 and Ex. II-a dated 18 August 1915) in favour of defendants 1 and 2; the deeds contain recitals that defendant 3 derived the lands under the 1911 will. Defendants 1 and 2 obtained a decree against defendant 3 and, in execution, attached the mortgaged properties. The plaintiff's claim petition in the execution proceeding was dismissed, and she brought the present suit. Both lower courts held the will invalid on the ground that the testator was a member of an undivided family (i.e., not divided from his brother) when he executed it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ramayya was divided from his brother at the date of the will (i.e., whether he had a separate, severed status as against the joint family).
  2. If Ramayya was not divided, whether the will nonetheless was valid and binding on defendant 3 (and, consequentially, whether the widow's right to maintenance under the will is enforceable and constitutes a charge on the property).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Position

  • The plaintiff asserted a right to Rs. 40 per year (past and future) for life, charged on the properties mentioned in the plaint; she relied on the maintenance provision described in the will (and pursued enforcement after her claim in execution was dismissed).

Defendants' Positions and Evidence

  • Defendant 3 (the legatee under the will) gave evidence that his father (Brahmayya) was an old decrepit man unable to sign. He admitted to paying the plaintiff Rs. 40 per year for six years under the terms of the will and later stopping payments because of illness and poor yields from the lands.
  • Defendant 3 attested the will and included recitals in his mortgage-deeds (Ex. II and Ex. II-a) stating that he had retained possession of the property "as devolved on me under the will dated 18th January, 1911." Thus, he treated and described his title as deriving from the will when executing mortgages.
  • Defendant 1 (a mortgagee) stated that defendant 3 told him the paternal uncle had bequeathed the property and that the will was referred to in the bonds; although the mortgagees said they did not personally see or take a copy of the will, the record indicates they were aware of the will and of defendant 3's claim of title under it.
  • It was argued (by parties or counsel, as recorded) that the execution of a will by a member of a joint family may evidence an intention to become separated (i.e., to get divided) and that co-parceners' knowledge or attestation of the will may amount to notice of that intention; relatedly, a family settlement argument (authority: Lakhsmi Ghand v. Anandi) was invoked to suggest the matter could be treated as a consensual arrangement among family members.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lakhsmi Ghand v. Anandi Authority relating to family settlement as a basis for treating dispositions as valid between family members (invoked on the question whether an agreement/settlement existed between the testator and co-parceners). The court considered this authority but concluded that, on the materials before it, the case could not be brought squarely within that precedent. The court preferred to rest its decision on a different ground (estoppel and conduct of defendant 3) and would, if necessary, have sent the matter back for fresh findings on whether defendant 3 was managing the family.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded from the following primarily factual and evidentiary findings: the will was genuine; under the will defendant 3 (Venkatanarasayya) received the testator's share in the ancestral property and was charged with paying the widow Rs. 40 per year for life; defendant 3 had attested the will; defendant 3 paid the maintenance for six years in the exact amount set out in the will and later executed mortgages of the property reciting that his title derived from the will; the mortgagees (defendants 1 and 2) had notice of the will and took their securities on the footing that the mortgagor's title was under the will.

From these facts the court applied an equitable-bar/estoppel analysis: where a person, although entitled to challenge a will, elects to take under it, enjoys the property, pays the maintenance specified by the will and deals openly with the property (including mortgaging it), and thereby leads the widow to suppose she is obtaining her rights under the will, that person cannot later repudiate the will and contend that the widow's rights exist only under the Hindu law of succession. The court emphasized that defendant 3's conduct (acceptance of the will benefits, payments of maintenance, and recitals in mortgages) precluded him from taking an inconsistent position later to the widow's detriment.

The court extended this reasoning to the mortgagees: because defendants 1 and 2 took their mortgages with notice that defendant 3 claimed title under the will, they could not later assert against the widow rights that their mortgagor (defendant 3) could have asserted only by disputing the will at Ramayya's death. The court distinguished this situation from that of a bona fide creditor or purchaser without notice who might seek to enforce rights in execution; here the attaching creditors were mortgagees who had notice and who themselves had taken the property subject to the mortgage.

The court noted but did not resolve alternative lines of argument. It observed that one could attempt to treat the matter as a family settlement and invoked Lakhsmi Ghand v. Anandi, but concluded the materials did not establish such an agreement and preferred the estoppel-based ground. The court also acknowledged an argument that execution of a will by a co-parcener may evidence an intention to become divided (and that co-parceners' knowledge may amount to notice), and it recognized settled principles that a member of a coparcenary can by certain acts indicate a desire to be separated; however, the court deemed it unnecessary to decide those questions for present purposes in light of its other findings.

Finally, on the specific point of remedy, the court held that the will's direction that maintenance be paid "out of the ancestral property" created a charge in favour of the widow on the relevant share of the property.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court reversed the decree of the lower courts and entered a decree in favour of the plaintiff (the widow) as prayed.

Specific Orders and Immediate Consequences:

  • The maintenance (past and future) awarded to the plaintiff in the amount and on the terms specified in the will is declared to be a charge on the half of the property mentioned in the plaint.
  • The property is liable to be attached by defendants 1 and 2 only subject to this charge in favour of the plaintiff.
  • Defendants 1 and 2 are ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs throughout.
  • The decree of the courts below is reversed.

Broader implications: The court based its decision on the conduct of defendant 3 and the notice enjoyed by the mortgagees, rather than resolving contested legal questions about whether a will executed by a coparcener itself operates as an automatic severance of coparcenary status or whether there was a family settlement. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel general rule beyond these findings; its operative effect is to bind the parties before it and to enforce the maintenance charge as declared above.

    (Boddanapalli Andi) Lakshmamma v. (Venduri) Sreeramalu

    1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for maintenance filed by the plaintiff who is the widow of one Ramayya, She claims Rs. 40 a year for her lifetime with past maintenance to be charged on the properties mentioned in the plaint. Her husband Ramayya had a brother Brahmayya. Ramaya died issue less in 1912. Brahmayya died, three years after, leaving a sen who is defendant 3.

    2. On 19th January, 1911 Ramayya executed a will, Ex. A. At that time his brother Brahmayya was alive. The evidence of defendant 3 is that his father was an old decrepit man unable to sign. There is no question about the genuineness of the will or of Brahmayya's being of sound disposing mind.

    3. Both the Courts find that the will is genuine. Under that will he gives his wife the jewels and what he calls his self-acquired property and he gives his share in the ancestral property, which he held in common as a member of the joint family consisting of himself, his brother and defendant 3 to defendant 3. He has also made some provision for his wife's maintenance. The material portion of the will as regards maintenance runs as follows:

    My entire share in the ancestral dry and wet lands has been given away to Yenkatanarasayya. You should therefore be receiving out of the ancestral property Rs. 33 per year towards-maintenance and Rs. 4 for clothing; in all R. 40 is words (forty rupees,) through your life, from the said Venkatanarasayya and you should receive the same by the 30th Magha Bahula of each year. After my lifetime in case Venkatarfrasayya is not favourably disposed towards you, you should receive the sum of forty rupees from him as per the above condition and maintain yourself.

    4. The previous Cl. 7 says that if she likes she should live with his elder brother's son Venkatanarasayya and his wife. This will is attested by defendant 3, Venkatanarasayya who under the will is the legatee of the half-share in the ancestral lands which the testator possessed. There can be little doubt from the evidence and the exhibits on record that after the death of the testator defendant 3, who under the will gets his half-share, was to pay the plaintiff's maintenance at Rs. 40 a year as provided for in the will. He admits in his evidence that he paid her maintenance for six years according to the will and that he did not pay her afterwards because he fell ill and the lands did not yield. Defendant 3 executed two mortgage-deeds, Exs. II and II-a, in favour of defendants 1 and 2. Ex. II is dated 8th June, 1913 and Ex. II a is dated 18th August, 1915. The testator, as I have said before, died in 1912 and Brahmayya died between the date of Ex. II and that of Ex. II-a; the exact date of his death is not known. So that we find a year after the testator's death there is a clear recital in Ex. II that the mortgage of defendant 3, took under the will all the lands. He mentions the lands and then says as follows:

    Which has been in my possession and enjoyment, the same having been acquired by my father and grandfather and which has been in my possession and enjoyment, the same having devolved on me under the will dated 18th January, 1911 executed by my junior paternal uncle Boddanapalli Ramayya Garu and registered as No. 3 of 1911 and retained the property in my possession.

    5. A similar statement is made in Ex. II-a. Defendant 1 was examined. He states that defendant 3 told him that his paternal uncle bequeathed the property to him and that the will is mentioned in the bonds. Though he says that he did not see the will or take a copy of the will defendants 1 and 2 were both mortgagees so that there can be little doubt that the mortgagees were aware of the will and were also aware that defendant 3 derived title under the will. Defendants 1 and 2, who are brothers, got a decree against defendant 3, and in execution attached the properties mortgaged to them under Exs. II and II-a. The plaintiff filed a claim petition asserting her right to maintenance charged on the properties. Her claim was dismissed. Hence this suit.

    6. Two questions arise: whether Ramayya was divided from his brother; and if not whether the will is valid and binding on defendant 3. It was held by both the Courts that Ramayya was not divided at the date of the will from his brother and that the will was invalid because the testator was a member of the joint family. The facts which we have set out above, the evidence of defendants 1 and 3 and the recitals in Exs. II and II-a make it clear that defendant 3, although he could have pleaded that the will was invalid and given the go by to the will, chose to take under the will the property and that he was paying the plaintiff Rs. 40 a year for her maintenance regularly for six years. This maintenance is the exact amount mentioned in the will; and there can be little doubt that he was acting under the terms of this will when he was paying the maintenance. He also mortgaged the property stating that he got the property under the will. Under these circumstances the question arises whether it is open to the defendant to state that he got the property by survivorship and that the will is invalid. It seems to us that where a person takes property under a will which is open to hire to repudiate but does not do so and where he enjoys the property, pays maintenance which is payable under the will to the widow of the testator and deals with the property by mortgaging it leading the widow to suppose that she was getting her rights under the will, he cannot at any subsequent stage plead that the widow has no right except under the Hindu law. It is clear that if he had taken a different attitude on Ramayya's death the widow would have sued for maintenance. Having led to believe that the will was valid and he would not dispute it and having mortgaged the property so as to make her rights under the Hindu law difficult if not impossible of realization, he can got defeat her rights saying that he mortgaged the property under the right of a member of an undivided family and not under the title given by the will. The mortgagees who had notice of the will and who took the mortgage on the footing that the title of the mortgagor was under the terms of the will cannot, in our opinion, be heard to say that they would set up their rights against the widow which their mortgagor could have set up on the death of Ramayya if he chose to dispute the will. That stage has long passed. The attaching creditors are mortgagees themselves and they attached the property subject to the mortgage. It is not the case of a bona fide creditor who purchased without knowing any of these facts and seeks in execution to recover his money. There is no suggestion here that the will was intended to defeat anybody's rights. Defendant 3 chose to take under the will as he gets three-fourths of the property on the testator's death, namely the testator's half-share and his own one-fourth share's son of his father instead of half which he will get as the son of his father if the testator's share survived. Under these circumstances it seems to us that the terms of the will are binding on defendant S. and are binding, also upon the mortgagees, defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff, and they cannot be heard to say that the property can be sold in execution of the decree on the footing that defendant; 3 was a member of an undivided family and that the will was inoperative. It has been argued that, on the facts found by us, we can also hold that there was a family settlement. It is no doubt true that the father of defendant 3 though he was alive for about a year after the testator's death, did not object to the terms of the will. According to the evidence he was old and decrepit. But the was competent to contract contemporaneous consent was necessary. We do not think that on the materials before us it can be said that there was an agreement; between defendant 3 and the deceased Ramayya so as to bring the case within the authority of Lakhsmi Ghand v. Anandi(1). We prefer to rest the case on a different ground. If it were necessary to go into the question we would send the case back for fresh findings on the question as to whether defendant 3 was managing the family: he states he did in the documents.

    7. There is one other aspect; of the question which arises, but which it is unnecessary to determine; and that is how far, where a person who is a member of an undivided family leaves a will with the consent of the other co-parceners, be can be held to have become divided in status. It is argued that the Court; can presume that he intended to get himself divided when he made the will and that the fact of his making a will which he cannot legally do unless he was divided in status is an unequivocal intention to get himself divided from the other members and that; their knowledge of the will by attestation or otherwise is notice of the intention and that as no formal words are necessary to express that intention the mere fact of execution of the will severs the status. There is force in the contention that as a testator must know that he cannot while he is a member of an undivided family leave a will and that as no testator will do an act which will be useless unless he creates a status of separation the execution of a will dealing with his undivided share is an expression of an intention to become separate. We think there is much in this argument as it is clear that it is now settled law that consent of other co-parceners is not necessary and that it is open to a member of a member of a co-parcenary to become divided in statyis by merely giving notice of his intention and that the notice may be given by any act of his which is consistent with his intention. In the light of the decisions it is clear that if a person who is a member of an undivided family, wants to get himself divided, he can do so by simply making a statement in the will

    I want to get myself divided and want to execute this will.

    8. Then there would not be any controversy at all if the co-parceners were informed of the will. As we have said before it is unnecessary to deal with these questions at present in view of our other findings.

    9. As regards the charge: we think that the will clearly gives a charge as it directs that the maintenance shall be payable out of the share of Ramayya. The direction that the maintenance should be given out of the ancestral property clearly creates a charge in favour of the widow.

    10. We reverse the decree of the Courts below, and there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for declaring that the maintenance (past and future) shall be a charge on the half of the property mentioned in the plaint and that the property is liable to be attached by defendants 1 and 2 subject to this charge.

    11. Defendants 1 and 2 will pay the plaintiff's costs throughout.

    12. Decree reversed.

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    (Boddanapalli Andi) Lakshmamma v. (Venduri) Sreeramalu
    (Mar 28, 1927)